Philosophy, Science, & The Unexplained - Main Thread

[Randall]

If you see what I'm saying then you understand that it's the arbitrary rejection of answers to the hard problem as built into it's formulation that makes it incoherent. It's basically saying that the hard problem cannot be solved because if it is solved the answer must be wrong because the hard problem cannot be solved.

I just don't see that circular reasoning at all in Nagel's paper - I think that would be made pretty short work of in academic circles - Nagel seems very clearly to lay out the hard problem and discusses the gap between the objective and the subjective and why reductionist approaches haven't worked. I don't see where the idea of a consciousness field bridges that gap specifically accounts for what it is like to be something. Your theory would need to be able to successfully predict what it is like to be a bat.

The analysis for this begins with the description of the hard problem in the Wikipedia article, so let's stick with that for the moment, to quote:

"Chalmers claims that the problem of experience is distinct from this set ( the modern materialistic conception of natural phenomena ), and he argues that the problem of experience will persist even when the performance of all the relevant functions is explained."

The circular argument is that if all the relevant functions of subjective experience ( consciousness ) are explained then there is no reason to think that it ( consciousness ) hasn't been explained. However Chalmers simply denies this by invoking this so-called "hard problem" that he maintains will persist regardless of whether modern materialistic conception of natural phenomena explains consciousness. This problem isn't as obvious in Nagel's paper because he starts off assuming that the hard problem is relevant in the first place. Specifically he assumes that explaining how subjective experience ( consciousness ) arises ( how a bat works ) cannot adequately explain what subjective experience ( consciousness ) itself is like ( what it's like to be a bat ) and the inference is that therefore, we have not explained what consciousness is ( our original question ).

The counterpoint to this is that Chalmer's position as explained by Nagel isn't relevant to the question because it's based on a logical incoherency brought about by the language in the formulation. Specifically, explaining what something "is" doesn't require that we explain what it's "like". It only requires that we explain what it "is". What something "is" and what something is "like" are two separate questions. A full explanation gets into the details of gramatical transitivity. I'll leave you to explore that link in further detail at your leisure and attempt to illustrate it again below in simpler terms:

• Question Q : Asks, What is X?
• Answer A: Explains what X is.
• Answer B: Explains that answer A does not explain what it's like to be X.
• Because Answer B addresses Answer A instead of answering Question Q, Answer B is not a relevant to Question Q. It's relevant only to another question that has not been asked ( What is it like to be X? ).

The above logical incoherency of the so-called hard problem as formulated by Chalmers and illustrated in Nagel's paper is only one facet of the larger problem, which is the general concept of duality. For that problem we've also provided a theoretical resolution to the issue of material versus non-material as it relates to the idea of physical versus non-physical.

I do think your interpretation of the Koan in the discussion above and specifically your belief that you have "shredded" it (which, from your point of view, you surely have) ties in with what appears to me to be your inability to understand the hard problem. Yes, I do think I could quote Nagel in specific objection but I think you would just respond with reiteration.

In the koan analysis, I didn't simply make up some "personal" interpretation without any supportable relevance to the content, therefore my "point of view" is both supportable and relevant. Saying I don't understand it and providing no other reasoning is pure denial. As for understanding the so-called "hard problem", there's more than one facet to the problem, but with respect to Nagel's paper, it's perfectly obvious that we cannot know what it's like to be X unless we are X, and that brings the whole concept of the nature of being into the mix. So I understand it just fine. I'm just on the side of the equation with those who think that this particular facet of the hard problem doesn't apply to the question we're asking ( What is consciousness? ).

As I truly think I could be missing the point of all this - I think you should contact Nagel directly with an abstract, there's an e-mail at the link below:

Thomas Nagel, Faculty of Philosophy | NYU

or a relevant department or association of philosophy for a review. If you do, I would like to know the response.

Or again, if someone is reading this thread and can help us out - that would be great!

I don't see any need to ask for Nagel's help here, and assuming that those in academic circles would make "short work" of my reasoning is a faith based assumption. If I'm wrong, then among other things, there should be some explanation that provides a rationale for thinking that the question of what consciousness is, is the same question as asking what it's like. I've seen no such explanation and can see no rationale for thinking it's a valid position to take.

 

[smcder]

The analysis for this begins with the description of the hard problem in the Wikipedia article, so let's stick with that for the moment, to quote:

"Chalmers claims that the problem of experience is distinct from this set ( the modern materialistic conception of natural phenomena ), and he argues that the problem of experience will persist even when the performance of all the relevant functions is explained."

The circular argument is that if all the relevant functions of subjective experience ( consciousness ) are explained then there is no reason to think that it ( consciousness ) hasn't been explained. However Chalmers simply denies this by invoking this so-called "hard problem" that he maintains will persist regardless of whether modern materialistic conception of natural phenomena explains consciousness. This problem isn't as obvious in Nagel's paper because he starts off assuming that the hard problem is relevant in the first place. Specifically he assumes that explaining how subjective experience ( consciousness ) arises ( how a bat works ) cannot adequately explain what subjective experience ( consciousness ) itself is like ( what it's like to be a bat ) and the inference is that therefore, we have not explained what consciousness is ( our original question ).

The counterpoint to this is that such a defense isn't relevant to the issue because it's based on a logical incoherency brought about by the language in the formulation. Specifically, explaining what something "is" doesn't require that we explain what it's "like". It only requires that we explain what it "is". What something "is" and what something is "like" are two separate questions. A full explanation gets into the details of gramatical transitivity. I'll leave you to explore that link in further detail at your leisure and attempt to illustrate it again below in simpler terms:

• Question Q : Asks, What is X?
• Answer A: Explains what X is.
• Answer B: Explains that answer A does not explain what it's like to be X.
• Because Answer B addresses Answer A instead of answering Question Q, Answer B is not a relevant to Question Q. It's relevant only to another question that has not been asked ( What is it like to be X? ).

The above logical incoherency of the so-called hard problem as formulated by Chalmers and illustrated in Nagel's paper is only one facet of the larger problem, which is the general concept of duality. For that problem we've also provided a theoretical resolution to the issue of material versus non-material as it relates to the idea of physical versus non-physical.

In the koan analysis, I didn't simply make up some "personal" interpretation without any supportable relevance to the content, therefore my "point of view" is both supportable and relevant. Saying I don't understand it and providing no other reasoning is pure denial. As for understanding the so-called "hard problem", there's more than one facet to the problem, but with respect to Nagel's paper, it's perfectly obvious that we cannot know what it's like to be X unless we are X, and that brings the whole concept of the nature of being into the mix. So I understand it just fine. I'm just on the side of the equation with those who think the so-called hard problem doesn't apply to the question we're asking ( What is consciousness? ).

I don't see any need to ask for Nagel's help here, and assuming that those in academic circles would make "short work" of my reasoning is a faith based assumption. If I'm wrong then among other things, there should be some explanation that provides a rationale for thinking that the question of what consciousness is, is the same question as asking what it's like. I've seen no such explanation and can see no rationale for thinking it's a valid position to take.

I did not say those in academic circles would make short work of your reasoning. What I meant is that if all Nagel's work amounted to was a circular argument as you described it in your earlier post- then short work would have been made of it - that probably can be described as a faith based (or high probability) assumption - and perhaps, short work has been made of it.

To me a full explanation of consciousness does need to account for subjectivity. I will try and have a look at the links and reasoning above and see if that ties up the loose end.

And I am sincere when I say I think you should send this to Nagel or someone for a response - I'm making the assumption that your ultimate goal is publication of this theory?

 

[smcder]

If I'm wrong then among other things, there should be some explanation that provides a rationale for thinking that the question of what consciousness is, is the same question as asking what it's like. I've seen no such explanation and can see no rationale for thinking it's a valid position to take.

In trying to work through this, I imagine that your theory is a full explanation of consciousness and therefore (theoretically) a technology could be developed and a device created according to your theory and you then would say that it is conscious based on your theory (objective description) but we still have no account of why "there is something that it is like to be that device" - then, with all of that said, why is it that we would not just have your word (with the support of the theory and its objective description) for it that the being is conscious?

 

[Randall]

I did not say those in academic circles would make short work of your reasoning. What I meant is that if all Nagel's work amounted to was a circular argument as you described it in your earlier post- then short work would have been made of it - that probably can be described as a faith based (or high probability) assumption - and perhaps, short work has been made of it.

I've not claimed that Nagel's paper amounts to circular reasoning. I'm claiming it's not relevant to the question we're asking.

To me a full explanation of consciousness does need to account for subjectivity. I will try and have a look at the links and reasoning above and see if that ties up the loose end.

The question isn't, "What does consciousness do?" or "What is it like to be a consciousness?" The question is, "What is consciousness?" ( How do we define consciousness and explain how it arises? ). It's not that the other questions aren't valid questions in their own right ( they are ). They're just different questions.

And I am sincere when I say I think you should send this to Nagel or someone for a response - I'm making the assumption that your ultimate goal is publication of this theory?

We're just having a discussion and in that sense it's already been published. Maybe if Nagel uses the Internet, he'll run across this thread in a Google search and become interested. In the meantime I'm not going to bother him with my armchair sophomoric philosophising. He's up there with the academic elites in their ivory towers and I'm not climbing all the way up there just to be told to come back when I've earned my elevator pass.

 

[smcder]

I've not claimed that Nagel's paper amounts to circular reasoning. I'm claiming it's not relevant to the question we're asking.

The question isn't, "What does consciousness do?" or "What is it like to be a consciousness?" The question is, "What is consciousness?" ( How do we define consciousness and explain how it arises? ). It's not that the other questions aren't valid questions in their own right ( they are ). They're just different questions.

We're just having a discussion and in that sense it's already been published. Maybe if Nagel uses the Internet, he'll run across this thread in a Google search and become interested. In the meantime I'm not going to bother him with my armchair sophomoric philosophising. He's up there with the academic elites in their ivory towers and I'm not climbing all the way up there just to be told to come back when I've earned my elevator pass.

I think it's very good philosophizing - why sell yourself short? Why assume he would do that? I don't think you have to do a lot of climbing to send an e-mail - at worst you don't get an answer or you get something rude back (and then you can spread it all over the internet . . . I'm kidding!!)

I've written to academics before and they've been responsive. Jeff Kripal and Jordan Peterson and others. Nagel might have a grad student review it, but then you might just get another participant in the discussion and that's not bad.

But the above paragraph does open it up for me and ties it in with my last post/ response - and it's Nagel's point I think, I'll try to find the quote (and confirm I'm understanding his point) but I think he is saying that you can't account for consciousness, can't explain it without accounting for "what is it like to be something" and in that consciousness is unique. So your argument, and I think he pretty much says this - holds up with everything but consciousness . . . (because it is unique in this way) I remember unique is the key word in that sentence so that is what I will search on.

 

[Randall]

If I'm wrong then among other things, there should be some explanation that provides a rationale for thinking that the question of what consciousness is, is the same question as asking what it's like. I've seen no such explanation and can see no rationale for thinking it's a valid position to take.

In trying to work through this, I imagine that your theory is a full explanation of consciousness ...

Not exactly. I'm saying that I think we may onto something with this idea of a consciousness field carried by virtual photons, and admit that it's possible we have snagged nothing more than a gumboot full of mud. We're out here on the edge of the unknown and still far from a "full explanation of consciousness".

... and therefore (theoretically) a technology could be developed and a device created according to your theory and you then would say that it is conscious based on your theory (objective description).

Perhaps. It sounds good in theory, but whether or not it would actually present as a conscious entity remains to be tested.

but we still have no account of why "there is something that it is like to be that device" - then, with all of that said, why is it that we would not just have your word (with the support of the theory and its objective description) for it that the being is conscious?

Assuming it works, the answer to the question of, "Why?" would be, "Because we created it." To elaborate. It's a causal circumstance. If consciousness is an emergent property of a sufficiently complex, organized, and normally functioning brain/body system in its waking state, then why "there is something that it is like to be that device" is because we created a sufficiently complex, organized, and normally functioning brain/body system in a waking state.

 

[smcder]

In the koan analysis, I didn't simply make up some "personal" interpretation without any supportable relevance to the content, therefore my "point of view" is both supportable and relevant. Saying I don't understand it and providing no other reasoning is pure denial.

I did want to respond to this so as to avoid continuing charges of pure denial.

Yes it is supportable and relevant, I probably shouldn't have said you don't understand it - maybe more that you missed (maybe intentionally) the point? Is that fair? I mean the aha! moment is the baby in this bathwater - it's kind of irrelevant whether the master was rude or mischievious or enjoying the power of his position (none of which I think is contrary to how I understand an "enlightened" person might act – I think they could do all of things) or even pulling the wool (back over) the Westerner's eyes . . . I don't know enough about Japanese culture or Zen or any of that stuff to assess it – I suspect within the culture and time and given his position, it probably wasn’t entirely rude – but flaunting social convention is an old Zen tradition, or so I am told) but it is very interesting to me what you see going on there and what motivations you ascribe to the Zen master and that you made quick to point out how you had “shredded” the Koan - when my point in bringing it up at all was merely as an analogy to what might be going on with the hard problem and then I said it might also be like an optical/cognitive illusion . . .

So, that’s really all I meant, but I can also tell it another way.

Have you ever had martial arts training? I don't mean woo-woo White Tiger Zen-fu Ninja Chai-Latte training but say . . . boxing. Good old American boxing . . . (this is a fairly true story, by the way) and say your tendency is to let your left hand drop . . . and say your trainer has seen it all and is a little impatient that night and so he pops you pretty good in the face . . . is that rude?? It never crossed my mind that it was – I was grateful because when I later got in the ring with an opponent who was trying to carry things well beyond merely being rude, say into the realms of unconsciousness . . . I had learned to keep my hand up.

So anyway I suspect you know all of this and you knew the point of the Koan too – that the value lay in the “a-ha” moment . . . or is there just no baby detectable in that bathwater for you?

Also, I enjoyed the earlier discussion of your "mystical" (for lack of a better term) experience - it seemed to be very meaningful to you and possibly a unique kind of experience.

 

[Randall]

In the koan analysis, I didn't simply make up some "personal" interpretation without any supportable relevance to the content, therefore my "point of view" is both supportable and relevant. Saying I don't understand it and providing no other reasoning is pure denial.

I did want to respond to this so as to avoid continuing charges of pure denial.

Yes it is supportable and relevant, I probably shouldn't have said you don't understand it - maybe more that you missed (maybe intentionally) the point? Is that fair?

No. Here's why. To begin with, either the words of the koan are important or they're not. If the words of the koan are of no importance, then it has the same value as complete gibberish and conveys no meaning. Surely that isn't what you are claiming? So I'll assume that you recognize that these koans are meant to convey meaning through the use of words. Therefore the words have importance, and therefore by reading them we are put in a position where we are expected to determine what that importance is. If you accept that, then we can continue. If you don't then once again the koan reverts to being pointless and might as well be gibberish.

If however you accept that the words have meaning and that we are expected to find meaning in them, then finding meaning in them depends on the message that the words relay, and here we find that my initial point is the same as that of the Japanese Master himself who states it in no uncertain terms. To quote,"Like this cup,'Nan-in said', you are full of your own opinions and speculations. How can I show you Zen unless you first empty your cup?" To claim that the words of the Master have no meaning is to deny the very point the koan. Therefore to claim that I have missed the point when I've used the same point as the Master as the foundation for my analysis is also to deny the very point of the koan as stated by the Master himself.

If you think there is some error above, then you need to explain it rather than simply hand waving it by suggesting that I don't understand it or have missed the point simply because I've taken the time to explain it.

I mean the aha! moment is the baby in this bathwater - it's kind of irrelevant whether the master was rude or mischievious or enjoying the power of his position (none of which I think is contrary to how I understand an "enlightened" person might act – I think they could do all of things) or even pulling the wool (back over) the Westerner's eyes . . . I don't know enough about Japanese culture or Zen or any of that stuff to assess it – I suspect within the culture and time and given his position, it probably wasn’t entirely rude – but flaunting social convention is an old Zen tradition, or so I am told) but it is very interesting to me what you see going on there and what motivations you ascribe to the Zen master and that you made quick to point out how you had “shredded” the Koan - when my point in bringing it up at all was merely as an analogy to what might be going on with the hard problem and then I said it might also be like an optical/cognitive illusion . . .

The "ah ha moment" is the realization of the message contained in the allegory. Perhaps the depth of that message was just a little deeper for me than most other people's "ah ha moments" because not only did I get the message that we need to set aside our own preconceptions in order to absorb new information, I also realized that the Master's own preconceptions were at play, and I took the time to explain that in my post. So why would my ah ha moment that includes this realization be any less valid than one that simply takes the Master's words and actions as justified?

So, that’s really all I meant, but I can also tell it another way.

Have you ever had martial arts training? I don't mean woo-woo White Tiger Zen-fu Ninja Chai-Latte training but say . . . boxing. Good old American boxing . . . (this is a fairly true story, by the way) and say your tendency is to let your left hand drop . . . and say your trainer has seen it all and is a little impatient that night and so he pops you pretty good in the face . . . is that rude?? It never crossed my mind that it was – I was grateful because when I later got in the ring with an opponent who was trying to carry things well beyond merely being rude, say into the realms of unconsciousness . . . I had learned to keep my hand up.

So anyway I suspect you know all of this and you knew the point of the Koan too – that the value lay in the “a-ha” moment . . . or is there just no baby detectable in that bathwater for you?

Also, I enjoyed the earlier discussion of your "mystical" (for lack of a better term) experience - it seemed to be very meaningful to you and possibly a unique kind of experience.

I'll have to review the last part above when I get home from the Starbucks hotspot. Thank you so much for engaging me on these issues, and please realize that my seeming insolence in the face of these issues isn't meant to be disrespectful. I'm just very dogged and analytical. Who knows, maybe that's part of my problem, but you won't have an easy time convincing me of that .

To continue. The martial arts example illustrates classical conditioning, which is a well established way of modifying behavior, but I don't see how it relates to the koan of the Japanese master. If you want to experience an ah ha moment that should also impart my point, let's try this another way by expanding on the koan:

Tea For Two

A Japanese master during the Meiji era (1868-1912), received a university professor who came to inquire about Zen.
Nan-in served tea. He poured his visitor's cup full, and then kept on pouring.

The professor watched the overflow until he no longer could restrain himself. "It is overfull. No more will go in!"

"Like this cup," Nan-in said, "you are full of your own opinions and speculations. How can I show you Zen unless you first empty your cup?"​

The university professor responded by pulling out another cup, this one full of holes, and began pouring tea for the Japanese Master who watched as the tea flowed out all the holes and onto the floor.

"Very clever", said the Master.

Then they noticed the mess they had created and both burst into laughter.​

Let me know if you have any ah ha moments for our expanded version above.

 

[smcder]

Not exactly. I'm saying that I think we may onto something with this idea of a consciousness field carried by virtual photons, and admit that it's possible we have snagged nothing more than a gumboot full of mud. We're out here on the edge of the unknown and still far from a "full explanation of consciousness".

Perhaps. It sounds good in theory, but whether or not it would actually present as a conscious entity remains to be tested.

Assuming it works, the answer to the question of, "Why?" would be, "Because we created it." To elaborate. It's a causal circumstance. If consciousness is an emergent property of a sufficiently complex, organized, and normally functioning brain/body system in its waking state, then why "there is something that it is like to be that device" is because we created a sufficiently complex, organized, and normally functioning brain/body system in a waking state.

If the gumboot full of mud fits . . . I always say! I definitely think the virtual photon consciousness field is worth exploring (and needs a catchy name) -

If consciousness is an emergent property of a sufficiently complex, organized, and normally functioning brain/body system in its waking state, then why "there is something that it is like to be that device" is because we created a sufficiently complex, organized, and normally functioning brain/body system in a waking state -

So could we say an answer to the hard problem is that once you have a theory of consciousness in place that allows a technology to be developed to create a sufficiently complex, organized, and normally functioning brain/body system in its waking state, then we have every (objective) ground to claim that system is conscious, even though we can't account for its objective state . . . now that's interesting b/c we basically have to say this now about every other human being (provided we do a brain scan and things look ok) that they are not a zombie, the hard problem is still there but becomes irrelevant in so far as the development of this technology. And once we start talking to it, things could be become very interesting, perhaps in response to McGinn's New Mysterianism, we could engineer the mind that does finally solve the hard problem . . . hmmmm.

 

[smcder]

No. Here's why. To begin with, either the words of the koan are important or they're not. If the words of the koan are of no importance, then it has the same value as complete gibberish and conveys no meaning. Surely that isn't what you are claiming? So I'll assume that you recognize that these koans are meant to convey meaning through the use of words. Therefore the words have importance, and therefore by reading them we are put in a position where we are expected to determine what that importance is. If you accept that, then we can continue. If you don't then once again the koan reverts to being pointless and might as well be gibberish.

If however you accept that the words have meaning and that we are expected to find meaning in them, then finding meaning in them depends on the message that the words relay, and here we find that my initial point is the same as that of the Japanese Master himself who states it in no uncertain terms. To quote,"Like this cup,'Nan-in said', you are full of your own opinions and speculations. How can I show you Zen unless you first empty your cup?" To claim that the words of the Master have no meaning is to deny the very point the koan. Therefore to claim that I have missed the point when I've used the same point as the Master as the foundation for my analysis is also to deny the very point of the koan as stated by the Master himself.

If you think there is some error above, then you need to explain it rather than simply hand waving it by suggesting that I don't understand it or have missed the point simply because I've taken the time to explain it.

The "ah ha moment" is the realization of the message contained in the allegory. Perhaps the depth of that message was just a little deeper for me than most other people's "ah ha moments" because not only did I get the message that we need to set aside our own preconceptions in order to absorb new information, I also realized that the Master's own preconceptions were at play, and I took the time to explain that in my post. So why would my ah ha moment that includes this realization be any less valid than one that simply takes the Master's words and actions as justified?


I'll have to review the last part above when I get home from the Starbucks hotspot. Thank you so much for engaging me on these issues, and please realize that my seeming insolence in the face of these issues isn't meant to be disrespectful. I'm just very dogged and analytical. Who knows, maybe that's part of my problem, but you won't have an easy time convincing me of that .

To continue. The martial arts example illustrates classical conditioning, which is a well established way of modifying behavior, but I don't see how it relates to the koan of the Japanese master. If you want to experience an ah ha moment that should also impart my point, let's try this another way by expanding on the koan:

Tea For Two

A Japanese master during the Meiji era (1868-1912), received a university professor who came to inquire about Zen.
Nan-in served tea. He poured his visitor's cup full, and then kept on pouring.

The professor watched the overflow until he no longer could restrain himself. "It is overfull. No more will go in!"

"Like this cup," Nan-in said, "you are full of your own opinions and speculations. How can I show you Zen unless you first empty your cup?"​

The university professor responded by pulling out another cup, this one full of holes, and began pouring tea for the Japanese Master who watched as the tea flowed out all the holes and onto the floor.

"Very clever", said the Master.

Then they noticed the mess they had created and both burst into laughter.​

Let me know if you have any ah ha moments for our expanded version above.

http://www.ashidakim.com/zenkoans/21thesoundofonehand.html

No. Here's why. To begin with, either the words of the koan are important or they're not. If the words of the koan are of no importance, then it has the same value as complete gibberish and conveys no meaning. Surely that isn't what you are claiming?

actually . . . it is what I'm claiming, sort of - and this is where I muddied up the waters by not clarifying earlier, I sort of thought it would come back to haunt me! ;-) - the example you use I realized isn't what I think of as a Koan, but more of a . . . well, "story with a moral" - the classic Koan is "What is the sound of one hand clapping?" - which kind of is nonsense, although I suspect just any nonsense wouldn't work - so maybe it's a phrase that evolved b/c of it's special "enlightening" value . . . but the words themselves aren't mean to convey a lesson like in the story you quote. (by the way, the one hand clapping is #21 on the link you posted)

That explanation doesn't make sense because the so-called lesson is to set aside one's preconceptions in order to absorb new information, yet it is the Zen Master who is demonstrating his own inability to set aside his own preconceptions and simply start the lesson. This means that although he understands the issue, he is acting out anyway, which means he's blind to his own hypocrisy. Therefore there is no cultural defense for this koan. Let's also remember that these parables are meant to be reflected on by a third party, so questioning their validity is perfectly acceptable, and blindly accepting them is contrary to their original intention. So no matter how one looks at this example, it falls apart ... completely.

Does the highlighted part necessarily follow? Maybe he wanted to bring the lesson home with a little zing so the university professor would be more likely to repeat the story - maybe he was indulging himself in a little rude behavior (class warfare?) for his own amusement (a Zen master might be entitled) . . . maybe he couldn't see very well and made up the little story to cover his embarassment at overpouring the tea, maybe he had the forethought to know his story will be repeated for the benefit of future third-parties and therefore set things up for your interpretation that it was in fact he, the Zen master, not the visiting university professor who showed an inability to set aside his own preconceptions . . . this would be a special lesson for extra-clever students (not the majority who "don't see the deeper meaning hidden within it because they are so blinded by the initial "ah ha moment" that the Zen Master takes on an aura of mystical wisdom"). I've heard some of these Zen masters were pretty clever.

I'm just very dogged and analytical. Who knows, maybe that's part of my problem, but you won't have an easy time convincing me of that .

I would say it's more the literalness of your thought that drives that dogged analysis . . . if you could uncouple that and just use it when you need to . . . zowiee!

To continue. The martial arts example illustrates classical conditioning, which is a well established way of modifying behavior, but I don't see how it relates to the koan of the Japanese master.

I'm glad you asked! It brings up yet another way to interpret the story, which is simply that everyone is full of opinions and speculations. Of course you can argue this is simplay a preconception, that the university professor was extraordinary (especially for a university professor! - oops, my hypocrisy is showing now . . . ) but, what if it was less a preconception and came more from the basic tenets of Zen - so in this case the Zen master did immediately start the lesson (just as my boxing teacher gave me the lesson in the most efficient way) and showed no hypocrisy in doing so as he may well have been following an honored and culturally valued teaching tradition. (who knows, in his own private moments perhaps he sat back and questioned those very tenets at his leisure . . . but hey, in the end even a Zen master has to make a living)

I like the modified story very much - but it's a different story.

 

[Randall]

If the gumboot full of mud fits . . . I always say! I definitely think the virtual photon consciousness field is worth exploring (and needs a catchy name) -

If consciousness is an emergent property of a sufficiently complex, organized, and normally functioning brain/body system in its waking state, then why "there is something that it is like to be that device" is because we created a sufficiently complex, organized, and normally functioning brain/body system in a waking state -

So could we say an answer to the hard problem is that once you have a theory of consciousness in place that allows a technology to be developed to create a sufficiently complex, organized, and normally functioning brain/body system in its waking state, then we have every (objective) ground to claim that system is conscious, even though we can't account for its objective state . . . now that's interesting b/c we basically have to say this now about every other human being (provided we do a brain scan and things look ok) that they are not a zombie, the hard problem is still there but becomes irrelevant in so far as the development of this technology. And once we start talking to it, things could be become very interesting, perhaps in response to McGinn's New Mysterianism, we could engineer the mind that does finally solve the hard problem . . . hmmmm.

Closer, and this time I think we've got it nailed down, so try to bear with me through the second paragraph. The hard problem as outlined by Chalmers and illustrated by Nagel is not resolvable by reductionist analysis. So essentially they're right, but it doesn't matter because it's also irrelevant with respect to our search for an explanation of what consciousness is. The only meaningful consequence of asking the question is to throw everything but our own subjective experience into question, and since I'm not an advocate of subjective idealism, that doesn't go very far with me. But it's been an interesting ride to sharpen the issue down to the fine tip where we find that it's a manifestation of two different approaches to explaining consciousness, one subjective and the other objective.

From my novice philosophical perspective, the line between these two perspectives seems to be the biggest line on the map. It seems to cross the whole thing from edge to edge and we constantly run into it. We can move ourselves back and forth over this line, but we can never fully be in both at once. In a sense this seems to be the very nature of the hard problem. It's the person on the subjective side of the map saying to the person on the objective side, "You can't know what it's like to be conscious from over there. You have to come over here!" to which the person on the objective side replies, "Yes I can see that, but you can't see what consciousness is from over there. You need to come over here and look back at it from outside the ketchup bottle!"

 

[smcder]

Closer, and this time I think we've got it nailed down, so try to bear with me through the second paragraph. The hard problem as outlined by Chalmers and illustrated by Nagel is not resolvable by reductionist analysis. So essentially they're right, but it doesn't matter because it's also irrelevant with respect to our search for an explanation of what consciousness is. The only meaningful consequence of asking the question is to throw everything but our own subjective experience into question, and since I'm not an advocate of subjective idealism, that doesn't go very far with me. But it's been an interesting ride to sharpen the issue down to the fine tip. To conclude, this discussion it's the manifestation of two different approaches to explaining consciousness, one subjective and the other objective.

From my novice philosophical perspective, the line between these two perspectives seems to be the biggest line on the map. It seems to cross the whole thing from edge to edge and we constantly run into it. We can move ourselves back and forth over this line, but we can never fully be in both at once. In a sense this seems to be the very nature of the hard problem. It's the person on the subjective side of the map saying to the person on the objective side, "You can't know what it's like to be conscious from over there. You have to come over here!" to which the person on the objective side replies, "Yes I can see that, but you can't see what consciousness is from over there. You need to come over here and look back at it from outside the ketchup bottle!"

"The only meaningful consequence of asking the question is to throw everything but our own subjective experience into question . . . "

No one will accept that your device is conscious (and very practical consequences will follow - from the devices perspective, if it is indeed conscious) unless . . . 1) you prove that there is something it is like to be that device (i.e. solve the hard problem) or 2) your conscious device decides to fight for its rights . . .

 

[smcder]

Put another way . . . if Ray Kurzweil came to you and said:

"I've taken your theory and created a device into which we can support your consciousness and we'll upload you first, in honor of it!"

Would you do that without knowing what it would be like or even that it would be like anything?

(wait . . . is that a Koan??)

 

[smcder]

I think the Star-Trek transporter gets at it too . . .

 

[Randall]

... I like the modified story very much - but it's a different story ...

No "ah ha moment" though eh? I guess I need to sharpen my kōan ( bad play on homonyms there ). Or how about this one, "It's better to be a kōanhead than a bonehead" . Sorry again ... I'll stop inflicting the pain now. So if the overflowing cup of tea represents one who is filled with so many opinions and speculations that they cannot absorb any new information, then what does the cup with the tea running out the holes represent? Yes it's a different story, but I think it kicks it up a notch. Indeed, according to the write-up in Wikipedia, we're doing exactly what we're supposed to do with this kōan without realizing it, and that is to study it to gain wisdom from the process.

My initial assumption about it was indeed filled with my own opinions and preconceptions. I had assumed that it was meant as an example that illustrates how the mystical Zen way is somehow superior to western thinking. But that's not what it was for at all. Recognizing the hypocrisy of the Master is something virtually anyone who reflects on this kōan long enough cannot help but see, and perhaps was meant to see ( as you also alluded to above ), and that in-turn leads to all sorts of other interesting issues as well. Realizing all this now just manifested yet another ( and even more profound ) ah ha moment for me ( thank you master smcder ) .

"The only meaningful consequence of asking the question is to throw everything but our own subjective experience into question . . . "

No one will accept that your device is conscious (and very practical consequences will follow - from the devices perspective, if it is indeed conscious) unless . . . 1) you prove that there is something it is like to be that device (i.e. solve the hard problem) or 2) your conscious device decides to fight for its rights . . .

Because point one is impossible to prove, I think it's safe to say we can just skip to point two where it has to fight for its rights. Also this issue of the so-called hard problem ( as formulated by Chalmers and illustrated by Nagel ) is getting even more clear and easier for me to put into words. Earlier I had used the idea of flight as an analogy, and I'm going to do that again, but this time, instead of expressing it logically, the kōan exercise inspired me to put it differently. Not that this is a kōan, but try considering it this way:

You ask two people the same question: What is flight? Then you give them each a different task. The first person you put on a jetliner, and the other you put on the ground at the air terminal to watch the planes. When the passenger lands and gets off the plane, he describes flight as what it's like to be lifted up off the ground, rise above the clouds, move through the air, and see the ground far below. When you ask the observer who has been watching from the air terminal, she says flight is what happens when you build an airplane, send it down the runway, and it takes off. Both are correct. The person in the plane knows what it's like to fly and to him that's what flight is. The observer on the ground also knows what flight is, but she doesn't know what it's "like" from the perspective of the passenger.

Now the key question for us at this juncture is, all other things being equal, which one do you think would have an easier time building an airplane, the passenger or the observer? Clearly the observer studying airplanes is always going to win this one. You can experience all the plane rides you want, but only the person who studies how they're made is going to figure out how they work, and I submit that is the real challenge. This is why I say that it ( consciousness ) is an emergent property. It's just what happens. Build and operate an airplane the right way and you get flight. Build and operate a brain/body system the right way and you'll get consciousness ( or so the theory goes ).

 

[smcder]

Because point one is impossible to prove, I think it's safe to say we can just skip to point two where it has to fight for its rights. Also this issue of the so-called hard problem ( as formulated by Chalmers and illustrated by Nagel ) is getting even more clear and easier for me to put into words. Earlier I had used the idea of flight as an analogy, and I'm going to do that again, but this time, instead of expressing it logically, the kōan exercise inspired me to put it differently. Not that this is a kōan, but try considering it this way:

You ask two people the same question: What is flight? Then you give them each a different task. The first person you put on a jetliner, and the other you put on the ground at the air terminal to watch the planes. When the passenger lands and gets off the plane, he describes flight as what it's like to be lifted up off the ground, rise above the clouds, move through the air, and see the ground far below. When you ask the observer who has been watching from the air terminal, she says flight is what happens when you build an airplane, send it down the runway, and it takes off. Both are correct. The person in the plane knows what it's like to fly and to him that's what flight is. The observer on the ground also knows what flight is, but she doesn't know what it's "like" from the perspective of the passenger.

Now the key question for us at this juncture is, all other things being equal, which one do you think would have an easier time building an airplane, the passenger or the observer? Clearly the observer studying airplanes is always going to win this one. You can experience all the plane rides you want, but only the person who studies how they're made is going to figure out how they work, and I submit that is the real challenge. This is why I say that it ( consciousness ) is an emergent property. It's just what happens. Build and operate an airplane the right way and you get flight. Build and operate a brain/body system the right way and you'll get consciousness ( or so the theory goes ).

Because point one is impossible to prove,

So you are declaring that the hard problem is impossible to solve? Or are you taking McGinn's position of New Mysterianism?

The observer on the ground also knows what flight is, but she doesn't know what it's "like" from the perspective of the passenger.

No, but she knows what other things are "like" - remember Nagel says the hard problem is unique . . . Now the key question for us at this juncture is, all other things being equal, which one do you think would have an easier time building an airplane, the passenger or the observer? - in the case of consciousness we are both "passenger" and "observer" - there are no analogies for "what it is like to be something".

Build and operate an airplane the right way and you get flight. Build and operate a brain/body system the right way and you'll get consciousness ( or so the theory goes ).

And what I am saying is that no one will believe you unless you can say what it is like to be that brain/body system (i.e. solve the hard problem) . . . Now, will you even believe it yourself or will you from time to time look at what you've built and wonder if anything is going on in there or if you just have a clockwork orange? It would be strictly a matter of faith in your theory whether or not you had solved the problem.

We assume an inner life for one another without being able to prove it I think because objectively we are in the same class - we look the same all the way down to the limits of our current technology - no matter how you sample, test or scan us. So to be safe we treat one another as if the same sorts of things are going on inside of us and this brings up another issue - because this artificial being is embodied in an entirely different way (perhaps even non-biological) it almost certainly won't have the same sorts of things going on inside of it (if you go along with emergent/embodied consciousness) - this is a bit of a different issue but brings its own problems in convincing us that we should respect it because of what goes on inside of it . . .

This is why I say that it ( consciousness ) is an emergent property. It's just what happens.
(see attached cartoon)

 

[Randall]

Because point one is impossible to prove,
So you are declaring that the hard problem is impossible to solve? Or are you taking McGinn's position of New Mysterianism?

I'm saying that the nature of the hard problem is such that anyone can solve the hard problem for themselves, but that it's impossible to solve it for someone or something else.

The observer on the ground also knows what flight is, but she doesn't know what it's "like" from the perspective of the passenger.

No, but she knows what other things are "like" - remember Nagel says the hard problem is unique . . . Now the key question for us at this juncture is, all other things being equal, which one do you think would have an easier time building an airplane, the passenger or the observer?

- in the case of consciousness we are both "passenger" and "observer"

Yes, we are both the passenger and the observer, but we can only solve the hard problem for us as passengers, not for those others we observe.

- there are no analogies for "what it is like to be something".

Actually there is. Nagel's whole Bat paper uses analogy, and so does the analogy to flight that I've written here. In fact I would argue that with respect to the specific issue, the analogy to flight is more applicable than Nagel's Bat paper. What it's like to be something with respect to the question, "What is consciousness?" is to ask the question, "What is it like to be in a state of consciousness?" It makes no difference whether it's a bat or a robot or a clone or another person.

This translates very well in the analogy to, "What is it like to be in a state of flight?" The word "flight" and the word "consciousness" are both nouns, and they both describe particular states of things. Our experiencer on the aircraft is therefore analogous to the subjective experiencer of consciousness, while the person on the ground is like the objective observer. Both are looking at the same issue from two separate vantage points, and both are correct from their particular perspective, yet the two are entirely separate, and therefore it is impossible for the objective observer to know the subjective experience of the experiencer. They are by the rules of logic, mutually exclusive.

Build and operate an airplane the right way and you get flight. Build and operate a brain/body system the right way and you'll get consciousness ( or so the theory goes ).

And what I am saying is that no one will believe you unless you can say what it is like to be that brain/body system (i.e. solve the hard problem) . . . Now, will you even believe it yourself or will you from time to time look at what you've built and wonder if anything is going on in there or if you just have a clockwork orange? It would be strictly a matter of faith in your theory whether or not you had solved the problem.

Some people might believe while others may not. Either way you're right that faith plays a part, though I wouldn't say "strictly" all parts. If we could duplicate all the functions that appear to give rise to consciousness, and then have our creation appear to demonstrate that it is conscious to the same degree as any one of us, we would have plenty of objective reasons to support the idea that it does indeed possess consciousness.

We assume an inner life for one another without being able to prove it I think because objectively we are in the same class - we look the same all the way down to the limits of our current technology - no matter how you sample, test or scan us. So to be safe we treat one another as if the same sorts of things are going on inside of us and this brings up another issue - because this artificial being is embodied in an entirely different way (perhaps even non-biological) it almost certainly won't have the same sorts of things going on inside of it (if you go along with emergent/embodied consciousness) - this is a bit of a different issue but brings its own problems in convincing us that we should respect it because of what goes on inside of it . . .

This is why I say that it ( consciousness ) is an emergent property. It's just what happens.
(see attached cartoon)

Good cartoon. Sums it up pretty well .

 

[smcder]

I'm saying that the nature of the hard problem is such that anyone can solve the hard problem for themselves, but that it's impossible to solve it for someone or something else.

Yes, we are both the passenger and the observer, but we can only solve the hard problem for us as passengers, not for those others we observe.

Actually there is. Nagel's whole Bat paper uses analogy, and so does the analogy to flight that I've written here. In fact I would argue that with respect to the specific issue, the analogy to flight is more applicable than Nagel's Bat paper. What it's like to be something with respect to the question, "What is consciousness?" is to ask the question, "What is it like to be in a state of consciousness?" It makes no difference whether it's a bat or a robot or a clone or another person.

This translates very well in the analogy to, "What is it like to be in a state of flight?" The word "flight" and the word "consciousness" are both nouns, and they both describe particular states of things. Our experiencer on the aircraft is therefore analogous to the subjective experiencer of consciousness, while the person on the ground is like the objective observer. Both are looking at the same issue from two separate vantage points, and both are correct from their particular perspective, yet the two are entirely separate, and therefore it is impossible for the objective observer to know the subjective experience of the experiencer. They are by the rules of logic, mutually exclusive.

Some people might believe while others may not. Either way you're right that faith plays a part, though I wouldn't say "strictly" all parts. If we could duplicate all the functions that appear to give rise to consciousness, and then have our creation appear to demonstrate that it is conscious to the same degree as any one of us, we would have plenty of objective reasons to support the idea that it does indeed possess consciousness.

Good cartoon. Sums it up pretty well .

You didn't answer my Kurzweil/Moravec question!

 

[smcder]

You might enjoy the book Consilience by EO Wilson 1998. There was a flurry of popular books about emergence around this time and now we don't hear much about it b/c f the devastating critique that cartoon offers -

I think about ants . . . they do many of the same things that we do: they farm aphids, they build climate controlled nests, they use pesticides, they solve problems, they get drunk on Saturdays and . . . ok, well maybe not everything that we do! - and they do it, possibly, without there being much of anything that it is "like" to be an ant.

So some say there is the "emergence" of the hive mind, some just say it's the emergence of complex behavior - some claim to run very complex simulations from which things emerge (Noble Apes) - but you pretty much have to posit the entire universe for this behavior to emerge and sometimes it seems that's forgotten and too much credit it given to the ants or the simulation and the same might be true for us - our intelligence and consciousness and everything is both inside of and outside of us - so I've always imagined we'd be more likely to "grow" a conscious entity than create one from a set of rules (I have an intuition that we won't be able to do the latter without solving the hard problem) - which is why traditional AI seems to have failed. With evolutionary algorithms at the helm - some kind of intelligence and even consciousness might appear "inside" of a machine - but how much satisfaction would there be for its "creators" . . . many implications!

Now, back to the problem at hand . . .

 

[smcder]

"This translates very well in the analogy to, "What is it like to be in a state of flight?" The word "flight" and the word "consciousness" are both nouns, and they both describe particular states of things. Our experiencer on the aircraft is therefore analogous to the subjective experiencer of consciousness, while the person on the ground is like the objective observer. Both are looking at the same issue from two separate vantage points, and both are correct from their particular perspective, yet the two are entirely separate, and therefore it is impossible for the objective observer to know the subjective experience of the experiencer. They are by the rules of logic, mutually exclusive."
Nagel's paper uses analogy but not analogy to what consciousness (subjectivity) is like. The flight analogy requires two conscious (subjective) experiencers - thus assuming the very thing you are trying to analogize. To be objective you have to prove the thing without requiring what it is you are trying to prove. The equations of flight would still hold in an unconscious universe. (hmmmm) This is what Nagel says early and often in his paper and why he argues the hard problem is unique.

The whole trick is to use only objective information to describe subjective experience - what you are arguing seems a little like "If I can write a complex enough equation, the equation will become conscious." (So maybe the Golem is the earliest approach to the hard problem for roboticists?)

Some people might believe while others may not. Either way you're right that faith plays a part, though I wouldn't say "strictly" all parts.

Any drop of faith required would put your argument outside of objective/scientific grounds and that means you fail to solve the problem of consciousness. Which means the hard problem is completely relevant to your quest. Otherwise all you objectively have is a very impressive simulacra. (just ask Rutger Hauer in Blade Runner - he knows!)

If we could duplicate all the functions that appear (this requires a conscious observer) to give rise to consciousness, and then have our creation appear (this requires a conscious observer) to demonstrate that it is conscious to the same degree as any one of us, we would have plenty of objective reasons to support the idea that it does indeed possess consciousness.

No amount of objective evidence would dispel the doubt - pass every Turing test with flying colors and the zombie problem remains and people would immediately begin to abuse and exploit your creation. The only reason we do so for one another (at least under some circumstances) is due to a legal argument. Since I can't reasonably claim that you are objectively different from me, I have no way to differentiate myself - so any basic laws of right I want to apply to me I damn well better make sure they apply to you. And of course, like anything else, there are still exceptions based on differences of mental abilities, etc.

Assuming it works, the answer to the question of, "Why?" would be, "Because we created it." To elaborate. It's a causal circumstance. If consciousness is an emergent property of a sufficiently complex, organized, and normally functioning brain/body system in its waking state, then why "there is something that it is like to be that device" is because we created a sufficiently complex, organized, and normally functioning brain/body system in a waking state.

I smell circularity . . .