Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 10

[Constance]

And the big question is how do our thoughts have physical effects? Emergence seems to say that thoughts arise from the (physical) actions of the brain but then take on a causal power of their own and then work back downward to have physical effects.

And then there is evidence that certain complex tasks can't be learned or executed without conscious effort - evidence and experience, that's how it seems to us -particularly the most important kind of tasks - novel thinking and problem solving - you have to do this intentionally and consciously ... but that can still be argued as an effect, that it is not the consciousness itself that has the effect but rather the activity of the brain that produces both the learning and the consciousness ...

That can be argued, but can it be proved to be true? The phenomenologists and existentialists have long recognized that "existence precedes essence," that is, that awareness and consciousness of existing/being precede everything that can be thought about and queried/questioned (or as MP expressed it, interrogated). In other words, we have to have the experience of being-in-the-world before we can begin to interrogate its origin and its meaning.

Ditch the idea that anything causes anything i.e. ditch ‘cause and effect’.
Instead, think of it like this: any effect is a form of action by an entity which is determined by the nature of its dynamic construction. As such, its actions mean something about its construction and what kind of meaning is placed on the interactive cause that incites the action.
Then, you have to think as follows: there are different classes of construction that determine different classes of meaning from interactive engagement. The meaning they derive from environmental interaction is of a specific class… it is still physical, but not of the physical class that material physicalism accounts for.
Think of there being layers of physicalism (or layers of physical realms) that are detached from one another. What detaches them from each other is the kind of meaning certain physical mechanisms derive from environmental interaction.

Again, 'lived experience' of being-in-the-world is compounded of environmental awareness as the human entity's basis of and for reflective consciousness as it grounds/underwrites intentional thinking.

event not "cause" i.e. event that incites a particular meaningful correpondence from the entity.

Whitehead has thought all this before, and it seems to me that we need to consult Whitehead's writing at this point to fill in the lacunae we still believe to exist between consciousness and 'brain'. Consciousness is the base out of which the mental, the intellectual, the philosophical emerge, and in its evolution consciousness is always already -- i.e., prereflectively -- the confluence/the compresence of mind and world. Pharoah wrote, in response to Steve, "I don't get the "?" does it mean the two statements conflict with one another, or does it mean both statements don't make sense?" I think our task is to find out how those statements do 'make sense'. Making sense of our experience and our thought is the task before us, and it does require that we 'ditch' the categorical presuppositions of reductivist thinking.

[quoting @Pharoah] Ditch the idea that anything causes anything i.e. ditch ‘cause and effect’.

Instead, think of it like this: any effect is a form of action by an entity which is determined by the nature of its dynamic construction. As such, its actions mean something about its construction and what kind of meaning is placed on the interactive cause that incites the action."

event not "cause" i.e. event that incites a particular meaningful correpondence from the entity.

determined by, interactive cause that incites, event that incites ...,

to which Steve responds:

That is causal language, so we can't forget cause and effect.

No we can't forget our historically hardened presuppositions concerning 'cause and effect', but we need to overcome them, to think beyond them on the basis of what we, and other species we coexist with, experience and do. We need to overcome the reductive intellectualist/rationalist/logistic limitations embedded in the still presuppositionally held concept that 'causes' must reside only in physicalist/mechanical descriptions of the world we exist in and experience now, in our own time, following millennia of scrutable human experiences and the rich plenitude of perspectives taken on the nature of human experience during our multicultural evolution.

Before y'all took up this discussion of emergence (which is excellent, btw), we were beginning to investigate the varying natures and structures of human languages, and we might well return to that subject again since in examining the variety of human languages we directly confront the challenges of thinking about human linguistic expression in both synchronic and diachronic terms, as demonstrating both synchronic and diachronic aspects of our developing understanding of the relation of mind and world.

 

[Constance]

If I corresponds to A for S each time, we can talk about causality - if I corresponds to some A for S each time, we can talk about causality - mediating the A through S doesn't get rid of causality - we are talking about a response to something in the environment - to sense something is to be affected by it - its not simple mechanical causation, but ...

Yes, indeed, conscious sensing -- and the varieties of reflection and thinking that emerge from it -- cannot be accounted for in terms of simple mechanical physical causation. Accepting this is/can be the beginning of thinking about consciousness (prereflective as well as a reflective consciousness) as developing more than one 'response' to any experience. Gestalt psychology recognized this.

What you've written above sounds just like behaviorism, but with a caveat you suggest, gesture toward, with an ellipsis. We need to examine the history of behaviorism and the many reactions to and critiques of it that led to the development of interdisciplinary Consciousness Studies in our time.

 

[Pharoah]

What is the specific problem of Kim's arguments for HCT?

Taking the physicalist stance (for the sake of this discussion) I don't see "meaning" and "causation" being in conflict.

I don't think of Kim as presenting a problem. Unfortunately, any emergentist thesis will be expected to take on Kim and to address his objections.
If one is of the view that before life existed mental properties, consciousness, qualia etc didn't exist as a certainty, and that these things came out of a physical world, then you are possibly having to answer to the criticisms directed at an emergentist position. I am not sure anyone quite knows what emergence is. And it comes in different flavours. My preference is chocolate.
Meaning and causation are closely aligned in my understanding. Usually, the assumption is that causation is what is going on in the objective physical world. while meaning is the stuff that is going on in the mental world (with stuff going on inbetween). Therefore the usual position is, how does meaning emerge from causal stuff?
What I said in my last post was that the concept of causation is an interpretation of what is going on in the objective physical world. Alternatively, what I think, is that what is going on in the objective physical world is meaningful and that that meaning appears, by best human approximation, as causal events.
So I am putting the cart and the horse the other way round. I am saying meaning exists first and that causation is an approximation to explain meaningful action—even in objective physical systems.
The assumption is that 2 apples are two of the same kind of thing, two oxygen elements are two of the same kind of thing etc. And so, we assume there are numbers of such things. But what if there were no numbers of things? What if that assumption of ours is just a consequence of how we interpret the world? Namely, a world with objects of certain kinds (somewhat thrown out of kilter by QM). If the idea that there are 'kinds of things' is an illusion, then number is illusory too (a problem for physics). And then we realise that everything has its own unique relation to the world. If there is no 'property of identity' for the unique aspect of all individual things then there is no property of the environment that determines what an individual thing does... rather what it does is unique to itself. And so nothing does the causing. Causation is an illusion.

 

[Pharoah]

@Pharoah

I agree with your intuition that "systems" have evolved unified, phenomenal, qualitative, meaning -full perspectives on (i.e. simulations of) the world because they are adaptive for the system.

The question has been and remains—how does such a sentient, phenomenal, and unified perspective emerge from supposedly insentient quantum fields and/or particles?

And if one argues that this unified, sentient perspective is ontologically distinct from the underlying physical system, how, when, and why does this perspective (sometimes but not all times?) exert downward influence on the underlying insentient, physical system?

I have tried to answer your first query in the past... without success... so I'm not inclined to try again.
Your second query.
If a ball has reason to roll
and by rolling it knocks over some skittles
did it mean to knock over the skittles?
(Well.. not when I'm at the bowling alley...)
That which had the reason to knock over the skittles were the atoms, otherwise, like neutrinos, they might just have past straight through

 

[smcder]

Yes, indeed, conscious sensing -- and the varieties of reflection and thinking that emerge from it -- cannot be accounted for in terms of simple mechanical physical causation. Accepting this is/can be the beginning of thinking about consciousness (prereflective as well as a reflective consciousness) as developing more than one 'response' to any experience. Gestalt psychology recognized this.

What you've written above sounds just like behaviorism, but with a caveat you suggest, gesture toward, with an ellipsis. We need to examine the history of behaviorism and the many reactions to and critiques of it that led to the development of interdisciplinary Consciousness Studies in our time.

And to be clear, this is not my view.

I'm trying to take the physicalist position and Kim's arguments as that is what @Pharoah is working on.

 

[Constance]

@Pharoah, would you link for us [or message us a link to] your most recent writing re HCT and causation/emergence? I'm impressed with, and delighted by, all that you have written in this current discussion.

 

[smcder]

I don't think of Kim as presenting a problem. Unfortunately, any emergentist thesis will be expected to take on Kim and to address his objections.
If one is of the view that before life existed mental properties, consciousness, qualia etc didn't exist as a certainty, and that these things came out of a physical world, then you are possibly having to answer to the criticisms directed at an emergentist position. I am not sure anyone quite knows what emergence is. And it comes in different flavours. My preference is chocolate.
Meaning and causation are closely aligned in my understanding. Usually, the assumption is that causation is what is going on in the objective physical world. while meaning is the stuff that is going on in the mental world (with stuff going on inbetween). Therefore the usual position is, how does meaning emerge from causal stuff?
What I said in my last post was that the concept of causation is an interpretation of what is going on in the objective physical world. Alternatively, what I think, is that what is going on in the objective physical world is meaningful and that that meaning appears, by best human approximation, as causal events.
So I am putting the cart and the horse the other way round. I am saying meaning exists first and that causation is an approximation to explain meaningful action—even in objective physical systems.
The assumption is that 2 apples are two of the same kind of thing, two oxygen elements are two of the same kind of thing etc. And so, we assume there are numbers of such things. But what if there were no numbers of things? What if that assumption of ours is just a consequence of how we interpret the world? Namely, a world with objects of certain kinds (somewhat thrown out of kilter by QM). If the idea that there are 'kinds of things' is an illusion, then number is illusory too (a problem for physics). And then we realise that everything has its own unique relation to the world. If there is no 'property of identity' for the unique aspect of all individual things then there is no property of the environment that determines what an individual thing does... rather what it does is unique to itself. And so nothing does the causing. Causation is an illusion.

"what I think, is that what is going on in the objective physical world is meaningful and that that meaning appears, by best human approximation, as causal events."

This, by best human approximation, is what Kant said. And the last parts I think wouldn't be out of place in certain philosophies of physics. Nominalism actually isn't a problem for physics (but Platonism is!)

 

[Pharoah]

You could start by explaining why a "mental perspective" need evolve if a system's physiology is all that is needed for it to interpret and respond to the environment.

What work does the system's mental perspective do? How is this work different from the work the system's physiology does?

A physiology exists because it means something (its meaning has relevance) for the replicating lineage—courtesy of replication. So its physical interactions (the physical interactions of its chemical constituents) mean more than they do in objective physical terms. Already we have a sense that something new has emerged from objective physical interaction. I argue that a physiology has meaning insofar as it has 'qualitative relevance' for the replicating lineage; it exists if its mechanisms qualify environmental interactions in a way that is relevant to the survival of the replicating lineage. If there is no such replicating lineage, then that meaning is absent from environmental interaction.
So
Over evolutionary time, these physiologies become more and more sophisticated in the way they qualify the qualitatively relevant environmental interactions. Subsequently, any mechanism that can manage these sophisticated qualitative assimilations in a way that advantages the organism is a mechanism that will tend to thrive... the environment has a meaning to such organisms if they can quickly filter those qualitative assimilations that matter. etc.

 

[smcder]

@Constance to forget our Phenomenology is to forget where we start, where we live and, in short, our humanity.

 

[Constance]

And to be clear, this is not my view.

I'm trying to take the physicalist position and Kim's arguments as that is what @Pharoah is working on.

I didn't expect that you would be or become a behaviorist. For you certainly know, in spades, that S-R experiments with dogs [training them to expect food to appear with the ringing of a bell] does not provide an explanation of the complex lived experience of dogs, out of which they develop mental as well as emotional responses to their situated existences in a world/the world as they, and we, intimately know it.

 

[smcder]

I didn't expect that you would be or become a behaviorist. For you certainly know, in spades, that S-R experiments with dogs [training them to expect food to appear with the ringing of a bell] does not provide an explanation of the complex lived experience of dogs, out of which they develop mental as well as emotional responses to their situated existences in a world/the world as they, and we, intimately know it.

Lucky knows it too...!

 

[Constance]

Over evolutionary time, these physiologies become more and more sophisticated in the way they qualify the qualitatively relevant environmental interactions. Subsequently, any mechanism that can manage these sophisticated qualitative assimilations in a way that advantages the organism is a mechanism that will tend to thrive... the environment has a meaning to such organisms if they can quickly filter those qualitative assimilations that matter. etc.

Thus the apparent difference between increasing complexity in animals/humans vis a vis increasing complexity in computers. By the affordances of nature, living beings awaken to their being-in-the-world physically --> physiologically, and gradually develop existential awareness of being. The increasing complexity of information-handling by computers may be [or seem] similar to that achieved in living animals, but it is also radically different. It is the difference that we need to understand.

 

[Soupie]

A physiology exists because it means something (its meaning has relevance) for the replicating lineage—courtesy of replication. So its physical interactions (the physical interactions of its chemical constituents) mean more than they do in objective physical terms. Already we have a sense that something new has emerged from objective physical interaction. I argue that a physiology has meaning insofar as it has 'qualitative relevance' for the replicating lineage; it exists if its mechanisms qualify environmental interactions in a way that is relevant to the survival of the replicating lineage. If there is no such replicating lineage, then that meaning is absent from environmental interaction.
So
Over evolutionary time, these physiologies become more and more sophisticated in the way they qualify the qualitatively relevant environmental interactions. Subsequently, any mechanism that can manage these sophisticated qualitative assimilations in a way that advantages the organism is a mechanism that will tend to thrive... the environment has a meaning to such organisms if they can quickly filter those qualitative assimilations that matter. etc.

So when, how, and why does the mental enter the picture?

You're using the intentional stance to describe the behavior of organisms. You have in no way established that a mental perspective emerges from said organisms.

I can rewrite your entire paragraph above using only the "physical stance." You haven't established why, when, and how the mental need emerge.

 

[smcder]

Thus the apparent difference between increasing complexity in animals/humans vis a vis increasing complexity in computers. By the affordances of nature, living beings awaken to their being-in-the-world physically --> physiologically, and gradually develop existential awareness of being. The increasing complexity of information-handling by computers may be [or seem] similar to that achieved in living animals, but it is also radically different. It is the difference that we need to understand.

what Animal/Insect level of AI do we have now? • r/Futurology

 

[Soupie]

"what I think, is that what is going on in the objective physical world is meaningful and that that meaning appears, by best human approximation, as causal events."

This a form of monism. But it ain't material-physical monism.

If you are ready to follow this thought through to its conclusion, then I am with you.

Non-materialist physicalism: an experimentally testable conjecture.

 

[Pharoah]

So when, how, and why does the mental enter the picture?

You're using the intentional stance to describe the behavior of organisms. You have in no way established that a mental perspective emerges from said organisms.

I can rewrite your entire paragraph above using only the "physical stance." You haven't established why, when, and how the mental need emerge.

Objective physical interaction does not interpret interaction in qualitative ways. When a chemical interacts with the environment, there is no qualitative meaningful correspondence. But that is not the case with a physiological mechanism because its existence depends on it have meaning for the replicating lineage, and that means environmental interactions have qualities that are relevant to any given lineage.
Qualitative relevance is the, therefore, key:
As soon as you have physiologies that derive meanings that delineate environmental interactions in qualitative terms (qualitative terms being an emerged disposition toward the environment) you have the fundamentals underpinning experience 'as qualities'. What emerges in animals above mere qualitative physiology is a mechanism (courtesy of neural networks) that weights and prioritizes realtime qualitatively assimilated events in terms of their qualitative relevance and in terms of their spatial and temporal relation to the individual (because that matters to survival). The individual thereby derives meaning from environmental interaction as an embedded subject, that is, as existing in a spatiotemporal and qualitatively delineated world... and that is what consciousness is. Every action is committed by the meaning that that system, and only that system derives from environmental interaction.
Relating this to causation:
when we observe a ball hitting another ball we interpret that as causation... easy!?
when we observe a ball and a human responding to the ball the causation 'model' ceases to work... crisis!
I say that the causation 'model' is flawed at the outset. As conscious embedded beings we see the world and have come to think "such and such object causes such and such to happen". We have objectified the world in our explanation. Objects, we assume, have properties of their kind and as such have causal influences of that kind. But this model will never be successfully apply to explain mental content.

 

[Pharoah]

@Pharoah, would you link for us [or message us a link to] your most recent writing re HCT and causation/emergence? I'm impressed with, and delighted by, all that you have written in this current discussion.

The Emergence of Qualitative attribution, Phenomenal experience and Being | Philosophy of Consciousness
Password: constance

 

[smcder]

This a form of monism. But it ain't material-physical monism.

If you are ready to follow this thought through to its conclusion, then I am with you.

Non-materialist physicalism: an experimentally testable conjecture.

Them's Pharoah's words!

 

[smcder]

Objective physical interaction does not interpret interaction in qualitative ways. When a chemical interacts with the environment, there is no qualitative meaningful correspondence. But that is not the case with a physiological mechanism because its existence depends on it have meaning for the replicating lineage, and that means environmental interactions have qualities that are relevant to any given lineage.
Qualitative relevance is the, therefore, key:
As soon as you have physiologies that derive meanings that delineate environmental interactions in qualitative terms (qualitative terms being an emerged disposition toward the environment) you have the fundamentals underpinning experience 'as qualities'. What emerges in animals above mere qualitative physiology is a mechanism (courtesy of neural networks) that weights and prioritizes realtime qualitatively assimilated events in terms of their qualitative relevance and in terms of their spatial and temporal relation to the individual (because that matters to survival). The individual thereby derives meaning from environmental interaction as an embedded subject, that is, as existing in a spatiotemporal and qualitatively delineated world... and that is what consciousness is. Every action is committed by the meaning that that system, and only that system derives from environmental interaction.
Relating this to causation:
when we observe a ball hitting another ball we interpret that as causation... easy!?
when we observe a ball and a human responding to the ball the causation 'model' ceases to work... crisis!
I say that the causation 'model' is flawed at the outset. As conscious embedded beings we see the world and have come to think "such and such object causes such and such to happen". We have objectified the world in our explanation. Objects, we assume, have properties of their kind and as such have causal influences of that kind. But this model will never be successfully apply to explain mental content.

You underestimate your opposition and the coherence of the physicalist model.

Just slightly aside, what do you make of Strawson paper above?

 

[Soupie]

Objective physical interaction does not interpret interaction in qualitative ways. When a chemical interacts with the environment, there is no qualitative meaningful correspondence. But that is not the case with a physiological mechanism because its existence depends on it have meaning for the replicating lineage, and that means environmental interactions have qualities that are relevant to any given lineage.

This is the Intentional Stance, it is not an explanation.

For instance, we can say that the honey bee lands on the flower because it wants to collect pollen.

But by merely saying this we certainly haven't established that the honey bee actually has the subjective experince of wanting to collect pollen.

Or we could say that a virus wants to invade a cell.

By merely saying this we haven't established that the virus actually has the subjective experince of wanting to invade a cell.

The intential stance is a form of anthropomorphizing.

The trick is that the intentional stance may actually be a more powerful way of describing the world! Especially the behavior of organisms!

Try to explain the behavior of a honey bee using only the physical stance!

The problem for a physicalism or an Emergentist is explaining how, why, and when systems/organisms came to have mental intentions from a non-mental substrate.

Describing systems/organisms using the intentional stance is not an explanation.