Philosophy, Science, & The Unexplained - Main Thread

[smcder]

There's that expression again "account for". What does that mean exactly? I don't see any way that it's applicable as an argument against a physical explanation for consciousness when used in the context of, "the nature of consciousness as we experience it". A physical model for consciousness doesn't have to "account for" the nature of consciousness as we experience it. It simply has to describe the situation in enough detail to duplicate it, and if that can be done, then that's sufficient to explain it as well as we can explain anything else, including the material that makes up our brain and the world around us. Accounting for it's "nature" is a whole other issue. As mentioned above it's essentially the same as asking what the ultimate nature of emergence or existence itself is. We don't have those answers and probably never will. But that doesn't mean we can't accumulate enough information to create consciousness. We already give birth to it biologically, so it's obviously reproducible, and that is the essential question. Can we reproduce it via physical means? I see no reason why not. Answering the question of its "nature" is beside that particular point.

But the formulation of the hard problem mushes it together and claims that because the inventory of the parts doesn't explain how it works, the assembled unit will be incomplete. It's faulty logic.

. . . where does Nagel say that? can you provide a quote from his paper?

also, try this . . . What is it like to be a bat? it addresses some of the questions you raise . . . maybe it will help

 

[Constance]

I'm in agreement with scmder, who I call Steve, in his response to ufology just above. ufology wrote:

A physical model for consciousness doesn't have to "account for" the nature of consciousness as we experience it. It simply has to describe the situation in enough detail to duplicate it, and if that can be done, then that's sufficient to explain it as well as we can explain anything else."

What do you mean by 'the situation'? Are you referring to the sensory-neural processes of perception, and are you claiming that a physical construct produced to model/duplicate those processes will be sufficient to produce consciousness? On what basis can you expect that to happen given that consciousness, though still a mystery to science and philosophy, so far exceeds perception itself (which is not yet fully understood, even at the visual level)?

 

[Constance]

you might also enjoy listening to this interview - Interview with Philosopher Alva Noë (BSP 58) — Brain Science Podcast

Thanks. That's a much clearer and better interview with Noe than the first one we listened to. I downloaded the transcript available there, much easier for me if I can read it.

Yesterday I wrote about Noe: "Noe seems increasingly out of touch with the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, which he studied for his doctoral work, after which he worked with Daniel Dennett and tried to retrain himself in neuroscience." I now understand better and admire the project he's set for himself: to clarify and make real for neuroscientists and cognitive scientists the essential role of the palpable world in consciousness, a real world we access through our embodiment (we are part of the world's body) and the evolved attunements of our sensual and neural capacities to prepare and enable us to live constructively and meaningfully in the world. Noe has learned all of his critical phenomenological insights from MP and made an attempt to engage others in them -- those specific others who by scientific training in a materialist/objectivist age have looked at life and mind reductively. That reductive view has trickled down to the culture (of the West) to the detriment of how we see ourselves and the world we live in.

 

[smcder]

Thanks. That's a much clearer and better interview with Noe than the first one we listened to. I downloaded the transcript available there, much easier for me if I can read it.

Yesterday I wrote about Noe: "Noe seems increasingly out of touch with the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, which he studied for his doctoral work, after which he worked with Daniel Dennett and tried to retrain himself in neuroscience." I now understand better and admire the project he's set for himself: to clarify and make real for neuroscientists and cognitive scientists the essential role of the palpable world in consciousness, a real world we access through our embodiment (we are part of the world's body) and the evolved attunements of our sensual and neural capacities to prepare and enable us to live constructively and meaningfully in the world. Noe has learned all of his critical phenomenological insights from MP and made an attempt to engage others in them -- those specific others who by scientific training in a materialist/objectivist age have looked at life and mind reductively. That reductive view has trickled down to the culture (of the West) to the detriment of how we see ourselves and the world we live in.

based on what you say above - you might enjoy this one too:

Michael Marder, “Plant-Thinking: A Philosophy of Vegetal Life” (Columbia UP, 2013)

 

[Randall]

But the formulation of the hard problem mushes it together and claims that because the inventory of the parts doesn't explain how it works, the assembled unit will be incomplete. It's faulty logic.
. . . where does Nagel say that? can you provide a quote from his paper?

It's not about what has been said, it's about what it means, and whether or not it makes any sense. Because the language used in discussing the so-called hard problem is ambiguous, my posts involve interpretation, therefore requiring quotes from Nagel that match what I've stated here in an effort to interpret the meaning is not a reasonable expectation. What's needed is to address the components of the argument as we've been discussing them:

What does it mean to make an "account of what it's like" to be something with consciousness, versus what does it mean to make an "accounting of" the parts, properties and operating principles of something with consciousness? The conclusion is that it's not possible to account for "what it's like" to be something in the same way we can account for "what it's made of " because the two kinds of "accounting" are entirely different.

In this discussion, the above conflict seems to be used as a rationale for arguing that consciousness isn't physical. However that logic is flawed: If question ( Q ) "Is consciousness physical?", is sufficiently addressed by answer ( A ), "Yes because ...", then the introduction of condition ( B ) " Does answer ( A ) explain what consciousness is like?" has no bearing on the validity of answer ( A ). It's an entirely separate question. All that we need to concern ourselves with is the initial question: "Is consciousness a physical phenomenon?" ( Yes or No ) and be able to provide sufficient evidence to support it. What "it's like" is irrelevant.

To press this further, is there any non-physical explanation that accounts for "what it's like" to be a conscious being? No. So either way the inclusion of this requirement is a dead end detour with respect to the question of whether or not consciousness is physical or non-physical, though it does make for interesting contemplation and investigation.

 

[Randall]

What do you mean by 'the situation'? Are you referring to the sensory-neural processes of perception, and are you claiming that a physical construct produced to model/duplicate those processes will be sufficient to produce consciousness? On what basis can you expect that to happen given that consciousness, though still a mystery to science and philosophy, so far exceeds perception itself (which is not yet fully understood, even at the visual level)?

When I say "duplicate the situation" I mean physically duplicate a being with consciousness to the extent that the same properties, including consciousness, emerge from the duplicated being as were evident in the being the duplicate was modeled from. For example, our natural reproductive function seems to do that just fine, and there is no substantial evidence that anything beyond the physical is required. In fact all evidence indicates that it ( physical materials and processes ) are necessary ( again physicalism is not to be confused with materialism ).

 

[Constance]

I'm not able to follow your last post, ufology.

I would like to respond to this paragraph, which you've added to a recent post:

To press this further, is there any non-physical explanation that accounts for "what it's like" to be a conscious being? No. So either way the inclusion of this requirement is a dead end detour with respect to the question of whether or not consciousness is physical or non-physical.

Modern literary art (and much earlier literary art), primarily in novels but also in poetry, presents an array of exemplifications, expressions, of what it's like to be a conscious being. Novels in the existentialist tradition do this most vividly. Modern cinema also contributes considerably to insight into what it's like to be a conscious being. But aside from all that, each of us knows what it's like to be a conscious being.

 

[Randall]

I'm not able to follow your last post, ufology.
Modern literary art (and much earlier literary art), primarily in novels but also in poetry, presents an array of exemplifications, expressions, of what it's like to be a conscious being. Novels in the existentialist tradition do this most vividly. Modern cinema also contributes considerably to insight into what it's like to be a conscious being. But aside from all that, each of us knows what it's like to be a conscious being.

Let's focus. What you're describing aren't non-physical explanations, they're artistic illustrations of fictional circumstances or direct experiences. We're not asking about the consciousness possessed by fictional Xeno in the Fifth dimension or what your conscious experience is like, we're asking: Is consciousness a physical phenomenon? If "Yes", what evidence is there? If "No" what evidence is there? Fictional accounts of imaginary candidates don't count as evidence for "No". They count as entertainment. Your personal experience however contains a wealth of evidence that conscious is physical ( not to be confused with material ).

 

[smcder]

It's not about what has been said, it's about what it means, and whether or not it makes any sense. Because the language used in discussing the so-called hard problem is ambiguous, my posts involve interpretation, therefore requiring quotes from Nagel that match what I've stated here in an effort to interpret the meaning is not a reasonable expectation. What's needed is to address the components of the argument as we've been discussing them:

What does it mean to make an "account of what it's like" to be something with consciousness, versus what does it mean to make an "accounting of" the parts, properties and operating principles of something with consciousness? The conclusion is that it's not possible to account for "what it's like" to be something in the same way we can account for "what it's made of " because the two kinds of "accounting" are entirely different.

In this discussion, the above conflict seems to be used as a rationale for arguing that consciousness isn't physical. However that logic is flawed: If question ( Q ) "Is consciousness physical?", is sufficiently addressed by answer ( A ), "Yes because ...", then the introduction of condition ( B ) " Does answer ( A ) explain what consciousness is like?" has no bearing on the validity of answer ( A ). It's an entirely separate question. All that we need to concern ourselves with is the initial question: "Is consciousness a physical phenomenon?" ( Yes or No ) and be able to provide sufficient evidence to support it. What "it's like" is irrelevant.

To press this further, is there any non-physical explanation that accounts for "what it's like" to be a conscious being? No. So either way the inclusion of this requirement is a dead end detour with respect to the question of whether or not consciousness is physical or non-physical, though it does make for interesting contemplation and investigation.

But the formulation of the hard problem mushes it together and claims that because the inventory of the parts doesn't explain how it works, the assembled unit will be incomplete. It's faulty logic.

I don't require that you provide a quote - but you are saying that Nagel is making a specific claim and I don't see it in his paper, so it's reasonable to ask where Nagel says this -

In this discussion, the above conflict seems to be used as a rationale for arguing that consciousness isn't physical.

No, Nagel does not claim this:

"It would be a mistake to conclude that physicalism must be false. Nothing is proved by the inadequacy of physicalist hypotheses that assume a faulty objective analysis of mind. It would be truer to say that physicalism is a position we cannot understand because we do not at present have any conception of how it might be true. Perhaps it will be thought unreasonable to require such a conception as a condition of understanding. After all, it might be said, the meaning of physicalism is clear enough: mental states are states of the body; mental events are physical events. We do not know which physical states and events they are, but that should not prevent us from understanding the hypothesis. What could be clearer than the words 'is' and 'are'?"

(but then read the next paragraph . . . )

Go back to the paper, the source material, whatever else has evolved in this discussion may well be muddled, but I re-read Nagel's paper this weekend and I don't think he needs any help from me, his argument is clear and coherent and regularly misunderstood- this link:

What is it like to be a bat?

addresses many of those misunderstandings and may be helpful - it seems to address some of your exact issues - it's worth quoting in full here for ease of reference:

agel's classic "What is it like to be a bat?"must be one of the most influential papers on consciousness of the last century, and it's still very relevant.

Nagel's aim is to launch a kind of counter-attack against physicalist arguments, which would reduce the mental to the merely physical, and which were evidently getting into the ascendant in 1974 when the paper was published. Tempting as it may be to fall back on the familiar kind of reductionist approach which has worked so well in other areas, Nagel argues, phenomenal, subjective experience is a special case. Reductive arguments always seek to give an explanation in objective terms, but the essential point about conscious experiences is that they are subjective. The whole idea of an objective account therefore makes no sense - no more sense than asking what my inward experiences are really like, as opposed to how they seem to me. How they seem to me is all there is to them. Any neutral, objective, third-person explanation has to leave out the essence of the experience. The point about conscious experience is that there is something it is like to see x, or hear y, or feel z.

Ah, 'there is something it is like' - the phrase that launched a thousand papers. Surely you realise that this is just an over-literal interpretation of the conventional phrase 'what is it like?'. To assume that the 'it' in that question represents a real thing rather than a grammatical quirk is just silly.

Yes, I understand your point, but Nagel's whole point is that 'what it's like' is strictly inexpressible in objective terms. So it isn't surprising that he has to resort to a back-handed way of getting you to see what he's talking about. If he could describe it straightforwardly, he'd be contradicting his own theory.

Anyway. Nagel uses the example of a bat to dramatise his case - how can we know what it is like to be a bat, from the inside?

There's a large rhetorical element in the choice of a bat. Bats have the traditional reputation of being a bit weird, and it's known that some of them have a sense we don't - echolocation. All this helps to persuade people that we can't imagine what things are like from another point of view. But if Nagel is right, it should be equally hard to see things from the point of view of an identical twin. So let's get the bats out of this particular belfry, OK?

Nagel's entitled to use any example he likes. He explains that he chose bats because they're close enough to human beings to leave most people in no doubt that they have conscious experiences of some kind, while far enough from us to dramatise his case. But whether you like it or not, it raises some fundamental issues. If Nagel is right, there are certain experiences - bat experiences, for example - that humans can never have. It follows that there are true facts about these experiences which humans can never grasp (although they can grasp that there must be facts of this kind. This general conclusion about the limits of human understanding must have been part of the inspiration for Colin McGinn'swider theory that even human consciousness is ultimately beyond our understanding.

Yes, of course, since human beings are by definition not bats, they can't have the experience of being a bat. But it does not follow that there are facts about bat experiences they can't understand. You see, actually we can know what it's like to be a bat. We can know what sizes of objects echolocation detects, and how the bat directs its ears and the stream of sound, and thousands of facts of that kind. We can know all about the kinds of information a bat's senses supply, and with the right equipment we can experience echolocation ourselves at least by proxy.

I think the worst part of the paper is where Nagel says that even if we imagine ourselves turning into a bat, that won't be any good. We're just imagining what it would be like for us to be a bat, whereas we need to imagine what it's like for a bat. This just reduces the whole thing to the trivial point that we can't stop being us. Because if we did - it wouldn't be us any more!

You just need to make the imaginative effort to see what he's on about. Actually, the claim being made is quite modest in some respects. Nagel himself says that his argument doesn't disprove physicalism. It would be nearer the truth to say that physicalism, the view that mental entities are physical entities, is a hypothesis we can't even understand properly...

 

[smcder]

There seems to be confusion about what constitutes a physical explanation. Irreducibility is recognized by science as a property of emergence, and is simply accepted as a part of nature. This is why I constantly revert back to the idea of a magnetic field. Depending on which scientist or philosopher you talk to, magnetic fields are "physical" because they have properties that are measureable. However they are also emergent properties of materials and nobody knows exactly what a magnetic field is made of. Similarly, I submit that a consciousness field may be a particular organization of EM fields generated by a functioning brain that results in the emergent experience we call consciousness. In this context, consciousness is still within the physical domain, so we can do away with all the objections that go along with traditional ideas around substance dualism that suggest consciousness is some kind of non-physical substance. Certainly it's non-material, but it's still in the bounds of the physical ( again, not to be confused with "material" ).

what distinction are you making between the physical and material? Nagel was familiar with EM in 1974 and what little I know of your theory - Nagel's criticism would apply, it falls within his discussion of physicalism:

15 I have not defined the term 'physical'. Obviously it does not apply just to what can be described by the concepts of contemporary physics, since we expect further developments. Some may think there is nothing to prevent mental phenomena from eventually being recognized as physical in their own right. But whatever else may be said of the physical, it has to be objective. So if our idea of the physical ever expands to include mental phenomena, it will have to assign them an objective character—whether or not this is done by analyzing them in terms of other phenomena already regarded as physical It seems to me more likely, however, that mental-physical relations will eventually be expressed in a theory whose fundamental terms cannot be placed clearly in either category.
Which seem to me to be the seeds of his later position of mind as irreducible.

In this context, consciousness is still within the physical domain, so we can do away with all the objections that go along with traditional ideas around substance dualism that suggest consciousness is some kind of non-physical substance.

We can't do away with it until you prove your theory . . . and this discussion is getting harder and harder without a clear statement of your theory of consciousness -

And I need some reference for this quote (below), as I don't understand the relationship you are making between irreducibility and emergence?

Irreducibility is recognized by science as a property of emergence, and is simply accepted as a part of nature.

Have another look at Chalmer's statement:

This position qualifies as a variety of dualism, as it postulates basic properties over and above the properties invoked by physics. But it is an innocent version of dualism, entirely compatible with the scientific view of the world. Nothing in this approach contradicts anything in physical theory; we simply need to add furtherbridging principles to explain how experience arises from physical processes. There is nothing particularly spiritual or mystical about this theory - its overall shape is like that of a physical theory, with a few fundamental entities connected by fundamental laws. It expands the ontology slightly, to be sure, but Maxwell did the same thing. Indeed, the overall structure of this position is entirely naturalistic, allowing that ultimately the universe comes down to a network of basic entities obeying simple laws, and allowing that there may ultimately be a theory of consciousness cast in terms of such laws. If the position is to have a name, a good choice might be naturalistic dualism.

 

[Constance]

We can't do away with it until you prove your theory . . . and this discussion is getting harder and harder without a clear statement of your theory of consciousness -

Seconded.

It's time for you to stop complaining and making excuses, ufology, and getting pushy as you just did with me a few posts back. Lay out your theory, model, whatever you want to call it, already. I'll check in in a few days to read it. Need a break from this.

 

[Randall]

But the formulation of the hard problem mushes it together and claims that because the inventory of the parts doesn't explain how it works, the assembled unit will be incomplete. It's faulty logic.

I don't require that you provide a quote - but you are saying that Nagel is making a specific claim and I don't see it in his paper, so it's reasonable to ask where Nagel says this -

In this discussion, the above conflict seems to be used as a rationale for arguing that consciousness isn't physical.

No, Nagel does not claim this:
"It would be a mistake to conclude that physicalism must be false ...

The point was in reference to the idea that physicalism must "account for 'what it's like' to be a being with consciousness" in order to be true, that's the problem. Introducing animals like bats into the discussion are purely for the purpose of example.

 

[Randall]

We can't do away with it ( all the problems associated with substance dualism ) until you prove your theory . . . and this discussion is getting harder and harder without a clear statement of your theory of consciousness -

What I'm saying is that if we can explain consciousness within the bounds of the physical ( which I'm attempting to do ), it will do away with the objections we see in the following video ( as previously posted ):

So I'm not claiming that I have proof that the path I've chosen is correct, only that it seems to make more sense than the type of dualism portrayed in the video, and because it deals with the non-material nature of consciousness while at the same time remaining within the bounds of the physical it also addresses the issues of dualism in general. So what I'm proposing isn't purely monism, nor is it substance dualism where the substance in question is something non-physical.

And I need some reference for this quote (below), as I don't understand the relationship you are making between irreducibility and emergence?

"Irreducibility is recognized by science as a property of emergence, and is simply accepted as a part of nature."​

I thought you said you didn't need any help using Wikipedia . Forgive me for being less precise than I should. The concept of emergence is looked at in different ways by different people in different contexts, and this subject is tiring my brain out and I'm thinking I'll just give up on it again before it gets out of control. However before that, the following quote is along the lines of what I was getting at with the quote of mine you posted:

"Strong emergence describes the direct causal action of a high-level system upon its components; qualities produced this way are irreducible to the system's constituent parts. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts. It follows that no simulation of the system can exist, for such a simulation would itself constitute a reduction of the system to its constituent parts." ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergence )​

Below is a video that drones on about emergence and includes the panel member who made part of the quote above ( Robert Laughlin ). This is actually quite a good video IMO.

Emergence
( To skip the intro move slider to 6:30 )

Have another look at Chalmer's statement:

This position qualifies as a variety of dualism, as it postulates basic properties over and above the properties invoked by physics. But it is an innocent version of dualism, entirely compatible with the scientific view of the world. Nothing in this approach contradicts anything in physical theory; we simply need to add furtherbridging principles to explain how experience arises from physical processes. There is nothing particularly spiritual or mystical about this theory - its overall shape is like that of a physical theory, with a few fundamental entities connected by fundamental laws. It expands the ontology slightly, to be sure, but Maxwell did the same thing. Indeed, the overall structure of this position is entirely naturalistic, allowing that ultimately the universe comes down to a network of basic entities obeying simple laws, and allowing that there may ultimately be a theory of consciousness cast in terms of such laws. If the position is to have a name, a good choice might be naturalistic dualism.

Chalmer's statement above seems perfectly reasonable, and his characterization of "naturalistic dualism" seems to be like what I'm trying to get at in the first part of this post.

 

[smcder]

The point was in reference to the idea that physicalism must "account for 'what it's like' to be a being with consciousness" in order to be true, that's the problem. Introducing animals like bats into the discussion are purely for the purpose of example. Or are you saying Nagel's paper isn't making that assertion? BTW, he can hedge his bets all he wants at the end and it makes no difference to what we were talking about in the first place.

I suggest we move on - we're missing the forest for the trees - what about looking at the specifics of your theory or choosing another topic, perhaps something brought up by another member in this thread?

 

[trainedobserver]

Can we all agree on two points about consciousness? (I apologize if I'm treading over already covered ground)

• It is all a person can experience.
• Although it is a representation of the world and ourselves in it, it is not those things.

The implications of those two facts are devastating to science, psychology, philosophy, and religion IMHO.

• Nothing outside of consciousness can be experienced, therefore anything outside of it can only be known about indirectly.
• Humans never experience or communicate with other beings. They only interface with their own self-constructed representation of other beings.
• The resource limitations imposed by the two facts restrict our comprehension to the domain of human experience itself. While this is sufficient for human beings to navigate the environment and sustain themselves it is completely inadequate to make anything like an "objective" appraisal of the universe or ourselves in it.

The paradox is that while consciousness is all that we can or ever will know or experience this limitation excludes us from the underlying reality and mechanisms that actually produce it.

Given these things one might argue that it is more beneficial to pursue the uses of our consciousness rather its origins.

 

[Randall]

I suggest we move on - we're missing the forest for the trees

The Trickster has the power to cloud men's minds ( or is that The Shadow? ). I think it's fair to say that no matter which way we look at the Hard Problem of Consciousness, it's an intellectual point of interest rather than part of the main highway, path, edge of the ledge by which we're hanging on by our fingernails ( whatever the case may be ). It invites us in, and if you take the tour you inevitably end up going through what we've just gone through. Neither one of our points seem to be unique to the problem. Your viewpoint is based on what you've seen out the window on your side of the bus, and my viewpoint is based on what I've seen out the other side. Both sets of scenery are valid for contemplative purposes.

- what about looking at the specifics of your theory or choosing another topic, perhaps something brought up by another member in this thread?

Another topic? OK. Bye Bye WILTBAB Land! Or perhaps we should take the tour again and switch seats? Now there's a scary thought. I'd probably emerge from the bus an incoherent blabbering mess . If we do that be prepared to call in the guys with straight jackets. But seriously, I'm OK with a switch of topics at almost any time. It's interesting though how much a number of them relate back to the concept of consciousness. Whether it's remote viewing, NDEs, OOBEs, hypnotic regression, or reincarnation, we find the various issues associated with consciousness entwined with them.

There's not much more I can add to where I'm at with respect to explaining consciousness. I'm with those who seem to rally under the label of Physicalism who suggest that consciousness is an emergent property of a normal living brain/body system in it's waking ( perceptually aware ) state. Based on the evidence, it seems that all that is required to produce consciousness is to duplicate the situation in which we find one consciousness, and another will emerge. Apart from the technical requirements, it's about as simple to me as that.

 

[Randall]

Can we all agree on two points about consciousness? (I apologize if I'm treading over already covered ground)

• It is all a person can experience.
• Although it is a representation of the world and ourselves in it, it is not those things.

The implications of those two facts are devastating to science, psychology, philosophy, and religion IMHO.

• Nothing outside of consciousness can be experienced, therefore anything outside of it can only be known about indirectly.
• Humans never experience or communicate with other beings. They only interface with their own self-constructed representation of other beings.
• The resource limitations imposed by the two facts restrict our comprehension to the domain of human experience itself. While this is sufficient for human beings to navigate the environment and sustain themselves it is completely inadequate to make anything like an "objective" appraisal of the universe or ourselves in it.

The paradox is that while consciousness is all that we can or ever will know or experience this limitation excludes us from the underlying reality and mechanisms that actually produce it.

Given these things one might argue that it is more beneficial to pursue the uses of our consciousness rather its origins.

Some good points there and feel free to track your muddy boots all over this topic. It's so muddy already nobody will mind anyway, I'm sure . If I were to pick at any particular point it would be that I do think that we can communicate with other beings, and the proof of that is the communication you are reading now. Not to mention all the other evidence. So perhaps you might want to clarify what you meant there. For example, if I were to guess, I'd say that what you meant was that humans cannot form a 1 to 1 Star Trek Vulcan mind meld like communicative experience with other beings, and if that's what you meant, I'd obviously have to agree.

 

[Constance]

Here is a post from about ten days ago by trained observer that presents some questions I'd like to see discussed if others here are willing to do so:

Don't you guys think the problem of consciousness is largely a semantic one driven by our limited perspective? We are limited to the "experience" of our own personal consciousness in our attempts to quantify it. To experience consciousness requires a functioning brain which being the organ of consciousness, can only experience itself.

 

[trainedobserver]

If I were to pick at any particular point it would be that I do think that we can communicate with other beings, and the proof of that is the communication you are reading now.

See fact one. We are talking to ourselves.
While data are definitely "communicated" through the senses, we are actually interfacing and communicating with our own self-constructed representation of these other beings. I can't express it any clearer than that and it may require some navel gazing to click in if at all.

We may think we are communicating with and know other living beings causally, but on a very basic level we are not nor can we ever. This condition explains "projection" to a tee. Of course we are going to see our own flaws in other people and disapprove of them and so forth and so on. Look! Squirrel!

 

[Randall]

See fact one. We are talking to ourselves.

If you're talking to yourself. Then where did this post come from?