Philosophy, Science, & The Unexplained - Main Thread

[Randall]

Or, if you prefer - we can use an anesthetic - would the rate and order of change matter to you then? For that matter, we could use the more mechanical Kurzweilian procedure?

I think there are substantial differences inherent in the procedures that cannot be reconciled. I'm sure you can reflect on them yourself easier than me explaining them.

 

[Jeff Davis]

No. I am the totality of my being. Destroying myself to make an inferior copy of some small portion of myself gains me nothing.

I liked your thread TO, because I admire your staunchness sincerely. Can you provide us other examples in nature wherein at least one other similar unguided aspect of what is human sentience arises from the sophistication of matter?

I just want to grasp more clearly, this progressive sophistication of matter known as a free willed, self recognizing, intelligent, being. Beyond the scientific faith offered up by the D. Evolution crowd that is.

If energy, which unquestionably we run on, and is one of the attracting factors within that relevant ocean like circuit we swim in called consciousness, can neither create nor destroy itself due to our basic understanding of thermodynamics, how is such a self contained perpetuation of being possible without the environmental template that consciousness provides?

Again, in my opinion, we are an animal that is by nature energetically coupled with consciousness by and of evolutionary design. I am not proposing new age mysticism or anything that deviates from the natural progressive models of species specific development within the context of that biological creature's environment.

 

[trainedobserver]

Jeff,
Much of what you said makes no sense to me. The second paragraph being entirely incomprehensible. The human body runs entirely on the energy released through chemical reactions.

I am saying we are not our just our consciousness. It is not the end-all, be-all. We are the entire organism of which our awareness/consciousness serves, not as a rider or driver, but rather the dashboard with which we navigate the environment and serve the needs of the organism.

 

[trainedobserver]

The "I" that can't be found is a necessary device that allows us to differentiate between ourselves and the said raw materials necessary for the chemical factory that is the human organism.

Do all organisms have this device? The zombie problem in philosophy is that it's conceivable for every human activity to occur without consciousness.

So, would you accept the Moravec/Kurzweil offer?

Well, I think it's difficult to tell. The "this is me and that is not" mechanism, however that is implemented, would seem to be an essential component in any survival situation.

Thinking about the M/K offer again. Are we essentially discussing whether our identity is associated with the pattern or the material of the human organism? I'm thinking our identification should be with both. If we could somehow magically or technologically transfer the pattern of ourselves (the physical configuration of all of our bits) onto other materials, even if they were identically biological, it would still be "another." I imagine if this were done to perfection, the copy would think it was an undisrupted continuation of the original. It could make for some interesting psychological complications in the copy.

 

[smcder]

I think there are substantial differences inherent in the procedures that cannot be reconciled. I'm sure you can reflect on them yourself easier than me explaining them.

I don't know that it's a matter of "easier" - I can reflect on my own thought but I can't come up with yours - I am interested in your thoughts and answers. I live with my own thoughts all the time! (and I get tired of them) - so a fresh perspective is valuable to me. I'm not going anywhere in particular with the questions - just seeing what comes from them, what holds up to them and I hope you would answer them differently than me. I suspect you would.

Under one perspective, there are no differences in the procedures, no reason to control the rate or order of neuron replacements (I do still want to hear your answer as to how the engineers will make these decisions - it would mean knowing how to preserve consciousness as it's replaced? (not sure I'm coherent here):

We decided earlier it's possible to create a device with all of the requirements to be conscious but we can't prove that it is conscious. So that leaves open the possibility of a "zombie".

We may be using the term "epiphenomena" differently - my understanding is that, as you said, it is just what is as a result of a sufficient degree of complexity - the way Dennett and others use it - subjectivity (the "I") is just "along for the ride" so to speak and doesn't offer anything. Interestingly, the Buddhist doctrine of Dependent Origination (as I understand it) is similar . . .

Epiphenomenalism - Dennett claims experiments show that consciousness is constructed after the fact - that there are spikes in the brain before a decision is consciously made so that you can reliably say what the person is going to do before they can . . . others have disputed these experiments (of course!) . . . and my understanding of Dennett is that he doesn't allow for consciousness to "feed back into" behavior - so reflection and mulling things over, the very things we are doing now theoretically occur without subjective awareness - it is constructed afterward and indeed, if we acknowledge zombies, we have to at least admit that such things can exist and function with the same "intelligence" to all outward aspects. This gets into Free Will and Searle, I think it is - argues that free will is necessary for rationality and that has implications for the role of consciousness but that seems far afield to our discussion - Here is another problem which is if you are patient #2 then no matter what assurances from patient #1, he will no more be able to prove to you that he is conscious than the device we constructed above - so it's getting at a way to test your faith or satisfaction that the process will indeed work and make the decision to submit to it. That's why I asked why you wanted to be awake for the process and control the rate and which neurons are replaced when? You go to sleep each night, the brain changes - someone else wakes up (under this theory) and really, in a way you are always undergoing the process you describe (neuronal replacement) all the time. (again, I think) -

So is the Kuerzweil objection merely visceral or is there a difference in slicing away the brain and replacing it physically one at a time in the brain with neurons? Under this view there is no location of consciousness because it's not a thing that can be located - it's an epiphenomena that arises "here" in you before the operation and then arises, identically, "there" after the operation - with here and there only referring to the physical location of the neurons, whichever procedure. So it's really only if we can show that consciousness makes any difference at all that we can choose between them or choose not to engage in either operation (given, of course, sufficient incentive but not enough to encourage "sacrifice" i.e. I can't offer you a body of steel to better care for your loved ones, for example) - I'm not quite sure what to do with the desire for pleasure experienced in your own subjective awareness, under this view, this is all also constructed after the fact - after the release of dopamine or whatever, but is essentially (I'm hesitant to use the word "illusory" but it seems to apply) - back to the Doctrine of Dependent Origination and the Tibetan diamond drill - under this meditative scrutiny, the "I" and everything associated with it, does indeed slice away (or is drilled to dust in the traditional metaphor) just like in the first part of the Kurzweilian procedure and I find that fascinating . . . I think

 

[smcder]

Well, I think it's difficult to tell. The "this is me and that is not" mechanism, however that is implemented, would seem to be an essential component in any survival situation.

Thinking about the M/K offer again. Are we essentially discussing whether our identity is associated with the pattern or the material of the human organism? I'm thinking our identification should be with both. If we could somehow magically or technologically transfer the pattern of ourselves (the physical configuration of all of our bits) onto other materials, even if they were identically biological, it would still be "another." I imagine if this were done to perfection, the copy would think it was an undisrupted continuation of the original. It could make for some interesting psychological complications in the copy.

I saw Oblivion the other night and realized that the girl could always have a fresh supply of TomCruises - so he had better mind his Ps and Qs! ;-)

Well, I think it's difficult to tell. The "this is me and that is not" mechanism, however that is implemented, would seem to be an essential component in any survival situation.

Right - it's just is subjective awareness needed for this? The zombie theory would say it isn't, that an entirely unconscious mechanism could do this with no "inner life" whatsoever. (The zombie theory says a zombie can do anything a human can do (and maybe better! ;-) without consciousness.)

I discussed some ideas about whether it would still be "another" in any meaningful sense in my last post. At least as it's seen under one view. For me, there is a strong intuition that it would - but that might be a function of self-preservation written into our cognitive structure or it might be a cultural bias - as the Buddhists seem to be able to come to see the "I" quite differently (and I suppose anyone could following their techniques) - but the "I" itself seems to be universal, although the Origination of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind and other theories seem to think that subjective awareness, the "I" has evolved over time from say ancient Egypt where most did not have a truly independent sense of self . . . I have no idea here what the heck I am talking about.

Too early . . . "I" need coffee!

 

[smcder]

I think Death is the other process that we have left off the table here - do you fight, do you not go gentle into that good night, neuron by neuron? Insisting that something is being lost? Or do you have some equanimity in the process (assuming you are conscious at the time) - aware that only an illusion, a construct is being redistributed back into "the system" in the most natural of processes.

OK . . . what kind of coffee is this??

 

[Randall]

I don't know that it's a matter of "easier" - I can reflect on my own thought but I can't come up with yours - I am interested in your thoughts and answers. I live with my own thoughts all the time! (and I get tired of them) - so a fresh perspective is valuable to me. I'm not going anywhere in particular with the questions - just seeing what comes from them, what holds up to them and I hope you would answer them differently than me. I suspect you would.

The consequences of both versions ( nano-neuronal live replacement versus slice and digitize ) result from fundamental differences in the engineering and process, and therefore assuming the same analysis is done, the results of that analysis should also be the same. That is to say that your analysis should reveal the same differences as mine or anyone else's.

Under one perspective, there are no differences in the procedures, no reason to control the rate or order of neuron replacements (I do still want to hear your answer as to how the engineers will make these decisions - it would mean knowing how to preserve consciousness as it's replaced? (not sure I'm coherent here):

As I said, controlling the rate of replacement is a question for engineers and has no bearing on the fundamental question.

We decided earlier it's possible to create a device with all of the requirements to be conscious but we can't prove that it is conscious. So that leaves open the possibility of a "zombie".

We've already been through all that in our discussion of the so-called "hard problem". I don't know what else can be added.

We may be using the term "epiphenomena" differently - my understanding is that, as you said, it is just what is as a result of a sufficient degree of complexity - the way Dennett and others use it - subjectivity (the "I") is just "along for the ride" so to speak and doesn't offer anything. Interestingly, the Buddhist doctrine of Dependent Origination (as I understand it) is similar . . .

Epiphenomenalism - Dennett claims experiments show that consciousness is constructed after the fact - that there are spikes in the brain before a decision is consciously made so that you can reliably say what the person is going to do before they can . . . others have disputed these experiments (of course!) . . . and my understanding of Dennett is that he doesn't allow for consciousness to "feed back into" behavior - so reflection and mulling things over, the very things we are doing now theoretically occur without subjective awareness - it is constructed afterward and indeed, if we acknowledge zombies, we have to at least admit that such things can exist and function with the same "intelligence" to all outward aspects.

There is a difference here between what you and I seem to be referring to as "subjective awareness". Returning to our imaginary red Ferrari. Regardless of how the image in our imagination is constructed, it exists as a purely subjective object that we are aware of, and therefore we possess subjective awareness.

This gets into Free Will and Searle, I think it is - argues that free will is necessary for rationality and that has implications for the role of consciousness but that seems far afield to our discussion - Here is another problem which is if you are patient #2 then no matter what assurances from patient #1, he will no more be able to prove to you that he is conscious than the device we constructed above - so it's getting at a way to test your faith or satisfaction that the process will indeed work and make the decision to submit to it. That's why I asked why you wanted to be awake for the process and control the rate and which neurons are replaced when? You go to sleep each night, the brain changes - someone else wakes up (under this theory) and really, in a way you are always undergoing the process you describe (neuronal replacement) all the time. (again, I think) -

Sure, the above is coherent and deserves to be addressed, but before that, let me say that I've been discussing the issue you mentioned with respect to Dennett for years because it's obvious that because of how the brain works, we cannot possibly have free will in the way that people usually define it ( as the ability to freely make conscious decisions ). In recent years EEG and other scanning techniques have provided empirical evidence that also proves it scientifically rather than logically.

The effect of sleep on identity is one of the first problems that comes up with respect to how we look at the brain in relation to identity. One facet of this problem is the importance assigned to continuity of consciousness, and I think that is an important issue, but it needs to be considered in the context of how it affects our unconscious ( including our sleep ) state, and what we consider to be a normal rate of change in our biological structure and the resulting consequences of such change.

The other facet of our material construction as it relates to identity, and that is often overlooked is the concept of ownership. There is a case that can be made that provided that the changes don't involve the invasion of unwanted material, that simple changes in material do not affect the concept of ownership. For example, everyday cells are replaced and grown and because those cells belong to us we can say they are a part of us that we've acquired and that the old ones are a part of us that we've discarded. Sleep doesn't change this concept of ownership.

The issue of nanoscale neural implants may however have ownership issues. Unless these units are given freely to the recipient so that they can take ownership of them, then they don't integrate to become part of what the recipient is, but rather replace the recipient with material owned by someone or something else. This gets into some rather interesting debates on the concept of what it means to be an individual, but it also cannot be ignored. I would not want to go through a procedure where my consciousness was suddenly the property of xyz corporation. Here's a link to a related video spoof that illustrates this really well:

Welcome To Life - Consciousness 2.0

NOTE: Another forum member actually posted this someplace else first
but In couldn't find it to link to.​

So is the Kuerzweil objection merely visceral or is there a difference in slicing away the brain and replacing it physically one at a time in the brain with neurons? Under this view there is no location of consciousness because it's not a thing that can be located - it's an epiphenomena that arises "here" in you before the operation and then arises, identically, "there" after the operation - with here and there only referring to the physical location of the neurons, whichever procedure. So it's really only if we can show that consciousness makes any difference at all that we can choose between them or choose not to engage in either operation (given, of course, sufficient incentive but not enough to encourage "sacrifice" i.e. I can't offer you a body of steel to better care for your loved ones, for example) - I'm not quite sure what to do with the desire for pleasure experienced in your own subjective awareness, under this view, this is all also constructed after the fact - after the release of dopamine or whatever, but is essentially (I'm hesitant to use the word "illusory" but it seems to apply) - back to the Doctrine of Dependent Origination and the Tibetan diamond drill - under this meditative scrutiny, the "I" and everything associated with it, does indeed slice away (or is drilled to dust in the traditional metaphor) just like in the first part of the Kurzweilian procedure and I find that fascinating . . . I think

Yes there is a difference. The evidence is that consciousness is located in close proximity to the brain that is producing it. Therefore maintaining proximity and function during replacement seems necessary in order to justify a continuity of personhood. Nanoscale neuron replacement fits these criteria, whereas the slice and digitize method doesn't.

 

[smcder]

There is a difference here between what you and I seem to be referring to as "subjective awareness". Returning to our imaginary red Ferrari. Regardless of how the image in our imagination is constructed, it exists as a purely subjective object that we are aware of, and therefore we possess subjective awareness.

There does seem to be a difference here - I'm not sure I understand your definition, but I may try to go back over your theory to see - as it may offer something that epiphenomenalism and eliminative materialism do not. There also seems to be a difference in the sense of the direction of the discussion (which is very open for me!), but this helps me to see where you are coming from (and where you are going) and is very interesting to me. If nothing else, it re-kindles some interest in the hard problem.

 

[smcder]

Now it makes me wonder if we could offer a neural implant that allows you finally find out what it is like to be a bat! ;-) A bit of humor - but it gets at the hard problem a bit too and the uses of the terms consciousness (elements of which do seem to be describable as a field) subjective awareness and what it is like to be in the discussion thread . . . interesting, interesting.

 

[Randall]

There does seem to be a difference here - I'm not sure I understand your definition, but I may try to go back over your theory to see - as it may offer something that epiphenomenalism and eliminative materialism do not. There also seems to be a difference in the sense of the direction of the discussion (which is very open for me!), but this helps me to see where you are coming from (and where you are going) and is very interesting to me. If nothing else, it re-kindles some interest in the hard problem.

I'm not sure what you mean by "epiphenomenalism and eliminative materialism". I assume that for epiphenomenalism you mean the same as the basic premise outlined in Wikipedia, and for the second you mean the same thing as reductionism. In the case for the former, I think there is a problem in that it's forcing the issue into a this or that context when neither alone apply. Consciousness, it would seem, especially if the field theory holds true, has an influence on the material of the brain, which in turn has an influence on the field. They are an interdependent dynamic system and cannot be separated without the whole ceasing to function.

 

[smcder]

I'm not sure what you mean by "epiphenomenalism and eliminative materialism". I assume that for epiphenomenalism you mean the same as the basic premise outlined in Wikipedia, and for the second you mean the same thing as reductionism. In the case for the former, I think there is a problem in that it's forcing the issue into a this or that context when neither alone apply. Consciousness, it would seem, especially if the field theory holds true, has an influence on the material of the brain, which in turn has an influence on the field. They are an interdependent dynamic system and cannot be separated without the whole ceasing to function.

Interesting . . . interesting (steepling fingers) I am not sure eliminative materialism is exactly the same as reductionism, I'd have to do some looking - but I wouldn't put it past the Churchlands (Paul and Patricia) - the same wonderful people who brought you folk psychology - to coin a new phrase for the same old thing, this has been a few years back but should be plenty out there on it.

Do you have your field theory altogether in a document or in some kind of summary form or only spread through the forums . . . ?

 

[Jeff Davis]

Jeff,
Much of what you said makes no sense to me. The second paragraph being entirely incomprehensible. The human body runs entirely on the energy released through chemical reactions.

I am saying we are not our just our consciousness. It is not the end-all, be-all. We are the entire organism of which our awareness/consciousness serves, not as a rider or driver, but rather the dashboard with which we navigate the environment and serve the needs of the organism.

That, and 3.00 at Starbucks will by you a cup a coffee.

You are brainwashed by science to the effect it's become a faith. Please explain to me this sentient sophistication of matter process exactly. Bio-Chemical reactions DO NOT equal sentience. They do NOT equal a comprehensive understanding of brain wave cyclic interactions in the least. Yes, we can state emphatically that the brain produces bio-chemical electrical energy, but please demonstrate precisely how that translates to consciousness in a manner that logically defines as much beyond question.

Again, attempt to use your imagination outside the box. Living in a learned box is like living in a world of fenced in black and white, when all you have to do is step through your front gate to see things in color. This isn't a short conversation. Please quit attempting to make it one. Strive more so to understand, and less so to depend on false beliefs. Beliefs like minute bio-chemical reactions in the brain equal sentience. That's just rubbish for which you have ZERO substantiation beyond faith.

 

[Randall]

Interesting . . . interesting (steepling fingers) I am not sure eliminative materialism is exactly the same as reductionism, I'd have to do some looking - but I wouldn't put it past the Churchlands (Paul and Patricia) - the same wonderful people who brought you folk psychology - to coin a new phrase for the same old thing, this has been a few years back but should be plenty out there on it.

Do you have your field theory altogether in a document or in some kind of summary form or only spread through the forums . . . ?

This field theory we're discussing here is one that was spawned from this forum ( sparked by @Jeff Davis I believe ) and that I then took and ran with in my own direction. You might still find that Jeff has some alternative input, and can provide you with a source for wherever he came up with it. It was then expanded upon with your participation, most notably that article you ( I think it was you ) posted on virtual photons as "carriers" of consciousness, because it confirmed that others besides me had independently also come up with the idea of virtual photons.

 

[smcder]

That, and 3.00 at Starbucks will by you a cup a coffee.

You are brainwashed by science to the effect it's become a faith. Please explain to me this sentient sophistication of matter process exactly. Bio-Chemical reactions DO NOT equal sentience. They do NOT equal a comprehensive understanding of brain wave cyclic interactions in the least. Yes, we can state emphatically that the brain produces bio-chemical electrical energy, but please demonstrate precisely how that translates to consciousness in a manner that logically defines as much beyond question.

Again, attempt to use your imagination outside the box. Living in a learned box is like living in a world of fenced in black and white, when all you have to do is step through your front gate to see things in color. This isn't a short conversation. Please quit attempting to make it one. Strive more so to understand, and less so to depend on false beliefs. Beliefs like minute bio-chemical reactions in the brain equal sentience. That's just rubbish for which you have ZERO substantiation beyond faith.

thats kind of sort of what the overall thread here as been about - what is called "the hard problem" in consciousness . . . how do you go from matter to mind? Or can you? Thomas Nagel wrote a classic paper on this "What Is It Like To Be a Bat" - (see thread above) and Colin McGinn has taken an interesting stance: that we can't know - called New Mysterianism , David Chalmers has had some interesting things to say as have Dan Dennett, the Churchlands (Paul and Patricia) and our very own Ufology has had a lot of good posts related to this (the idea of consciousness as a field and "virtual protons" being involved, other than that I cannot do it justice) on this thread that make for very thought provoking reading -

 

[smcder]

This field theory we're discussing here is one that was spawned from this forum ( sparked by @Jeff Davis I believe ) and that I then took and ran with in my own direction. You might still find that Jeff has some alternative input, and can provide you with a source for wherever he came up with it. It was then expanded upon with your participation, most notably that article you ( I think it was you ) posted on virtual photons as "carriers" of consciousness, because it confirmed that others besides me had independently also come up with the idea of virtual photons.

Well, if you do write it up, I would be interested to read it - and would encourage you to consider some form of publication, Sage I think it is - allows scholarly self-publication, not sure how peer-review works . . . or if it's even a good thing at all, a friend of mine came across it while working on her PhD - hmmm, I wonder if there is some way to "publish" theories right here on the forum? Maybe have an archive where they can be checked out - reinventing the wheel I suppose. But nice for you to facilitate future discussion on this.

 

[smcder]

I'm not sure what you mean by "epiphenomenalism and eliminative materialism". I assume that for epiphenomenalism you mean the same as the basic premise outlined in Wikipedia, and for the second you mean the same thing as reductionism. In the case for the former, I think there is a problem in that it's forcing the issue into a this or that context when neither alone apply. Consciousness, it would seem, especially if the field theory holds true, has an influence on the material of the brain, which in turn has an influence on the field. They are an interdependent dynamic system and cannot be separated without the whole ceasing to function.

Eliminative Materialism From Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Eliminative Materialism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

just picked out a couple of paragraphs to give the feel of it -

2.2 Eliminative Theory Change
The second component of eliminative materialism is the thesis that folk psychology is profoundly wrong about the actual nature of the mind/brain. Eliminative materialists argue that the central tenets of folk psychology radically misdescribe cognitive processes; consequently, the posits of folk psychology pick out nothing that is real. Like dualists, eliminative materialists insist that ordinary mental states can not in any way be reduced to or identified with neurological events or processes. However, unlike dualists, eliminativists claim there is nothing more to the mind than what occurs in the brain. The reason mental states are irreducible is not because they are non-physical; rather, it is because mental states, as described by common-sense psychology, do not really exist.

. . .

Some writers have suggested an eliminativist outlook not just with regard to particular states of consciousness, but with regard to phenomenal consciousness itself. For example, Georges Rey (1983, 1988) has argued that if we look at the various neurological or cognitive theories of what consciousness might amount to, such as internal monitoring or the possession of second-order representational states, it seems easy to imagine all of these features incorporated in a computational device that lacks anything we intuitively think of as “real” or robust consciousness. Rey suggests that the failure of these accounts to capture our ordinary notion of consciousness may be because the latter corresponds with no actual process or phenomenon; the “inner light” we associate with consciousness may be nothing more than a remnant of misguided Cartesian intuitions (see also Wilkes, 1988; 1995).

 

[smcder]

I'm not sure what you mean by "epiphenomenalism and eliminative materialism". I assume that for epiphenomenalism you mean the same as the basic premise outlined in Wikipedia, and for the second you mean the same thing as reductionism. In the case for the former, I think there is a problem in that it's forcing the issue into a this or that context when neither alone apply. Consciousness, it would seem, especially if the field theory holds true, has an influence on the material of the brain, which in turn has an influence on the field. They are an interdependent dynamic system and cannot be separated without the whole ceasing to function.

For completeness sake on this thread - this link has the classic McGinn paper that I mentioned a couple of times (at the bottom)

Colin McGinn: the New Mysterian and cognitive closure.

that paper is The Problem of Philosophy: http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness97/papers/ProblemOfPhilosophy.html

this one might be of some interest too, about the location of consciousness:

http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/courses/consciousness97/papers/ConsciousnessSpace.html

 

[Randall]

Well, if you do write it up, I would be interested to read it - and would encourage you to consider some form of publication, Sage I think it is - allows scholarly self-publication, not sure how peer-review works . . . or if it's even a good thing at all, a friend of mine came across it while working on her PhD - hmmm, I wonder if there is some way to "publish" theories right here on the forum? Maybe have an archive where they can be checked out - reinventing the wheel I suppose. But nice for you to facilitate future discussion on this.

What I'd prefer to do is create a video presentation with animation rather than a paper, but I'm not experienced enough to do it myself in a reasonably short period of time.

 

[smcder]

I bet you could find a collaborator on here. Forum threads get unwieldy and repetitious quick but there is so much good content - it would be nice to have a library of some type of material from members who have well-developed positions.