Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 8

[Soupie]

How could phenomenal contents emerge from a fundamental consciousness?

If the primary substrate is consciousness, then one can conceptualize how this substrate might differentiate and evolve into a variety of forms, all of which would "be conscious" or "have consciousness" in one form or the other.

I'm not saying this is my view per se (as I'm agnostic about whether consciousness is continuous or discontinuous).

The point is that it's easier to see how phenomenal contents could emerge from a primary consciousness and it's not easy to see how consciousness could emerge from a primary non-conscious substrate.

how is virtual reality useful as a metaphor?

From a primary computational (interactive) substrate many diverse forms are able to be made. (That's not a good answer. I'll try to share something better as I continue to get a grip on these ideas.)

if consciousness is primary and reality is the phenomenal content ... what restricts those contents? how is it that we (as independent conscious agents) agree that (many) things are the way they are?

I can only offer my layman's speculation. I personally like the idea of unbound telesis, that is unbound potential, being the primary substrate.

From this unbound potential anything and nothing can and do emerge.

It seems to me that for something to emerge from unbound telesis and persist, it must be self-sustaining, self-interactive and self-organizing. And also self-restricting.

 

[smcder]

"The manuscript later published as Ideas II clearly made a profound
impression on Merleau-Ponty, so much so that he once described studying it as “an almost voluptuous experience.”

What an extraordinary sensitivity he must have had ...

Strawson's cognitive phenomenology ....

 

[smcder]

If the primary substrate is consciousness, then one can conceptualize how this substrate might differentiate and evolve into a variety of forms, all of which would "be conscious" or "have consciousness" in one form or the other.

I'm not saying this is my view per se (as I'm agnostic about whether consciousness is continuous or discontinuous).

The point is that it's easier to see how phenomenal contents could emerge from a primary consciousness and it's not easy to see how consciousness could emerge from a primary non-conscious substrate.


From a primary computational (interactive) substrate many diverse forms are able to be made. (That's not a good answer. I'll try to share something better as I continue to get a grip on these ideas.)


I can only offer my layman's speculation. I personally like the idea of unbound telesis, that is unbound potential, being the primary substrate.

From this unbound potential anything and nothing can and do emerge.

It seems to me that for something to emerge from unbound telesis and persist, it must be self-sustaining, self-interactive and self-organizing. And also self-restricting.

If the primary substrate is consciousness, then one can conceptualize how this substrate might differentiate and evolve into a variety of forms, all of which would "be conscious" or "have consciousness" in one form or the other.

1) one can conceptualize how this substrate might differentiate and evolve into a variety of forms

• Do you have a how in mind that you can communicate? Or are you saying it just feels easier to think about things that way rather than consciousness emerging from matter? When you conceptualize this, is it in terms of words or pictures of some type? How would you reply to someone who says its easier for them to conceptualize consciousness emerging from matter, being excreted by the brain - ? What details would you need from this person to find such a conceptualization compelling? How did things start, if they did, when and why did they differentiate and evolve and are there specific rules of how this happens?

I'm not saying this is my view per se (as I'm agnostic about whether consciousness is continuous or discontinuous).

• what does it mean for consciousness to be continuous? I assume you mean that when we fall into a dreamless sleep - consciousness either disappears or does not - if consciousness is primary, where does it go when we sleep? or does it simply persist outside of our awareness? what is the involvement of memory in this process? (how do we know or prove that consciousness went away and wasn't simply forgotten or otherwise not reported?)

The point is that it's easier to see how phenomenal contents could emerge from a primary consciousness and it's not easy to see how consciousness could emerge from a primary non-conscious substrate.

• (pheomenal contents = in part, what we call "matter"?) But both are cases of "emergence" why is one case easier to "see" and again, what do you mean by see? Do you just mean that the way you imagine it feels easier to you? if there are specifics attached to this imagining, can you share them? for me, it seems about as difficult, well really more difficult to "imagine" a substrate of pure consciousness (its hard to imagine because it has no physical qualities, so I can't "see" it or imagine it as a field or a force or anything else) ... and then to imagine this "differentiating" into various forms ...

I can only offer my layman's speculation. I personally like the idea of unbound telesis, that is unbound potential, being the primary substrate. From this unbound potential anything and nothing can and do emerge.

It seems to me that for something to emerge from unbound telesis and persist, it must be self-sustaining, self-interactive and self-organizing. And also self-restricting.

This is, as I understand it, similar to various cosmogonies of eastern philosophy - I know Jung and Pauli discussed this idea, I think it is also maybe similar to Poe's idea in his essay "Eureka" if we do comparisons with Eastern philosophy, I think it's important to look at the influence of Romanticism on Western thinking in the development of these ideas, compared to traditional Eastern philosophies.

Again, it seems we have all the same problems whether we say matter as elementary particles is self-sustaining, self-interactive, etc ... except that we have, maybe, in some sense - experimental evidence for this ... and a well developed theory - it is just this point at which Hoffman's theory (and I know it is not yours) is vulnerable to attack - critics say he has made a lot of assumptions getting there ...

finally, what is to prevent someone from saying:

"There is yet another, a fourth layer, that is more primal than even unis mundus (because UM had to "come from" somewhere and had to get its quality of "unus" from somewhere ... and reality is really this fourth layer seeming-to-be-unus-mundus-seeming-to-be-consciousness-seeming-to-be-matter ... etc and so reality, in principle, is never what it "seems" to be (by the principle of non-seeming)?

We could call this unus tortoisus.

 

[Soupie]

If the primary substrate is consciousness, then one can conceptualize how this substrate might differentiate and evolve into a variety of forms, all of which would "be conscious" or "have consciousness" in one form or the other.

1) one can conceptualize how this substrate might differentiate and evolve into a variety of forms

• Do you have a how in mind that you can communicate? Or are you saying it just feels easier to think about things that way rather than consciousness emerging from matter? When you conceptualize this, is it in terms of words or pictures of some type? How would you reply to someone who says its easier for them to conceptualize consciousness emerging from matter, being excreted by the brain - ? What details would you need from this person to find such a conceptualization compelling? How did things start, if they did, when and why did they differentiate and evolve and are there specific rules of how this happens?

No, I don't know how or when etc.

Yes, it is just easier to conceptualize. We can't conceptualize (model) consciousness emerging from matter at all (hard problem).

But if we take consciousness as fundamental (instead of matter as physicalists do) then we can conceptualize this consciousness differentiating and evolving into a variety of forms.

Yes, consciousness may not do this via the forces identified by physics. However, it may be self-interactive in other ways. Ways that we can't currently conceptualize.

QM is spooky, self-interactive and behaves in ways that classical, macro physical bodies do not, for example.

I'm not saying this is my view per se (as I'm agnostic about whether consciousness is continuous or discontinuous).

• what does it mean for consciousness to be continuous? I assume you mean that when we fall into a dreamless sleep - consciousness either disappears or does not - if consciousness is primary, where does it go when we sleep? or does it simply persist outside of our awareness? what is the involvement of memory in this process? (how do we know or prove that consciousness went away and wasn't simply forgotten or otherwise not reported?)

Yes, those are all questions I have.

The point is that it's easier to see how phenomenal contents could emerge from a primary consciousness and it's not easy to see how consciousness could emerge from a primary non-conscious substrate.

• (pheomenal contents = in part, what we call "matter"?) But both are cases of "emergence" why is one case easier to "see" and again, what do you mean by see? Do you just mean that the way you imagine it feels easier to you? if there are specifics attached to this imagining, can you share them? for me, it seems about as difficult, well really more difficult to "imagine" a substrate of pure consciousness (its hard to imagine because it has no physical qualities, so I can't "see" it or imagine it as a field or a force or anything else) ... and then to imagine this "differentiating" into various forms ...

The key is self-interaction and differentiation.

I hear you when you say you can't conceptualize a non-physical substrate having these qualities. You've warned about thinking of consciousness in physical terms. I hear you. (But the alternative seems to be dualism and see some problems below.)

Again, I think the quantum substrate is helpful in this regard. It differentiates and evolves but doesn't seem to follow many (any?) of the laws of classical physics. Although there are those trying to apply classic laws to QM (the superfluid vacuum of Thad Roberts being one example).

And I don't think they are equally hard to see (conceptualize).

Consciousness from matter? Hard.

Form from consciousness? Easier. (I'll try to think of a metaphor to help here. Or even suggest some ways of thinking about non-classical physics ways of interaction besides those of QM.)

I can only offer my layman's speculation. I personally like the idea of unbound telesis, that is unbound potential, being the primary substrate. From this unbound potential anything and nothing can and do emerge.

It seems to me that for something to emerge from unbound telesis and persist, it must be self-sustaining, self-interactive and self-organizing. And also self-restricting.

This is, as I understand it, similar to various cosmogonies of eastern philosophy - I know Jung and Pauli discussed this idea, I think it is also maybe similar to Poe's idea in his essay "Eureka" if we do comparisons with Eastern philosophy, I think it's important to look at the influence of Romanticism on Western thinking in the development of these ideas, compared to traditional Eastern philosophies.

Again, it seems we have all the same problems whether we say matter as elementary particles is self-sustaining, self-interactive, etc ... except that we have, maybe, in some sense - experimental evidence for this ... and a well developed theory - it is just this point at which Hoffman's theory (and I know it is not yours) is vulnerable to attack - critics say he has made a lot of assumptions getting there ...

finally, what is to prevent someone from saying:

"There is yet another, a fourth layer, that is more primal than even unis mundus (because UM had to "come from" somewhere and had to get its quality of "unus" from somewhere ... and reality is really this fourth layer seeming-to-be-unus-mundus-seeming-to-be-consciousness-seeming-to-be-matter ... etc and so reality, in principle, is never what it "seems" to be (by the principle of non-seeming)?

We could call this unus tortoisus.

I'm not sure what point you're making here. We don't have a complete theory/model? Sure. We don't have any theory/model of consciousness? Sure.

Could it be turtles all the way down? Sure.

You have an affinity for dualism. You have the problem of interaction between mind and matter. It's hard to conceptualize how two different substances could interact. But you apparently do so.

That consciousness does not emerge from matter is "supported" both empirically and philosophically, i.e., the absolute failure to produce any empirical or theoretical explanations for how it could. Yes, as you often say it could be a brute fact of nature. Sure.

Additionally, critical realism and other avenues show us that naive/direct realism is false. Reality in itself is much different than how it appears to us phenomenally (classical physics).

Ergo classical physical reality may not be fundamental but a different, non-physical substrate may be.

 

[smcder]

No, I don't know how or when etc.

Yes, it is just easier to conceptualize. We can't conceptualize (model) consciousness emerging from matter at all (hard problem).

But if we take consciousness as fundamental (instead of matter as physicalists do) then we can conceptualize this consciousness differentiating and evolving into a variety of forms.

Yes, consciousness may not do this via the forces identified by physics. However, it may be self-interactive in other ways. Ways that we can't currently conceptualize.

QM is spooky, self-interactive and behaves in ways that classical, macro physical bodies do not, for example.


Yes, those are all questions I have.

The key is self-interaction and differentiation.

I hear you when you say you can't conceptualize a non-physical substrate having these qualities. You've warned about thinking of consciousness in physical terms. I hear you. (But the alternative seems to be dualism and see some problems below.)

Again, I think the quantum substrate is helpful in this regard. It differentiates and evolves but doesn't seem to follow many (any?) of the laws of classical physics. Although there are those trying to apply classic laws to QM (the superfluid vacuum of Thad Roberts being one example).

And I don't think they are equally hard to see (conceptualize).

Consciousness from matter? Hard.

Form from consciousness? Easier. (I'll try to think of a metaphor to help here. Or even suggest some ways of thinking about non-classical physics ways of interaction besides those of QM.)


I'm not sure what point you're making here. We don't have a complete theory/model? Sure. We don't have any theory/model of consciousness? Sure.

Could it be turtles all the way down? Sure.

You have an affinity for dualism. You have the problem of interaction between mind and matter. It's hard to conceptualize how two different substances could interact. But you apparently do so.

That consciousness does not emerge from matter is "supported" both empirically and philosophically, i.e., the absolute failure to produce any empirical or theoretical explanations for how it could. Yes, as you often say it could be a brute fact of nature. Sure.

Additionally, critical realism and other avenues show us that naive/direct realism is false. Reality in itself is much different than how it appears to us phenomenally (classical physics).

Ergo classical physical reality may not be fundamental but a different, non-physical substrate may be.

Yes, it is just easier to conceptualize. We can't conceptualize (model) consciousness emerging from matter at all (hard problem).

But if we take consciousness as fundamental (instead of matter as physicalists do) then we can conceptualize this consciousness differentiating and evolving into a variety of forms.

1. We can't conceptualize (model) consciousness emerging from matter at all (hard problem).
2. But if we take consciousness as fundamental (instead of matter as physicalists do) then we can conceptualize (model) this consciousness differentiating and evolving into a variety of forms.

In sentence (1) you equate "conceptualize" with "model", in sentence (2) you say we can conceptualize consciousness differentiating and evolving etc and if I understand you correctly, you feel this is easier. I put in the word "model" for "conceptualize" so in (2) ... so what is the model for consciousness differentiating and evolving that you use?

Yes, consciousness may not do this via the forces identified by physics. However, it may be self-interactive in other ways. Ways that we can't currently conceptualize.

These two sentences together seem to contradict.

The point is that it's easier to see how phenomenal contents could emerge from a primary consciousness and it's not easy to see how consciousness could emerge from a primary non-conscious substrate.

You keep saying "see". In my experience, I have thought I could see something - for example, when I read about "emergence" I used to think I could "see" how consciousness could arise as an "epiphenomenon" but the more closely I examined it, the more concerned I was that I was just using examples like "steam from a locomotive" or "flocks of birds" and then "seeing" (a vague) picture of some kind of field or force arising from the interaction of neurons. So when you say it's easier to see how phenomenal contents could emerge ... are you seeing specific "pictures" or sensations or what, exactly?

◦ (pheomenal contents = in part, what we call "matter"?) But both are cases of "emergence" why is one case easier to "see" and again, what do you mean by see? Do you just mean that the way you imagine it feels easier to you? if there are specifics attached to this imagining, can you share them? for me, it seems about as difficult, well really more difficult to "imagine" a substrate of pure consciousness (its hard to imagine because it has no physical qualities, so I can't "see" it or imagine it as a field or a force or anything else) ... and then to imagine this "differentiating" into various forms ...

The key is self-interaction and differentiation.

That's a little vague ... lol ... What is "self-interaction" and "differentiation"?

I hear you when you say you can't conceptualize a non-physical substrate having these qualities. You've warned about thinking of consciousness in physical terms. I hear you. (But the alternative seems to be dualism and see some problems below.)

It depends on what is meant by "conceptualize". Dualism has problems, that's why I don't have an affinity for dualism or any other approach. Every approach has problems. The various approaches that put consciousness as fundamental seem to have various problems like the combination problem or Hoffman's stated problem of having to derive all of physics from his theory ... Idealism (Berkley) had the problem of Other Minds ... each has its own "hard problem". One thing I could ask is what benefits does your approach offer for other kinds of problems we have? Does it solve anything other than the hard problem of consciousness?

Again, I think the quantum substrate is helpful in this regard. It differentiates and evolves but doesn't seem to follow many (any?) of the laws of classical physics. Although there are those trying to apply classic laws to QM (the superfluid vacuum of Thad Roberts being one example).

And I don't think they are equally hard to see (conceptualize).

Consciousness from matter? Hard.

Form from consciousness? Easier. (I'll try to think of a metaphor to help here. Or even suggest some ways of thinking about non-classical physics ways of interaction besides those of QM.)

Again, you're not providing specifics - so let me ask it this way. What if someone said it's easier for them to see (conceptualize(model)) consciousness from matter? What would you expect them to provide you with to convince you?


I'm not sure what point you're making here. We don't have a complete theory/model? Sure. We don't have any theory/model of consciousness? Sure.

Could it be turtles all the way down? Sure.

I'm making the point that you don't seem to have an answer to such objections. If you say reality isn't like this, it's like this but the only reason you say that is because it solves one problem, the hard problem, I'm asking what is to stop someone from positing more and more layers of reality (which some people do)? How would someone falsify such approaches as the one you take? I believe this has been a problem with Hoffman's idea. If consciousness is fundamental, there may be problems with having a fundamental science. That seems to be a major concern ... in other words, if reality isn't physical, how do we know what it is?

You have an affinity for dualism. You have the problem of interaction between mind and matter. It's hard to conceptualize how two different substances could interact. But you apparently do so.

No sir, I do not have an affinity for dualism. Not I do not conceptualize this.

That consciousness does not emerge from matter is "supported" both empirically and philosophically, i.e., the absolute failure to produce any empirical or theoretical explanations for how it could. Yes, as you often say it could be a brute fact of nature. Sure.

It could be. Sure. It could be that we don't have the right kind of mind to understand it (McGinn). Sure.

Additionally, critical realism and other avenues show us that naive/direct realism is false. Reality in itself is much different thanNo how it appears to us phenomenally (classical physics).

I think we all understand that.

Ergo classical physical reality may not be fundamental but a different, non-physical substrate may be.

Sure. We just need some more specifics here.

 

[smcder]

You have an affinity for dualism. You have the problem of interaction between mind and matter. It's hard to conceptualize how two different substances could interact. But you apparently do so.

I repeat that no, sir, I do not have an affinity for dualism! I do have an affinity for looking at the history of ideas. This is from the SEP on Dualism (with my notes in bold)

The main uncertainty that faced Descartes and his contemporaries, however, was not where interaction took place, but how two things so different as thought and extension could interact at all. This would be particularly mysterious if one had an impact view of causal interaction, as would anyone influenced by atomism, for whom the paradigm of causation is like two billiard balls cannoning off one another.

Various of Descartes' disciples, such as Arnold Geulincx and Nicholas Malebranche, concluded that all mind-body interactions required the direct intervention of God. The appropriate states of mind and body were only the occasions for such intervention, not real causes. Now it would be convenient to think that occasionalists held that all causation was natural except for that between mind and body. In fact they generalized their conclusion and treated all causation as directly dependent on God. Why this was so, we cannot discuss here.

substance under attack!
Descartes' conception of a dualism of substances came under attack from the more radical empiricists, who found it difficult to attach sense to the concept of substance at all.

• problems with the concept of substance

Locke, as a moderate empiricist, accepted that there were both material and immaterial substances. Berkeley famously rejected material substance, because he rejected all existence outside the mind. In his early Notebooks,

• (Berkeley) he toyed with the idea of rejecting immaterial substance, because we could have no idea of it, and reducing the self to a collection of the ‘ideas' that constituted its contents. Finally, he decided that the self, conceived as something over and above the ideas of which it was aware, was essential for an adequate understanding of the human person. Although the self and its acts are not presented to consciousness as objects of awareness, we are obliquely aware of them simply by dint of being active subjects. Hume rejected such claims, and proclaimed the self to be nothing more than a concatenation of its ephemeral contents.

Hume's critic from empiricism

• In fact, Hume criticised the whole conception of substance for lacking in empirical content: when you search for the owner of the properties that make up a substance, you find nothing but further properties. Consequently, the mind is, he claimed, nothing but a ‘bundle’ or ‘heap’ of impressions and ideas—that is, of particular mental states or events, without an owner. This position has been labelled bundle dualism, and it is a special case of a general bundle theory of substance, according to which objects in general are just organised collections of properties. the binding problem The problem for the Humean is to explain what binds the elements in the bundle together. This is an issue for any kind of substance, but for material bodies the solution seems fairly straightforward: the unity of a physical bundle is constituted by some form of causal interaction between the elements in the bundle. For the mind, mere causal connection is not enough; some further relation of co-consciousness is required. We shall see in 5.2.1 that it is problematic whether one can treat such a relation as more primitive than the notion of belonging to a subject.

One should note the following about Hume's theory. His bundle theory is a theory about the nature of the unity of the mind. As a theory about this unity, it is not necessarily dualist. Parfit (1970, 1984) and Shoemaker (1984, ch. 2), for example, accept it as physicalists. In general, physicalists will accept it unless they wish to ascribe the unity to the brain or the organism as a whole. Before the bundle theory can be dualist one must accept property dualism, for more about which, see the next section.

causal closure under physics
A crisis in the history of dualism came, however, with the growing popularity of mechanism in science in the nineteenth century. According to the mechanist, the world is, as it would now be expressed, ‘closed under physics’. This means that everything that happens follows from and is in accord with the laws of physics. There is, therefore, no scope for interference in the physical world by the mind in the way that interactionism seems to require. According to the mechanist, the conscious mind is an epiphenomenon (a notion given general currency by T. H. Huxley 1893): that is, it is a by-product of the physical system which has no influence back on it. In this way, the facts of consciousness are acknowledged but the integrity of physical science is preserved. However, many philosophers found it implausible to claim such things as the following; the pain that I have when you hit me, the visual sensations I have when I see the ferocious lion bearing down on me or the conscious sense of understanding I have when I hear your argument—all have nothing directly to do with the way I respond.

I think this is a key point:

• It is very largely due to the need to avoid this counterintuitiveness that we owe the concern of twentieth century philosophy to devise a plausible form of materialist monism.

But, although dualism has been out of fashion in psychology since the advent of behaviourism (Watson 1913) and in philosophy since Ryle (1949), the argument is by no means over. Some distinguished neurologists, such as Sherrington (1940) and Eccles (Popper and Eccles 1977) have continued to defend dualism as the only theory that can preserve the data of consciousness. Amongst mainstream philosophers, discontent with physicalism led to a modest revival of property dualism in the last decade of the twentieth century. At least some of the reasons for this should become clear below.

 

[smcder]

@Soupie I think you have said before what draws you to your approach - so I'm sorry for asking again, but in addition to solving the hard problem or not having the HP - what attracts you to your approach? Are their implications that we haven't discussed? On

2. if consciousness is fundamental, then we see the "reality" we see because of the interaction of various conscious agents? Is that right? Are these agents "independent" and to what degree? Are they in any way able to shape the shared reality? Or is that even a question that can be asked?

 

[Soupie]

Yes, it is just easier to conceptualize. We can't conceptualize (model) consciousness emerging from matter at all (hard problem).

But if we take consciousness as fundamental (instead of matter as physicalists do) then we can conceptualize this consciousness differentiating and evolving into a variety of forms.

1. We can't conceptualize (model) consciousness emerging from matter at all (hard problem).
2. But if we take consciousness as fundamental (instead of matter as physicalists do) then we can conceptualize (model) this consciousness differentiating and evolving into a variety of forms.

In sentence (1) you equate "conceptualize" with "model", in sentence (2) you say we can conceptualize consciousness differentiating and evolving etc and if I understand you correctly, you feel this is easier. I put in the word "model" for "conceptualize" so in (2) ... so what is the model for consciousness differentiating and evolving that you use?

We cannot empirically model consciousness emerging from matter. And we can't conceptualize it doing so either, except as brute fact. (For what it's worth, as I've noted, I think the autopoietic model of how a system might evolve to "sense" its environment is just about as damn close as we can get to conceptualizing how conscious experience could emerge from matter.)

Yes, consciousness may not do this via the forces identified by physics. However, it may be self-interactive in other ways. Ways that we can't currently conceptualize.

These two sentences together seem to contradict.

I have been mixing my use of model and conceptualize. I apologize for the confusion.

Let me try to make the same point with clearer language:

Consciousness as a fundamental substrate (or at least more fundamental than classical physical reality) may interact with itself and differentiate within itself, but it may do so in ways unlike those described in classical physics.

The point is that it's easier to see how phenomenal contents could emerge from a primary consciousness and it's not easy to see how consciousness could emerge from a primary non-conscious substrate.

You keep saying "see". In my experience, I have thought I could see something - for example, when I read about "emergence" I used to think I could "see" how consciousness could arise as an "epiphenomenon" but the more closely I examined it, the more concerned I was that I was just using examples like "steam from a locomotive" or "flocks of birds" and then "seeing" (a vague) picture of some kind of field or force arising from the interaction of neurons. So when you say it's easier to see how phenomenal contents could emerge ... are you seeing specific "pictures" or sensations or what, exactly?

Here is a very crude metaphor in order to "see." (Throwback to our discussion of how we use physical terminology to describe mental processes.)

Imagine (if you can) a background of unbound telesis. Nothing emerges from this background. Something emerges from this background but dissipates. Something emerges from this background that is self-sustaining and ergo able to persist. If it wasn't self-sustaining it wouldn't persist and ergo would fall back into the background of unbound potential. (This is a tautology I believe.)

Imagine that the self-sustaining substrate/process that emerged from the background of UT was consciousness. A crude metaphor might be a uniform clay substrate. (And here you will rightly protest that I am using physical metaphors, but it can't be avoided. We have to use metaphors. I'm not saying consciousness is like physical clay, only using it as a metaphor.) This uniform substrate/process--in order that it exist in the first place must be self interacting, i.e., it must be able to self-sustain itself within the ground state of unbound potential (the potential for nothing and something that is always present, the ground state of what-is).

This clay self-interacts, differentiates, and evolves. Imagine the clay differentiating into various forms. We can assume (better word than conceptualize?) that it does these things but that it does these things in ways unlike those described (and that's an important word here!) in quantum and classical physics.

Why is described so important? Because at the heart of physics, we don't know why the processes we observe are happening, we are merely describing them. We can importantly make very accurate predictions based off of the patterns we've described, which I don't mean to diminish in any way, but why the described physical laws of the universe are as they are is ultimately a mystery.

◦ (pheomenal contents = in part, what we call "matter"?) But both are cases of "emergence" why is one case easier to "see" and again, what do you mean by see? Do you just mean that the way you imagine it feels easier to you? if there are specifics attached to this imagining, can you share them? for me, it seems about as difficult, well really more difficult to "imagine" a substrate of pure consciousness (its hard to imagine because it has no physical qualities, so I can't "see" it or imagine it as a field or a force or anything else) ... and then to imagine this "differentiating" into various forms ...

The key is self-interaction and differentiation.

That's a little vague ... lol ... What is "self-interaction" and "differentiation"?

I think Velman's book extract was very helpful with this issue.

On the one hand we can think of consciousness as pure, content-less awareness. But wouldn't contentless awareness be nothingness? Even if we say pure awareness is "awareness of awareness" we are inserting a content, a something. An awareness "of" something. A reflexive or self awareness is still an awareness of something. ergo not contentless.

Velmans had said consciousness was a "something its like." If there is a "something" its like, then there can be said to be consciousness.

Awareness of awareness. Awareness of self. Awareness of oneness. Awareness of pure love. Awareness of X.

We can discuss this at length some more if you'd like, but contentless awareness doesn't seem possible to... conceptualize.

So, I submit that the conscious substrate/process that arises from UT must therefore be self-interactive and able to differentiate within itself.

Aware of awareness implies self-interaction and differentiating. Otherwise nothingness.

I hear you when you say you can't conceptualize a non-physical substrate having these qualities. You've warned about thinking of consciousness in physical terms. I hear you. (But the alternative seems to be dualism and see some problems below.)

It depends on what is meant by "conceptualize". Dualism has problems, that's why I don't have an affinity for dualism or any other approach. Every approach has problems. The various approaches that put consciousness as fundamental seem to have various problems like the combination problem or Hoffman's stated problem of having to derive all of physics from his theory ... Idealism (Berkley) had the problem of Other Minds ... each has its own "hard problem". One thing I could ask is what benefits does your approach offer for other kinds of problems we have? Does it solve anything other than the hard problem of consciousness?

Again, I think the quantum substrate is helpful in this regard. It differentiates and evolves but doesn't seem to follow many (any?) of the laws of classical physics. Although there are those trying to apply classic laws to QM (the superfluid vacuum of Thad Roberts being one example).

And I don't think they are equally hard to see (conceptualize).

Consciousness from matter? Hard.

Form from consciousness? Easier. (I'll try to think of a metaphor to help here. Or even suggest some ways of thinking about non-classical physics ways of interaction besides those of QM.)

Again, you're not providing specifics - so let me ask it this way. What if someone said it's easier for them to see (conceptualize(model)) consciousness from matter? What would you expect them to provide you with to convince you?

A metaphor or rough model. As I say, I think the autopoeitic approach is the best I've encountered.

I'm not sure what point you're making here. We don't have a complete theory/model? Sure. We don't have any theory/model of consciousness? Sure.

Could it be turtles all the way down? Sure.

I'm making the point that you don't seem to have an answer to such objections. If you say reality isn't like this, it's like this but the only reason you say that is because it solves one problem, the hard problem, I'm asking what is to stop someone from positing more and more layers of reality (which some people do)? How would someone falsify such approaches as the one you take? I believe this has been a problem with Hoffman's idea. If consciousness is fundamental, there may be problems with having a fundamental science. That seems to be a major concern ... in other words, if reality isn't physical, how do we know what it is?

Dealing with the hard problem is nothing to take lightly, haha.

There may be more and more layers of reality! We identify problems with current paradigms and propose paradigms that are more explanatory. The HP, QM, Critical Realism point to a reality not grounded in classical, billiard-ball, macro physics.

You have an affinity for dualism. You have the problem of interaction between mind and matter. It's hard to conceptualize how two different substances could interact. But you apparently do so.

No sir, I do not have an affinity for dualism. Not I do not conceptualize this.

Ok. I'll loop back and find the post were you outlined these ideas recently.

 

[Soupie]

@Soupie I think you have said before what draws you to your approach - so I'm sorry for asking again, but in addition to solving the hard problem or not having the HP - what attracts you to your approach? Are their implications that we haven't discussed? On

I'm drawn to the approach that makes the most sense, while avoiding brute "causes." Of course all the normal unconscious, cultural biases apply as they do all of us.

2. if consciousness is fundamental, then we see the "reality" we see because of the interaction of various conscious agents? Is that right? Are these agents "independent" and to what degree? Are they in any way able to shape the shared reality? Or is that even a question that can be asked?

The individual, independent "conscious agents" is an aspect of Hoffman's theory. While I'm open to the idea, it's not one I've really considered or put thought into.

 

[Soupie]

No sir, I do not have an affinity for dualism. Not I do not conceptualize this.

Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 7

1. consciousness is fundamental - I do think consciousness, experience, maybe even POV are in some sense fundamental ... I think it is very hard for me not to think about this the way I think of fundamental aspects of what we call the physical/material - in other words, I think we should be careful thinking about little tiny bits of consciousness or proto-consciousness, for Chalmers thinking about it this way leads to the "combination problem" ... so it's very hard not to think about consciousness as a fluid or a field, or a particulate building block from which we build up our experiences - but I think we should try, because I think these metaphors are misleading.

You've shared the idea before that rather than monism or dualism there may be a "polyism." That is, there may be a multitude of fundamental "aspects" within what-is such as mass, gravity, space, time, consciousness, etc.

To me, that is classic dualism or perhaps "polyism."

So maybe you don't have an affinity for this approach, but you've mentioned it several times throughout this discussion.

And of course there are "hard" problems with this approach, namely the problem of interaction, and perhaps the "hard problem" of interaction as consciousness would seem to be an aspect unlike those other aspects.

 

[Soupie]

I think we should be careful thinking about little tiny bits of consciousness or proto-consciousness, for Chalmers thinking about it this way leads to the "combination problem" ... so it's very hard not to think about consciousness as a fluid or a field, or a particulate building block from which we build up our experiences - but I think we should try, because I think these metaphors are misleading.

And I would say--as I outlined above--that we have to be careful thinking of "pure" consciousness existing in a form devoid of contents.

I'll try to find a more formal discussion pro and con of this idea; the idea that consciousness can be said to exist without content.

 

[Soupie]

Pretty exciting (although not directly related to consciousness). Some very interesting nuggets in here.

The Demise of the Synapse As the Locus of Memory: A Looming Paradigm Shift?

Synaptic plasticity is widely considered to be the neurobiological basis of learning and memory by neuroscientists and researchers in adjacent fields, though diverging opinions are increasingly being recognized. From the perspective of what we might call “classical cognitive science” it has always been understood that the mind/brain is to be considered a computational-representational system. Proponents of the information-processing approach to cognitive science have long been critical of connectionist or network approaches to (neuro-)cognitive architecture, pointing to the shortcomings of the associative psychology that underlies Hebbian learning as well as to the fact that synapses are practically unfit to implement symbols. Recent work on memory has been adding fuel to the fire and current findings in neuroscience now provide first tentative neurobiological evidence for the cognitive scientists' doubts about the synapse as the (sole) locus of memory in the brain. This paper briefly considers the history and appeal of synaptic plasticity as a memory mechanism, followed by a summary of the cognitive scientists' objections regarding these assertions. Next, a variety of tentative neuroscientific evidence that appears to substantiate questioning the idea of the synapse as the locus of memory is presented. On this basis, a novel way of thinking about the role of synaptic plasticity in learning and memory is proposed. ...

Now, when we are looking for a mechanism that implements a read/write memory in the nervous system, looking at synaptic strength and connectivity patterns might be misleading for many reasons. Most pressingly, as Gallistel and King point out, synapses might already be too complex in terms of implementing such a very basic function:

In the final analysis, however, our skepticism rests most strongly on the fact that the synapse is a circuit-level structure, a structure that it takes two different neurons and a great many molecules to realize. It seems to us likely for a variety of reasons that the elementary unit in the memory mechanism will prove to be a molecular or sub-molecular structural unit. (Gallistel and King, 2009, p. 282)

Hence, they suggest turning to DNA and RNA, which already implement the functionality of a read/write memory at the sub-molecular level. Interestingly, in discussing recent work on memory, Poo et al. reach a similar conclusion when they remark that “[…] some other mechanisms, potentially involving epigenomic modifications in engram neurons, appear to be necessary for memory trace storage” (Poo et al., 2016, p. 8).

A mechanism as essential as memory has to be efficient in all respects, be it implementational complexity or energy efficiency. Another part of Gallistel and collaborators' argument for the point of view they put forward is the observation that neural computation is demonstrably incredibly fast, therefore making it much more likely that the memory mechanism is (sub-)molecular in nature so that computational machinery and memory can be located in close physical proximity in order to minimize the distance over which a signal has to be transmitted (a process which evidently is “slow” in the nervous system in comparison to, for example, conventional computers). ...

To this day, tentative evidence for the (classical) cognitive scientists' reservations toward the synapse as the locus of memory in the brain has accumulated. A lot of groundbreaking work concerning the way in which the brain carries forward information in time was actually performed on comparatively simple model organisms such as Aplysia and has then been extrapolated to speculate about what might be going on in human mind/brains (e.g., Kandel and Siegelbaum, 2013). Interestingly, it is recent work in this exact domain which has indicated that the idea of synaptic conductance as the basic memory mechanism is insufficient and incomplete at best.

In Kandel and collaborators' by now classic work with Aplysia, changes in synaptic conductivity were shown to alter how the animal reflexively responds to its environment. But not even in Aplysia all synapses are equally susceptible to change, many appeared not to be very plastic (Kandel and Siegelbaum, 2013). Recent work with cultured Aplysia motor and sensory neurons by Chen et al. (2014) has revealed that long-term memories appear to persist covertly in cell bodies and can be restored after synapses have been eliminated. Long-term memory persisted after pharmacological elimination of synapses that had been produced only after learning had occurred, calling the role of synapses as the presumed locus of memory into serious doubt.

Similarly and possibly even more convincing, in a groundbreaking study bulding on earlier work (Hesslow et al., 2013) that already pointed to the mismatch between LTD in Purkinje cells and cerebellar learning, Johansson et al. (2014) investigated how the response of Purkinje cells changes during learning. Studying eyeblink conditioning, they showed that the cells could learn the temporal relationship between paired stimuli during conditioning. Strikingly and in stark contrast to widespread belief, the timing of responses exhibited by conditioned Purkinje cells after conditioning did not depend on a temporally patterned input. Consequently, Johansson et al. conclude that both, timing mechanism and memory trace, are located within the Purkinje cell itself. As they put it, “[…] the data strongly suggest that the main timing mechanism is within the Purkinje cell and that its nature is cellular rather than a network property” (Johansson et al., 2014, p. 14933).

Lastly, in a recent study supposed to demonstrate the increase in synaptic strength and density of dendritic spines during memory consoldiation, Ryan et al. (2015), to their own surprise, showed that changes in synaptic strength are not directly related to storage of new information in memory. In accordance with the literature on memory consolidation, Ryan et al. found that injection of protein synthesis inhibitors induced retrograde amnesia, meaning that the memory could not be retrieved. However, when optogenetically activating the neurons previously tagged during the conditioning process, memories could nevertheless be retrieved despite chemical blocking, indicating that the formation of synapses or strengthening of synaptic weights is not critical to memory formation as such. ...

 

[Soupie]

http://logos-and-episteme.acadiasi....USNESS-SHOULD-NOT-BE-CONFUSED-WITH-QUALIA.pdf

CONSCIOUSNESS SHOULD NOT BE CONFUSED WITH QUALIA

ABSTRACT: The equation of consciousness with qualia, of wakeful awareness with awareness-of-cognitive content (perceptions, conceptions, emotions), while intuitively attractive, and formally referenced as the primary index of consciousness by many philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists, nevertheless has significant difficulties specifying precisely what it is that distinguishes conscious from non-conscious cognition. Moreover, there is a surprisingly robust congruence of evidence to the contrary, supporting the notion that consciousness, as a state of reflexive awareness, is distinct from the content one is aware of, that this awareness/content amalgam is actually the product of an incorporation process of various intermittent, and constantly varying streams of content onto a pre-existing reflexively conscious state which is not reliant on these streams for its constitution as a reflexive state. Consciousness, the evidence strongly indicates, is not qualia, not the awareness of this or that perceptual, conceptual or emotional content, but reflexive, autonoetic awareness as such.

 

[Soupie]

https://evanthompsondotme.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/self-no-self.pdf

Memory and Reflexive Awareness EVAN THOMPSON

1. Introduction This paper focuses on two interrelated problems: Does consciousness essentially involve self-awareness? Does self-awareness imply the existence of a self ? I will answer yes to both questions, but my yes for the second question will be a qualified one. I plan to address these two problems by counterpoising two distinct philosophical traditions and debates. The first is the debate over reflexive awareness (svasam˙ vedana) in Indo-Tibetan Buddhist philosophy. The second is the debate between egological versus nonegological conceptions of consciousness in Western phenomenology.1

 

[Soupie]

I posted and discussed this paper and the ideas within it some time ago, pre Hoffman. But here it is again. (I'll pull and post relevant pieces from all these papers as they relate to the idea of consciousness being fundamental and as such how fundamental awareness could/,ight be self-interacting and able to differentiate.)

http://www.menaskafatos.com/Theise Kafatos FINAL.pdf

The ontologic framework of Fundamental Awareness proposed here assumes that non-dual Awareness is foundational to the universe, not arising from the interactions or structures of higher level phenomena. The framework allows comparison and integration of views from the three investigative domains concerned with the understanding nature of consciousness: science, philosophy, and metaphysics. In this framework, Awareness is the underlying reality, not reducible to anything else. Awareness and existence are the same. As such, the universe is nonmaterial, self-organizing throughout, a holarchy of complementary, process driven, recursive interactions. The universe is both its own first observer and subject. Considering the world to be non-material and comprised, a priori, of Awareness is to privilege information over materiality, action over agency and to understand that qualia are not a “hard problem”, but the foundational elements of all existence. These views fully reflect main stream Western philosophical traditions, insights from culturally diverse contemplative and mystical traditions, and are in keeping with current scientific thinking, expressible mathematically.

The universe is comprised of self-organizing systems, in which every part, at every level of scale, contributes to the emergent properties of the whole. 21-29 Thus, according to generally accepted, consensus opinions regarding the sciences, the physical universe arises and manifests from interactions between space and time, matter and energy at the smallest (Planck) scale. While there is as yet no confirmed and comprehensive view of the Planck scale of existence, we consider a generalized view that a quantum foam of entities arises within or from the vacuum. These entities, by interacting with each other, give rise (at least) to the wave/particle entities described by the Standard Model of particle physics (Greene 1999).* ...

Conceptualizing the world, then, as a nested hierarchy undermines the idea of a materialist universe, a universe that in some sense is knowable from some initial conditions and through the application of dynamical equations of physics, made of “stuff” such as matter and energy, or even time and space through which matter and energy move and interact. However, it is in total resonance with the view of a quantum universe which eventually appears to conscious observers as the classical world. The appearance of material stuff is scale dependent. ...

Our approach to consciousness, this framework of Fundamental Awareness, thus rests on insights from QM and studies of self-organizing systems and reflects a decision to take “pure Awareness”, as it is described, refracted through the experiential lenses of the above (and other, undescribed) contemplative traditions as axiomatic. Thus, what we propose here, Fundamental Awareness, begins with these primary axioms: I. The substratum of existence is Fundamental Awareness, i.e. pure Awareness which is reflexively self-aware. II. Fundamental Awareness is non-dual and non-material. How to define Fundamental Awareness immediately becomes a question for which, necessarily, all answers are inherently insufficient. As Fundamental Awareness is non-dual, any attempt to make a complete linguistic or mathematically formal system to define and describe it will inevitably contradict itself or, conversely, any consistent description, with words or mathematics, will necessarily be incomplete. And therefore, we would suggest, it can only be truly known experientially (as through metaphysical practices) rather than conceptually (through empirical science or philosophy). Nonetheless, we must try. So: if awareness may be generally defined as "the state of knowing or perceiving", Fundamental Awareness, tautologically, is "the state of knowing/perceiving the state of knowing/perceiving." Some associated statements considered as refinements or commentaries then follow: III. Emanation of the phenomenal universe is initiated by a first symmetry breaking wherein Fundamental Awareness, as begins to manifest/perceive the possibility of Self and Other, moves from a self-reflexive "I Am" to "I and That", or Self and the Universe. IV. This primary symmetry breaking results in the dualistic phenomenal universe with the emanation of space-time, matter and energy. V. The emergence of the dualistic universe from the non-dual Fundamental Awareness is characterized, at the first and all subsequent levels of scale, by process (as creative intra-activity in non-local scales, as creative inter-activity at higher, material scales, and as sentience in biological systems), complementarity and recursion (Figure 2).

[And now the good stuff.]

Core principles of the self-organizing universe

The initial emanation of space and time, matter and energy that comprise both the initiating events (Big Bang) of the universe as well as its moment by moment maintenance represent the initiation of duality in contrast to the substratum of non-duality. This represents a complementarity in Bohr’s sense of the term and represents one core principle of Fundamental Awareness, i.e. it is irreducibly present at every scale and from every perspective. One might ask, of course, whether this is truly fundamental because prior to the initiating symmetry break there is, by definition, no ability to assign qualities to the non-dual awareness, including complementarity. However, what pre-exists the initiating symmetry break is also therefore beyond description and, de facto, to describe it we are already an observer that has arisen from it. Our presence to interrogate its nature necessarily implies that this non-dual pure awareness is in complementarity with the dual, phenomenal universe. Thus complementarity is fundamental in this sense. At the Planck scale we still do not have a clear understanding of the nature of existence, though terms often applied with varying degrees of precision are quantum vacuum and quantum foam. The smallest entities that arise at this smallest scale, inclusive of quanta of space and time, of energy (and therefore matter, in whatever form it manifests at this scale), interact with each other giving rise to acts of creation, to higher level, emergent structures. We refer to this as process (with scale and self-organizational subclasses to be further defined, below). These higher level structures (e.g. the particle/wave entities of the Standard Model) can then interact to give rise to higher level structures and, therefore, the universe manifests in recursive patterns, unfurling as inflationary cooling allowsfor stability at every higher level of scale. Thus, we believe these three principles – complementarity, process, and recursion – are seen operating together, working within and throughout the unified whole, the holarchy, of the cosmos and of its component parts, in many different ways, in the purely physical and biological realms.

 

[Soupie]

Way back when I first joined this discussion, I wondered if consciousness began with interaction. And I'm still wondering that.

"One might ask, of course, whether this is truly fundamental because prior to the initiating symmetry break there is, by definition, no ability to assign qualities to the non-dual awareness, including complementarity. However, what pre-exists the initiating symmetry break is also therefore beyond description and, de facto, to describe it we are already an observer that has arisen from it."

To say that contentless awareness is fundamental is to say that nothingness is fundamental. An empty statement. To say that reflexive awareness (self-awareness) is fundamental begs the question above. Can it truly be fundamental? It seems not. However, there is good reason to believe that reflexive awareness (self-awareness) is one of the most fundamental properties of what-is. And one could argue that self-interaction must be one of the fundamental properties of what-is, otherwise how could it exist, sustain, and differentiate.

One might argue that reflexive/self-awareness and self-interaction are the same property. To interact is to experience, to experience is to interact.

(1) Unbound telesis is primary substrate. The potential for nothing and something.
(2) From this primary substrate arose a self-interacting process, i.e., self-awareness.
(3) From this secondary substrate emerge/differentiate all variety of sub-processes, including (conscious) perceiving organisms.

In my view, the ideas relating to autopoiesis best capture how forms (in this case cells) could form/differentiate against/within the reflexive awareness that emerges at the previous ontological level. As cells and multi-cellular organisms became increasingly complex, so too did their minds.

 

[Constance]

@Soupie, you've expressed your metaphysics with much greater clarity in these last several posts, and linked us to three papers -- by Peters, Thompson, and Kafatos -- that will likely clarify many of your statements in the recent past. I'm intrigued by the ideas you're now pursuing and will read with care all three of the papers you linked.

 

[smcder]

Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 7

1. consciousness is fundamental - I do think consciousness, experience, maybe even POV are in some sense fundamental ... I think it is very hard for me not to think about this the way I think of fundamental aspects of what we call the physical/material - in other words, I think we should be careful thinking about little tiny bits of consciousness or proto-consciousness, for Chalmers thinking about it this way leads to the "combination problem" ... so it's very hard not to think about consciousness as a fluid or a field, or a particulate building block from which we build up our experiences - but I think we should try, because I think these metaphors are misleading.

You've shared the idea before that rather than monism or dualism there may be a "polyism." That is, there may be a multitude of fundamental "aspects" within what-is such as mass, gravity, space, time, consciousness, etc.

To me, that is classic dualism or perhaps "polyism."

So maybe you don't have an affinity for this approach, but you've mentioned it several times throughout this discussion.

And of course there are "hard" problems with this approach, namely the problem of interaction, and perhaps the "hard problem" of interaction as consciousness would seem to be an aspect unlike those other aspects.

yeah ... i'll reply later with the problem i have with "dualism" and monism

 

[Constance]

yeah ... i'll reply later with the problem i have with "dualism" and monism

I have to say that I don't think your approaches to consciousness all along in this thread can be understood as rigidly 'dualistic'. I also think that once we engage in the metaphysical theories @Soupie has been promoting we will add more feathers to our quivers as we continue exploring reflexity in consciousness and perhaps better understand Velmans reflexive monism. As I review what I've learned today in extracts from the three papers Soupie has linked, my first impression is that the most difficult thing to explain will be the way in which a formless substrate of foundational consciousness can generate ideas of 'form' before generating interacting forms in the emerging physical universe. We can't say that it's impossible that this could happen {it might turn out to be 'true'}, but I doubt that our species will be capable of demonstrating this to be the case in our time. Perhaps the actual understanding of this primordial nature of Being/being can only be comprehended by beings whose consciousness survives separation from the body in another mileau of existence. The testimony of some people describing NDEs includes the experience of a period of illumination while crossing the boundaries of the material existence they have known in embodied life, in which they felt that they had suddenly "understood everything" about the whole nature of what-is, the intricate interrelationship of all Being.

 

[Constance]

Perhaps we should also read McGinn's book laying out his argument for 'new mysterianism' and also his most recent book entitled Inborn Knowledge: The Mystery Within (MIT Press), 2015.