1. This site uses cookies. By continuing to use this site, you are agreeing to our use of cookies. Learn More.
  2. SUPPORT THE SHOW AND ENJOY A PREMIUM PARACAST EXPERIENCE! Welcome to The Paracast+! For a low subscription fee, you will receive access to an ad-free version of The Paracast, the exclusive After The Paracast podcast, featuring color commentary, exclusive interviews, plus show transcripts, the new Paracast+ Video Channel, Classic Episodes and Special Features categories! We now offer lifetime memberships! You can subscribe via this direct link:
    https://www.theparacast.com/introducing-the-paracast/

    The Official Paracast Store is back! Check out our latest lineup of customized stuff at: The Official Paracast Store!

    Subscribe to The Paracast Newsletter!
    Dismiss Notice

Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 10

Discussion in 'General Freewheeling Chit-Chat' started by Gene Steinberg, Jun 12, 2017.



  1. smcder

    smcder Paranormal Adept

    Joined:
    Feb 6, 2016
    Messages:
    1,893
    Likes Received:
    1,133
    Location:
    Arkansas, USA

    That is, consciousness is not secondary with respect to matter; but at the same time, there are likely more fundamental processes underlying consciousness and matter/energy.


    1. I don't see any reason why there has to be, much less why it is likely - matter/energy/consciousness may all be thought of as fundamental without reference to yet more fundamental processes (i.e. rabbit holes)

    2. but there is a whole cottage-industry of metaphysical activity that you get with a MFP - why does the MFP manifest as consciousness and matter/energy? how long before it manifests so? what stimulates it to do so? or is the manifestation continuous? - does it have other manifestations, could it have had other manifestations, will it have other manifestations? - if these manifestations are implicit in it, then is it really more fundamental? Could there be something even more (more) fundamental to this more fundamental process that helps us understand why a fundamental process expresses itself in the duality of consciousness and matter/energy? The hard problem pales in comparison ... ;-)

    matter/energy - consciousness

    MFP (more fundamental process)

    DUP (deeper underlying process that exlains MFP)

    SMDMUP (still more deeper more underlying process to explain DUP)
    ...
    ...
    ...
    turtle 1
    turtle 2
    turtle 3
    ...
    ...
    turtle n

    ;-)

    I'm in the realm of parody here ... but you get the point.
     
    Soupie and Constance like this.
  2. smcder

    smcder Paranormal Adept

    Joined:
    Feb 6, 2016
    Messages:
    1,893
    Likes Received:
    1,133
    Location:
    Arkansas, USA
    let me just note that this DOES NOT make me a:

    1. hard emergentist
    2. Rortian neo-pragmatist
    3. Pankseppian
    4. dualist (I always feel I need to throw that disclaimer in)
    5. neo-Testudinal foundationalist
     
    Constance likes this.
  3. smcder

    smcder Paranormal Adept

    Joined:
    Feb 6, 2016
    Messages:
    1,893
    Likes Received:
    1,133
    Location:
    Arkansas, USA
  4. smcder

    smcder Paranormal Adept

    Joined:
    Feb 6, 2016
    Messages:
    1,893
    Likes Received:
    1,133
    Location:
    Arkansas, USA
    Andrei Simionescu-Panait: Husserl's somatology was conceived as the discipline that ought to study the dynamical aspects of the emergence of experience within the embodied consciousness – by following the ongoing generative constitution of rational acts from within the prerational transcendental realm of experience, and by stressing out the fundamental importance of that prerational net of possibilities of the lived body.

    Do you think that 21st century scientific communities will be able to see the importance of the lived character of experience?


    Do you think that all areas of science will eventually manage to integrate Husserlian phenomenology into their research?

    Dan Zahavi: I think the scientific community is already far more receptive to the idea that the lived character of experience must be accounted for than it was just 30 years ago. This is all part of the well-known boom in consciousness research that happened in the early nineties. Just consider how the study of phenomenal and subjective consciousness went from being a topic few dared touch because of its perceived “un-scientific” character to being a hot topic in cognitive and affective neuroscience. This, however, is certainly not to say that all is well. Although mainstream science might currently be more attentive to the importance of subjective consciousness, the latter is still primarily considered a mere object of study rather than something with an essential impact on the very possibility of cognition. In short, transcendental considerations are still very far from being incorporated into the scientific outlook. Hard to say whether this will ever change, but unless it does, I don’t think it is very likely that all areas of science will ever go Husserlian.

    Andrei Simionescu-Panait: The last decades have seen a revival of Husserl's phenomenology within select scientific areas of study. Thinkers such as Varela, Thompson, Edelman, Barbieri, T. Deacon, Sheets-Johnstone have adapted phenomenology to biology, anthropology, neurology, linguistics and have generated new domains of research, such as biosemantics and neurophenomenology. What is your vision regarding the importance of interdisciplinary approaches on consciousness studies? Also, what pheno-based recently emerged area (or areas) of research do you consider to be “the next big thing” in science?

    Dan Zahavi: I am firmly committed to the importance of interdisciplinary collaboration when it comes to the study of consciousness. Consciousness is far too complex and complicated to be left to one discipline only. I consequently think it will be of paramount importance to integrate a variety of different empirical and theoretical perspectives if we are to make any serious progress. It is hard to predict what the next new area will be, but emotion research seems to be up and coming. But incidentally, some important areas are actually forgotten from your list. Consider that psychiatry and psychopathology has a very long history for engaging with phenomenology. Just think of the work of Karl Jaspers. And what about physics? Consider the work of Hermann Weyl.
     
    Constance likes this.
  5. smcder

    smcder Paranormal Adept

    Joined:
    Feb 6, 2016
    Messages:
    1,893
    Likes Received:
    1,133
    Location:
    Arkansas, USA
    Andrei Simionescu-Panait: Let's have a look back at the history of western philosophy. Some thinkers more or less follow in the Heraclitean tradition by stressing out the notion of change, which is directly linked to the concept of stream – Aristotle's studies of the body in the Physics and the De anima, sparse perspectives concerning lifeworld acts from Diogenes the Cynic, Hume's discussion of the perception of space in the Treatise (which announces sections §36 to §41 from Ideas II), Kant's transcendental aesthetics, some more transcendental in Schelling's Naturphilosophie and finally – Nietzsche's own life, lived by the way of his custom made epoché. Husserl came and gave life and rigorous contour to this fragmentary underlying tradition of thought by inventing phenomenology. Given the fact that all those thinkers had intuitions regarding concepts like bracketing, emergence, the prerational (or prereflective) horizon of experience, etc. - without having the technical means to study, let's say, the saccadic eye movement (as a prerational act), I want to ask you if phenomenology can always be reconfigured as a method, given the recurring invention of new tools of investigation. What is your perspective on this?

    Dan Zahavi: Hmm. Here is perhaps what might qualify as an answer: For Husserl, phenomenology is not just one type of philosophy among many. Phenomenology, and the phenomenological attitude, is the philosophical stance par excellence. This is in all likelihood also why Husserl would claim that a philosopher who embraced naturalism would have ceased being a philosopher. If we just for a second assume that Husserl is right and that the reflective stance of phenomenology is really the stance of philosophy, then we also ought to recognize that Husserl was not the first phenomenologist, but that others figures up through history have entertained similar ideas. Likewise, whereas it is hard to predict whether there will self-avowed phenomenologists 100 years from now, I am quite confident that the basic insights found in phenomenology will continue to flourish though perhaps in new forms and guises. In fact, if we think there is some truth to phenomenology, then I also think we need to be confident that it will be able to renew itself.
     
    Constance likes this.
  6. Constance

    Constance Paranormal Adept

    Joined:
    Feb 6, 2013
    Messages:
    6,242
    Likes Received:
    3,638
    I've found a page that addresses and clarifies the stages in the phenomenological and neuroscientific history of what Steve describes as "the long, strange road from Husserl's ambitions to neuro-phenomenology."

    neurophenomenology – Neurophenomenology

    For the moment, I'll quote a lengthy extract from Part 2 of a comprehensive analysis of developments in that history [appearing part-way down the informative page I've just linked; note that links are also embedded there to Parts 1 and 3 of this historical interdisciplinary analysis]. I think that everything presented on and linked at the above-linked webpage as a whole must be read and understood if our current discussion is to proceed with any mutual understanding of -- and responsibility to -- what has been developed over the last century in the project of understanding consciousness and mind and their relationships with biological embodiment and contact with the environments/world in which consciousness has emerged.


    ". . . Pribram’s essay “Behaviorism, Phenomenology, and Holism in Psychology” pointed to the need for a broader, phenomenologically and neurobiologically informed approach to psychology (pg. 142:

    “But there are limits to understanding achieved solely through the observation and experimental analysis of behavior. These limits are especially apparent when problems other than overt behavior are addressed, problems related to thought or to decisional processes, to appetive and other motivational mechanisms, to emotions and feelings, and even to images and perception”.

    and (pg. 146):

    “Existential-phenomenological psychology has not, up to now, been very clear in it’s methods. I suggest that multidimensional analyses (factor analysis, principle components analysis, stepwise discriminant analysis) might serve well as tools to investigate the structure of experience-in-the-world.”

    Moss lucidly analyzed the similarities and divergences between neuroscience and existential-phenomenology in a essay entitled “Phenomenology and Neuropsychology” (pg.159):

    “Pribram points to the role of the brain processes in”constructing” the world as perceived. Yet existential-phenomenology has also emphasized the “constituting functions”of the ego (Husserl), the constituitive role of the lived body (Merleau-Ponty), and the role of the human body and upright posture in articulating the world of sensory experience (Straus). Thus, neither school of thought naively recognizes a reality per se unaffected by the presence and condition of the organism.”

    Such exchanges occurred on the margins of mind-science. By the 1960’s, the largely cold-war funded research program of Artificial Intelligence (A.I) and growing interest in cognitive or information-processing approaches to problems in psychology etc. had produced a “cognitive revolution”. Some brave cognitivists even made use of introspective techniques (though not without drawing fire from behaviorists). Herbert Simon asked his subjects to verbally report on how they solved logic-puzzles, much to the chagrin of the remaining orthodox behaviorists. The renewal of mentalistic language and willingness to freely use data from introspection and verbal reports from subjects about how they solved logic problems was a robust challenge to the behaviorists, but over time a rapprochement ensued.

    But what really allowed the scientific study of consciousness and experience to re-emerge was the success of theoretical and laboratory neuroscience. EEG data had been produced for years with good temporal but limited spatial resolution, but in the 1970’s and 1980’s an alphabet soup of new imaging technologies (CAT, PET, MRI, and recently MEG) allowed neuroscientists to better “peek inside” the living brains of subjects in experiments. Progress in molecular biology, genomics, and biophysics in the postwar West allowed curious researchers to formulate models of emotions in chemical terms, such as the finding of endogenous opiates (or endorphins) and their receptors in the brain. The finding that nerve fibers connect with the organs of the immune system helped ground theories of the effect of emotions and beliefs on health, leading to the interdiscipline of psychoneuroimmunology. A growing industry to synthesize pharmaceutical products based on the molecular structure of receptor proteins has led to neuropharmacology and neuropsychopharmacology.

    Some brain researchers looking for theoretical models of the mind found the information-processing/computationalist approach of the cognitivists limiting in understanding emotions and experience. Cognitive science itself had been rocked from its early (late 1950’s-early 1960’s) success to the gradual realization that many aspects of mind are not easily characterized as formal-logical, rule-based systems, as had been predicted by the phenomenologically-informed philosopher Hubert Dreyfus (1972) in What Computers Can’t Do, where he argued that rule-based, symbolic-logical, representationalist models of mind and language fail to deal with the radically embodied nature of cognition. This was hotly rejected by prominent AI researchers, but later influenced Terry Winograd, among others.

    [​IMG]

    Mostly the insights of clinical neurologists and phenomenological psychologists were ignored in postwar cognitive science, which had a great overlap with computer science and Artificial Intelligence (A.I). Indeed, cognitivists and AI engineers might profess agnosticism about the neurobiology of the mind, viewing brain “hardware” as the domain of other specialists. In the late 1950’s and through the 1960’s, cognitive science and Artificial Intelligence seemed to have revolutionary new insights. AI as engineering of useful artifacts overlapped with AI as cognitive modeling. An early era of exciting optimism eventually gave way to slow progress on “general purpose” problem solving. The limitations of their symbolic-logical, information-processing, and computationalist approach led others to develop the hybrid field of cognitive neuroscience. Sometimes there were interesting discrepancies between the two: onetime “pure” cognitivist Stephen Kosslyn performed neuroimaging experiments on subjects who were asked to rotate mental objects. According to John McCrone’s report of Kosslyn’s work in Going Inside: A Tour ‘Round a Single Moment of Consciousness, the resulting pattern of distributed activity across disparate brain regions was difficult to reconcile with the neat schematic Kosslyn had developed as an abstract cognitive model possessing a few modules for accomplishing aspects of the rotation operation. This lends credence to those who propose that cognitive science must be much more thoroughly integrated with the “gory details” of neuroscience, with the neural networks/connectionist camp serving as a conceptual bridge fro brain to symbols and representations. Over time, the lack of interest in biology and “implementation agnosticism” of some computationalist cognitive scientists has given way to modern cognitive neuroscience. A movement in the 1980’s to reform cognitive science and artificial intelligence along biologically-inspired and “subsymbolic” lines known as connectionism, artificial neural-networks, and parallel-distributed processing splits cogntivism to this day.

    A pathbreaking (and for some, puzzling*) book appeared in the second half of the 1980’s that seemed to point the way to a synthesis of neurobiology, cognitivism, computer science, and phenomenology: Understanding computers and cognition: a new foundation for design by AI and language-processing expert Terry Winograd and Fernando Flores:

    [​IMG]

    The book proposed a phenomenologically-grounded understanding of how people in real-world environments use systems that software designers build. It took inspiration from Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela‘s idea of autopoesis, a cybernetics-inspired, dynamical theory of organisms self-organizing their own structure by regenerating parts and by being coupled to their environment, until death. The brains of creatures do not represent features (such as colors) of objects external to them as cognitivists typically assume. Rather, each ecologically-situated animal brings forth or co-constitutes a perceived world through evolutionarily-selected sensorimotor systems. Autopoesis is a sort of post-Cartesian biology, and Maturana and Varela described it in 1981 as:

    “a network of processes of production (transformation and destruction) of components which: (i) through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in space in which they (the components) exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a network.”

    While a cognitivist might recognize a consonance with cybernetics here, abandoning representationalism is very difficult for some. What other bridging concepts are there to relate brain and mind events? This is still an open issue.

    As it turned out, a sophisticated alternative to cognitivism was on the way: Walter Freeman, Francisco Varela, and others have offered a post-representationalist approach to consciousness, cognition, and the brain based in dynamical systems theory. The undercurrents of dissatisfaction with understanding the mind as information-processing, rule-based symbolic logical procedures, and “computations over representations” emerged in the 1990’s as embodied cognitive science and neurophenomenology.

    (Part I is here, and part III is here)"
     
    Last edited: Oct 12, 2017 at 4:59 PM
  7. Soupie

    Soupie Paranormal Adept

    Joined:
    Jul 21, 2013
    Messages:
    2,105
    Likes Received:
    996
    Location:
    Unbound Telesis
    Yep. There may or may not be MFP. All I'm "exploring" is the notion that phenomenal consciousness does not emerge from matter/energy.
     
    smcder likes this.
  8. Constance

    Constance Paranormal Adept

    Joined:
    Feb 6, 2013
    Messages:
    6,242
    Likes Received:
    3,638
    Note to @Usual Suspect: in your post yesterday you mistook my use of the phrase "spinning our wheels" as agreement with your consistent refusal to engage with the detailed development of this thread over the last 2-3 years and your consequent dismissal of the value of the thread. Every question, issue, and approach we have taken up and discussed so far in the development of this thread has been necessary for us to reach our present engagement with the deeply interdisciplinary sources and insights into the nature of consciousness that inform 'consciousness studies' in our time.

    What I meant by 'spinning our wheels' in the post you reacted to was the long detour we have taken recently into discussing some currently expressed ontological 'truth' claims postulated on slender hypotheses based in presuppositional thinking.
     
    Soupie and smcder like this.
  9. Constance

    Constance Paranormal Adept

    Joined:
    Feb 6, 2013
    Messages:
    6,242
    Likes Received:
    3,638
    Unfortunately the territory of MFP/SMFP you are attempting to identify as the remote physical explanation of consciousness is so remote that experiential consciousness cannot be found there, demonstrated to exist there. If you were to let go, temporarily, of your adherence to the promissory note of physicalists -- who claim that one fine (remote) day their presuppositional beliefs will be borne out -- you might be able to read and comprehend what the phenomenological analyses of experiential consciousness have to offer.
     
  10. smcder

    smcder Paranormal Adept

    Joined:
    Feb 6, 2016
    Messages:
    1,893
    Likes Received:
    1,133
    Location:
    Arkansas, USA
    OK, it was confusing because you said "there are likely more fundamental processes underlying consciousness and matter/energy" and that's different from "there may or may not be MFP"
     
    Soupie likes this.
  11. Soupie

    Soupie Paranormal Adept

    Joined:
    Jul 21, 2013
    Messages:
    2,105
    Likes Received:
    996
    Location:
    Unbound Telesis
    Constance:

    What I am attempting to do is get a grip on how phenomenal consciousness in particular is related to the contents of consciousness—what we know of as matter and energy.

    I'm currently exploring the idea that phenomenal consciousness and matter/energy are ontologically identical. We "know" this substrate both via the 1st person perspective and the 3rd person perspective.

    If you feel that phenomenological philosophy can help me get a grip on the relationship (or non-relationship) between phenomenal consciousness and matter/energy, then please explain.
     
    Last edited: Oct 12, 2017 at 8:56 PM
  12. Usual Suspect

    Usual Suspect USI Calgary

    Joined:
    Aug 15, 2010
    Messages:
    8,138
    Likes Received:
    5,731
    Location:
    Calgary Canada
    Home Page:
    How nonsensical proclamations like that just magically pop into your head is a mystery that will probably never solved.
    And all this time I thought we were just having a friendly forum discussion.
    So no comment on the Colin McGinn clip I posted then?
     
  13. smcder

    smcder Paranormal Adept

    Joined:
    Feb 6, 2016
    Messages:
    1,893
    Likes Received:
    1,133
    Location:
    Arkansas, USA
    I guess someone will have to tell him how long we've been looking at Colin McGinn ...
     
    Soupie likes this.
  14. smcder

    smcder Paranormal Adept

    Joined:
    Feb 6, 2016
    Messages:
    1,893
    Likes Received:
    1,133
    Location:
    Arkansas, USA
    Constance and Soupie like this.
  15. smcder

    smcder Paranormal Adept

    Joined:
    Feb 6, 2016
    Messages:
    1,893
    Likes Received:
    1,133
    Location:
    Arkansas, USA

    And all this time I thought we were just having a friendly forum discussion.


    and yet how unfriendly you have been! :)
     
    Constance likes this.
  16. smcder

    smcder Paranormal Adept

    Joined:
    Feb 6, 2016
    Messages:
    1,893
    Likes Received:
    1,133
    Location:
    Arkansas, USA
    Case in point:

    Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 10

    Ufology says:

    Welcome to the thread. You've stepped into a 10 part pile of doo doo that goes nowhere.

    Sounds a mighty heap like a "dismissal of the value of the thread" to me!
     
    Constance likes this.
  17. Soupie

    Soupie Paranormal Adept

    Joined:
    Jul 21, 2013
    Messages:
    2,105
    Likes Received:
    996
    Location:
    Unbound Telesis
    What I find more asinine is the thought that @Usual Suspect has probably convinced himself that his own position regarding consciousness has been like McGinn's from the start!

    When in actuality it wasn't too long ago that Usual Suspect was telling us the HP was nothing but semantics!

    And you're right, he has consistently characterized this discussion as being rubbish, etc. It seemed that he had reached this conclusion because we hadn't resolved the HP! That's right, we haven't resolved a millenniums old problem in this discussion.

    What we have done is discuss a myriad of approaches to this problem. None of which is not without problems.

    All of this which we've explained to him. My guess is that Usual Suspect just now fully groks the HP/MBP.

    Now he's "introducing" us to McGinn. Lol
     
    smcder likes this.
  18. Constance

    Constance Paranormal Adept

    Joined:
    Feb 6, 2013
    Messages:
    6,242
    Likes Received:
    3,638
    ? Do you mean to say that, as you experience consciousness, the contents of your consciousness consist only of abstract conceptualizations of matter and energy? Or what?

    That's an interesting thesis. Can you explain and defend it in any detail?

    It seems to me that you are preoccupied with a desire or need for knowledge of the Absolute as the single source of Being unifying mind and world, also sought by the 19th-century German Romantic philosophers. Here's a link to a book that might be useful for you, Dalia Nassar's The Romantic Absolute: Being and Knowing in Early German Romantic Philosophy, 1795-1804. Here are a few reviewer's comments:

    The Romantic Absolute is an excellent book. Dalia Nassar has a superb command of the very difficult materials she deals with and makes a strong case for the significance of ‘romantic philosophy’ by offering extensive readings of Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg), Friedrich Schlegel, and Friedrich Schelling. Not simply carving out a little niche but addressing the core issue in Germany around 1800, she thinks along with these thinkers, unfolding how they explore different versions of the ‘absolute.’”
    (John H. Smith, University of California, Irvine) [note to Steve: three more 'Friedrichs' to deal with in German philosophy]

    “Dalia Nassar’s The Romantic Absolute is an excellent book. It focuses on the still relatively neglected topic of the metaphysical and epistemological foundations of German romanticism. Nassar argues for interpreting the leading romantics as constructive metaphysicians (a reading which leads her to include Friedrich Schelling as one of them). Her historical scholarship is first-rate, her critical discussion of other secondary literature consistently illuminating, and she writes with a rare combination of linguistic mastery and intellectual clarity that makes her book a pleasure to read.”
    (Michael Forster, Bonn University)

    “In The Romantic Absolute, Dalia Nassar explores the treacherous philosophical territory between Kant and Hegel, which is the reserve of the early romantics: the poet Friedrich von Hardenberg (Novalis), the classicist Friedrich Schlegel, and the boy-philosopher Friedrich Schelling. Danger lurks here. Without a reliable guide, the reader can quickly tumble into crevasses of incomprehension. Nassar provides such a guide. With articulate verve, she shows how the romantics construed nature and mind as identical, how in Schelling’s terms nature was the poetry of mind and mind the outgrowth of nature. Following a careful path through thickets of disputing critics, she illuminates the darker areas of German romanticism and protects the reader from sliding into the slough of despond.”
    (Robert J. Richards, University of Chicago)

    The best postulate I've been able to offer here in the past is the speculation that the core phenomena of interactivity, superposition, decoherence, and entanglement as presently described in the q substrate might have instituted an ensemble of primordial habits of nature beginning at the Big Bang [or from whatever pre-existed the Big Bang?] and influencing the subsequent evolution and development of the 'universe' presently visible to us including the appearance of life and mind within it. My impression is that the details of how those enabling habits in the q substrate have constituted the 'World' we think we exist in (universe, multiverse, cosmos?) remain to be worked out. While phenomenological philosophy might help you get a 'grip' on the conditions of your personal existence and the nature of your lived experience, it won't, of course, provide you with knowledge of any Absolute foundations of Being, here or elsewhere.
     
  19. Soupie

    Soupie Paranormal Adept

    Joined:
    Jul 21, 2013
    Messages:
    2,105
    Likes Received:
    996
    Location:
    Unbound Telesis
    Re the idea that we know reality via 1st and 3rd person perspectives.

    It's not a new thesis on my part. I've been articulating it for months. It is the thesis expressed in Max Velman's Reflexive Monism:

    Reflexive monism - Wikipedia

    "Reflexive monism maintains that, in its evolution from some primal undifferentiated state, the universe differentiates into distinguishable physical entities, at least some of which have the potential for conscious experience [subjective experience - Soupie], such as human beings. While remaining embedded within and dependent on the surrounding universe and composed of the same fundamental stuff, each human, equipped with perceptual and cognitive systems, has an individual perspective on, or view of, the rest of the universe and him or her self. In this sense, each human participates in a process whereby the universe differentiates into parts and becomes conscious of itself, making the process reflexive. ..."

    If you read the full entry, you'll see that some believe that this view actually does not entail an ontological identity between mind and body, but I strongly disagree.

    Perception does allow us a "3rd person" perspective on what-is, but it is still ultimately—and ontologically—a 1st person perspective. The 3rd person perspective is ultimately a process of inference via the 1st person perspective on what we assume/infer is an external, mind-independent reality.

    Thus, the mind "viewed" from the 1st person perspective "appears" as the steam of consciousness we all know from early childhood onward; the mind "viewed" from the 3rd person perspective appears as a body/brain (within our 1st person stream of consciousness).

    They are ontologically identical, but "look" different based on the perspective they are viewed from.
     
    Last edited: Oct 13, 2017 at 5:51 PM
  20. Constance

    Constance Paranormal Adept

    Joined:
    Feb 6, 2013
    Messages:
    6,242
    Likes Received:
    3,638
    I'll read the Wikipedia entry you linked and I remember our discussions in earlier parts of C&P of Velman's theory of Reflexism Monism. I think we also need to bring into this discussion Velman's paper "Psychophysical Nature," which I linked in a post a few months ago [pg. 24 of Part 10] when we were contemplating panpsychism, here:

    Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 10

    I think it would be helpful at this point for us to review the discussions we had on pages 23 and 24 and perhaps the pages leading up to and following those pages. We linked and discussed additional relevant papers then (early August) that I've found helpful in trying to understand what you wrote yesterday concerning 1st and 3rd person perspectives both being implicit in preconscious senses of 'what is'/'what was' in the early stages of formation of the universe out of the quantum substrate in which subjectivity was somehow already present.

    You added the following statements in your post yesterday, which we should also discuss:

    "If you read the full [Wikipedia] entry, you'll see that some believe that this view actually does not entail an ontological identity between mind and body, but I strongly disagree.

    Perception does allow us a "3rd person" perspective on what-is, but it is still ultimately—and ontologically—a 1st person perspective. The 3rd person perspective is ultimately a process of inference via the 1st person perspective on what we assume/infer is an external, mind-independent reality.

    Thus, the mind "viewed" from the 1st person perspective "appears" as the steam of consciousness we all know from early childhood onward; the mind "viewed" from the 3rd person perspective appears as a body/brain (within our 1st person stream of consciousness).

    They are ontologically identical, but "look" different based on the perspective they are viewed from."
     
    Last edited: Oct 13, 2017 at 8:14 PM
Loading...

Share This Page