Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 3

[Constance]

IIT 3.0:

"IIT starts from phenomenological axioms:" (abstract)
IIT identifies "the fundamental properties of experi- ence itself: existence, composition, information, integra- tion, and exclusion. IIT then postulates that the physical substrate of consciousness must satisfy these very properties." (Author summary)

"EXISTENCE: Consciousness exists – it is an undeniable aspect of reality. Paraphrasing Descartes, ‘‘I experience therefore I am’’.

COMPOSITION: Consciousness is compositional (structured): each experience consists of multiple aspects in various combinations. Within the same experience, one can see, for example, left and right, red and blue, a triangle and a square, a red triangle on the left, a blue square on the right, and so on.

INFORMATION: Consciousness is informative: each experience differs in its particular way from other possible experiences. Thus, an experience of pure darkness is what it is by differing,in its particular way, from an immense number of other possible experiences. A small subset of these possible experiences includes, for example, all the frames of all possible movies.

INTEGRATION: Consciousness is integrated: each experience is (strongly) irreducible to non-interdependent components. Thus, experiencing the word ‘‘SONO’’ written in the middle of a blank page is irreducible to an experience of the word ‘‘SO’’ at the right border of a half-page, plus an experience of the word ‘‘NO’’ on the left border of another half page – the experience is whole. Similarly, seeing a red triangle is irreducible to seeing a triangle but no red color, plus a red patch but no triangle.

EXCLUSION: Consciousness is exclusive: each experience excludes all others – at any given time there is only one experience having its full content, rather than a superposition of multiple partial experiences; each experience has definite borders – certain things can be experienced and others cannot; each experience has a particular spatial and temporal grain – it flows at a particular speed, and it has a certain resolution such that some distinctions are possible and finer or coarser distinctions are not." (page 2 right)

Yes, that's what I thought you were referring to. You've indicated an opposition to these five axioms. Can you explain your opposition to them?

 

[Constance]

IIT 3.0:

"IIT starts from phenomenological axioms:" (abstract)
IIT identifies "the fundamental properties of experi- ence itself: existence, composition, information, integra- tion, and exclusion. IIT then postulates that the physical substrate of consciousness must satisfy these very properties." (Author summary)

"EXISTENCE: Consciousness exists – it is an undeniable aspect of reality. Paraphrasing Descartes, ‘‘I experience therefore I am’’.

COMPOSITION: Consciousness is compositional (structured): each experience consists of multiple aspects in various combinations. Within the same experience, one can see, for example, left and right, red and blue, a triangle and a square, a red triangle on the left, a blue square on the right, and so on.

INFORMATION: Consciousness is informative: each experience differs in its particular way from other possible experiences. Thus, an experience of pure darkness is what it is by differing,in its particular way, from an immense number of other possible experiences. A small subset of these possible experiences includes, for example, all the frames of all possible movies.

INTEGRATION: Consciousness is integrated: each experience is (strongly) irreducible to non-interdependent components. Thus, experiencing the word ‘‘SONO’’ written in the middle of a blank page is irreducible to an experience of the word ‘‘SO’’ at the right border of a half-page, plus an experience of the word ‘‘NO’’ on the left border of another half page – the experience is whole. Similarly, seeing a red triangle is irreducible to seeing a triangle but no red color, plus a red patch but no triangle.

EXCLUSION: Consciousness is exclusive: each experience excludes all others – at any given time there is only one experience having its full content, rather than a superposition of multiple partial experiences; each experience has definite borders – certain things can be experienced and others cannot; each experience has a particular spatial and temporal grain – it flows at a particular speed, and it has a certain resolution such that some distinctions are possible and finer or coarser distinctions are not." (page 2 right)

As I indicated above, I have an objection to this statement in the fifth 'axiom':

"Consciousness is exclusive: each experience excludes all others – at any given time there is only one experience having its full content, rather than a superposition of multiple partial experiences; each experience has definite borders."

There are many reasons to object to that claim, and I expect that Tononi will revise it as he reads further in consciousness studies and philosophy of mind. But what are your objections to this and the other four axioms he provided in IIT.3?

 

[Pharoah]

An extreme statement. Can you support it? Or cite someone learned in systems theory and its applications who has made this claim and supported it?

That in itself does not mean that systems theory is simply an intellectual fad operating as a mere meme in scientific disciplines.

If so, please tell us how IIT "solves [that] problem that HCT has.".

I meant, that what constitutes a "system", has no solid theoretical or scientific foundations. There are literally hundreds or even thousands of definitions for the term system.
The systems sciences are very important.
I just mean that the term is meaningless. One must qualify what one means when using the term and 99% of the time, things called systems I would not think qualify as a distinct systems-forms under scrutiny. But that is fine. The term has become generic.

Can't tell how IIT solves problem... have to think

 

[Pharoah]

As I indicated above, I have an objection to this statement in the fifth 'axiom':

"Consciousness is exclusive: each experience excludes all others – at any given time there is only one experience having its full content, rather than a superposition of multiple partial experiences; each experience has definite borders."

There are many reasons to object to that claim, and I expect that Tononi will revise it as he reads further in consciousness studies and philosophy of mind. But what are your objections to this and the other four axioms he provided in IIT.3?

Part of my problem with them is that they are so brief, that I find myself altering my interpretation of what they really mean. So I end up with questions seeking qualification. I don't get as far as critiquing them or agreeing/ disagreeing with them.

Nevertheless, the overarching criticism stands. They are used to define the criteria by which the theory is formulated and judged

 

[Constance]

Part of my problem with them is that they are so brief, that I find myself altering my interpretation of what they really mean. So I end up with questions seeking qualification. I don't get as far as critiquing them or agreeing/ disagreeing with them

Maybe you should write a paper on this problem you have, try it out on us here, and then send it to Tononi for a response. I suspect that you resist engaging with axioms because Tononi identifies them as "phenomenological axioms" and phenomenology places in question reductive physicalist explanations for
consciousness.

Those five axioms are not mysterious and I have seen evidence supporting all of them in a number of POM papers.

 

[Constance]

I meant, that what constitutes a "system", has no solid theoretical or scientific foundations.

If you say so.

Nah, not if you say so. Systems thinking, complex systems thinking, and nonlinear dissipative systems thinking all represent interdisciplinary developments in scientific analysis and theory in the last 20 years and have enabled increasing insights into how nature works at numerous levels. How does that history not confirm a solid theoretical foundation for science and philosophy of science?

 

[Constance]

It also seems to me, Pharoah, that your HCT theory absolutely requires the application of complex systems theory including dissipative systems theory and illustrations, or a persuasive explanation of why HCT gets on well without them.

 

[smcder]

I'm still looking for the post in which @smcder used the phrase 'the big five'. Would you clear that up, @Pharoah.

Big Five:

telepathy, clairvoyance or remote viewing, precognition, psychokinesis, and psychic healing

considered by Tart, Radin and others to be well supported by scientific evidence -

See excerpt from Chapter 1 of The Conscious Universe by Radin here:

Dean Radin - The Conscious Universe

 

[smcder]

@smcder
Read the extracts but the link was dead.

Classical terms - standard physical approaches

Correct statement of physicalism:
Jackson states that Physicalism is not the thesis that the world is largely physical but the thesis that the world is entirely physical (Jackson, F. 1986. What Mary Didn’t Know, Journal of Philosophy, 83: 291-5.)
What is physical?
Essentially, if I were a physicalist I would have to say that I am entirely physical and of this world. In being so, I would have to conclude that all worldly physical things are potentially explainable in terms of their relation to me.
But having said that, I am not a physicalist although every argument I take is from a physicalist stance.
The idea that physicalism is fixated on bottom up causation and determinism leads to the often claimed 'physicalism is anti freewill' stance, but I find the philosophical arguments against this very satisfying and solid. There is no brief summary.

@smcder , I thought you were the kingpin of the paranormal. I just think that a solid article giving the history, research and theory would be good to come out of this forum.

I also asked what are the specific explanations in classical terms for each of the phenomena in Kelly's article?

Extreme Psychophysiological Influence
Extremes of Informational Capacity and Precision
Memory
Psychological Automatisms and Secondary Centers of Consciousness
Psi Phenomena
Genius-Level Creativity
Mystical Experience
The Unity of Conscious Experience

The statement of physicalism appears substantially the same as what Kelly offers and epiphenomenalism and lack of free will (or compatibilism) are common commitments by physicalists.

 

[smcder]

1.
HCT reveals, that it is not ‘a brain state equals consciousness’ thing. Alternatively, what an ontological reductive explanation does is link the interactive environment to the evolution of the brain itself and thereby explain the phenomenon of consciousness contextually. Instead of it being a brain state equals consciousness thing, it becomes an environmentally integrated construct thing, whereby brain/body processes are explained in terms of their informed interactive meaning in so far as it evinces qualitatively relevant relations concerning environmental interaction. Where such relations of qualitative representation are, consciousness - as an informed representation of qualitative relevancy - is evoked. One way of looking at this level of explanation is to say that the causal dynamic is not relevant. Instead, what is relevant is the nature of the integration of environment with regard its qualitative impact on replicative mechanism and the processes that mechanism evinces. The brain and its states are integrated with the environment, and in being so, derive representational features in the manner of their processes from which consciousness becomes the qualitatively relevant feature.
Perhaps that dodges the question... it is not intended to.

The experiment that I would like performed is an artificial consciousness application based on HCT. I tried to become a millionaire to finance it myself, but I ended up a few pennies short. The evidence will always be incomplete. Even if an artificial construct looked as though it was conscious, people would always argue against. I can't think of any experiment that could prove consciousness is generated and not just correlated with the brain. It comes down to weight of evidence for and against, and the relative intuitive and logical coherence of conflicting theories.

2.
I read your threads but not the article because the link was dead.
Did your threads say what the big five were? I can't say that I know what these five things are.

I've read and re-read the first paragraph and I can't understand it. I'm convinced it can be written more simply and I'm convinced you can do that.

One problem is that ordinary words are combined in terminology-phrases like qualitative impact on replicative mechanism which I think means "impacts replication" and qualitatively relevant relations concerning environmental interaction which I think means something possibly similar?

 

[smcder]

@Pharoah

can you point to specific posts/statements that led you to think I am the Kingpin of the Paranormal?
----------------------
These are posts from this part of the thread only (part three) that might be relevant, the statements in italics are from @Soupie, the rest are my responses or other posts - the post in bold is particularly relevant as is this post (also in bold)

Here is how I look at the evidence that supports the possibility of the existence of consciousness independent of the brain, including survival of independent consciousness: it's been obtained scientifically and validated statistically. The evidence for Parapsychology is at least as rigorous as and possibly more rigorous than that obtained to support current theories in Psychology.

To dissuade me of that you're going to have to get into the nitty gritty of experimental design and statistics with me.

That means either we have problems with experimental methods, statistical methods or very subtle human errors ... or the data has some flaw we've not found ... and these two could then call mainstream results into question as well ... or we have to show massive fraud and collusion over a century among hundreds of experimenters ... or we have to dismiss it out of hand.
Or ... we have to try and deal with the evidence and decide what effect it has on current theories of the mind.

The big problem is excluding evidence for which we don't have a model. Saying I won't look at the data that falls outside my model is Procustean not Promethean.
Without models, what would we talk about?
1. what do the anomalous facts have in common? (if anything)
2. what do the current models of consciousness lack? (for starters, an explanation of consciousness)

Are you saying that philosophers, neuroscientists, psychologists, etc. should be factoring NDEs, past life memories, and PSI into their models? (OBEs seem to be incorporated.)
Not yet - the first step is to look at the evidence. Kuhn explains why this hasn't happened. Either this evidence will remain a fringe activity or it will become part of a paradigm shift.
What better models are there?
I don't know. There may not be any. I think the original C&P thread started with the intent to answer this question.
I don't seem to be able to convince you that I'm not championing a particular cause. What I am doing is trying to keep the playing field level and keep us cognizant of what we don't know.
I'd like a clean thread to actually discuss Consciousness and the Paranormal and that was where we started, so it makes sense for the new thread to break off on the IIT/HTC side.
If there is good evidence that subjective states exist apart from organisms (survival) or that subjective information is available at a temporal or physical distance (psi) then the defintion of "possess" would need to accomodate this evidence.
If I could read your mind, would I not be said to violate your possession of it?
This still leaves discussion of possess in terms of orginate. You could generate consciousness and I might still be able to take it from you ... think of the implications for copyright law!
So, if you have determined there isn't good evidence - then that would be another point of delineation for a new thread. You could post at the outset the parameters of what you are wanting to look at - and that other ideas could be looked at on the C&P.

As for the other phenomena listed, while they are certainly fascinating and beg explanation, I'm not ready to appeal to a supernatual soul or realm just yet. But yes, our models of reality and of the mind will need to account for them.

Where was supernatural soul or realm appealed to? I missed that. I think Kelly's paper ends with the idea of mind being in tune with our deepest physical science
"Thus, the brain/brain processes may generate phenomenal experiences, or the brain/brain processes may manipulate some generic "phenomenal" property that exists external to the brain. Or something else altogether or perhaps some combination of both. Until humans are able to make strong predictions about the brain/mind or manipulate consciousness at will, all options are on the table."

I'm wanting to know what kind of experiment we could perform that would prove either that the brain generates consciousness or that it manipulates something that is external to the brain.

 

[Constance]

Big Five:

telepathy, clairvoyance or remote viewing, precognition, psychokinesis, and psychic healing

considered by Tart, Radin and others to be well supported by scientific evidence -

See excerpt from Chapter 1 of The Conscious Universe by Radin here:

Dean Radin - The Conscious Universe

That's what I thought. From Pharoah's reference I thought I might have missed a post by you concerning the five axioms in IIT.3.

 

[Constance]

The big problem is excluding evidence for which we don't have a model. Saying I won't look at the data that falls outside my model is Procrustean not Promethean.

Exactly. I agree it's time we return to the questions we asked at the beginning of this thread and identified in the title. The models we've been talking about for 200+ pages have rarely addressed the thread's original topic. We've surveyed and discussed numerous approaches to and positions on consciousness in CS and POM, and we've spent an extraordinary amount of time discussing IIT and HCT to the extent possible given their lack of clarity. At this point we have reached no agreement concerning what an adequate theory of consciousness might be, and we've only recently begun to discuss in detail phenomenological aspects of conscious experience that constitute the hard problem. The facts that physicalist science has (a) for centuries ignored consciousness as a subject for research, (b) resisted contemplation and pursuit of the evidence constituting the hard problem during the few decades since Consciousness Studies became a major interdisciplinary challenge, and (c) marginalized psychical and parapsychological research for the past 150 years strongly suggest that we are not going to find satisfaction concerning all of our questions about consciousness in physicalist science any time soon, if ever. So let's finally expand our inquiry here to the hardest problems concerning consciousness -- how to account for the para-normal, genuinely anomalous, and veridically supported human experiences that most deeply challenge physicalist/mechanistic assumptions about consciousness and therefore challenge the physicalist/mechanistic concept of the nature of reality.

I think it's reasonable to ask that all of us here read the 15-page paper by Kelly and Kelly summarizing the major topics presented in Irreducible Mind and the first chapter excerpt from Radin's The Conscious Universe and then take up the topics Steve has presented in his extracts and in the list presented in post quoted below, in whatever order he recommends. As we discuss these topics we will gradually become better able to answer the first question he poses in this post:

1. what do the anomalous facts have in common?

and then be in a position to address his second question:

2. what do the current models of consciousness lack?

 

[Constance]

I also asked what are the specific explanations in classical terms for each of the phenomena in Kelly's article?

Extreme Psychophysiological Influence
Extremes of Informational Capacity and Precision
Memory
Psychological Automatisms and Secondary Centers of Consciousness
Psi Phenomena
Genius-Level Creativity
Mystical Experience
The Unity of Conscious Experience

The statement of physicalism appears substantially the same as what Kelly offers and epiphenomenalism and lack of free will (or compatibilism) are common commitments by physicalists.

 

[Constance]

Also, the question Steve raises here should be addressed by those seriously entertaining physicalist theories of consciousness:

I'm wanting to know what kind of experiment we could perform that would prove either that the brain generates consciousness or that it manipulates something that is external to the brain.

 

[Constance]

I'd like to respond to a question Soupie asked in one of her exchanges with Steve quoted in the post linked here:

What better models are there?
I don't know. There may not be any. I think the original C&P thread started with the intent to answer this question.

One better model drawn from physics and physical theory is based in quantum processes and quantum entanglement and was cited at several points in parts 1 and 2.

 

[Pharoah]

If you say so.

Nah, not if you say so. Systems thinking, complex systems thinking, and nonlinear dissipative systems thinking all represent interdisciplinary developments in scientific analysis and theory in the last 20 years and have enabled increasing insights into how nature works at numerous levels. How does that history not confirm a solid theoretical foundation for science and philosophy of science?

Coevolving Innovations | What is a system? (and the challenges of definition)

 

[Pharoah]

I've read and re-read the first paragraph and I can't understand it. I'm convinced it can be written more simply and I'm convinced you can do that.

One problem is that ordinary words are combined in terminology-phrases like qualitative impact on replicative mechanism which I think means "impacts replication" and qualitatively relevant relations concerning environmental interaction which I think means something possibly similar?

Thanks for this. I need to know where I am gibberish
qualitative impact on replicative mechanism - translation: the impact on the quality of mechanisms that replicate (not 'impacts replication' itself) where quality is define by how something comes to influence the survival potential of the replicator.
qualitatively relevant relations concerning environmental interaction - I agree this is poor. translation: (I am talking abut the relation between a mechanism that replicates and its environment). The relation between the environment and mechanisms that replicate must be qualitative because a qualitative relation is pertinent to the survival of a mechanism. Only replicating mechanisms can pass on their structure to offspring, and the structures that are more qualitatively response to environment are more likely to propagate... soreplication is a vital conduit to the evolution of mechanisms that are qualitatively response to environment.
Too wordy now hey smcder?

 

[Pharoah]

Maybe you should write a paper on this problem you have, try it out on us here, and then send it to Tononi for a response. I suspect that you resist engaging with axioms because Tononi identifies them as "phenomenological axioms" and phenomenology places in question reductive physicalist explanations for
consciousness.

Those five axioms are not mysterious and I have seen evidence supporting all of them in a number of POM papers.

Maybe you have identified another issue with IIT here; that using phenomenological axioms requires that the theory be non-reductive by default. This is further 'evidence' as to why the theory is self-referentially affirmative and indicates why the theory does not provide a link between what makes the 'quality' (in qualitative phenomena) and the external environment... which is great to your way of thinking, but in my view makes it impotent and essentially non-explanatory. By which I mean, not worthless, but that it has nothing explanatory to say about qualitative phenomenal experience i.e., it just says it exists. Alternatively, in competition with IITm HCT gives that explanation, though admittedly, none of you seem to understand my theory despite your efforts to do so.
I do like smcder's highlighting of phrases that he says are not clear. That allows me to target my efforts

 

[Pharoah]

Maybe you should write a paper on this problem you have, try it out on us here, and then send it to Tononi for a response. I suspect that you resist engaging with axioms because Tononi identifies them as "phenomenological axioms" and phenomenology places in question reductive physicalist explanations for
consciousness.

Those five axioms are not mysterious and I have seen evidence supporting all of them in a number of POM papers.

@Constance I know you shouldn't have to do Tononi's dirty work for him (or me) but I could really do with finding some of those PoM papers...