Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 10

[Pharoah]

To your first point, I do think its partly an "effect" ;-) of the way its worded.

The second part too...as you have written it, there appears to be some tension between 1 and 2.

tension? Doesn't give me much to go on

 

[Randall]

This paper is likely ... Where is the mind? The extended mind reloaded

Would you say that the memory repository ( the data storage part of the brain ) is part of the mind? Or is only the active memory ( the part being held in consciousness ) part of the mind? I ask this question because if the repository is part of the mind, then the rationale that the "extended mind" could include non-conscious memory modules seems allowable. Personally, I have a problem with that. If we allow that, then hypothetically, if the human race simply vanished, part of its mind would remain in the form of CDs and memory chips. I don't see CDs as minds. I see them simply as data storage. To me mind and consciousness seem to be synonymous. CDs ≠ consciousness.

 

[Soupie]

There is no overdetermination because the mental actions that ensue, relate to what those actions mean in mentalistic terms only, not in microphysical terms. I act on the world in my response to what the world means to me, and those acts are of a kind that relate to the nature of my particular meaningful correspondence.

Are all human actions consciously (mentally) willed? How about dog actions? How about jelly fish actions? How about tree actions? And cancer cell actions? How about molecule actions?

 

[smcder]

Are all human actions consciously (mentally) willed? How about dog actions? How about jelly fish actions? How about tree actions? And cancer cell actions? How about molecule actions?

actually ....

NanoPutian - Wikipedia

 

[smcder]

tension? Doesn't give me much to go on

1. "There is no overdetermination because the mental actions that ensue, relate to what those actions mean in mentalistic terms only, not in microphysical terms."

but

2. "Downward causal consequences are incidental to the meaning behind the actions and the consequence of those actions in that class of meaning about the world."

?

Statement 1. says mental causes mental only, but 2. indicates "downward causal consequences". Overdetermination is downward causation.

 

[smcder]

event not "cause" i.e. event that incites a particular meaningful correpondence from the entity.
I don't get the "?" does it mean the two statements conflict with one another, or does it mean both ststements don't make sense?

Ditch the idea that anything causes anything i.e. ditch ‘cause and effect’.

Instead, think of it like this: any effect is a form of action by an entity which is determined by the nature of its dynamic construction. As such, its actions mean something about its construction and what kind of meaning is placed on the interactive cause that incites the action."

event not "cause" i.e. event that incites a particular meaningful correpondence from the entity.

determined by, interactive cause that incites, event that incites ...

That is causal language, so we can't forget cause and effect.

 

[smcder]

Why did nature bother with consciousness?
If consciousness is a view of the world that is qualitatively and spatiotemporally differentiated, it services the requirements of the individual to act in a manner that benefits its qualitatively and spatiotemporally differentiated experience of that world. i.e., it exists and acts for its individual's self.

@smcder: “Emergence seems to say that thoughts arise from the (physical) actions of the brain but then take on a causal power of their own and then work back downward to have physical effects.”
The problem, as I see it, concerns causation.
You say “thoughts arise from... physical actions...” i.e. “Physical actions cause thoughts”
You see what you have done? You have jumped from ‘material physicalism’ to the ephemeral notion of ‘thought’, and assumed that there is a direct connection from one to the other in mechanistic causal terms.
Ditch the idea that anything causes anything i.e. ditch ‘cause and effect’.
Instead, think of it like this: any effect is a form of action by an entity which is determined by the nature of its dynamic construction. As such, its actions mean something about its construction and what kind of meaning is placed on the interactive cause that incites the action.
Then, you have to think as follows: there are different classes of construction that determine different classes of meaning from interactive engagement. The meaning they derive from environmental interaction is of a specific class… it is still physical, but not of the physical class that material physicalism accounts for.
Think of there being layers of physicalism (or layers of physical realms) that are detached from one another. What detaches them from each other is the kind of meaning certain physical mechanisms derive from environmental interaction.

If an environmental event instigates a meaningful correspondence of a particular mental kind, then that mental mechanism will generate an effect that relates to mental-type meanings. Those meanings may, for example, qualify the nature of our existential being. The process of our existing, as instructed by the mental-type meanings, will be what determines (or qualifies) our actions of a mental kind—they are the actions of the existential being. There is no overdetermination because the mental actions that ensue, relate to what those actions mean in mentalistic terms only, not in microphysical terms. I act on the world in my response to what the world means to me, and those acts are of a kind that relate to the nature of my particular meaningful correspondence.
Downward causal consequences are incidental to the meaning behind the actions and the consequence of those actions in that class of meaning about the world.

You see what you have done? You have jumped from ‘material physicalism’ to the ephemeral notion of ‘thought’, and assumed that there is a direct connection from one to the other in mechanistic causal terms.

No - I don't:

assumed that there is a direct connection from one to the other in mechanistic causal terms.

That's the whole of the problem with emergence (for Kim): either consciousness is epiphenomenal (causally impotent) or there is downward causation - either:

1. the nerves fire causing both my thoughts about this post and the writing of this post OR
2. the nerves fire causing both my thoughts and the writing of this post AND my thoughts cause the writing of this post (that's overdetermination)

"If an environmental event instigates a meaningful correspondence of a particular mental kind, then that mental mechanism will generate an effect that relates to mental-type meanings. Those meanings may, for example, qualify the nature of our existential being. The process of our existing, as instructed by the mental-type meanings, will be what determines (or qualifies) our actions of a mental kind—they are the actions of the existential being. There is no overdetermination because the mental actions that ensue, relate to what those actions mean in mentalistic terms only, not in microphysical terms. I act on the world in my response to what the world means to me, and those acts are of a kind that relate to the nature of my particular meaningful correspondence. "

The above reads like epiphenomenalism - but this

"Downward causal consequences are incidental to the meaning behind the actions and the consequence of those actions in that class of meaning about the world."

is downward causation - it may be incidental to the meaning behind the actions etc but it's still exerting causal influence.

On your view, is there mental causation or is consciousness epiphenomenal?

 

[Pharoah]

Are all human actions consciously (mentally) willed? How about dog actions? How about jelly fish actions? How about tree actions? And cancer cell actions? How about molecule actions?

"consciously" willed?
If a system interacts with the environment and, in doing so, its physiology interprets the environment as spatiotemporal and qualitatively delineated (i.e. every aspect of the spatiotemporal world has qualities of multi-various kinds), then it will respond and act accordingly (unlike, say, a table leg which simply expands and contracts, heats up and cools down etc). It will have an understanding of the world—that is limited by the sophistication of its spatiotemporal and qualitative capabilities—and will be observed as having an understanding of the world that corresponds with the extent of that physiological sophistication. However sophisticated it is, it is an individuated existential status of understanding the world spatiotemporally and qualitatively (to some varying degree). The response—the actions that ensue—are individuated and reflect that particular world-view of meaningful embedded spatiotemporal experiences.
If a system has no spatiotemporal interpretations following environmental interaction, it does not understand the world as a spatiotemporal world and, therefore, it does not 'exist' as an embedded entity. It does not possess an existential individuated identity, and does not act as if it does... it will act somewhat like a molecule or a table leg.

 

[Pharoah]

You see what you have done? You have jumped from ‘material physicalism’ to the ephemeral notion of ‘thought’, and assumed that there is a direct connection from one to the other in mechanistic causal terms.

No - I don't:

assumed that there is a direct connection from one to the other in mechanistic causal terms.

That's the whole of the problem with emergence (for Kim): either consciousness is epiphenomenal (causally impotent) or there is downward causation - either:

1. the nerves fire causing both my thoughts about this post and the writing of this post OR
2. the nerves fire causing both my thoughts and the writing of this post AND my thoughts cause the writing of this post (that's overdetermination)

"If an environmental event instigates a meaningful correspondence of a particular mental kind, then that mental mechanism will generate an effect that relates to mental-type meanings. Those meanings may, for example, qualify the nature of our existential being. The process of our existing, as instructed by the mental-type meanings, will be what determines (or qualifies) our actions of a mental kind—they are the actions of the existential being. There is no overdetermination because the mental actions that ensue, relate to what those actions mean in mentalistic terms only, not in microphysical terms. I act on the world in my response to what the world means to me, and those acts are of a kind that relate to the nature of my particular meaningful correspondence. "

The above reads like epiphenomenalism - but this

"Downward causal consequences are incidental to the meaning behind the actions and the consequence of those actions in that class of meaning about the world."

is downward causation - it may be incidental to the meaning behind the actions etc but it's still exerting causal influence.

On your view, is there mental causation or is consciousness epiphenomenal?

"1. the nerves fire causing both my thoughts about this post and the writing of this post OR
2. the nerves fire causing both my thoughts and the writing of this post AND my thoughts cause the writing of this post (that's overdetermination)"

As I said: the problem is with the notion of causation. Try this for size"
"If we say of a certain environmental impetus I, that it corresponds with a certain kind of action A1 by a system S1, then one might state I causes A1 (in virtue of S1). If we say that that same I corresponds with an alternative kind of action A2 by an alternative system S2, then we have reason to conclude that I also causes A2 (in virtue of S2—noting arguments in Alexander 1920, p. 43; van Cleve 1990, p. 221; O’Connor & Wong 2005 pp. 665–70). Theoretically, I has the potential to cause An (in virtue of Sn). Therefore, to say of I, that it has causal ‘properties’ is meaningless because an n number of actions can ensue from its interactions with n systems. "
Causation means zip and is not relevant to the problem

 

[smcder]

"1. the nerves fire causing both my thoughts about this post and the writing of this post OR
2. the nerves fire causing both my thoughts and the writing of this post AND my thoughts cause the writing of this post (that's overdetermination)"

As I said: the problem is with the notion of causation. Try this for size"
"If we say of a certain environmental impetus I, that it corresponds with a certain kind of action A1 by a system S1, then one might state I causes A1 (in virtue of S1). If we say that that same I corresponds with an alternative kind of action A2 by an alternative system S2, then we have reason to conclude that I also causes A2 (in virtue of S2—noting arguments in Alexander 1920, p. 43; van Cleve 1990, p. 221; O’Connor & Wong 2005 pp. 665–70). Theoretically, I has the potential to cause An (in virtue of Sn). Therefore, to say of I, that it has causal ‘properties’ is meaningless because an n number of actions can ensue from its interactions with n systems. "
Causation means zip and is not relevant to the problem

"to say it has causal properties is meaningless" does not follow from:

"...an n number of actions can ensue from its interactions with n systems. "

We talk about causality that way all the time.

If I corresponds to A for S each time, we can talk about causality - if I corresponds to some A for S each time, we can talk about causality - mediating the A through S doesn't get rid of causality - we are talking about a response to something in the environment - to sense something is to be affected by it - its not simple mechanical causation, but ...

 

[Soupie]

If a system interacts with the environment and, in doing so, its physiology interprets the environment as spatiotemporal and qualitatively delineated (i.e. every aspect of the spatiotemporal world has qualities of multi-various kinds), then it will respond and act accordingly (unlike, say, a table leg which simply expands and contracts, heats up and cools down etc).

>> it's physiology interprets the environment...

So when, how, and why does phenomenal consciousness enter the picture?

You still haven't overcome overdetermination nor incorporated downward causation from the mental back to the physical. (By arguing for ontological dualism you must do so.) Indeed, as I note above, you haven't even made a case for when, how, and why the mental could/should strongly emerge as something ontologically new in the universe.

And it seems you are using the "intentional stance" quite loosely. We could informally say a dog runs down the hill to get to the pond just as we could say the ball rolls down the hill to get to the pond.

The intentional stance is a way, like physics, of talking about the world (but mostly the social world).

 

[Soupie]

@Pharoah

And you didn't answer whether all (human) behavior is guided by mental actions.

 

[smcder]

>> it's physiology interprets the environment...

So when, how, and why does phenomenal consciousness enter the picture?

You still haven't overcome overdetermination nor incorporated downward causation from the mental back to the physical. (By arguing for ontological dualism you must do so.) Indeed, as I note above, you haven't even made a case for when, how, and why the mental could/should strongly emerge as something ontologically new in the universe.

And it seems you are using the "intentional stance" quite loosely. We could informally say a dog runs down the hill to get to the pond just as we could say the ball rolls down the hill to get to the pond.

The intentional stance is a way, like physics, of talking about the world (but mostly the social world).

Physicalism
physical -> chemical -> biological -> mental

Emergentism
physical -> chemical -> biological -> mental |
physical <- chemical <- biological <-----------

Idealism
MENTAL

 

[smcder]

Emergentism
physical -> chemical -> biological -> (mental) |
physical <- chemical <- biological <-----------

I put brackets on "mental" to note that on the emergentist view, once instantiated - the mental is autonomous - given the exact same set of pre-conditions - the response could be different every time, depending on the mental actions alone - that is what is meant by free will ... given the same set of cicrcumstances, you could have done differently - this has its own set of difficulties

 

[Soupie]

OT from current, good discussion. Ignore if you wish!

Physicalism
physical -> chemical -> biological -> mental

Emergentism
physical -> chemical -> biological -> mental |
physical <- chemical <- biological <-----------

Idealism
MENTAL

Since everything comes to us via our 1st-person, subjective, MENTAL experience, I can imagine a school of thought wherein we must explain how ANYTHING could be non-MENTAL.

Ironic that mainstream science has us trying to explain how anything could be non-physical. Teehee.

 

[Pharoah]

So many questions? not sure where to start
if unbeknown to us, an oxygen element were actually conscious, would we say that it responds chemically because it decides to or because it is caused to?
Best ask the oxygen...
But a physicalist has already decided. It interprets meaningful action as caused by things with causal properties. I am saying that to talk of things has hsving causal properties is eroneous (or meaningless)
What this discussion centers around is how meaning comes out of causal processes. What I am saying is that all action is meaningful (depending on the mechanism involved) but thst the physicalist has interpreted only some actions as causal in nature which in turn then makes the problem of meaning from causation problematic.

 

[Soupie]

This is why the discussion we are having re "the intentional stance" vs the "physical stance" is relevant and important. And will only become more so when AI behavior can no longer be explained via the physical stance.

How Criminal Courts Are Putting Brains—Not People—on Trial

 

[smcder]

So many questions? not sure where to start
if unbeknown to us, an oxygen element were actually conscious, would we say that it responds chemically because it decides to or because it is caused to?
Best ask the oxygen...
But a physicalist has already decided. It interprets meaningful action as caused by things with causal properties. I am saying that to talk of things has hsving causal properties is eroneous (or meaningless)
What this discussion centers around is how meaning comes out of causal processes. What I am saying is that all action is meaningful (depending on the mechanism involved) but thst the physicalist has interpreted only some actions as causal in nature which in turn then makes the problem of meaning from causation problematic.

What is the specific problem of Kim's arguments for HCT?

Taking the physicalist stance (for the sake of this discussion) I don't see "meaning" and "causation" being in conflict.

 

[Soupie]

@Pharoah

I agree with your intuition that "systems" have evolved unified, phenomenal, qualitative, meaning -full perspectives on (i.e. simulations of) the world because they are adaptive for the system.

The question has been and remains—how does such a sentient, phenomenal, and unified perspective emerge from supposedly insentient quantum fields and/or particles?

And if one argues that this unified, sentient perspective is ontologically distinct from the underlying physical system, how, when, and why does this perspective (sometimes but not all times?) exert downward influence on the underlying insentient, physical system?

 

[Soupie]

So many questions? not sure where to start

You could start by explaining why a "mental perspective" need evolve if a system's physiology is all that is needed for it to interpret and respond to the environment.

What work does the system's mental perspective do? How is this work different from the work the system's physiology does?