Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 10

[Pharoah]

You underestimate your opposition and the coherence of the physicalist model.

Just slightly aside, what do you make of Strawson paper above?

I am mostly a physicalist and the physicalist interpretation is no less valid as a vision of objective reality.
The Strawson paper... I read a bit and stopped... just because he annoys me... for no good reason. I' ll give it another go

@Soupie Intentional stance? no it's not. Dennett's Intentional Stance | a critique

 

[smcder]

I am mostly a physicalist and the physicalist interpretation is no less valid as a vision of objective reality.
The Strawson paper... I read a bit and stopped... just because he annoys me... for no good reason. I' ll give it another go

@Soupie Intentional stance? no it's not. Dennett's Intentional Stance | a critique

Or you can read Russel instead.

 

[Soupie]

@Soupie Intentional stance? no it's not. Dennett's Intentional Stance | a critique

"The intentional stance is the strategy of interpreting the behavior of an entity (person, animal, artifact, whatever) by treating it as if it were a rational agent who governed its ‘choice’ of ‘action’ by a ‘consideration’ of its ‘beliefs’ and ‘desires.’"

I believe you are treating systems as if they are rational agents motivated by beliefs and desires about the world.

However:

"Lingering doubts about whether the chess-playing computer really has beliefs and desires are misplaced; for the definition of Intentional systems I have given does not say that Intentional systems really have beliefs and desires, but that one can explain and predict their behavior by ascribing beliefs and desires to them."

You may argue that you are not taking the intentional stance because you actually believe that said systems really have mental beliefs and desires.

But I am saying that you haven't established how, why, or when systems/organisms came to have personal, subjective experiences consisting of beliefs and desires, etc.

Merely saying they do is the intentional stance.

 

[Pharoah]

@Soupie no I'm not. You can say that I'm saying the same as intentional stance but you have no proof. You are just attributing my ideas 'as if' they are equivalent to dennett's. Hang on a minute.... You are intentionalising my stance as an intentional stance.

 

[smcder]

 

[Soupie]

Objective physical interaction does not interpret interaction in qualitative ways. When a chemical interacts with the environment, there is no qualitative meaningful correspondence. But that is not the case with a physiological mechanism because its existence depends on it have meaning for the replicating lineage, and that means environmental interactions have qualities that are relevant to any given lineage.

Qualitative relevance is the, therefore, key:

As soon as you have physiologies that derive meanings that delineate environmental interactions in qualitative terms (qualitative terms being an emerged disposition toward the environment) you have the fundamentals underpinning experience 'as qualities'. What emerges in animals above mere qualitative physiology is a mechanism (courtesy of neural networks) that weights and prioritizes realtime qualitatively assimilated events in terms of their qualitative relevance and in terms of their spatial and temporal relation to the individual (because that matters to survival). The individual thereby derives meaning from environmental interaction as an embedded subject, that is, as existing in a spatiotemporal and qualitatively delineated world... and that is what consciousness is. Every action is committed by the meaning that that system, and only that system derives from environmental interaction.

Here you describe physiologies and animals using the intentional stance, but fail to explain how, when, and why physiologies/animals develop ontologically distinct mental perspectives on the world.

It's one thing to describe their behavior as if they do, it's quite another to explain how, why, and when they have them.

 

[Soupie]

"As soon as you have physiologies that derive meanings that delineate environmental interactions in qualitative terms (qualitative terms being an emerged disposition toward the environment) you have the fundamentals underpinning experience 'as qualities'. "

Yes, of course, "As soon as you have physiologies that derive meanings ... you have the fundamentals underpinning experience 'as qualities'."

Can you explain to me just how physiologies derive (mental) meaning from the environment?

This is where you slip in the intentional stance. Saying that they do (intentional stance), does not explain how they do (model for mind-body problem).

 

[Soupie]

I can say that a clump of cells evolves a light sensitive organ (a physiology). And that this physiology delineates [more intentional language] light waves of various lengths (environmental interactions). The light sensitive organ is "meaningful" to the clump of cells because delineates light waves that are qualitatively relevant [objectively adaptive] to the survival of the clump of cells.

This description is filled with intentional stance-like language. We--as consciousness beings--can say and understand that light waves of a certain wavelength are "qualitatively relevant" to the clump of cells. But none of this explains how a clump of cells itself might come to possess a mental, personal, subjective, perspective of the world. (I would add "unified" perspective because this is another huge, so far intractable, problem but let's just talk about the emergence of the mental.)

 

[Soupie]

http://news.berkeley.edu/2017/12/04/robots-see-into-their-future/

Note the loads of Intentional Stance-like language (bolded) in the following:

"UC Berkeley researchers have developed a robotic learning technology that enables robots to imagine the future of their actions so they can figure out how to manipulate objects they have never encountered before. In the future, this technology could help self-driving cars anticipate future events on the road and produce more intelligent robotic assistants in homes, but the initial prototype focuses on learning simple manual skills entirely from autonomous play.

Using this technology, called visual foresight, the robots can predict what their cameras will see if they perform a particular sequence of movements. These robotic imaginations are still relatively simple for now – predictions made only several seconds into the future – but they are enough for the robot to figure out how to move objects around on a table without disturbing obstacles. Crucially, the robot can learn to perform these tasks without any help from humans or prior knowledge about physics, its environment or what the objects are. That’s because the visual imagination is learned entirely from scratch from unattended and unsupervised exploration, where the robot plays with objects on a table. After this play phase, the robot builds a predictive model of the world, and can use this model to manipulate new objects that it has not seen before."

This is not the language of physics, the physical stance. This is all intentional stance language being used to describe the actions of this robot.

Are we really to believe this robot imagines, explores, plays, manipulates, predicts, sees, etc?

 

[smcder]

That can be argued, but can it be proved to be true? The phenomenologists and existentialists have long recognized that "existence precedes essence," that is, that awareness and consciousness of existing/being precede everything that can be thought about and queried/questioned (or as MP expressed it, interrogated). In other words, we have to have the experience of being-in-the-world before we can begin to interrogate its origin and its meaning.



Again, 'lived experience' of being-in-the-world is compounded of environmental awareness as the human entity's basis of and for reflective consciousness as it grounds/underwrites intentional thinking.



Whitehead has thought all this before, and it seems to me that we need to consult Whitehead's writing at this point to fill in the lacunae we still believe to exist between consciousness and 'brain'. Consciousness is the base out of which the mental, the intellectual, the philosophical emerge, and in its evolution consciousness is always already -- i.e., prereflectively -- the confluence/the compresence of mind and world. Pharoah wrote, in response to Steve, "I don't get the "?" does it mean the two statements conflict with one another, or does it mean both statements don't make sense?" I think our task is to find out how those statements do 'make sense'. Making sense of our experience and our thought is the task before us, and it does require that we 'ditch' the categorical presuppositions of reductivist thinking.



No we can't forget our historically hardened presuppositions concerning 'cause and effect', but we need to overcome them, to think beyond them on the basis of what we, and other species we coexist with, experience and do. We need to overcome the reductive intellectualist/rationalist/logistic limitations embedded in the still presuppositionally held concept that 'causes' must reside only in physicalist/mechanical descriptions of the world we exist in and experience now, in our own time, following millennia of scrutable human experiences and the rich plenitude of perspectives taken on the nature of human experience during our multicultural evolution.

Before y'all took up this discussion of emergence (which is excellent, btw), we were beginning to investigate the varying natures and structures of human languages, and we might well return to that subject again since in examining the variety of human languages we directly confront the challenges of thinking about human linguistic expression in both synchronic and diachronic terms, as demonstrating both synchronic and diachronic aspects of our developing understanding of the relation of mind and world.

Before y'all took up this discussion of emergence (which is excellent, btw), we were beginning to investigate the varying natures and structures of human languages, and we might well return to that subject again since in examining the variety of human languages we directly confront the challenges of thinking about human linguistic expression in both synchronic and diachronic terms, as demonstrating both synchronic and diachronic aspects of our developing understanding of the relation of mind and world.

Where do we begin with this topic? My own thoughts are mostly about my experiences learning new languages - I am intrigued by the idea that about 50,000 years ago language appeared in humans (after 150,000-250,000 years of existence as a species) ... what are the various ideas of how this arose - and why did it take so long to appear?

 

[Pharoah]

Here you describe physiologies and animals using the intentional stance, but fail to explain how, when, and why physiologies/animals develop ontologically distinct mental perspectives on the world.

It's one thing to describe their behavior as if they do, it's quite another to explain how, why, and when they have them.

No I do not. I do not apply the intentional stance. I'll tell you why. Because I am not saying that we should take the stance of assuming everything has intentionality. In fact, I haven't used the word intentionality at all!! so stopped saying that I am taking the intentional stance! You could equally say anything that is completely irrelevant and keep on saying it. It won't make it so though

 

[Pharoah]

Before y'all took up this discussion of emergence (which is excellent, btw), we were beginning to investigate the varying natures and structures of human languages, and we might well return to that subject again since in examining the variety of human languages we directly confront the challenges of thinking about human linguistic expression in both synchronic and diachronic terms, as demonstrating both synchronic and diachronic aspects of our developing understanding of the relation of mind and world.

Where do we begin with this topic? My own thoughts are mostly about my experiences learning new languages - I am intrigued by the idea that about 50,000 years ago language appeared in humans (after 150,000-250,000 years of existence as a species) ... what are the various ideas of how this arose - and why did it take so long to appear?

@smcder My latest paper has stuff to say on language and its 'emergence'.
btw. I like your critical points on overdetermination and downward causation. It is very tricky to overcome these arguments. My rantings are my working through the problem because I don't have a clear idea in my head how to nail it.... but that is hardly surprising because other philosophers have the same problem, hence the debates.

 

[Pharoah]

It has occurred to me that you are a skeptical lot. HCT is a theory... it is not fact, proved, or tested. When I try to answer the questions you all pose I am thinking 'how does HCT facilitate the answer?' Why don't you lot ever try to figure out the answer yourselves. Assume HCT (or any other chosen theory of preference) is valid and think, 'How does (HCT) make sense of this problem that I have raised?' Just saying "you are wrong... Prove it... You haven't explained why my granny was called Trevor.. etc." ... it could just go on forever... particularly if you don't want to hear the explanation.

 

[smcder]

It has occurred to me that you are a skeptical lot. HCT is a theory... it is not fact, proved, or tested. When I try to answer the questions you all pose I am thinking 'how does HCT facilitate the answer?' Why don't you lot ever try to figure out the answer yourselves. Assume HCT (or any other chosen theory of preference) is valid and think, 'How does (HCT) make sense of this problem that I have raised?' Just saying "you are wrong... Prove it... You haven't explained why my granny was called Trevor.. etc." ... it could just go on forever... particularly if you don't want to hear the explanation.

Why don't you lot ever try to figure out the answer yourselves. Assume HCT (or any other chosen theory of preference) is valid and think, 'How does (HCT) make sense of this problem that I have raised?'

Because I have a physiology that derive meanings that delineate environmental interactions in qualitative terms. A neural network that weights and prioritizes realtime qualitatively assimilated events in terms of their qualitative relevance and in terms of their spatial and temporal relation to the me, the individual, as it matters to survival. "I" - the individual, thereby derive meaning from environmental interaction as an embedded subject, that is, as existing in a spatiotemporal and qualitatively delineated world... that is what consciousness is. Every action is committed by the meaning that that system, and only that system derives from environmental interaction.

That's why. ;-)

 

[Pharoah]

Why don't you lot ever try to figure out the answer yourselves. Assume HCT (or any other chosen theory of preference) is valid and think, 'How does (HCT) make sense of this problem that I have raised?'

Because I have a physiology that derive meanings that delineate environmental interactions in qualitative terms. A neural network that weights and prioritizes realtime qualitatively assimilated events in terms of their qualitative relevance and in terms of their spatial and temporal relation to the me, the individual, as it matters to survival. "I" - the individual, thereby derive meaning from environmental interaction as an embedded subject, that is, as existing in a spatiotemporal and qualitatively delineated world... that is what consciousness is. Every action is committed by the meaning that that system, and only that system derives from environmental interaction.

That's why. ;-)

oh yea! silly me doh!

 

[Soupie]

It has occurred to me that you are a skeptical lot. HCT is a theory... it is not fact, proved, or tested. When I try to answer the questions you all pose I am thinking 'how does HCT facilitate the answer?' Why don't you lot ever try to figure out the answer yourselves. Assume HCT (or any other chosen theory of preference) is valid and think, 'How does (HCT) make sense of this problem that I have raised?' Just saying "you are wrong... Prove it... You haven't explained why my granny was called Trevor.. etc." ... it could just go on forever... particularly if you don't want to hear the explanation.

We are a skeptical lot and with good reason.

When you first introduced HCT, I recall reading through that first paper with great interest and hope. Only to find that you hadn't addressed (phenomenal) consciousness at all.

When this was brought to your attention, I recall you commenting that you would "shred Chalmers."

You seem to have moved on from that stance and now embrace Strong Emergentism. I say seem to have because as I read your arguments, I find that the how, why, and when of phenomenal consciousness still has not been addressed.

You have a clever, compelling story about organisms/species evolving "subjective" relationships with the environment.

You describe these organisms and their relationships using terms such as "qualitative" and "meaningful" and "subjective" but you haven't established a case for how, why, and when the organisms themselves might come to possess a phenomenal, unified, mental perspective of the world. (Which is why I claim that you are using the intentional stance.)

Any theory, such as yours, which begins with the assumption of an insentient background, will be at pains to resolve the following problems:

The emergence of sentience from insentience (mental from matter)

Overdetermination

Downward causation

The unity of subjective experience

Also, regarding skepticism, when I have argued for non-materialist physicalism, @smcder and @Constance have asked me to address all the same problems that smcder and I have asked you/HCT to address.

Sometimes I ask questions seeking to understand how HCT addresses one of the above problems; sometimes I ask to point out that HCT fails to address the above problems.

 

[Soupie]

@Pharoah

As I've noted in the past, if one presupposes that sentience is there from the start, and that this sentience-as-substrate just is the thing doing the interacting and differentiating—rather than presupposing that sentience emerges from a purely material, insentient background as something ontologically new—then HCT instantly becomes much richer and robust.

The organism/physiology and its phenomenal perspective on the world no longer hold an ontologically distinct relationship; instead the organism/physiology just is a phenomenal perspective on the world.

 

[Pharoah]

We are a skeptical lot and with good reason.

When you first introduced HCT, I recall reading through that first paper with great interest and hope. Only to find that you hadn't addressed (phenomenal) consciousness at all.

When this was brought to your attention, I recall you commenting that you would "shred Chalmers."

You seem to have moved on from that stance and now embrace Strong Emergentism. I say seem to have because as I read your arguments, I find that the how, why, and when of phenomenal consciousness still has not been addressed.

You have a clever, compelling story about organisms/species evolving "subjective" relationships with the environment.

You describe these organisms and their relationships using terms such as "qualitative" and "meaningful" and "subjective" but you haven't established a case for how, why, and when the organisms themselves might come to possess a phenomenal, unified, mental perspective of the world. (Which is why I claim that you are using the intentional stance.)

Any theory, such as yours, which begins with the assumption of an insentient background, will be at pains to resolve the following problems:

The emergence of sentience from insentience (mental from matter)

Overdetermination

Downward causation

The unity of subjective experience

Also, regarding skepticism, when I have argued for non-materialist physicalism, @smcder and @Constance have asked me to address all the same problems that smcder and I have asked you/HCT to address.

Sometimes I ask questions seeking to understand how HCT addresses one of the above problems; sometimes I ask to point out that HCT fails to address the above problems.

I've never said "shred Chalmers". I might have said shred his extended mind...
2/3rds of my work addresses phenomenal consciousness, so to say that it doesn't address phen cs is like a colour blind person saying Lowry paints only in black and white

 

[smcder]

↑
smcder ok just To clarify then - when you say you are done discussing "it" here ... "it" = IIT, correct?

it = IIT - more specifically with me trying to point out why it is meaningless to Soupie...
which brings me onto Chalmers support for it. Of course Chalmers would like an account of this kind. An irreductive panpsychist account is right up his street. I must read his stance on IIT as I would be eager to attempt to shred it.

Jan 13, 2015

 

[Soupie]

A very old paper of chalmers in which he helpfully defines weak and strong emergence and deliciously argues for the strong emergence of consciousness:

http://consc.net/papers/emergence.pdf