Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 9

[Constance]

Here is an informative review article concerning a book I referred to a few pages back: Louise Westling, The Logos of the Living World: Merleau-Ponty, Animals, and Language, New York: Fordham University Press, 2014:

Sean Meighoo, No Logos: Phenomenology, Animal Studies, and Logocentrism

http://www.depauw.edu/humanimalia/issue 14/pdfs/meighoo-westling-pdf.pdf

 

[Constance]

The Phenomenology of Animal Life

Dominique Lestel
Département de Philosophie, École normale supérieure, France

Jeffrey Bussolini
Department of Sociology and Anthropology, City University of New York, USA

Matthew Chrulew
Centre for Culture and Technology, Curtin University, Australia


"How does animal life enter the sphere of interpretation? The question is double-pronged. It is a
matter of understanding what it means that an animal life requires interpretation, and also what
a human life means such that it can be not only transformed by the interpretation of animal
lives, but also enriched. The majority of approaches that seek to study animal behaviour today
either fail to ask this question, or if they do ask it, fail to deploy any of the means that would
enable them to answer it. Animal life is thus excised from the play of significance and enclosed
in a realm of physical machines paired to inaccessible qualia. However, interpreting the
meaning of nonhuman comportment is not only possible, but a much needed task that
deepens human experience. In the following pages we show that, when grounded in the operational framework of the phenomenological approach, the interpretation of animal life acquires a much more robust character than is usually supposed.

http://environmentalhumanities.org/arch/vol5/5.7.pdf

http://www.depauw.edu/humanimalia/issue 14/pdfs/meighoo-westling-pdf.pdf

 

[Soupie]

What is the source/text of that extract? Thanks.

it was the quora post I linked to several posts back.

 

[Soupie]

So it isn't the matter in "materialism" we object to ... but the "doesn't matter".

Materialism in the sense of treating everything as material. As "standing reserve" as "human resources" and capital. Would we have imbued "materialism" into the matter(s) of our sciences without this ethos? Or would we have seen, as @Soupie reminds us, that matter can be quite ethereal?

Smcder you also ask who still holds the billiard-ball view? In Nagel's review of Dennett he seems to indicate that indeed Dennett does.

Relatedly, in the link Constance recently provided:

"This makes it seem as if all phenomena above the scale of the atom is explicable in terms of atomic behaviour – a view that should strictly be called reductionism, but which is implicit in materialism in its general form."

I do reject the matter of materialism. As I noted before, even Thad Robert's QST which reifies matter, indeed posits that what-is is constituted solely of spherical quanta, even his theory holds that these quanta are constituted of sub-quanta and those of sub-sub-quanta literally ad infinitum.

Thus even when materialism is walked out in its most extreme form, there is simply no material there. It's relationships all the way down and all the way up.

But I also reject the matter in materialism from the Kantian perspective; what we perceive of reality is a representation of reality. To reify perception is to fall into Naive Realism.

Note, this is not to say that there is not a real, external reality beyond our perceptual bubble. However, we mustn't reify our perceptual bubble.

Now, Dennett says colors, smells, sounds, textures, these are all phenomena, but then claims that electrons, protons, and atoms are noumena. And he tries to get to phenomena via what he considers to be the noumena—billiard balls.

Reductionism and mechanism.

To do this he must deny consciousness and meaning. He must deny these things because they cannot emerge from atoms and mechanisms.

People who do believe consciousness and meaning exist—but also hold reductionism and mechanism to be true—will continue to seek models of emergence.

 

[smcder]

Smcder you also ask who still holds the billiard-ball view? In Nagel's review of Dennett he seems to indicate that indeed Dennett does.

Relatedly, in the link Constance recently provided:

"This makes it seem as if all phenomena above the scale of the atom is explicable in terms of atomic behaviour – a view that should strictly be called reductionism, but which is implicit in materialism in its general form."

I do reject the matter of materialism. As I noted before, even Thad Robert's QST which reifies matter, indeed posits that what-is is constituted solely of spherical quanta, even his theory holds that these quanta are constituted of sub-quanta and those of sub-sub-quanta literally ad infinitum.

Thus even when materialism is walked out in its most extreme form, there is simply no material there. It's relationships all the way down and all the way up.

But I also reject the matter in materialism from the Kantian perspective; what we perceive of reality is a representation of reality. To reify perception is to fall into Naive Realism.

Note, this is not to say that there is not a real, external reality beyond our perceptual bubble. However, we mustn't reify our perceptual bubble.

Now, Dennett says colors, smells, sounds, textures, these are all phenomena, but then claims that electrons, protons, and atoms are noumena. And he tries to get to phenomena via what he considers to be the noumena—billiard balls.

Reductionism and mechanism.

To do this he must deny consciousness and meaning. He must deny these things because they cannot emerge from atoms and mechanisms.

People who do believe consciousness and meaning exist—but also hold reductionism and mechanism to be true—will continue to seek models of emergence.

Smcder you also ask who still holds the billiard-ball view? In Nagel's review of Dennett he seems to indicate that indeed Dennett does.

So that's one. ;-)

 

[smcder]

Hume's theory of causality as a law-like progression or order, clears the way for Cartesian duality - as it eliminates the problem of causation between two utterly different substances ... i.e. if it were "billiard balls" then the objection would hold.

 

[smcder]

@Soupie - I'm using matter as "value" - it doesn't matter what matter is made up of - what may be behind the objection to materialism is what seems to be an unavoidable ethic that comes with it, assigning value based on utility. Does CR avoid this? Without knowing what conscious agents are ... it would be hard to know.

 

[smcder]

@Soupie - I'm using matter as "value" - it doesn't matter what matter is made up of - what may be behind the objection to materialism is what seems to be an unavoidable ethic that comes with it, assigning value based on utility. Does CR avoid this? Without knowing what conscious agents are ... it would be hard to know.

What would be different about conscious agents as fundamental vs "particles" as fundamental?

 

[Soupie]

@Soupie - I'm using matter as "value" - it doesn't matter what matter is made up of - what may be behind the objection to materialism is what seems to be an unavoidable ethic that comes with it, assigning value based on utility. Does CR avoid this? Without knowing what conscious agents are ... it would be hard to know.

Not sure how I hadn't found this paper previously:

Objects of consciousness

"Definition of Conscious Agents
If our reasoning has been sound, then space-time and three-dimensional objects have no causal powers and do not exist unperceived. Therefore, we need a fundamentally new foundation from which to construct a theory of objects. Here we explore the possibility that consciousness is that new foundation, and seek a mathematically precise theory. The idea is that a theory of objects requires, first, a theory of subjects.

This is, of course, a non-trivial endeavor. Frank Wilczek, when discussing the interpretation of quantum theory, said, “The relevant literature is famously contentious and obscure. I believe it will remain so until someone constructs, within the formalism of quantum mechanics, an “observer,” that is, a model entity whose states correspond to a recognizable caricature of conscious awareness … That is a formidable project, extending well-beyond what is conventionally considered physics” (Wilczek, 2006).

The approach we take toward constructing a theory of consciousness is similar to the approach Alan Turing took toward constructing a theory of computation. Turing proposed a simple but rigorous formalism, now called the Turing machine (Turing, 1937; Herken, 1988). It consists of six components: (1) a finite set of states, (2) a finite set of symbols, (3) a special blank symbol, (4) a finite set of input symbols, (5) a start state, (6) a set of halt states, and (7) a finite set of simple transition rules (Hopcroft et al., 2006).

Turing and others then conjectured that a function is algorithmically computable if and only if it is computable by a Turing machine. This “Church-Turing Thesis” can't be proven, but it could in principle be falsified by a counterexample, e.g., by some example of a procedure that everyone agreed was computable but for which no Turing machine existed. No counterexample has yet been found, and the Church-Turing thesis is considered secure, even definitional.

Similarly, to construct a theory of consciousness we propose a simple but rigorous formalism called a conscious agent, consisting of six components. We then state the conscious agent thesis, which claims that every property of consciousness can be represented by some property of a conscious agent or system of interacting conscious agents. The hope is to start with a small and simple set of definitions and assumptions, and then to have a complete theory of consciousness arise as a series of theorems and proofs (or simulations, when complexity precludes proof). We want a theory of consciousness qua consciousness, i.e., of consciousness on its own terms, not as something derivative or emergent from a prior physical world.

No doubt this approach will strike many as prima facie absurd. It is a commonplace in cognitive neuroscience, for instance, that most of our mental processes are unconscious processes (Bargh and Morsella, 2008). The standard account holds that well more than 90% of mental processes proceed without conscious awareness. Therefore, the proposal that consciousness is fundamental is, to contemporary thought, an amusing anachronism not worth serious consideration.

This critique is apt. ..."

If I'm understanding this, he seems to eschew a materialist, reductionist, mechanistic model and aim for a systems approach starting from a ground of consciousness. Naive question: is a systems approach the same as a "relational" approach.

 

[smcder]

Not sure how I hadn't found this paper previously:

Objects of consciousness

"Definition of Conscious Agents
If our reasoning has been sound, then space-time and three-dimensional objects have no causal powers and do not exist unperceived. Therefore, we need a fundamentally new foundation from which to construct a theory of objects. Here we explore the possibility that consciousness is that new foundation, and seek a mathematically precise theory. The idea is that a theory of objects requires, first, a theory of subjects.

This is, of course, a non-trivial endeavor. Frank Wilczek, when discussing the interpretation of quantum theory, said, “The relevant literature is famously contentious and obscure. I believe it will remain so until someone constructs, within the formalism of quantum mechanics, an “observer,” that is, a model entity whose states correspond to a recognizable caricature of conscious awareness … That is a formidable project, extending well-beyond what is conventionally considered physics” (Wilczek, 2006).

The approach we take toward constructing a theory of consciousness is similar to the approach Alan Turing took toward constructing a theory of computation. Turing proposed a simple but rigorous formalism, now called the Turing machine (Turing, 1937; Herken, 1988). It consists of six components: (1) a finite set of states, (2) a finite set of symbols, (3) a special blank symbol, (4) a finite set of input symbols, (5) a start state, (6) a set of halt states, and (7) a finite set of simple transition rules (Hopcroft et al., 2006).

Turing and others then conjectured that a function is algorithmically computable if and only if it is computable by a Turing machine. This “Church-Turing Thesis” can't be proven, but it could in principle be falsified by a counterexample, e.g., by some example of a procedure that everyone agreed was computable but for which no Turing machine existed. No counterexample has yet been found, and the Church-Turing thesis is considered secure, even definitional.

Similarly, to construct a theory of consciousness we propose a simple but rigorous formalism called a conscious agent, consisting of six components. We then state the conscious agent thesis, which claims that every property of consciousness can be represented by some property of a conscious agent or system of interacting conscious agents. The hope is to start with a small and simple set of definitions and assumptions, and then to have a complete theory of consciousness arise as a series of theorems and proofs (or simulations, when complexity precludes proof). We want a theory of consciousness qua consciousness, i.e., of consciousness on its own terms, not as something derivative or emergent from a prior physical world.

No doubt this approach will strike many as prima facie absurd. It is a commonplace in cognitive neuroscience, for instance, that most of our mental processes are unconscious processes (Bargh and Morsella, 2008). The standard account holds that well more than 90% of mental processes proceed without conscious awareness. Therefore, the proposal that consciousness is fundamental is, to contemporary thought, an amusing anachronism not worth serious consideration.

This critique is apt. ..."

If I'm understanding this, he seems to eschew a materialist, reductionist, mechanistic model and aim for a systems approach starting from a ground of consciousness. Naive question: is a systems approach the same as a "relational" approach.

He definitely eschews ... the choice then is the hard problem of deriving consciousness from physics ... vs the hard problem of deriving physics from consciousness? (although they might be the same problem - or the same solution).

 

[smcder]

If we've evolved to perceive and think about things according to what helps us survive - not according to reality - then how can we trust our conclusions about things like CR? How do we know it's not part of the UI?

 

[smcder]

Hoffman: The formal theory of conscious agents I’ve been developing is computationally universal—in that sense, it’s a machine theory. And it’s because the theory is computationally universal that I can get all of cognitive science and neural networks back out of it. Nevertheless, for now I don’t think we are machines—in part because I distinguish between the mathematical representation and the thing being represented. As a conscious realist, I am postulating conscious experiences as ontological primitives, the most basic ingredients of the world. I’m claiming that experiences are the real coin of the realm. The experiences of everyday life—my real feeling of a headache, my real taste of chocolate—that really is the ultimate nature of reality.

 

[Michael Allen]

So in that respect, we can easily dismiss "consciousness" as an "ontologically distinct thing" since the very apparatus to perform such distinctions are in and of themselves presumed before we take on the task (of understanding, explaining, etc).

Soupie:
"We can or we can't dismiss consciousness as ontologically distinct from matter?"
"Why are why can't we? Because the apparatus are presumed before we ask the question?"


Answer (1) -- we can dismiss it

Answer (2) -- because the distinction was created by the very apparatus we are examining.

"Ontological categories" are an artifice of the faculty we are trying to examine.

 

[Michael Allen]

This still sounds like Metzinger.

While I am most certainly influenced by Metzinger, I took my comments in that particular section as being straight from Heidegger.

 

[Michael Allen]

The "hard problem" as I see it is in our attempt to fully explain the result (i.e. our "qualia" and "experience") in terms and categories that are dependent on a background of being that precedes the formation and application of the "consciousness" categories and abstractions. I suppose the term used for this category is "pre-reflective" (@Constance).

Regarding the Quantum domain as "noumena" (@Soupie) I have to cautiously remind everyone that the entire edifice of quantum mechanics is in itself an attempt to systemically identify rules and processes that follow logically from the root metaphor that "measurement" (required for observation) is in and of itself an activity that "occupies a portion of time and space" (Julian Schwinger) which when looked at in the light of human (i.e. or any embodied sentient) means that once again the very actions (i.e. measuring, testing, looking) supporting our epistemic frameworks are themselves dependent on the same dynamics (i.e. mechanics) of the systems we are trying to measure.

So the "quantum domain" is the activity of analyzing the effects of the very tools required in our attempts to probe out the answers we seek regarding "causes and effects."

 

[Michael Allen]

I'm completely in over my head here of course.

I'm still stuck on the question I posed at the end of the last thread. If we can't achieve absolute knowledge of the absolute, can we account for the order/structure we experience?

In other words, if the principle of causation and the principle of intentionality are both incomplete models, neither of which fully explain the order/structure we experience, what next?

Are there other principles of order/structure? Im not asking whether we endorse them, but just curios what else is out there. How about the simulation theory? The idea that the order we experience is due to the fact that we exist within a computation; a principle of computation?

I posted awhile back about the ways in which quantum physics seems to mirror computation. (Note I'm not arguing for this approach, just noting it.)

Did Kant truly destroy metaphysics? Enter McGinn? The end?

Interesting way to phrase the question--"achieve absolute knowledge of the absolute"

It is as if we have two meanings of "absolute" -- when perhaps the entire process of living actually converges to one meaning (if you can even call it such).

Maybe the process of discovering and living withing the absolute without having perfect "knowledge" (for what would "perfect" knowledge mean in this case, other than the complete destruction of the very mechanism that makes one "conscious?") Perfect knowledge leads to a complete "white out" of all possibilities to consciousness...consciousness requires not knowing some _____ for which it will attempt to resolve in its own activities...

If all questions and answers are found and resolved at once (and for all), "temporality" and "spatiality" disintegrates.

Simply put, I don't see our account of order and structure being a contradiction of our incomplete (with respect to "perfection") knowledge.

 

[smcder]

The "hard problem" as I see it is in our attempt to fully explain the result (i.e. our "qualia" and "experience") in terms and categories that are dependent on a background of being that precedes the formation and application of the "consciousness" categories and abstractions. I suppose the term used for this category is "pre-reflective" (@Constance).

Regarding the Quantum domain as "noumena" (@Soupie) I have to cautiously remind everyone that the entire edifice of quantum mechanics is in itself an attempt to systemically identify rules and processes that follow logically from the root metaphor that "measurement" (required for observation) is in and of itself an activity that "occupies a portion of time and space" (Julian Schwinger) which when looked at in the light of human (i.e. or any embodied sentient) means that once again the very actions (i.e. measuring, testing, looking) supporting our epistemic frameworks are themselves dependent on the same dynamics (i.e. mechanics) of the systems we are trying to measure.

So the "quantum domain" is the activity of analyzing the effects of the very tools required in our attempts to probe out the answers we seek regarding "causes and effects."

The "hard problem" as we have used it here is based on Nagel's WILTBAB - which poses it as a problem for physicalism. A complete, physicalist explanation would leave something out ... "what it is like".

The "hard problem" as I see it is in our attempt to fully explain the result (i.e. our "qualia" and "experience") in terms and categories that are dependent on a background of being that precedes the formation and application of the "consciousness" categories and abstractions. I suppose the term used for this category is "pre-reflective" (@Constance).

What does "a background of being" mean? What are "the "consciousness" categories and abstractions?" Can I re-write this as:

The hard problem as I see it is in our attempt to explain "experience" in familiar terms - terms that came before the idea of consciousness. (do you mean in "intuitive" or "naieve" terms?

Without a loss of meaning?

I don't think everyone makes this mistake though or thinks in these terms. A lot of people have argued that the problem dissolves when you look at it in another way. But these other ways of looking at things create other "hard problems". And the problem does persist. If it were as easy as pointing out that we are thinking about it the wrong way - would it have gone away by now? Or do we maintain that large groups of intelligent people just get it wrong?

And Nagel was being rhetorical when he wrote WILTBAB.

 

[smcder]

Soupie:
"We can or we can't dismiss consciousness as ontologically distinct from matter?"
"Why are why can't we? Because the apparatus are presumed before we ask the question?"


Answer (1) -- we can dismiss it

Answer (2) -- because the distinction was created by the very apparatus we are examining.

"Ontological categories" are an artifice of the faculty we are trying to examine.

so how does this snake not twist around and bite it's own certainty in the tale?

 

[smcder]

The "hard problem" as I see it is in our attempt to fully explain the result (i.e. our "qualia" and "experience") in terms and categories that are dependent on a background of being that precedes the formation and application of the "consciousness" categories and abstractions. I suppose the term used for this category is "pre-reflective" (@Constance).

Regarding the Quantum domain as "noumena" (@Soupie) I have to cautiously remind everyone that the entire edifice of quantum mechanics is in itself an attempt to systemically identify rules and processes that follow logically from the root metaphor that "measurement" (required for observation) is in and of itself an activity that "occupies a portion of time and space" (Julian Schwinger) which when looked at in the light of human (i.e. or any embodied sentient) means that once again the very actions (i.e. measuring, testing, looking) supporting our epistemic frameworks are themselves dependent on the same dynamics (i.e. mechanics) of the systems we are trying to measure.

So the "quantum domain" is the activity of analyzing the effects of the very tools required in our attempts to probe out the answers we seek regarding "causes and effects."

Yes ... but not wrong for all of that. What you are arguing is a bit like Zeno's paradox.

 

[Constance]

Thus even when materialism is walked out in its most extreme form, there is simply no material there. It's relationships all the way down and all the way up.

so how does this snake not twist around and bite it's own certainty in the tale?

What certainty?

@Soupie went on to write:

But I also reject the matter in materialism from the Kantian perspective; what we perceive of reality is a representation of reality. To reify perception is to fall into Naive Realism.

We do not perceive representations of reality; we perceive presentations of things and others within our Umwelts, and these are the grounds of our experience in the world from which we begin to reflect and eventually think about the nature of 'reality'.

@Soupie also writes:

Note, this is not to say that there is not a real, external reality beyond our perceptual bubble. However, we mustn't reify our perceptual bubble.

Which of our perspectives in this discussion 'reifies our perceptual bubble'?