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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 10


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What are the parts you are questioning here, @Constance? (remember, I don't do colors well! ;-)

Sorry Steve, I forgot about the colors issue. Here's that post again with terms and claims that I think we should look at closely set in boldface type instead of being highlighted in red. In rereading my post and its embedded extract again, I've added the boldface signal to larger elements of the quoted extract and also added further comments at the end.

The original post is at this link:
Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 10

'Following is an interesting extract from a 2017 report on current neuroscientific research under the title "Insights into how dopamine directs learning and new techniques for imaging and tracing cells were just some of the advances described at the third annual gathering of the Simons Collaboration on the Global Brain," linked at

Inner Workings of the Brain Explored at 2017 SCGB Annual Meeting | Simons Foundation


". . .Why don’t muscles move when we think about moving them?


When we think about reaching for a coffee cup, the motor cortex shows a pattern of neural activity similar to when we actually make the move. Why do similar activity patterns sometimes translate into movement and sometimes not?

Previous research suggests that neural activity patterns linked to movement are qualitatively different from those that aren’t. In mathematical terms, these patterns reside in different dimensions. In so-called ‘motor-potent’ dimensions, the linear combination of neuronal activity triggers a net output on muscle. In ‘motor-null’ dimensions, the summed activity essentially cancels itself out, having no effect on muscle.

Muscle service: Imagine a simplified system with two neurons driving a single muscle — the sum of their firing rates is a constant, say 20 spikes per second. When the firing rate for one neuron goes up, the other goes down. Individual neuronal activity can change, but the output to the muscle remains the same. The firing rates of these two neurons create a line that defines the motor-null dimension. In a more complex system of, say, 200 neurons, the line becomes a hyperplane. “When not driving the muscle, patterns of activity in motor cortex seem to live along this hyperplane,” Shenoy says. “Anything that doesn't fall on that output null hyperplane by definition does change activation of the muscle.” Credit: Krishna Shenoy

Motor-null dimensions may offer the motor cortex the ability to plan a movement before executing it. In new research, Krishna Shenoy, a neuroscientist at Stanford, and collaborators suggest that motor-null dimensions also help the motor cortex process new sensory information during movement planning. “We think of those null dimensions as a scratch pad where computations can happen,” Shenoy says.

If someone bumps your arm as you reach for a coffee cup, the brain processes that sensory information and adjusts the arm’s reach accordingly. But exactly how that happens is puzzling. Neural recordings have shown that sensory information itself can travel to the motor cortex very quickly, so how does the brain have enough time to act on it? Shenoy predicts that new sensory information briefly lingers in motor-null dimensions and then shifts to motor-potent dimensions, where it directs movement.

The researchers tested this hypothesis in monkeys implanted with a brain-machine interface (BMI), a device that records neural activity from roughly 200 neurons in the motor cortex and translates it into some kind of output. In this experiment, the monkeys learned to move a cursor on a computer screening using just their thoughts. On some trials, scientists made the cursor jump, mimicking someone getting bumped while reaching for coffee. The monkey then had to alter its thinking to correct the cursor’s movement.

Because the researchers are using a BMI, they know precisely how neural activity maps to the cursor’s movement and can clearly define motor-null and motor-potent dimensions. They first record neural activity and the location of a moving target on a screen, which the monkey is trained to plan to reach to. This generates natural motor cortical activity. They then fit a decode model to the neural and kinematic data, which defines a weight matrix that transforms the former into the latter. With the weight matrix in hand, they can then use standard linear algebra to define which dimensions are null and which are potent.

Shenoy’s team found that neural activity linked to the visual ‘bump’ did indeed exist in the motor-null dimension initially. After about 50 milliseconds, it morphed into the motor-potent dimension. “The data fall beautifully into those dimensions,” Shenoy says. The results suggest that the motor system performs computations locally before using that data to direct movement.

The researchers next plan to do that same experiment with monkeys trained to use a haptic robotic arm, which can detect tactile feedback. “Now that we can physically perturb the arm, we want to know if proprioceptive information also comes in to the null space first and to see how general this computational principle really is,” Shenoy says.

The researchers also want to apply the findings to their clinical work with people learning to use robotic arms. The software that translates brain activity into arm movement needs to know how to react if the robotic arm gets jostled. For example, the software needs to be able to distinguish motor cortex activity that is being processed in null dimensions from activity that is intended to drive arm movement. “We think that by understanding the null and potent dimensions, we can have people controlling robotic arms without the arm flailing around if it bumps into something,” Shenoy says."

I'm offering this extract for discussion if anyone is interested. I've underscored some of the questionable terms and speculative presuppositions that stand out for me in the extract and elsewhere in the Simons Foundation presentations at the link.'


ETA: Re the monkey experiment, how much does it actually explain about how the 'computational brain' assists physically compromised individuals who lack the ability to physically sense relevant aspects of their physical environments? It seems to me that it is not computation but consciousness that fills in the gaps. In other words, the brain does not produce consciousness but rather assists, enables consciousness in developing awareness of its situation and ability to cope with the conditions and demands of its situation.

In the text above concerning the monkey experiment, the experimenters interestingly go so far as to refer to what the monkeys "think": "The monkey then had to alter its thinking to correct the cursor’s movement." It's important to recognize that these experimenters believe that thinking goes on in what they call a "motor null dimension" of neural operations -- another way of claiming that it is our neurons that think, or as the Churchlands exquisitely expressed it, "we are our neurons."

It seems to me that evidentiary, empirical, support for this belief could only arise from ethically prohibited experiments that would place newborn infants in vats wearing life-sustaining but sensorially deprivational equipment/suits that effect total sensory deprivation for perhaps 7-10 years of physical growth and development, and then place them back into the actual, natural, physical world that sensorially impinges upon us humans (and all other living organisms and animals) and examine their mental processes at length -- after first laboriously teaching them language and human meanings embedded in it -- in order to find out about what they have been able to 'think'.

It's obvious, also, that these researchers hark back to Libet's famous experiments and implicitly adopt interpretations of his research that run counter to Libet's and others' interpretations. In fact, the way these Simon Foundation researchers interpret the 50 millisecond delay recognized in Libet's experiments runs directly counter to what Libet was able to establish: i.e., that the body begins to respond to a stimulus represented on a computer screen 50 milliseconds before the subject being tested 'decides' to respond by striking a key [or not striking a key], whereas the researchers quoted in the Simons Foundation article believe that 'information' lies latent, unconscious, and unexpressed in a conjectured "motor-null 'dimension'" before becoming available to the body's sensorally and mentally responsive behaviors/actions.










 
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Is Physical Law an Alien Intelligence?
Alien life could be so advanced it becomes indistinguishable from physics.

Caleb Scharf

Extract:

". . . only about 5 percent of the mass-energy of the universe consists of ordinary matter: the protons, neutrons, and electrons that we’re composed of. A much larger 27 percent is thought to be unseen, still mysterious stuff. Astronomical evidence for this dark, gravitating matter is convincing, albeit still not without question. Vast halos of dark matter seem to lurk around galaxies, providing mass that helps hold things together via gravity. On even larger scales, the web-like topography traced by luminous gas and stars also hints at unseen mass.

Cosmologists usually assume that dark matter has no microstructure. They think it consists of subatomic particles that interact only via gravity and the weak nuclear force and therefore slump into tenuous, featureless swathes. They have arguments to support this point of view, but of course we don’t really know for sure. Some astronomers, noting subtle mismatches between observations and models, have suggested that dark matter has a richer inner life. At least some component may comprise particles that interact with one another via long-range forces. It may seem dark to us, but have its own version of light that our eyes cannot see. . . ."

Is Dark Matter Hiding Aliens?
 
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A fascinating new book by Timothy Morton -- Humankind: Solidarity with Nonhuman People -- described as follows at amazon:

Book Description: "A radical call for solidarity between humans and non-humans

What is it that makes humans human? As science and technology challenge the boundaries between life and non-life, between organic and inorganic, this ancient question is more timely than ever. Acclaimed object-oriented philosopher Timothy Morton invites us to consider this philosophical issue as eminently political. In our relationship with nonhumans, we decide the fate of our humanity. Becoming human, claims Morton, actually means creating a network of kindness and solidarity with nonhuman beings, in the name of a broader understanding of reality that both includes and overcomes the notion of species. Negotiating the politics of humanity is the first crucial step in reclaiming the upper scales of ecological coexistence and resisting corporations like Monsanto and the technophilic billionaires who would rob us of our kinship with people beyond our species."


Review by Christine M. Skolnik:

"In his characteristically eccentric and predictably enthralling new book, Humankind, Timothy Morton argues that Marxism has erred in excluding nonhumans from “social space,” but is capable of correcting its course because of its commitment to solidarity. The exclusion of nonhumans is a bug, rather than a feature of Marxist thought. Capitalism, based on property ownership and various forms of slavery, conversely, is necessarily exclusive and hierarchical. Resources, including humans and nonhumans, are subordinated to the transcendent value of capital, and human beings, in effect, develop kinship bonds with capital rather than human and nonhuman beings. Folding anarchy back into Marxism, Morton argues that solidarity with nonhuman beings simply effaces our ties to consumer capitalism (“Kindness,” 2300 – 2313). Though Morton criticizes the New Left’s focus on identity politics for reproducing essential difference and thus undermining solidarity, his vision is certainly a boon for the Left (“Things in Common,” 207-261). I’m not quite sure if Morton’s radical reconfiguration of social space is Marxism as we know it, or as it was conceived, but Humankind might encourage intellectuals to trade their chains for an optimistic New New Left. Humans and nonhumans in solidarity, willing Trump’s last tweet.

One of Morton’s most radical concepts is the symbiotic real. I say it’s radical not because symbiosis is new, but because Morton presents non-hierarchical symbiosis as an integral feature of political life. When we become aware of the symbiotic real, solidarity is no longer a value, choice, or decision. It simply is, and any social, economic, or political theory that externalizes nonhuman beings is recognized as inoperable—an insolvent fantasy (“Things in Common,” 66 – 87). Another important element of Morton’s project here, and I think it’s his most significant one to date, is interrogating life, categorically. “Life” based on substance ontology, and specious distinctions between its various forms, is antithetical to life (“Life,” 807). Rather than subordinating life to the “agrologistic” principles of non-contradiction and the excluded middle, that create mutually exclusive categories of life and non-life, and identify life with autonomous being, Morton rediscovers and celebrates life as quivering, shimmering, spectral (“Life,” 770, 776, 846, 850, 860). He sings of life forms that overflow their boundaries, downward and upward. Human beings, composed of myriad nonhuman beings, and haunted by what have heretofore been considered inanimate objects; nonhuman beings composed of what have heretofore been considered inanimate objects, and haunted by human beings. “[T]he intrinsic shimmering of being” (“Life,” 860).

Subscendence is the most theoretically important concept of the book, and possibly the most important piece of Humankind’s political argument. Under the sign of subscendence, Morton illustrates that wholes are smaller and more fragile than the sum of their parts (“Subscendence,” 1767 – 1794). And this applies to menacing hyperobjects such as neoliberalism. Though we imagine it as Cthulu, Morton suggests neoliberalism may be ontologically small and easy to subvert. It pervades social space, but it cannot contain or rule its parts. Our fear and cynicism is based on an assumption that neoliberalism is a transcendent whole, but solidarity with human and nonhuman beings can help us dismantle it. Locally unplugging from fossil fuel energy grids seems trivial, until we rediscover solidarity and begin to replicate such local forms of resistance (“Subscendence,” 1726 – 1828).

Subscendence replaces mastery. Because parts exceed wholes, and because all objects withdraw, increasing knowledge does not result in mastery. The more objects and levels of objects we discover, the more objects withdraw. And this includes our knowledge of ourselves. The more we know about ourselves the more we perceive our withdrawal. “You are a haunted house” (“Subscendence,” 1965). The dream of access to the thing itself is replaced by a real feeling of being followed or watched. Intimacy is paranoia, and truth is being haunted (“Subscendence,” 1912; “Kindness,” 2649)

Humankind, like human beings, is “a fuzzy, subscendent whole that includes and implies other lifeforms, as a part of the also subscendent symbiotic real” (“Subscendence,” 2013). This quote reminds us not to reify the symbiotic real—it’s not a new transcendent whole, God or Gaia. Just as humankind is haunted by the inhuman, so the symbiotic real is haunted by spectral beings in a spectral dimension (“Specters,” 1198; “Kindness,” 2274).

Another of the book's powerful and utterly persuasive concepts is “The Severing,” a “traumatic fissure” between the “human-correlated world” and the “ecological symbiosis of human and nonhuman parts of the biosphere” (“Things in Common,” 272). Solidarity is the “default affective environment,” but anthropocentrism suppresses solidarity between humans and nonhumans, and erects boundaries between humans (“Things in Common,” 296 – 299). The effects of this intergenerational trauma are widespread, resulting in a desert landscape “from which meaning and connection have evaporated” (“Things in Common,” 312, 355). This results in alienation, not from some transcendent presence but from “an inconsistent spectral essence we are calling humankind,” as well as the spectrality of nonhuman beings (“Species,” 2197-2201). “What capitalism distorts is not an underlying substantial Nature or Humanity, but rather the ‘paranormal’ energies of production” (“Species” 2204).

Ultimately, Morton argues that solidarity is kindness, and kindness is an unconscious aspect of ourselves, which we share with nonhumans (“Kindness,” 2283- 2306). Acknowledgement, awareness, and fascination are all aesthetic and ethical/political acts of solidarity (“Kindness,” 2296 – 2368). And since our origins lie in the symbiotic real, these “styles” of being also belong to nonhumans (“Kindness,” 2294, 2453, 2835). Indeed, recent animal behavior studies suggest that solidarity is inherited from nonhumans (“Kindness,” 2860). Morton ends by queering the active and passive categories, and “veering” love toward the environment (“Kindness,” 2963, 3119). Solidarity requires nonhumans because we are inseparable from the symbiotic real (“Kindness,” 3123 – 3127). We are them. “Solidarity just is solidarity with nonhumans.”

“Things in Common,” 416, 430. All in-text references are to chapter titles and locations.

(See complete review at Environmental Critique.)


A related book:
Arts of Living on a Damaged Planet: Ghosts and Monsters… (Kindle Edition)
by Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing, Nils Bubandt

 
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Here is a skeptico thread we might want to pursue:

Religion and psi attempt #2 - Mind-energy.net

Here is a website created by the primary discussant in the above thread:

dreams
 
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Sorry Steve, I forgot about the colors issue. Here's that post again with terms and claims that I think we should look at closely set in boldface type instead of being highlighted in red. In rereading my post and its embedded extract again, I've added the boldface signal to larger elements of the quoted extract and also added further comments at the end.

The original post is at this link:
Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 10

'Following is an interesting extract from a 2017 report on current neuroscientific research under the title "Insights into how dopamine directs learning and new techniques for imaging and tracing cells were just some of the advances described at the third annual gathering of the Simons Collaboration on the Global Brain," linked at

Inner Workings of the Brain Explored at 2017 SCGB Annual Meeting | Simons Foundation


". . .Why don’t muscles move when we think about moving them?


When we think about reaching for a coffee cup, the motor cortex shows a pattern of neural activity similar to when we actually make the move. Why do similar activity patterns sometimes translate into movement and sometimes not?

Previous research suggests that neural activity patterns linked to movement are qualitatively different from those that aren’t. In mathematical terms, these patterns reside in different dimensions. In so-called ‘motor-potent’ dimensions, the linear combination of neuronal activity triggers a net output on muscle. In ‘motor-null’ dimensions, the summed activity essentially cancels itself out, having no effect on muscle.

Muscle service: Imagine a simplified system with two neurons driving a single muscle — the sum of their firing rates is a constant, say 20 spikes per second. When the firing rate for one neuron goes up, the other goes down. Individual neuronal activity can change, but the output to the muscle remains the same. The firing rates of these two neurons create a line that defines the motor-null dimension. In a more complex system of, say, 200 neurons, the line becomes a hyperplane. “When not driving the muscle, patterns of activity in motor cortex seem to live along this hyperplane,” Shenoy says. “Anything that doesn't fall on that output null hyperplane by definition does change activation of the muscle.” Credit: Krishna Shenoy

Motor-null dimensions may offer the motor cortex the ability to plan a movement before executing it. In new research, Krishna Shenoy, a neuroscientist at Stanford, and collaborators suggest that motor-null dimensions also help the motor cortex process new sensory information during movement planning. “We think of those null dimensions as a scratch pad where computations can happen,” Shenoy says.

If someone bumps your arm as you reach for a coffee cup, the brain processes that sensory information and adjusts the arm’s reach accordingly. But exactly how that happens is puzzling. Neural recordings have shown that sensory information itself can travel to the motor cortex very quickly, so how does the brain have enough time to act on it? Shenoy predicts that new sensory information briefly lingers in motor-null dimensions and then shifts to motor-potent dimensions, where it directs movement.

The researchers tested this hypothesis in monkeys implanted with a brain-machine interface (BMI), a device that records neural activity from roughly 200 neurons in the motor cortex and translates it into some kind of output. In this experiment, the monkeys learned to move a cursor on a computer screening using just their thoughts. On some trials, scientists made the cursor jump, mimicking someone getting bumped while reaching for coffee. The monkey then had to alter its thinking to correct the cursor’s movement.

Because the researchers are using a BMI, they know precisely how neural activity maps to the cursor’s movement and can clearly define motor-null and motor-potent dimensions. They first record neural activity and the location of a moving target on a screen, which the monkey is trained to plan to reach to. This generates natural motor cortical activity. They then fit a decode model to the neural and kinematic data, which defines a weight matrix that transforms the former into the latter. With the weight matrix in hand, they can then use standard linear algebra to define which dimensions are null and which are potent.

Shenoy’s team found that neural activity linked to the visual ‘bump’ did indeed exist in the motor-null dimension initially. After about 50 milliseconds, it morphed into the motor-potent dimension. “The data fall beautifully into those dimensions,” Shenoy says. The results suggest that the motor system performs computations locally before using that data to direct movement.

The researchers next plan to do that same experiment with monkeys trained to use a haptic robotic arm, which can detect tactile feedback. “Now that we can physically perturb the arm, we want to know if proprioceptive information also comes in to the null space first and to see how general this computational principle really is,” Shenoy says.

The researchers also want to apply the findings to their clinical work with people learning to use robotic arms. The software that translates brain activity into arm movement needs to know how to react if the robotic arm gets jostled. For example, the software needs to be able to distinguish motor cortex activity that is being processed in null dimensions from activity that is intended to drive arm movement. “We think that by understanding the null and potent dimensions, we can have people controlling robotic arms without the arm flailing around if it bumps into something,” Shenoy says."

I'm offering this extract for discussion if anyone is interested. I've underscored some of the questionable terms and speculative presuppositions that stand out for me in the extract and elsewhere in the Simons Foundation presentations at the link.'


ETA: Re the monkey experiment, how much does it actually explain about how the 'computational brain' assists physically compromised individuals who lack the ability to physically sense relevant aspects of their physical environments? It seems to me that it is not computation but consciousness that fills in the gaps. In other words, the brain does not produce consciousness but rather assists, enables consciousness in developing awareness of its situation and ability to cope with the conditions and demands of its situation.

In the text above concerning the monkey experiment, the experimenters interestingly go so far as to refer to what the monkeys "think": "The monkey then had to alter its thinking to correct the cursor’s movement." It's important to recognize that these experimenters believe that thinking goes on in what they call a "motor null dimension" of neural operations -- another way of claiming that it is our neurons that think, or as the Churchlands exquisitely expressed it, "we are our neurons."

It seems to me that evidentiary, empirical, support for this belief could only arise from ethically prohibited experiments that would place newborn infants in vats wearing life-sustaining but sensorially deprivational equipment/suits that effect total sensory deprivation for perhaps 7-10 years of physical growth and development, and then place them back into the actual, natural, physical world that sensorially impinges upon us humans (and all other living organisms and animals) and examine their mental processes at length -- after first laboriously teaching them language and human meanings embedded in it -- in order to find out about what they have been able to 'think'.

It's obvious, also, that these researchers hark back to Libet's famous experiments and implicitly adopt interpretations of his research that run counter to Libet's and others' interpretations. In fact, the way these Simon Foundation researchers interpret the 50 millisecond delay recognized in Libet's experiments runs directly counter to what Libet was able to establish: i.e., that the body begins to respond to a stimulus represented on a computer screen 50 milliseconds before the subject being tested 'decides' to respond by striking a key [or not striking a key], whereas the researchers quoted in the Simons Foundation article believe that 'information' lies latent, unconscious, and unexpressed in a conjectured "motor-null 'dimension'" before becoming available to the body's sensorally and mentally responsive behaviors/actions.










In the text above concerning the monkey experiment, the experimenters interestingly go so far as to refer to what the monkeys "think": "The monkey then had to alter its thinking to correct the cursor’s movement." It's important to recognize that these experimenters believe that thinking goes on in what they call a "motor null dimension" of neural operations -- another way of claiming that it is our neurons that think, or as the Churchlands exquisitely expressed it, "we are our neurons."

You see the same thing in discussions of machine "intelligence" - even though some (many) recognize what goes on in a AI and what goes on in the brain, even in relatively sophisticated models based on what we know about neurons ... is not the same thing.

10 Misconceptions about Neural Networks

I've been spending some time learning about (and playing with) neural networks and the field is in a very interesting place now - but basically neural networks are a way of breaking computation down into (relatively) simple units of computation (based on a (relatively) simple model of the neuron and then applying a (relatively) large amount of power in the form of making iterative adjustments to the "weights" between these "neurons" for a specified output.

A single neuron in the brain is an incredibly complex machine that even today we don’t understand. A single “neuron” in a neural network is an incredibly simple mathematical function that captures a minuscule fraction of the complexity of a biological neuron. So to say neural networks mimic the brain, that is true at the level of loose inspiration, but really artificial neural networks are nothing like what the biological brain does. - Andrew Ng
 
https://www.researchgate.net/profil...00/From-Logic-to-Neural-Networks-and-Back.pdf

Since our brains are the outcomes of an evolutionary selection process in which our ancestors had to struggle with commonsense problems rather than with the perfect world of mathematics, it would be surprising if the logical properties of normality statements did not show up in the way that our neural circuits are put together. In the last few years, logicians and neural network specialists have started to investigate whether the logic of non-monotonic conditionals could tell us anything about how inferences are drawn by neural networks and how these networks are able to learn. If so, this would be an important step in understanding what neural networks actually do; otherwise, we might be stuck with an ingenious technical machinery which maps inputs to their desired outputs but where the processes which lead from the one to the other remain mysterious and uninterpreted.
 
Note to @Soupie: I've been reading in philosophy of language and linguistic theory and came across this power point summary of a paper that might interest you. (I'll look for the text of the whole paper as well). What I think is relevant for you relates to a post of yours some time back concerning color perception in which you cited research among a group of people that, as you read it, or the results of it, somewhere, concluded that these people were unable to differentiate between green and blue. The power point representation at the link suggests a different reading of the reason why they appeared to be unable to distinguish between these two colors, which I think you will find interesting (along with what is referred to as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis).

http://www.blutner.de/color/Sapir-Whorf.pdf
 
Here is a link to the paper itself:

http://www1.icsi.berkeley.edu/~kay/Kay&Kempton.1984.pdf


And this, from Edge, is extremely interesting:

HOW DOES OUR LANGUAGE SHAPE THE WAY WE THINK?
Lera Boroditsky [6.11.09]

"For a long time, the idea that language might shape thought was considered at best untestable and more often simply wrong. Research in my labs at Stanford University and at MIT has helped reopen this question. We have collected data around the world: from China, Greece, Chile, Indonesia, Russia, and Aboriginal Australia. What we have learned is that people who speak different languages do indeed think differently and that even flukes of grammar can profoundly affect how we see the world. Language is a uniquely human gift, central to our experience of being human. Appreciating its role in constructing our mental lives brings us one step closer to understanding the very nature of humanity.

Humans communicate with one another using a dazzling array of languages, each differing from the next in innumerable ways. Do the languages we speak shape the way we see the world, the way we think, and the way we live our lives? Do people who speak different languages think differently simply because they speak different languages? Does learning new languages change the way you think? Do polyglots think differently when speaking different languages?

These questions touch on nearly all of the major controversies in the study of mind. They have engaged scores of philosophers, anthropologists, linguists, and psychologists, and they have important implications for politics, law, and religion. Yet despite nearly constant attention and debate, very little empirical work was done on these questions until recently. For a long time, the idea that language might shape thought was considered at best untestable and more often simply wrong. Research in my labs at Stanford University and at MIT has helped reopen this question. We have collected data around the world: from China, Greece, Chile, Indonesia, Russia, and Aboriginal Australia. What we have learned is that people who speak different languages do indeed think differently and that even flukes of grammar can profoundly affect how we see the world. Language is a uniquely human gift, central to our experience of being human. Appreciating its role in constructing our mental lives brings us one step closer to understanding the very nature of humanity. . . ."


LERA BORODITSKY is an assistant professor of psychology, neuroscience, and symbolic systems at Stanford University, who looks at how the languages we speak shape the way we think.

HOW DOES OUR LANGUAGE SHAPE THE WAY WE THINK? | Edge.org
 
Here is a link to the paper itself:

http://www1.icsi.berkeley.edu/~kay/Kay&Kempton.1984.pdf


And this, from Edge, is extremely interesting:

HOW DOES OUR LANGUAGE SHAPE THE WAY WE THINK?
Lera Boroditsky [6.11.09]

"For a long time, the idea that language might shape thought was considered at best untestable and more often simply wrong. Research in my labs at Stanford University and at MIT has helped reopen this question. We have collected data around the world: from China, Greece, Chile, Indonesia, Russia, and Aboriginal Australia. What we have learned is that people who speak different languages do indeed think differently and that even flukes of grammar can profoundly affect how we see the world. Language is a uniquely human gift, central to our experience of being human. Appreciating its role in constructing our mental lives brings us one step closer to understanding the very nature of humanity.

Humans communicate with one another using a dazzling array of languages, each differing from the next in innumerable ways. Do the languages we speak shape the way we see the world, the way we think, and the way we live our lives? Do people who speak different languages think differently simply because they speak different languages? Does learning new languages change the way you think? Do polyglots think differently when speaking different languages?

These questions touch on nearly all of the major controversies in the study of mind. They have engaged scores of philosophers, anthropologists, linguists, and psychologists, and they have important implications for politics, law, and religion. Yet despite nearly constant attention and debate, very little empirical work was done on these questions until recently. For a long time, the idea that language might shape thought was considered at best untestable and more often simply wrong. Research in my labs at Stanford University and at MIT has helped reopen this question. We have collected data around the world: from China, Greece, Chile, Indonesia, Russia, and Aboriginal Australia. What we have learned is that people who speak different languages do indeed think differently and that even flukes of grammar can profoundly affect how we see the world. Language is a uniquely human gift, central to our experience of being human. Appreciating its role in constructing our mental lives brings us one step closer to understanding the very nature of humanity. . . ."


LERA BORODITSKY is an assistant professor of psychology, neuroscience, and symbolic systems at Stanford University, who looks at how the languages we speak shape the way we think.

HOW DOES OUR LANGUAGE SHAPE THE WAY WE THINK? | Edge.org

I think about this a lot as I learn new languages - I have read about an effect on new language learners, that there is a kind of emotional freedom early in the process, perhaps there aren't as many associations with certain emotions in this new language ... I'll have to look this up. I do remember that when I was in Germany and starting to think in German and even when I got home after a year, my friends felt my personality had changed - some of this I do think may have been the language (mixed in with a lot of other factors) - this is what makes translation so fascinating (and so impossible!) ...
 
Although the link reads "http" - if you hover over it in @Pharoah's post - it shows "https" - click the link and you get the 404 error, then just go to the URL and edit out the "s" in "https" - ...
 
Talking Nets

This is an oral history of neural networks in a series of interviews with people who made that history - the first interview is with Jerome Letvin, who co-wrote "What the Frog's Eye Tells the Frog's Brain" in 1959 with Humberto Maturana (the same, of "autopoetic" fame) and Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts. Letvin gives a fascinating history of the early thinking around neural nets and what was at least a shift toward trying to think about how the brain does what it does - at the center of this beginning was the neurophysiologist Warren McCulloch and it was the chance connection with Walter Pitts that gave the movement its early flavor and crossover into more mainstream computing via Wiener and Von Neumann and set the trajectory for some time to come - this is also traced out in the paper by Hannes Leitgeb I linked above. The book focuses on the human and historical side of science, a fascinating behind the scenes look at the messiness and happenstance that get us to where we are, when we could have easily ended up somewhere else but for the "political" side of science - and this is as true in the "hardest" of hard sciences, mathematics and logic as anywhere else.

Another interesting thing he talks about is how much Leibniz anticipated in modern computing ... rather a lot! Walter Pitts showed the relationship between Leibniz's thought and universal computing as we now know it. The mechanical limitations Leibniz had to work with at the time prevented him from building more sophisticated computing devices.

Here's a fun anecdote from Letvin:

While working in the Marine Zoological Station in Naples, Letttvin had a 30-foot-long (9.1 m) room in which octopus holding tanks were kept, with fine mesh metal screens to keep them from escaping. One tank, at the far end, held his youngest son Jonathan's pet octopus, known as Juvenile Delinquent or JD.[11][not in citation given] One day he teased JD with a stick. The next morning, he and his son came to the door, and noticed a puddle. Fearing that the tanks had broken, Lettvin opened the door, and was greeted by a blast of water in his face (but not his son's face). From across the room, and through the screen, JD had perfect aim, after which he jetted to the bottom of the tank, inked it up, and hid for the rest of the day. Still confused about the water under the door, Lettvin looked at the back of the door and saw a spot of water at the height of his face. JD had been practicing for revenge. From this and other experiences, Lettvin concluded that octopodes are highly intelligent, and from that time on he never ate octopus again.
 
hmmm ....

Looking forward to the details of your responses to this significant paper that @Pharoah has linked. I'm impressed by the reasoning employed in this paper, for example in this paragraph:

"IV. A dynamical emergence model

Our picture of emergence becomes more complicated once we consider not just the
generation of an initial emergent state, but the dynamics of an object's having one or more emergent features for a period of time. Think of what we’ve just described as a baseline case, involving the onset of an emergent state. Then consider that, as a fundamentally new kind of feature, it will confer causal capacities on the object that go beyond the summation of capacities directly conferred by the object's microstructure. Its effects might include directly determining aspects of the microphysical structure of the object as well as generating other emergent states. In setting forth a general account of how this might go, we are guided not by abstract intuition about how it must go in any possible emergent scenario, but about how it is plausible to suppose it goes with respect to our own mental life, on the supposition that qualitative and intentional features of our mental states are emergent. (The diagram below, then, is not intended to capture a minimally sufficient schema for emergence, but a variant that plausibly applies to the mental, if any emergentist
scenario does.)" [pp. 12-13]

I think the above is relevant to the ways in which language must have emerged among early humans -- out of need and desire to communicate more fully among themselves, within their communities, about the sensed prelinguistic semiotic meanings (signs, significations, connections, interrelations) that they become increasingly aware of. The origin and evolution of language is, I believe, the result not [or not only] of random physical processes of 'natural selection' but of the increasing needs and desires of sentient biological beings to comprehend the relationship of their awareness to that which they are increasingly aware of.

Once systemized and widely shared, languages tend to overlay fixed interpretations of things and their relations, so that language not only enables reflection on and thinking about what is experienced but eventually constrains thinking to closed [reified] systems of consensual reference and meaning of things encountered in the world, supporting the development of objectivist thought while suppressing the exploration of the plenum of subjective experience of the world, which is the essential ground of whatever can be thought.

Lera Boroditsky asks in the paper I last cited: "are languages merely tools for expressing our thoughts, or do they actually shape our thoughts?". I think, as she does, that the answer must be 'both'. Language, like consciousness, evolves. Preconscious, conscious, and indeed subconscious knowing are experienced at increasing levels in the evolution of species. The challenge, as I've said in past discussions in this thread -- and recognized in the development of phenomenology -- is to reveal the nature of prereflective consciousness, of prelinguistic awareness and orientation to early humans' environmental conditions and situations, their encounters with still unobjectified things and other beings, and their undoubtable struggle to understand the relationships between their own awareness, and also the evident awareness of other living species, and that which becomes gradually understood among members of their own communities. We are still on that path.
 
The seminal insights of Benjamin Whorf are well-summarized at this link, the text copied below:

The Whorfian Hypothesis

"Among recent developments in the anthropological sciences hardly any have found so much attention and led us to so much controversy as have the views advanced by the late Benjamin Whorf.

The hypothesis offered by Whorf is:

That the commonly held belief that the cognitive processes of all human beings possess a common logical structure which operates prior to and independently of communication through language is erroneous. It is Whorf's view that the linguistic patterns themselves determine what the individual perceives in this world and how he thinks about it. Since these patterns vary widely, the modes of thinking and perceiving in groups utilizing different linguistic systems will result in basically different world views (Fearing, 1954).

We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar.... We cut up and organize the spread and flow of events as we do largely because, though our mother tongue, we are parties of an agreement to do so, not because nature itself is segmented in exactly that way for all to see. (Whorf, 1952, pg. 21)

For example, in the Indo-European languages substantives, adjectives and verbs appear as basic grammatic units, a sentence being essentially a combination of these parts. This scheme of a persisting entity separable from its properties and active or passive behavior is fundamental for the categories of occidental thinking, from Aristotle's categories of "substance," "attibutes" and "action" to the antithesis of matter and force, mass and energy in physics.

Indian languages, such at Nootka or Hopi do not have parts of speech or separate subject and predicate. Rather they signify an event as a whole. When we say "a light flashed" or "it ( a dubious hypostatized entity) flashed." Hopi uses a single term "flash (occurred)".

It would be important to apply the methods of mathematical logic to such languages. Can statements in languages like Nootka or Hopi be rendered by the usual logistic notation, or is the latter a formalization of the structure of Indo-European language? It appears that this important subject has not been investigated.

Indo-European languages emphasize time. The "give and take" between language and culture leads, according to Whorf, to keeping of diaries, mathematics stimulated by accounting, to calendars, clocks, chroniology, time as used in physics; to the historical attitude, interest in the past, archeology, etc. It is interesting to compare this with Spengler's conception of the central role of time in the occidental world picture which, from a different viewpoint, comes to the identical conclusion.

However, the -- for us -- self-evident distinction between past, present and future does not exist in the Hopi language. It makes no distinction between tenses, but indicates the validity a statement has: fact, memory, expectations or custom. There is no difference in Hopi between "he runs," "he is running," "he ran,' all being rendered by wari "running occur." An expectation is rendered by warinki ("running occur I daresay"), which covers "he will, shall, should, would run." If, however, it is a statement of a general law, warikngwe ("running occur, characteristically") is applied (La Barre, 1954, 1954, pp 197). The Hopi " has no general notion or intuition of time as a smooth flowing continuum in which everything in the universe proceeds at an equal rate, out of a future, through a present, into a past" (Whorf 1952, p 67) instead of our categories of space and time. Hopi rather distinguishes the "manifest," all that which is accessible to the senses with no distinction between present and past, and the unmanifest" comprising the future as well as what we call mental. Navaho (cf. kluckhohn and Leighton, 1951) has little development of tenses; the emphasis is upon types of activity, and thus it distinguishes durative, perective[?], usitative, repetitive, iterative, optative, semifactive, momentaneous, progressive, transitional, conative, etc., aspects of action.

The difference can be defined that the first concern of English (and Indo-European language in general) is time, of Hopi -- validity, and of Navaho -- type of activity (personal communication of Professor Klockhohn)
....

The ingrained mechanistic way of thinking which comes into difficulties with modern scientific developments is a consequence of our specific linguistic categories and habits, and Whorf hopes that insight into the diversity of linguistic systems may contribute to the reevaluation of scientific concepts."
 
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