Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 9

[Randall]

... I think that maybe the question can be simplified to "what is it like to be" -- even if we ask it about ourselves ...

Yup. I think you've had that concept down all along. Something I'd like to ask your opinion on at this point is whether you've gained any new insights on the relationship between consciousness and the paranormal from this discussion? From what I can tell, we're still left with little choice other than conclude that ideas like afterlives aren't possible as they're typically portrayed, which is as some sort of continuity of consciousness and personhood following the death of the body. Or do you see any way around that?

 

[smcder]

Well, it's one thing to say that CR and panpsychism are essentially the same, but to say that physical monism or emergentism are the same is different imo.

And I agree that they present difficult problems as well, but I'm not convinced the problems are equivalent to the HP. In fact, those other problems are still present for physical monism and emergentism, on top of the HP.

I'm not saying that physical monism or emergentism are the same. (as what? CR?) I'm saying each approach has a problem that hasn't been solved.

for example:

Panpsychism

"Take a sentence of a dozen words, and take twelve men and tell to each one word. Then stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch, and let each think of his word as intently as he will; nowhere will there be a consciousness of the whole sentence … Where the elemental units are supposed to be feelings, the case is in no wise altered. Take a hundred of them, shuffle them and pack them as close together as you can (whatever that might mean); still each remains the same feeling it always was, shut in its own skin, windowless, ignorant of what the other feelings are and mean. There would be a hundred-and-first feeling there, if, when a group or series of such feeling were set up, a consciousness belonging to the group as such should emerge. And this 101st feeling would be a totally new fact; the 100 original feelings might, by a curious physical law, be a signal for its creation, when they came together; but they would have no substantial identity with it, nor it with them, and one could never deduce the one from the others, or (in any intelligible sense) say that they evolved it (1890/1950, p. 160, original emphasis)."

So, that's an emergence problem for panpsychism.

 

[smcder]

Conscious Realism - the task is to come up with a formalism (a model of "conscious agents") and then derive physics from that formalism.

Well, it's one thing to say that CR and panpsychism are essentially the same, but to say that physical monism or emergentism are the same is different imo.

And I agree that they present difficult problems as well, but I'm not convinced the problems are equivalent to the HP. In fact, those other problems are still present for physical monism and emergentism, on top of the HP.

I'm reading the article on conscious agents ... it looks like it will depend on if it can make novel predictions ... and if it can be falsified ... otherwise, it is more of a metaphysical stance and would add something extra (conscious agents) ... one simple objection is mimicry. Some animals evolve to look like others ... doesn't that mean there is some "objective" basis? There may be an explanation by way of CR for this, though.

 

[smcder]

The lectures on physics by Leonard Susskind (several sets starting with classical mechanics) at Stanford, on Youtube, are good - they don't pull any punches and they use math, although it's the simplest math that can be used. It's not dummied-down.

 

[smcder]

[Note: First sentence in the above extract seems to have been garbled.]

This IEP article, "The Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel's Theorem,"
might be helpful.

Lucas-Penrose Argument about Gödel’s Theorem | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

5. Other Anti-Mechanism Arguments
Finally, there are some alternative anti-mechanism arguments to Lucas-Penrose. Two are briefly mentioned. McCall (1999) has formulated an interesting argument. A Turing machine can only know what it can prove, and to a Turing machine, provability would be tantamount to truth. But Gödel’s theorem seems to imply that truth is not always provability. The human mind can handle cases in which truth and provability diverge. A Turing machine, however, cannot. But then we cannot be Turing machines. A second alternative anti-mechanism argument is formulated in Cogburn and Megill (2010). They argue that, given certain central tenets of Intuitionism, the human mind cannot be a Turing machine.

 

[smcder]

5. Other Anti-Mechanism Arguments
Finally, there are some alternative anti-mechanism arguments to Lucas-Penrose. Two are briefly mentioned. McCall (1999) has formulated an interesting argument. A Turing machine can only know what it can prove, and to a Turing machine, provability would be tantamount to truth. But Gödel’s theorem seems to imply that truth is not always provability. The human mind can handle cases in which truth and provability diverge. A Turing machine, however, cannot. But then we cannot be Turing machines. A second alternative anti-mechanism argument is formulated in Cogburn and Megill (2010). They argue that, given certain central tenets of Intuitionism, the human mind cannot be a Turing machine.

Abstract
Jason Megill | Bentley University - Academia.edu

We first discuss Michael Dummett’s philosophy of mathematics and Robert Brandom’s philosophy of language to demonstrate that inferentialism entails the falsity of Church’s Thesis and, as a consequence, the Computational Theory of Mind. This amounts to an entirely novel critique of mechanism in the philosophy of mind, one we show to have tremendous advantages over the traditional Lucas-Penrose argument

 

[smcder]

Some other interesting papers there: a new argument for Atheism ... and an alternative to cognitive theories of emotion.

 

[smcder]

Abstract:
This paper has two aims: (1) to point the way towards a novel alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and (2) to delineate a number of different functions that the emotions play in cognition, functions that become visible from outside the framework of cognitive theories. First, I hold that the Higher Order Representational (HOR) theories of consciousness ? as generally formulated ? are inadequate insofar as they fail to account for selective attention. After posing this dilemma, I resolve it in such a manner that the following thesis arises: the emotions play a key role in shaping selective attention. This thesis is in accord with A. Damasio?s (1994) noteworthy neuroscientific work on emotion. I then begin to formulate an alternative to cognitive theories of emotion, and I show how this new account has implications for the following issues: face recognition, two brain disorders (Capgras? and Fregoli syndrome), the frame problem in A. I., and the research program of affective computing.

Publication Date: 2003
Publication Name: Consciousness & Emotion

 

[smcder]

An Argument Against Epiphenomenalism

4. Dualism Thus far, I’ve argued that (i) qualia have causal powers, i.e., epiphenomenalism is false, (ii) different types of qualia have different causal powers, and (iii) qualia have at least some of their causal powers necessarily. These claims, if true, have some implications for dualism, which I now discuss

 

[smcder]

Emotion, Cognition, and Artificial Intelligence

 

[Soupie]

The "hard problem" as I see it is in our attempt to fully explain the result (i.e. our "qualia" and "experience") in terms and categories that are dependent on a background of being that precedes the formation and application of the "consciousness" categories and abstractions. I suppose the term used for this category is "pre-reflective."

I will need to revisit this statement above...as well as the question "what is it like to be a ______"

But I think that maybe the question can be simplified to "what is it like to be" -- even if we ask it about ourselves.

Hm, unusual suspect reads this and concludes you've got it, but I read this and now I wonder if you've got it? @smcder ?

Of course I don't think usual suspect had a grip on the hp so that might explain the confusion.

I'll be interested to read your response.

Here's a creative attempt to explicate the HP:

Imagibe a being capable of perception, emotion, and cognition. We don't know the physical appearance of this being. In fact, completely ignore the physical appearance of this being and hold in mind only its perceptions, emotions, and cognitions. In fact, let's imagine this being has no physical appearance.

This being just is perceptions, emotions, and cognitions.

One day this being perceived itself in the mirror. It sees an object staring back it.

"What the devil is this, the being wonders. An odd looking thing this is. And here I thought mirrors were to reflect what fell upon them.

In this mirror I don't see myself; I don't see my perceptions, emotions, and cognitions.

All I see is this object. Hmph."

As the being moved away from the mirror, a reflection of the backside of a departing man shrunk to a black dot on its silver surface.

 

[smcder]

@Soupie

I think my question boils down to if there is anything about the Interface Theory that is inconsistent in the same way as the argument that says:

the brain evolved to survive, not solve philosophical or scientific problems, therefore there is no basis to trust (or distrust) philosophical/scientific thinking

(and from there you have to decide if naturalism is true)

?

In the objection to IT ... it feels like Hoffman says "forget what you think you know, because we didn't evolve to perceive reality" but I have perceived reality and here it is ... the main objection being the simple skeptical one that says "your theory appears to be consistent (or not inconsistent) with the world as it appears to us and as we have worked out the physics of it (if he gets to that point) but I'll only have reason to take an interest in your theory /prefer your theory - if it makes some successful predictions that the theories we have now don't

 

[smcder]

Hm, unusual suspect reads this and concludes you've got it, but I read this and now I wonder if you've got it? @smcder ?

Of course I don't think usual suspect had a grip on the hp so that might explain the confusion.

I'll be interested to read your response.

Here's a creative attempt to explicate the HP:

Imagibe a being capable of perception, emotion, and cognition. We don't know the physical appearance of this being. In fact, completely ignore the physical appearance of this being and hold in mind only its perceptions, emotions, and cognitions. In fact, let's imagine this being has no physical appearance.

This being just is perceptions, emotions, and cognitions.

One day this being perceived itself in the mirror. It sees an object staring back it.

"What the devil is this, the being wonders. An odd looking thing this is. And here I thought mirrors were to reflect what fell upon them.

In this mirror I don't see myself; I don't see my perceptions, emotions, and cognitions.

All I see is this object. Hmph."

As the being moved away from the mirror, a reflection of the backside of the departing man shrunk to a black dot on its silver surface.

http://organizations.utep.edu/portals/1475/nagel_bat.pdf

Conscious Entities » What is it like to be a bat

Two points from the conscious entities essay:

1. Ah, ‘there is something it is like’ – the phrase that launched a thousand papers. Surely you realise that this is just an over-literal interpretation of the conventional phrase ‘what is it like?’. To assume that the ‘it’ in that question represents a real thing rather than a grammatical quirk is just silly.

Blandula Yes, I understand your point, but Nagel’s whole point is that ‘what it’s like’ is strictly inexpressible in objective terms. So it isn’t surprising that he has to resort to a back-handed way of getting you to see what he’s talking about. If he could describe it straightforwardly, he’d be contradicting his own theory.

that seems to be the petard on which Usual was hoisted ... I remember he said he proved it was incoherent by converting the statements into logical sentences and then performing predicate or other calculus on the whole thing ... and, to be fair, I think of the professor who said only about half of his students got the HP from Nagel's paper - he had to use other methods for other students

2. Actually, the claim being made is quite modest in some respects. Nagel himself says that his argument doesn’t disprove physicalism. It would be nearer the truth to say that physicalism, the view that mental entities are physical entities, is a hypothesis we can’t even understand properly…

which is like the Strawson quote you mention

 

[Constance]

I'm not saying that physical monism or emergentism are the same. (as what? CR?) I'm saying each approach has a problem that hasn't been solved.
for example:
Panpsychism
"Take a sentence of a dozen words, and take twelve men and tell to each one word. Then stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch, and let each think of his word as intently as he will; nowhere will there be a consciousness of the whole sentence … Where the elemental units are supposed to be feelings, the case is in no wise altered. Take a hundred of them, shuffle them and pack them as close together as you can (whatever that might mean); still each remains the same feeling it always was, shut in its own skin, windowless, ignorant of what the other feelings are and mean. There would be a hundred-and-first feeling there, if, when a group or series of such feeling were set up, a consciousness belonging to the group as such should emerge. And this 101st feeling would be a totally new fact; the 100 original feelings might, by a curious physical law, be a signal for its creation, when they came together; but they would have no substantial identity with it, nor it with them, and one could never deduce the one from the others, or (in any intelligible sense) say that they evolved it (1890/1950, p. 160, original emphasis)."

Who are you quoting here Steve?

So, that's an emergence problem for panpsychism.[/QUOTE]

 

[smcder]

Who are you quoting here Steve?

So, that's an emergence problem for panpsychism.

[/QUOTE]

William James

 

[Soupie]

@Soupie

I think my question boils down to if there is anything about the Interface Theory that is inconsistent in the same way as the argument that says:

the brain evolved to survive, not solve philosophical or scientific problems, therefore there is no basis to trust (or distrust) philosophical/scientific thinking

(and from there you have to decide if naturalism is true)

?

In the objection to IT ... it feels like Hoffman says "forget what you think you know, because we didn't evolve to perceive reality" but I have perceived reality and here it is ... the main objection being the simple skeptical one that says "your theory appears to be consistent (or not inconsistent) with the world as it appears to us and as we have worked out the physics of it (if he gets to that point) but I'll only have reason to take an interest in your theory /prefer your theory - if it makes some successful predictions that the theories we have now don't

We did evolve to perceive reality, our perceptions however are not veridical.

At the end of his Ted Talk he was asked the question you pose: doesn't this theory undermine itself. He said no. While our perceptions are not veridical he holds that our conceptions can be.

 

[Soupie]

I'm not saying that physical monism or emergentism are the same. (as what? CR?) I'm saying each approach has a problem that hasn't been solved.

for example:

Panpsychism

"Take a sentence of a dozen words, and take twelve men and tell to each one word. Then stand the men in a row or jam them in a bunch, and let each think of his word as intently as he will; nowhere will there be a consciousness of the whole sentence … Where the elemental units are supposed to be feelings, the case is in no wise altered. Take a hundred of them, shuffle them and pack them as close together as you can (whatever that might mean); still each remains the same feeling it always was, shut in its own skin, windowless, ignorant of what the other feelings are and mean. There would be a hundred-and-first feeling there, if, when a group or series of such feeling were set up, a consciousness belonging to the group as such should emerge. And this 101st feeling would be a totally new fact; the 100 original feelings might, by a curious physical law, be a signal for its creation, when they came together; but they would have no substantial identity with it, nor it with them, and one could never deduce the one from the others, or (in any intelligible sense) say that they evolved it (1890/1950, p. 160, original emphasis)."

So, that's an emergence problem for panpsychism.

All approaches to consciousness must answer the combination problem, not just panpsychism, right?

 

[smcder]

We did evolve to perceive reality, our perceptions however are not veridical.

At the end of his Ted Talk he was asked the question you pose: doesn't this theory undermine itself. He said no. While our perceptions are not veridical he holds that our conceptions can be.

Well ... of course he's gonna say that! But why would that be the case?

 

[smcder]

All approaches to consciousness must answer the combination problem, not just panpsychism, right?

No ... eliminativism doesn't ... and emergentism, doesn't it's just the opposite, only when things get complex enough, do you have consciousness emerge ... the combination problem says how do you get from a fundamental unit of consciousness to something like a mind - like our phenomenal experience? So I think it's limited to forms of panpsychism.

 

[smcder]

William James[/QUOTE]

It's from the SEP on panpsychism, I believe, they describe it as an "emergence" problem.