Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 3

[Soupie]

@smcder

You are befuddling me right now. You are the one who just said Chalmers considers "experience" to be an easy problem.

Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 3 | Page 66 | The Paracast Community Forums

Alternatively, my post above does not deviate from what I've recently articulated. Having a subjective pov is having experience.

The hp is objectively describing how matter/energy can have experience. The hp is not objectively describing a particular organisms experiences (although that is related and indeed would be harder).

The hp is the problem of experience (in general), not the problem of Sam's experience (in particular).

 

[smcder]

@smcder

You are befuddling me right now. You are the one who just said Chalmers considers "experience" to be an easy problem.

Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 3 | Page 66 | The Paracast Community Forums

Alternatively, my post above does not deviate from what I've recently articulated. Having a subjective pov is having experience.

The hp is objectively describing how matter/energy can have experience. The hp is not objectively describing a particular organisms experiences (although that is related and indeed would be harder).

The hp is the problem of experience (in general), not the problem of Sam's experience (in particular).

Sam's experience isn't experience in general - it is always Sam's experience in particular.

 

[smcder]

@smcder

You are befuddling me right now. You are the one who just said Chalmers considers "experience" to be an easy problem.

Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 3 | Page 66 | The Paracast Community Forums

Alternatively, my post above does not deviate from what I've recently articulated. Having a subjective pov is having experience.

The hp is objectively describing how matter/energy can have experience. The hp is not objectively describing a particular organisms experiences (although that is related and indeed would be harder).

The hp is the problem of experience (in general), not the problem of Sam's experience (in particular).

Yes I was sloppy -

First:

"There is not just one problem of consciousness. "Consciousness" is an ambiguous term, referring to many different phenomena. Each of these phenomena needs to be explained, but some are easier to explain than others. At the start, it is useful to divide the associated problems of consciousness into "hard" and "easy" problems. The easy problems of consciousness are those that seem directly susceptible to the standard methods of cognitive science, whereby a phenomenon is explained in terms of computational or neural mechanisms. The hard problems are those that seem to resist those methods."

And then:

"The easy problems of consciousness include those of explaining the following phenomena:

• the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli;

• the integration of information by a cognitive system;

• the reportability of mental states;

• the ability of a system to access its own internal states;

• the focus of attention;

• the deliberate control of behavior;

• the difference between wakefulness and sleep."

 

[smcder]

Hard problem?

Easy?

Just ask yourself:

WCZD?

 

[smcder]

@smcder

You are befuddling me right now. You are the one who just said Chalmers considers "experience" to be an easy problem.

Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 3 | Page 66 | The Paracast Community Forums

Alternatively, my post above does not deviate from what I've recently articulated. Having a subjective pov is having experience.

The hp is objectively describing how matter/energy can have experience. The hp is not objectively describing a particular organisms experiences (although that is related and indeed would be harder).

The hp is the problem of experience (in general), not the problem of Sam's experience (in particular).

Experience in other words is subjective and so never "in general" ... see?

No such thing as experience in general etc etc don't know how else to put it ... It's maybe easier to see in Nagel than Chalmers ... But it's why the article I posted a while back said Tononandonandoni seed to miss the full "implications" of Nagel as being why I am me and not you ...

 

[Soupie]

Did the Chalmers quotes help here?

What is it like when you see red? For you that is the same as seeing red? The mind is just red? Is feeling pain, the experience, the same as seeing red except a different object is in place? Is the mind pain? Insult to the body vs em? Is the something it is like to feel pain or to be Soupie in pain the same as the something it like to see red? Or is there only red and pain?

Do you dream in color?

"Is the mind pain?"

Yes. The mind is pain. Pain is the mind.

"Is the something it is like to feel pain or to be Soupie in pain the same as the something it like to see red? Or is there only red and pain?"

My mind can be the following:

Pain.

I, Soupie (the self), am experiencing pain that is in my body.

The former is non-conceptual, the latter conceptual. I distinguish between the body and the mind, but not between the mind and experience. Additionally, I don't distinguish between experience and self. There is the body and there is mind, experience, self.

The mind/body problem could be the experience/body problem. The concept of the self arises from meta-experience, awareness of awareness. When "pain" the experience becomes the "I am experiencing pain," experience.

 

[smcder]

Have we read this?

https://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/block/papers/harder.htm


X The Hard and the Harder

"Are the Hard and Harder Problems really different problems? The Hard Problem is: why is the scientific basis of a phenomenal property the scientific basis of that property rather than another or rather than a non-phenomenal property?

The question behind the Harder Problem could be put so as to emphasize the similarity: why should physically different creatures overlap phenomenally in one way rather than another or not at all? This way of putting it makes it plausible that the Harder Problem includes or presupposes the Hard Problem. In any case, the Harder Problem includes an issue that is more narrowly epistemic than the Hard Problem The Hard Problem could arise for someone who has no conception of another person, whereas the Harder Problem is closely tied to the problem of other minds.Finally, the Harder Problem involves an epistemic discomfort not involved in the Hard Problem. My claim is that the “Harder Problem” differs from the “Hard Problem” in these ways independently of whether we choose to see them as distinct problems or as part of a single problem."

 

[smcder]

http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/~kbalog/Web publications/Hard, Harder.pdf

Hard ... harder ... hardest!

 

[smcder]

Also good:

Qualia | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

 

[smcder]

@Soupie

The hp is objectively describing how matter/energy can have experience. The hp is not objectively describing a particular organisms experiences (although that is related and indeed would be harder).

The hp is the problem of experience (in general), not the problem of Sam's experience (in particular).

------

Maybe so ... But

I posted this above from Chalmers:

"If any problem qualifies as the problem of consciousness, it is this one. In this central sense of "consciousness", an organism is conscious if there is something it is like to be that organism, and a mental state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in that state."

an organism
that state

Rewrite that with "organisms" ... Nagel didn't say What it's like to be Bats.

For now it seems to me that the problem of why I am me is pretty immediate in following any definition of the hard problem ...

The Secrets of Consciousness and the Problem of God | The Los Angeles Review of Books

"Tononi doesn’t think it much matters that we don’t know what it’s like to be a bat: bats have their qualia and we have ours. But he misses, or nearly misses, the force of Nagel’s critique. Nagel’s deepest question about consciousness is not provoked by the sheer fact of conscious experience. It’s the plurality of consciousness that’s strange. No objective scientific account of all the elements in the universe could say why I am me and you are you. Objectively speaking, we could accept that there are many different conscious beings. But we don’t have the ghost of an idea of how there could be an objective explanation for the distribution of subjectivities among them. Why is my consciousness mine? Why isn’t your consciousness mine? The hard question of consciousness is less this question, “How can consciousness exist?” than the question of how there can be more than one. What is the principle of discrimination between them?"

 

[smcder]

@Soupie

"But it's not the mind, right? You seem to hold the position that the mind and phenomenal green are distinct things."

*SIGH*

"I don't think "the mind is green" is profound. I'm sure the concept is well noted. I would expect you, constance, or pharoah to be able to point me to the philosopher who's already been down this road, however."

I would expect you to do the pointing!

;-)

That could motivate you to read more philosophy.

That it's "well noted" assumed there is anything to it, that it was worth well noting ... And it may well be - I just can't tell from how you discuss it.

I'm not sure how perception and sensation are being distinguished. (Can you have a perception of a sensation or a sensation of a perception?)

But, no, I don't distinguish between a perception/sensation of red or pain. They are both about something, something objective.

The sensation/perception of red is about em waves, the sensation/perception of pain is about insult to the body.

I will certainly read MP, but it will need to be through a 3rd party. However, I will be reading the Body in Mind book presently.

Did you read the article Constance posted? It may answer your questions about sensation / perception

 

[smcder]

"If "I" am not my experiences, emotions, thoughts, or memories... what am I?"

Those questions seem to me to require knowledge only you can acquire ... knowledge of what it's like to be you and inseparable from the language and your understanding of it and all the other assumptions they are couched in.

I have seen Buddhism and some forms of psychology offer ways to explore these questions ... Phenomenological methods might be helpful too?

Otherwise we may have to wait on the hard problem to be solved!

 

[Soupie]

What is the book you mention?

Sorry, that would be Mind in Life.

 

[Soupie]

Sam's experience isn't experience in general - it is always Sam's experience in particular.

An analogy, with a full understanding that the objective is different than the subjective, might be the difference between describing the formation of snow (in general) and the formation of individual, unique snowflakes (in particular), wherein snow = consciousness, and snowflakes = individual minds.

That it's "well noted" assumed there is anything to it, that it was worth well noting ... And it may well be - I just can't tell from how you discuss it.

My position, as I noted, can be boiled down to the standard, dichotomous mind/body problem. A human can be described as a body/mind duality. My position (the mind is green) is just my idiosyncratic way of saying this; I originally did so to contrast/clarify my approach against what I gather to be your view, which I categorize as a trichotomous view. On your approach, you distinguish physical nature from phenomenal nature (the hard problem), but additionally, you distinguish phenomenal reality from the experiencing self.

mind/body
self/mind/body

(Obviously, these positions can be much more complicated than as described above. For instance, one can be a substance monist, but a property dualist.)

 

[Soupie]

Heidegger in the New York Times. (@Constance, what do you make of the article author's take on Heidegger's thought?)

Being There: Heidegger on Why Our Presence Matters

... On this basis I will show that, for Heidegger, not only are we in direct contact with the people and things of this world, but also that our presence matters for how they are made manifest — how theycome into presence — in the full potential that is associated with the sort of beings that they are. This is not our presence in a physical sense, but rather in the sense of how we are engaged as living, experiencing human beings — what Heidegger famously refers to as our “being in the world.” The thought is that our worldly presence matters for how things actually unfold, well beyond any physical or physiological processes that would purport to be the ultimate basis for human activity. So, for example, when we feel that someone is really listening to us, we feel more alive, we feel our true selves coming to the surface — this is the sense in which worldly presence matters. ...
​

As noted by some in the comments, I'm not sure one must consider these two "approaches" to be mutually exclusive, and that's not to say that either approach is 100% correct. Phenomenology and Cognitive Psychology are two levels of description imo.

... Attention is one of the more intensively studied areas in cognitive science. As is well recognized in this literature, we cannot take in all of the stimuli that impinge upon the senses at a given time, so there must be some sort of filtering mechanism (that goes by the name of attention) before we get down to the business of representing reality. The question of attention has to do with all possible modes of human existence — all senses (visual, auditory, etc.) and other modalities such as thought, emotion and the imagination. Any information processing that provides access to things so they can be represented must first go through the filter of attention. ...
​

For what it's worth, I don't completely agree with this cognitive description of how attention and conscious awareness are related.

 

[Soupie]

"If "I" am not my experiences, emotions, thoughts, or memories... what am I?"

Those questions seem to me to require knowledge only you can acquire ... knowledge of what it's like to be you and inseparable from the language and your understanding of it and all the other assumptions they are couched in.

I have seen Buddhism and some forms of psychology offer ways to explore these questions ... Phenomenological methods might be helpful too?

Otherwise we may have to wait on the hard problem to be solved!

On my view, I am what-it-is-like. What-it-is-like is who I am.

We've discussed this re contentless consciousness. Contentless consciousness it seems to me is an oxymoron.

Consciousness is what-it-is-like. If there is no what-it-is-like then there is no consciousness.

Can you, are you, making the argument that consciousness is distinct from what-it-is-like?

On my approach, if there is no what-it-is-like, there is no I, if there is what-it-is-like, that is I.

I = what-it-is-like

No what-it-is-like = no I

Re wait for the hard problem.

On your approach, the solution to the hard problem will be of little help. We may describe the relation of the physical to the phenomenal, but it would not follow, on your view, that we would know the ontology of this so-called experiencing self. It would certainly help though, yes.

 

[smcder]

An analogy, with a full understanding that the objective is different than the subjective, might be the difference between describing the formation of snow (in general) and the formation of individual, unique snowflakes (in particular), wherein snow = consciousness, and snowflakes = individual minds.


My position, as I noted, can be boiled down to the standard, dichotomous mind/body problem. A human can be described as a body/mind duality. My position (the mind is green) is just my idiosyncratic way of saying this; I originally did so to contrast/clarify my approach against what I gather to be your view, which I categorize as a trichotomous view. On your approach, you distinguish physical nature from phenomenal nature (the hard problem), but additionally, you distinguish phenomenal reality from the experiencing self.

mind/body
self/mind/body

(Obviously, these positions can be much more complicated than as described above. For instance, one can be a substance monist, but a property dualist.)

I don't commit to a view ... I don't see a reason to as so far I haven't found a satisfactory view - there appear to me now to be multiple "hard problems" and even more than one way to describe the "original" ... I do challenge and question other views, but that doesn't mean I'm not sympathetic to them.

I want to sit down and list out several of the descriptions of the hard problems as well as the harder and hardest problem ... maybe put it in a table for reference ... this should include how words like experience are defined -

 

[smcder]

On my view, I am what-it-is-like. What-it-is-like is who I am.

We've discussed this re contentless consciousness. Contentless consciousness it seems to me is an oxymoron.

Consciousness is what-it-is-like. If there is no what-it-is-like then there is no consciousness.

Can you, are you, making the argument that consciousness is distinct from what-it-is-like?

On my approach, if there is no what-it-is-like, there is no I, if there is what-it-is-like, that is I.

I = what-it-is-like

No what-it-is-like = no I

Re wait for the hard problem.

On your approach, the solution to the hard problem will be of little help. We may describe the relation of the physical to the phenomenal, but it would not follow, on your view, that we would know the ontology of this so-called experiencing self. It would certainly help though, yes.

*SIGH*

Why do you always look for an argument? ;-0

This does sound more like you are getting the hard problem the way that I do.

 

[smcder]

On my view, I am what-it-is-like. What-it-is-like is who I am.

We've discussed this re contentless consciousness. Contentless consciousness it seems to me is an oxymoron.

Consciousness is what-it-is-like. If there is no what-it-is-like then there is no consciousness.

Can you, are you, making the argument that consciousness is distinct from what-it-is-like?

On my approach, if there is no what-it-is-like, there is no I, if there is what-it-is-like, that is I.

I = what-it-is-like

No what-it-is-like = no I

Re wait for the hard problem.

On your approach, the solution to the hard problem will be of little help. We may describe the relation of the physical to the phenomenal, but it would not follow, on your view, that we would know the ontology of this so-called experiencing self. It would certainly help though, yes.

Re "contentless consciousness" on a literal interpretation of the words, it could be an oxymoron - but for me following the instructions, the result was as the author of the article described ... it seems to me so much of this is subject to "what it is like" to be you ... and I'm not sure how you could argue against someone's subjective experience and what they are call;ing it - how would you know what I experienced?

 

[Soupie]

I just ordered a hard copy of Mind in Life!

Also, ive been reading "the evolution of consciousness" by max velmans. Hes got a treasure trove of articles with amazing topics @

Max Velmans | Goldsmiths, University of London - Academia.edu