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How do YOU define consciousness?

... The real question of course is do we function in the world via paradigms that must exist prior to our involved coping with reality? Heidegger's answer to this question is probably another question: "what makes you think we needed a paradigm in the first place?" You'll probably find the missing "figuring things out" in the sections starting with the first lecture leading to the discussion of the modes of being ;)
In the context of truth we need a paradigm in the first place, otherwise we can't ask the question, e.g. "Is it true that the red Ferrari has 4 wheels?" BTW, we're still at the place where despite your claim, Heidegger does no such thing as show that the two types of reality ( objective and subjective ) are actually the same reality. So far, the claim is nothing more than a proclamation that is assumed to be true for the sake of argument rather than an analysis of the actual state of affairs.

Furthermore, wading through hours of irrelevant philosophese may be interesting in places, but it isn't going to reinforce that claim. The bottom line still remains ( and will remain at the end of the series ), that the reality of the red Ferrari in one's imagination is still entirely separate from the materially real one on the showroom floor, and any argument to the contrary is pure nonsense. Of course according to the lecture material, Heidegger would also have us discard common sense. This is typical of his model which arbitrarily discards evidence and analysis contrary to his views.

What's even more aggravating is that according to the material so far, Heidegger is also prone to reintegrating previously rejected analyses in order to justify some other point whenever he finds it convenient. This makes the overall model fragmented and incoherent. So far, there is just so much wrong with this view that I don't know how anyone can seriously subscribe to it.

Interesting discussion though.
 
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Most of this fascinating discussion has gone beyond my cognitive and educational pay grade. One sign of an excellent thread, I think. But I am tossing in a link to Jill Bolte Taylor's Ted Talk, "Stroke Of Insight", because I think it makes a salient point about the distinction between the phenomenon of consciousness versus consciousness that is aware of itself as a discrete entity. The implication is that individuation is yet another emergent construct of consciousness. At any rate, it's a gripping presentation.

 
... I am tossing in a link to Jill Bolte Taylor's Ted Talk, "Stroke Of Insight", because I think it makes a salient point about the distinction between the phenomenon of consciousness versus consciousness that is aware of itself as a discrete entity. The implication is that individuation is yet another emergent construct of consciousness. At any rate, it's a gripping presentation.
That was absolutely fantastic! Thank you for sharing :).
 
In the context of truth we need a paradigm in the first place, otherwise we can't ask the question, e.g. "Is it true that the red Ferrari has 4 wheels?" BTW, we're still at the place where despite your claim, Heidegger does no such thing as show that the two types of reality ( objective and subjective ) are actually the same reality. So far, the claim is nothing more than a proclamation that is assumed to be true for the sake of argument rather than an analysis of the actual state of affairs.

Furthermore, wading through hours of irrelevant philosophese may be interesting in places, but it isn't going to reinforce that claim. The bottom line still remains ( and will remain at the end of the series ), that the reality of the red Ferrari in one's imagination is still entirely separate from the materially real one on the showroom floor, and any argument to the contrary is pure nonsense. Of course according to the lecture material, Heidegger would also have us discard common sense. This is typical of his model which arbitrarily discards evidence and analysis contrary to his views.

What's even more aggravating is that according to the material so far, Heidegger is also prone to reintegrating previously rejected analyses in order to justify some other point whenever he finds it convenient. This makes the overall model fragmented and incoherent. So far, there is just so much wrong with this view that I don't know how anyone can seriously subscribe to it.

Interesting discussion though.


I think I meant a paradigm or model that is followed through explicitly (i.e. you didn't look at a diagram or model to make the recognition, nor did you consult references or tomes on automotive theory)
The only thing you are saying is that two features of one reality are different -- many such features in our reality are different, but this is not a sufficient condition to claim they have independent ontic bases. I thought I made this clear in my post with the chain of clearly different events in one unified process. OF course your visual image of the (A) red Ferrari in your imagination is different from the (B) actual red Ferrari (which you forgot to mention was an active image as you were looking at it)-- but that does not mean A and B are independent, much less does it say that there are two mythic umbrellas A-reality and B-reality that hold A and B with completely different causal or ontological principles.

"Heidegger threw away common sense"--that's certainly news to me and highly ironic, considering he based an entire mode of being on the absorbed involvement in a world of actual things equipment and such. I think you have a ways to go on this...

"Heidegger is also prone to reintegrating previously rejected analyses"


This is a very mysterious statement -- which analysis? What was reintegrated to what?

Overall I am happy to have another individual to talk about Heidegger and Being and Time, just do me a favor and start from the beginning rather than at the END of the lecture series.

 
I think I meant a paradigm or model that is followed through explicitly (i.e. you didn't look at a diagram or model to make the recognition, nor did you consult references or tomes on automotive theory)
The only thing you are saying is that two features of one reality are different -- many such features in our reality are different, but this is not a sufficient condition to claim they have independent ontic bases.
Not really. Allow me to clarify. When I use the word "paradigm" I use it in it's generic English language sense to mean "A typical example of something" ( Encarta ), rather than to be synonymous with the concept of a worldview. So in the case of the red Ferrari, we're not simply discerning that certain things are different, but that those things represent "typical examples", and in order to do that we have to have some previously existing and sufficiently complex framework of "typical" that allows us to recognize and make comparisons.
I thought I made this clear in my post with the chain of clearly different events in one unified process. OF course your visual image of the (A) red Ferrari in your imagination is different from the (B) actual red Ferrari (which you forgot to mention was an active image as you were looking at it)-- but that does not mean A and B are independent, much less does it say that there are two mythic umbrellas A-reality and B-reality that hold A and B with completely different causal or ontological principles.
I'm not sure what you mean by an "active image". I simply mean an imagined image ( or object ), in this case an imaginary red Ferrari, without reference to any particular material object ( in this case a materially real red Ferrari ).
"Heidegger threw away common sense"--that's certainly news to me and highly ironic, considering he based an entire mode of being on the absorbed involvement in a world of actual things equipment and such. I think you have a ways to go on this...
I'm just relaying what was actually said in the audio. However it may well be another one of those things that either the professor or Heidegger finds convenient to either discard or integrate depending on the situation.
"Heidegger is also prone to reintegrating previously rejected analyses" This is a very mysterious statement -- which analysis? What was reintegrated to what?
Do you really need me to start keeping quotes and timestamps from the audio? I've just listened to all four parts of the Introduction plus Lecture 01, and he's done it several times. If you've actually listened to it yourself more than once it's impossible not to notice. Furthermore the professor tends to sound quite unsure about what it is he's trying to get across, as if he doesn't really get it himself sometimes. Perhaps this is just an act for the student's benefit. I don't know, but that's not what it sounds like.
Overall I am happy to have another individual to talk about Heidegger and Being and Time, just do me a favor and start from the beginning rather than at the END of the lecture series.
Beginning, middle, end ... is there really any difference ;) ? Anyway, nothing has been done yet to reasonably illustrate dualism isn't true. Furthermore I would submit that nothing can be done. If you believe otherwise, instead of using a mountain of rhetoric and lecture material that does nothing to address the point of the illustration we've been using, let's just stick with the illustration. It's really quite simple and elegant and it's all we need to resolve the issue one way or the other. If you can show us how an imaginary red Ferrari and a materially real one are in fact one in the same, then we can discard dualism. Until then all the philosophical wrangling in the world isn't going to invalidate dualism.
 
I'm not sure what you mean by an "active image". I simply mean an imagined image ( or object ), in this case an imaginary red Ferrari, without reference to any particular material object ( in this case a materially real red Ferrari ).

Firstly, from a historical perspective, the sequence of events that led to the formation of the the imaginary red Ferrari did not come about without reference to the material object (the light hit the object, which came to your eyes, was processed into signals that led to your brain--all of these are different)--so it appears you are already on the wrong track. And the fact that your mental picture of the object is different from the actual object does not prove that the two objects are in "separate realities." The picture (an object) of the Ferrari on your screen is a separate thing from the actual object, but BOTH the picture of the object AND the object itself exist in the same "world" framework. Just because they are different doesn't mean they are completely separate and independently founded realities.

Your illustration is fine, its just incomplete. What you fail to mention are the background details that connect the reality of the car to your "mental image"

(1) Your recognition of the car was not based on any rules that you explicitly followed -- you just did it
(2) If I asked you how you recognized the car, you would give me a story (a story that your body and brain DID NOT USE IN ITS RECOGNITION!)
(3) The referential totality of things related to cars, wheels, driving, car body shops, engines, equipment, and all other stuff that formed the background of intelligibility of the same-- without this background of other relations between yourself and these things, you would have no "image" of a car--what you would have is an image of a big large shiny red blob with black blobs and clear translucent panes ....etc .etc
(4) Your relation to the car; to the car's equipmental totality; to the car's driver; to the place it is photographed; i.e... an innumerable other relations is precisely what is constitutive of your seeing it as such--this blows the "separate realities" thesis right out of the sky. They are part of the same reality--they may be DIFFERENT...but DIFFERENT objects in the SAME REALITY is not the same as them being separate and independent sources of reality which is what a dualistic perspective would claim.




 
Firstly, from a historical perspective, the sequence of events that led to the formation of the the imaginary red Ferrari did not come about without reference to the material object ...
I said: "... without reference to any particular material object ( in this case a materially real red Ferrari )", not without any reference period. In other words, we're presuming that the imaginer already understands what a materially real Ferrari is and what it should look like without having to be right in front of one every time.

Also, your response still does nothing to demonstrate that a materially real object and an imaginary one are one in the same, and therefore we still cannot discard duality. In fact, the difference between something imaginary and something materially real is so incredibly obvious that it's hard to believe we're even having a debate about it. Next time you go to the store, try paying for your groceries with some imaginary money and see what happens. There is simply no escaping duality without becoming willfully ignorant of the overwhelming evidence supporting it. The problem with Heidegger is that he's only focused on one particular context of existence ( being or dasein ) within an entirely subjective model. That's fine if one wants to ignore everything else. However that hardly seems like an approach that is going to get us any closer to solving the mystery.
 
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When you said "without reference to any particular material object" -- what other reference could you mean? Do you mean Plato's Red Ferrari? If so then I think you've really kicked up the confusion another notch with the introduction of some kind of Eternal Formal Red Ferrari (hint: it doesn't exist). Also I think you are now twisting my words -- I never said the "material" and "imaginary" object were the same. That's obvious as daylight. What I said was that a same fundamental basis underlies both -- i.e. they are part of the same real world (which is neutral to either the "physical" or "mental" labels we keep throwing into the discussion). And I think you even agreed with me on this point--so this is why I am suddenly confused.

Your quote:

I'm good with that, and we can make progress by recognizing that duality is part of that larger process rather than discarding it altogether

So you see I am NOT saying that they are the same (and if I did or misspoke or even made a stupid statement then I am wrong on this point)--its not even right to say that they are different, because they are not real categories. The physical/mental, subject/object schema is completely flawed at the start--so its meaningless to even say that they are not the same.

IF as you say, duality is part of a larger process, then what difference does it make between your example and the example of the phonograph? A phonograph is not a "thinking" being and yet there's a duality between the pits and valleys of the groove and the sound that corresponds to the same. Does this mean there's a fundamental ontological difference between the vinyl material holding the pattern and the sound material pattern in the air? -- of course not! Does this also mean there's a "mental" material called "music" that corresponds to the "physical" material called "vinyl?" No! :)

Duality, Triality, ....N-ality may be found in the world in many forms including the process that makes vinyl etchings into sound and sound into brain signals and brain signals into felt qualities, this does not mean that process is divided into 2,3 or ... N different worlds of separate independent ontologies!

We agree on some points and I don't see any point re-hashing the same arguments over and over again or boring you with other banalities. We both recognize that we're living in a unified reality. I may take a step further and say that our terms our dated and should be reexamined or even discarded in favor of a new framework of understanding. I also probably step further in saying that there is no such thing as a subject or object, just existence. That's my opinion based on hours and hours of thinking, reflection, meditation and reading.
 
The problem with Heidegger is that he's only focused on one particular context of existence ( being or dasein ) within an entirely subjective model. That's fine if one wants to ignore everything else. However that hardly seems like an approach that is going to get us any closer to solving the mystery.

How's an objective model going to work if its already assumed by the subjective model? Why not dispense with "subject" and "object" altogether?

You can't have a subject without objects and vice versa--so how can Heidegger (who clearly does not work within a completely subjective model--I am just humoring you right now) have an entirely subjective model when he's talking about equipment, objects and the relational totality of things in a real world (Heidegger is a realist...btw)?

So you see he's not ignoring everything else....wow...so completely, completely, utterly...wrong!

The entire basis of a Dasein is its involvement in the world of objects, things, equipment and relations (and even other daseins)....wow Where's this entirely subjective model? Without a REAL WORLD there wouldn't be any Dasein.

Gosh, now you're disappointing me Ufology, ... I thought I was getting through to you :) Are you sure you aren't just saying things to get me worked up?
 
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I found this at The Many Worlds of Logic - Classic Logical Arguments: The Determinist Argument


The Mental Image Argument for Dualism
  1. When I form the image in my mind of a red stop sign, my mental image is red. But no part of my physical brain turns red when I form the image in my mind.
  2. So, my mental state has a property—the property of redness—that my brain state lacks.
  3. If x has a property that y lacks, then x must not be identical with y.
  4. Therefore, my mental state is not identical with my brain state, i.e., my mental state and my brain state are two distinct entities.
  5. Since my mental state is a state of my mind and my brain state is a state of my brain, it follows that my mind has a property that my brain lacks, and so my mind is not identical with my brain, i.e., my mind and my brain are two different entities.

I thought it would be an interesting exercise to pull it apart, because I think its basically what you are getting at, right Ufology?
 
It seems we're going a bit off the rails here so let's do a quick recap and take a couple of deep breaths.

You quoted me here when I said: "I don't see how it's possible to eliminate all forms of dualism, including the basic concept behind Cartesian Dualism. Can you explain why you think it's wrong? Or is that just your opinion? If you're going to answer this. Please let's take it in small steps rather than posting huge walls of text or hours of videos. Basically, my view is that when one holds a particular image within their mind, no matter how closely one looks at a brain scan or the brain matter itself, all the way down to the atomic level if necessary, they will never be able to see that image. Yet the image exists, and therefore is separate from the material that gives rise to it. For dualism to be wrong, you have to reconcile this issue. How do you do that without violating logic and dismissing all the scientific evidence that the brain is responsible for producing such imagery?"

You indicated that you believed I was wrong by saying: "I think its wrong because what you consider to be the "mental" or the "inside perspective" is an "illusion married to a futility."

The explanation you provided shows you think I'm wrong, but fails to explain why, it's a mere proclamation, as is all the rest of the information you've posted and pointed me to so far. I've explained why at each step along the way and used a simple illustration ( the red Ferrari ). So now at this stage you're claiming:

Michael Allen said:
The physical/mental, subject/object schema is completely flawed at the start--so its meaningless to even say that they are not the same.
The above is one of those arbitrary dismissals I mentioned earlier. Before it counts as meaningful counterpoint you need to validate it, and so far I've seen no validation. Only mere proclamation. Heidegger hasn't proven anything. At best he's created his own brand of existentialism, which so far, still breaks down into subjective idealism.
 
Indeed the "mental" is an "illusion married to a futility" -- that was a reference to an Alan Watts quote, and I should have given you more background. In the context of his discussion he was talking about the problem of our own self-transformation and why our methods often failed (i.e. to better ourselves in one way or another). His explanation regarding the ego (a subsystem of the mental) made the point that what we think of as ourselves is really just an idea or image of ourselves. This was his explanation for the reason why when we try to make ourselves stop thinking about something, we are unable...because the our focal point is actually not on our selves, but an idea of ourselves.

“When we are aware of the ego “I”, we are aware of this chronic tension inside ourselves – and that’s not us, it’s a futile tension.
So when we get the illusion, the image of ourselves, married to a futile tension you got an illusion married to a futility. And then you wonder why “I” can’t do anything, why “I” feel in the face of all the problems the world input on me, and why “I” can somehow not manage to transform “I”.” (…)

Analogous to this situation is your "inside perspective" and your involvement in images. One might interject that your experiences (whether present or remembered) are a moving about in this realm of subjectivity. What you consider to be the story on how you experience after-images (i.e. that they are different than the objects the refer to) is again a concept formulated in a background frame that you may be taking for granted.

One of the reasons why I jumped on your example was because I saw immediately that you seemed to be mistaking the content of your mind for the mind itself (or is there every really a difference?).

And now you are forcing me to go back to your original post which basically asserts the metaphysical monism I was looking for anyways...regardless of the rhetorical somersaults we've gone through. There's nothing in here that suggests you agree with the "ghost in the machine" perspective. Although it seems to be bent towards some kind of cartesian materialism--but I don't think you can be faulted for that.

Consciousness is the state of being aware of ones self and environment, and the weight of the evidence strongly suggests that this state as an emergent property of a sufficiently complex normally functioning processor/sensor system. In humans this system consists of our brains and bodies, our bodies carrying our sensors and processors together as an integrated self-regulating, maintaining, and reproducing organism. In further discussion I'll refer to this simply as the brain/body system, and the presumption will be that it is normal and healthy. The presumption can also be made that the production of consciousness is not limited to biological constructs and could conceivably be attained by technology.

The article that is linked to above gets into the role of quantum level processes in brain function, and gets dangerously close to Quantum Mysticism. It raises a lot of interesting questions, but ultimately it still reinforces the idea that it's the brain/body system that is responsible for producing consciousness. I often use the light bulb analogy. If our brain is the light bulb, then our consciousness is the light. Consciousness is often equated with the concept of spirit, which in major forms of expression is often associated with light. In the light bulb analogy we also have the situation where the light is distinctly separate from the bulb itself, existing at some extended distance from it, and yet still inextricably linked to it while the bulb is in operation. This is analogous to the concept of duality, which I argue is inescapable, though not fully represented by any single philosophical model.

The one thing we probably are both in total agreement: there are many things we don't understand about universe and our own selves.
 
You quoted me here when I said: "I don't see how it's possible to eliminate all forms of dualism, including the basic concept behind Cartesian Dualism. Can you explain why you think it's wrong? Or is that just your opinion? If you're going to answer this.

I feel I must do it again, if only for the sake of exercise (I must warn you that breaking apart concepts is a hobby of mine...including writing large walls of text as notes in response)

Ok, enter the Red Ferrari (from here on will be simply notated as RF)
Enter the mental image recalled by the RF without the actual RF being in visceral field -- we'll call it, iRF
Now...you agree that what you see of the RF while you are looking at it is some kind of mental state? If so well call it the Real Time Impression of the RF -- notated as TiRF

Now I am going to introduce an intermediary PISPRF (physical sensory intermediary processes relevant to RF ) -- no objections?


Now that we have all the bases loaded...here's the pitch

iRF is not the same as RF therefore some form of mental/material dualism is correct (weak version)
"""""""""""""""""""" RF therefore mental/material dualism is correct (strong version)

Assumption: All forms of mental/material dualism are equivalent

Problem: we haven't defined dualism

Your statement is that iRF is not the same as RF, therefore dualism cannot be discarded (better formulation).
Firstly I will show

(1) The premise iRF is not equal to RF is not a sufficient condition for asserting dualistic ontology (fundamental mind/material world)

Explanation:
For instance: RF is not equal to PISPRF
Question: where does PISPRF lie, in the world of RFs or the world of iRFs?
Thought: If PISPRF / RF is not a sufficient condition to break the material world into another duality, then neither is your statement grounds for formulating the RF/iRF boundary.

(the same argument can be made for iRF and TiRF...in addition, I find it fascinating to explore lines of the sort: iRF is not the same as TiRF ! )

Its really hard to do philosophy without writing large walls of text...but I try.

 
Indeed the "mental" is an "illusion married to a futility" -- that was a reference to an Alan Watts quote, and I should have given you more background. In the context of his discussion he was talking about the problem of our own self-transformation and why our methods often failed (i.e. to better ourselves in one way or another). His explanation regarding the ego (a subsystem of the mental) made the point that what we think of as ourselves is really just an idea or image of ourselves. This was his explanation for the reason why when we try to make ourselves stop thinking about something, we are unable...because the our focal point is actually not on our selves, but an idea of ourselves.
Again, the above does nothing to address the issue of dualism as it's been outlined at the start of our discussion, that being that we're dealing with two classes of reality, one mental, the other physical. Issues of ego, self-transformation, and all the rest are irrelevant to that specific issue. To demonstrate that there aren't these two classes of reality you need to unify them, however you have not been able to do that. The best your examples have been able to do is arbitrarily dismiss objective reality. That isn't a valid position to take when there is overwhelming evidence in favor of its existence.
One of the reasons why I jumped on your example was because I saw immediately that you seemed to be mistaking the content of your mind for the mind itself (or is there every really any difference)?
Again this isn't relevant to the issue. Whether we consider the mind to be something separate from its contents or not still leaves us with a differentiation between the mind and the material ( dualism ).
And now you are forcing me to go back to your original post which basically asserts the metaphysical monism I was looking for anyways...regardless of the rhetorical somersaults we've gone through. There's nothing in here that suggests you agree with the "ghost in the machine" perspective.
You're correct that I don't subscribe to the "ghost in the machine" perspective, at least in the sense that we're something generically referred to as "souls" or "spirits" or some independent entity that simply inhabits our bodies analogous to the driver of an automobile, and that when we die, we can simply discard our bodies and walk away into La La Land or a new body or whatever. At the same time, I have entirely dismissed the concept of continuity of consciousness either.
Although it seems to be bent towards some kind of cartesian materialism--but I don't think you can be faulted for that.
If the Wikipedia entry on Cartesian Materialism is at all accurate, it's not something I subscribe to. This brings up an interesting point. What exactly do I subscribe to? The fact is, I've considered a lot of possibilities over the years and come up with my own particular view that doesn't appear to have a specific philosophical label. The closest seems to be Cartesian Substance Dualism, the mystery there being what exactly is the immaterial substance that forms the image we see when we imagine something?
The one thing we probably are both in total agreement: there are many things we don't understand about universe and our own selves.
Absolutely, but isn't it interesting pursuing the mystery? Or is that a fools errand? I don't think so. I think that the clues and puzzles we're presented with point to greater things, things to irresistible not to pursue. That's why I engage in these kinds of discussions.
 
How's an objective model going to work if its already assumed by the subjective model? Why not dispense with "subject" and "object" altogether?

You can't have a subject without objects and vice versa--so how can Heidegger (who clearly does not work within a completely subjective model--I am just humoring you right now) have an entirely subjective model when he's talking about equipment, objects and the relational totality of things in a real world (Heidegger is a realist...btw)?
Those are examples of how he reinserts things into his model to solve specific issues that can be solved any other way.
So you see he's not ignoring everything else....wow...so completely, completely, utterly...wrong! The entire basis of a Dasein is its involvement in the world of objects, things, equipment and relations (and even other daseins)....wow Where's this entirely subjective model? Without a REAL WORLD there wouldn't be any Dasein.
Again, those are examples of how he reinserts previously rejected ideas to solve specific issues that can be solved any other way. If we accept those reinsertions we restore duality, if we don't, then his model fails. Either way it's incoherent.
Gosh, now you're disappointing me Ufology, ... I thought I was getting through to you :) Are you sure you aren't just saying things to get me worked up?
I'm simply stating things as they appear to be presented by the various sources. There is no intent to get you worked up. However I can appreciate how frustrating these issues can be. What seems perfectly clear and coherent to one person can make absolutely no sense to someone else, sometimes to the point where they might start making assumptions that send them rolling back down the hill from whence they've come. This phenomenon might be seen as a manifestation of @Christopher O'Brien's Trickster element, which tends to inhabit this territory. So let's not let the trickster get the better of us here. I'm good to keep clawing away at this if you are :).

I suggest that for the moment we simply discard Heidegger because all he's doing is getting us sidetracked from the issue that we have yet to reconcile, the issue of duality. I'll address that in my next post when I catch up with your latest post, which seems to be addressing it more directly.
 
There is more mental nutrition here than I can digest, but it still fascinates. I would like to pose a couple of loose questions in hopes of gleaning viewpoints and better understanding.

Student raises his hand from back of classroom. He has read but dismally failed to comprehend Roger Penrose's "The Emperor's New Mind". He hopes his questions have not already been answered and he has simply missed them :

-Can the emergent process of human consciousness be deconstructed as no more than a kind of awareness producing algorithm following an essentially hierarchical set of (self-modifying or externally modified) codes? Does the 'algorithm only' view violate the notion (often attributed to Kurt Godel and the math is gibberish to said student) that any algorithm can generate true statements that can only be proved within the concept of a larger algorithm, ad infinitum?

-If consciousness is indeed no more than an algorithm occurring in the macro vs quantum world, does that mean it is indeed substrate independent ? Can it be mapped in silicon as well as carbon based systems?

Are the above questions evidence the student has entered a psychologically dissociative state and should have signed up for "Turfgrass Management 101" instead? :confused:
 
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I feel I must do it again, if only for the sake of exercise (I must warn you that breaking apart concepts is a hobby of mine...including writing large walls of text as notes in response) ...

OK I think we're getting into the nuts and bolts here. Good show. Here's how it breaks down from my perspective:
  • Imagined Object = subjective reality ( SR )
  • Material Object = objective reality ( OR )
  • SROR therefore duality.

  • The above corresponds to a general view of Duality.
  • We don't need to get into the specifics of substance duality or anything else. All that is required is that we recognize that mental constructs and material constructs both exist.
  • Arbitrarily discarding either OR or SR is not an option because the evidence that both types of reality exist is overwhelming.
  • Given the above, it is not possible to reasonably discard duality.
 
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