SUPPORT THE SHOW AND ENJOY THE VERY BEST PREMIUM PARACAST EXPERIENCE! Welcome to The Paracast+, eight years young! For a low subscription fee, you can download the ad-free version of The Paracast and the exclusive, member-only, After The Paracast podcast, featuring color commentary, exclusive interviews, the continuation of interviews that began on the main episode of The Paracast. We also offer lifetime memberships! Flash! Use the coupon code ufo20 to receive a 20% discount on five-year or lifetime subscriptions. And PayPal now accepts cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, in payment. We also offer a second payment method for major credit or debit cards (which also includes Apple Pay and Google Pay), so act now! It's easier than ever to susbcribe! You can sign up right here!
Here's two articles that touch on the lack of theories:Thank you, @Gene. @Soupie wrote in the last post in Part II: "Perhaps the absence of models/theories isn't just in regard to paranormal aspects of mind, as I've read several articles lately that bemoan the shocking lack of theories of the mind in general."
Would you link those articles for us?
With this fresh thread, one thing we might consider doing is defining, as best we can, what we mean when we refer to "consciousness." There are many aspects of consciousness as well as beliefs about consciousness. What seems self-evident to some about consciousness is completely rejected by others.
Ok... so ITT 3.0.
I have a problem from line 2 of the abstract. Didn't get much further because it is not significantly improved on what I read previously.
Not sure that I have identified why I think it is nonsense. Perhaps it is because the terminology used, defines itself. . . . I don't recognise ITT addressing the problem I want addressed - it is self-referential; in a bubble of its own making.
Furthermore, I have a strong interpretation of 'information' that I consider to be remarkably consistent with observation and what we understand about evolution. If my stance is correct ITT must equate to HCT or be wrong.
How does your interpretation of 'information' differ from Tononi's? It would be helpful if you would clarify this difference, since Soupie has indicated that as he sees it you interpret information in the same way Tononi and Doyle do. It might also be the case that you will find on reading Tononi's recent two papers on IIT.3 that his idea now matches yours better.
I have to say that it doesn't fill me with insight, either about 'information' or about consciousness. Here's one quote from Varela in the paper I linked for you that sums up the situation:
"According to the physics model,
'objectivity' accounts for observable
properties in the World, by describing them
as spatial-temporal interactions between
spatial-temporal elements defined as
structures or dimensions in a state space
with laws of evolution. Objectivity is the
realm of the phenomenology of objects,
processes, trajectories, force, field,
attraction, repulsion, acceleration, mass,
energy, etc. The crucial question is how
such modes of description can provide us
with deep insights about the 'origin' of our
The insight is as follows:
Any united construct (- or entity) that interacts, can be viewed hypothetically as an example of a Newtonian 'body' i.e., the term "body" need not apply purely to material objects (like the archetypal 'billiard ball'). Newton's "body" is an abstract. The law applies to all interacting constructs. So it applies to consciousness. That, is the insight.
Constance: "To evaluate that claim, one needs to be shown by you what work that law does to account for the nature of consciousness and mind."
The easiest way to see an example of this is to consider what your mind is doing by reading these very words. You have an existing construct of "knowledge" and it is interacting - via the written word - with mine. The outcome of this interaction is a considered change in the dynamic of our aware concepts about existence. The conceptual constuct is a "body" and it evolves through interaction. Our phenomenal consciousness does likewise, but in a manner that is not subject to introspective 'conceptual' analysis, which is why the experience is subjective and teasingly mysterious. The interactions are of a different level of informed construct.
You want a link in my work... not sure where it would be, probably 'origins of consicousness' chapter.
"The living being is a process, that of “being autonomous” (Varela, 1977a). Therefore, it is not Reproduction or Evolution or any list of properties that primordially characterizes life, but rather individual organization that allows for autonomy (Varela, 1984a )"
This is a puzzling ststement for me, from thst Varela paper...
Do non-living processes not also qualify on these terms?
Are you thinking that phenomenal consciousness takes place in a 'module' of some kind that is unconnected with cognition?
A more specific citation to page numbers would be helpful.