Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2

[smcder]

On whose table? That idea is certainly on the table for many thinkers, including thinkers in disciplines that the 'hard sciences' won't touch, such as parapsychology, psi, spirituality, and even phenomenological philosophy. That table is for people who don't accede to the persistent reductiveness of 'normal science'. Not all of the thinkers at that table are trying to 'get to teleology'. It's a big blooming world full of perspectives and ideas and experiences, many (indeed most) of which are not entertained by analytical science and philosophy and certainly not by those who are conditioned by now to think of the mind (and even the world) as the product of computation {i.e., the "slightly destestable operandum" in that Stevens poem.

I meant that the specific idea of consciousness unbinding itself would raise the idea of teleology.

Advancing the concept could demonstrate that the consciousness state is irreconcilably instrumental in the formation of the physical fabric of the universe, thereby entwining our concept of consciousness with the intrinsic properties of our physics concepts both classical and quantum.

 

[smcder]

Can you provide or cite the context of that sentence? Alva Noe and his coauthor in their major paper on sensorimotor contingencies, following insights of Varela and Evans, are at the forefront of a combined project in which phenomenologists and neuroscientists are participating. Cognitive science might have presented some evidence that "the self or cognizing subject is fundamentally fragmented, divided, or nonunified," but that might not turn out to be their ultimate conclusion (a radical overstatement to begin with) when/if consciousness becomes more fully understood.

Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, The embodied mind

 

[smcder]

Sunyata is mentioned ten times from what I can find on Google books.

 

[smcder]

I seem to be able to get to the page the reference is on without being signed in on Google books ... at least so far, that's not the full context of course and it was 1991 but what I am reading is very interesting - I am going to have to get their books - looking at Amazon now

 

[Constance]

I meant that the specific idea of consciousness unbinding itself would raise the idea of teleology.

Advancing the concept could demonstrate that the consciousness state is irreconcilably instrumental in the formation of the physical fabric of the universe, thereby entwining our concept of consciousness with the intrinsic properties of our physics concepts both classical and quantum.

Is that a quotation from someone else or is that a quote to something you yourself have written in this thread? As Tyger pointed out a day or two ago, it would be enormously helpful you would identify who is speaking when it is not yourself. Just putting the last name of the speaker in parentheses at the beginnings or ends of quotations would be sufficient. The context of single sentences would also help.

 

[Constance]

Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, The embodied mind

You can search terms in Google Books samples and obtain an immediate series of locations in a book in which a term used, each of which provides a link to the page where it occurs. Do you remember what section you were reading or even what page? Btw, you do not have to be signed in to Google Books to search available parts of books presented there.

 

[Constance]

I meant that the specific idea of consciousness unbinding itself would raise the idea of teleology.

Perhaps deep meditation raises the idea of teleology, but much teleological thinking has gone on in the human world outside of meditational practices. I wonder what you mean by "consciousness unbinding itself." Consciousness seems to me to be preeminently free of 'boundaries' except when thought is constrained by reductive presuppositions. We find expressions of ontological and even teleological thinking in the earliest cultural artefacts of our forebears.

 

[smcder]

You can search terms in Google Books samples and obtain an immediate series of locations in a book in which a term used, each of which provides a link to the page where it occurs. Do you remember what section you were reading or even what page? Btw, you do not have to be signed in to Google Books to search available parts of books presented there.

Do you mean this text?

Varela, Thompson, and Rosch argue that it is only by having a sense of common ground between mind in science and mind in experience that our understanding of cognition can be more complete. To create this common ground, they develop a dialogue between cognitive science and Buddhist meditative psychology and situate this dialogue in relation to other traditions, such as phenomenology and psychoanalysis. The existential concern that animates our entire discussion in this book results from the tangible demonstration within cognitive science that the self or cognizing subject is fundamentally fragmented, divided, or nonunified.... Our view is that the current style of investigation is limited and unsatisfactory, both theoretically and empirically, because there remains no direct, hands-on, pragmatic approach to experience with which to complement science.... Our concern is to open a space of possibilities in which the circulation between cognitive science and human experience can be fully appreciated and to foster the transformative possibilities of human experience in a scientific culture.... In writing the book, we have aimed for a level of discussion that will be accessible to several audiences. Thus we have attempted to address not only working cognitive scientists but also educated laypersons with a general interest in the dialogue between science and experience, as well as those interested in Buddhist or comparative thought.

it's here (abstract)

Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, The embodied mind

then I went to Google Books The Embodied Mind

The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience - Eleanor Rosch, Evan Thompson, Francisco J. Varela - Google Books

and did a "search inside" for Sunyata, this resulted in hits on pp

219
220
225
226
241
244
248
250
276

 

[smcder]

Perhaps deep meditation raises the idea of teleology, but much teleological thinking has gone in the human world outside of meditational practices. I wonder what you mean by "consciousness unbinding itself." Consciousness seems to me to be preeminently free of 'boundaries' except when thought is constrained by reductive presuppositions. We find expressions of ontological and even teleological thinking in the earliest cultural artefacts of our forebears.

Perhaps deep meditation raises the idea of teleology,

not in my experience - and I meant to respond more to you about mystics and may when I have more time and energy, but for now I would just say the interpretation of even well defined states of meditation (the four jhanas) is ultimately the individual's responsibility, but it is usually guided in part by the tradition within which the person is practicing (to now include secular traditions). Most traditions however, when a paractitioner reports an extraordinary insight or other experience, respond by saying "keep meditating". Some mystics may be know it alls, but I think the practices tend to result in a sense of humility, a loss of self or a placement of self within a larger context (more and more when things happen to you it's no different than when they happen to anyone else), equinimity - also mystics tend to be introverted as they need to spend a lot of time alone and most religions isolate mystics from the exoteric body of the church ... so the occasional know it all probably doesn't do much harm, although I'm sure there could be some ringing counter-examples! (Rasputin??)

but much teleological thinking has gone in the human world outside of meditational practices. I wonder what you mean by "consciousness unbinding itself."

I wonder too .. it may just be a turn of phrase that came up in my mind with some imagery, if I can develop it further, I will ...

Consciousness seems to me to be preeminently free of 'boundaries' except when thought is constrained by reductive presuppositions. We find expressions of ontological and even teleological thinking in the earliest cultural artefacts of our forebears.

The boundaries I'm thinking of are the limits of my imagination, or my own sense of self - for example, can I really imagine practice metta for that person or tonglen for that situation? Or physical limitations ... this comes from the quote about about consciousness being involved fundamentally with physical processes.

 

[Constance]

Can you provide or cite the context of that sentence? Alva Noe and his coauthor in their major paper on sensorimotor contingencies, following insights of Varela and Evans, are at the forefront of a combined project in which phenomenologists and neuroscientists are participating. Cognitive science might have presented some evidence that "the self or cognizing subject is fundamentally fragmented, divided, or nonunified," but that might not turn out to be their ultimate conclusion (a radical overstatement to begin with) when/if consciousness becomes more fully understood.

I've tracked back now to the post farther up on the page in which you had quoted a paragraph from The Embodied Mind. When you subsequently quoted one sentence from it I did not recall the sentence and its source. If my train of thought were identical with yours in today's discussion I might have remembered that sentence and the paragraph it came from.

 

[smcder]

Can you talk a little more about the process of quantum entanglement and how it may be related to phenomenal consciousness? You've mentioned it several times, and I've never encountered it before. (Not that I'm very well read in philosophy of mind.)

Also, why might quantum entanglement relate to macro-level phen. consciousness, but the potential of the micro-phenomenal and micro-physical relation to it seem dubious?

It seems to me that though we experience on the macro level, there are surely micro processes behind this — whether micro physical and/or phenomenal.

Also, while Chalmers does discuss "information" and it's potential role in consciousness, Russelian Panprotopsychism doesn't seem to deal with pure info exactly.

I'd like to write much more on the questions you and @smcder have asked in these last posts — especially about info and the Hard Problem — but I'm away from a PC for several days.

Keep well, enjoy being unplugged!


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

 

[smcder]

http://www.audiodharma.org/teacher/...hanissaro_Bhikkhu-IMC-emptiness_revisited.mp3

This is a good "dharma talk" on emptiness. 45min


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

 

[smcder]

Here's another, longer paper, by Lee Smolin (also a video), under the title "Think About Nature":

THINK ABOUT NATURE | Edge.org

Reading this now.


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

 

[Pharoah]

4 points:
1. On page 4 an extensive quote in blue type is attributed to Frank Jackson. He didn't write that, I did.
2. What is consciousness? - To be conscious is to have an understanding of the qualitative relevance of realtime experiences as and when they happen.
3. Galen Strawson writes, "‘Representationists’... are the principal remaining representatives of an extraordinary sect (now slowly expiring) whose members single-handedly made the twentieth century the silliest in the history of philosophy. Members of the sect typically pursue the project of trying to define the mental reductively in non-mental terms. In order to do so they have to deny the existence of experiential qualitative character..."
It is not the case that representationalism has to deny the existence of experiential qualitative character. Far from it. In fact, if this is regarded as representationalism's Achilles heel, an explanation as to how qualitative character can be explained representationally and reductive would be significant: for a (460 word) teaser c.f. Intentionality & Non-Mental Representation | Tye | Philosophy of Consciousness Part 3 section title "Understanding the qualitative relevance of colour"
4. Check out "Panpsychism versus Emergentism – What do they need to learn from one another?" Philosophy Of Emergentism Parts 1 To 5 | Philosophy of Consciousness

 

[Constance]

Pharoah, sorry for missing your authorship of that paper. Your author line is very faint, and I assumed it was Jackson writing when his photo appeared near the top. It's an excellent paper indeed. I see you have just joined the Paracast forum and I hope you enjoy it and that you will spend time in this particular thread.

2. What is consciousness? - To be conscious is to have an understanding of the qualitative relevance of realtime experiences as and when they happen.

I like this crisp definition of what it is to be conscious. It perhaps extends less fully to infants and toddlers and to young animals, but it makes the essential tie between consciousness and its situation in the world. Have you written anywhere concerning your viewpoint on how the subconscious and collective unconscious are integrated into consciousness?

I look forward to reading your papers/chapters linked in your points 3. and 4.

 

[Constance]

Re Smolin, "Thinking About Nature," two ramifying comments:

". . . The third thing that happened was I started interacting with a philosopher, Roberto Mangabeira Unger who had on his own been thinking about evolving laws for his own reasons. And he basically took me to task—this is about six or seven years ago—and said, "Look, you've been writing and thinking about laws evolving in time but you haven't thought deeply about what that means for our understanding of time. If laws can evolve in time then time must be fundamental." And I said "Yes," but he said, "You haven't thought deeply, you haven't thought seriously about that." And we began talking and working together as a result of that conversation."

". . . Feynman once told me, "Whatever you do—you're going to have to do crazy things to think about quantum gravity—but whatever you do, think about nature. If you think about the properties of a mathematical equation, you're doing mathematics and you're not going to get back to nature. Whatever you do, have a question that an experiment could resolve at the front of your thinking." So I always try to do that."

 

[Soupie]

Re: The Subject of Experience

The phrase "subject of experience" can be equated to "self," I believe. If I'm wrong, someone please correct me. That is, the subject of experience isn't meant to mean the physical organism, but rather a mental construct.

That is, the phrase implies there is a mental self "having" mental experiences.

This is a deep issue for me, and one that I haven't entirely worked out for myself. The issue of "self" seems to be central to consciousness and even pan(proto)psychism.

As I've said, I think an organism can generate/have experience, but lack awareness that "they" are an entity generating/having experiences.

Do organisms capable of generating/having phenomenal experiences — but lacking self-awareness — perceive being a subject of experience? I think the answer is "no."

The question was raised above "if (proto) consciousness is pervasive throughout the universe, why are our experiences ours." That was a paraphrase, but the question - I've seen it elsewhere - is essentially, if consciousness is fundamental, how/why is there a boundary between our consciousness and the consciousness of others?

1) I don't think there is a hard boundary, in the same way that there is no hard boundary between any physical objects. However, in our "lived" experience, there are boundaries between physical objects, and thus it's the same for phenomenal objects, such as experiences. That is, we perceive their being a hard inter- and intra-boundary between "our" experiences and the experiences of others, but this boundary may not be "hard" on the micro level. I don't think it is.

2) But why do we perceive there to be a hard boundary? I think this is related to a) memories, b) the unique — but temporal — structure of one's brain, and c) the ability for some entities to generate/have self-aware consciousness.

@Constance you haven't answered my previous questions and I hope you are able to at some point, but another relates to the subconscious; I believe the subconscious of humans gives us insight into the above questions. (And terms will get confusing here.) We call it "subconscious" not because it's non-conscious but because it's sub-self-awareness.

I have more to say on this, but I've got to run.

 

[Soupie]

Another way of thinking about "the self" is to say that the mental self is the perceived boundary between our thoughts/feelings/sensations and everything else.

The perception of self seems to be unique to our age (ancient Greeks may not have had this perception) and I argue that it may be unique to humans and some other Earth organisms).

This boundary — so real on the lived, macro, phenomenal level — may only be as real as the boundary between our temporal, dynamic physical bodies and the rest of the physical universe.

Another pathway to explaining this concept is to say that:

1) There is an organism (body self), that has...

2) Experiences (the mental self).

This is opposed to traditional views like so:

1) There is an organism (body self), that has...

2) a subject (mental self), that has...

3) experiences.

On my view, 2) and 3) or collapsed in to one.

If I'm right and this is the case, this makes the Hard Problem even harder, haha. As it is now, we have experiences, and we know we have experiences, but we don't know why we have experiences and we don't know why we know we have experiences!

If my view is correct, organisms can have experiences and not know (in the self-aware sense) that they are having experiences. Wtf would that be the case?

Cognition and phenomenal consciousness are intertwined; where there is physical material capable of cognition, there will be phenomenal experience.

 

[smcder]

Another way of thinking about "the self" is to say that the mental self is the perceived boundary between our thoughts/feelings/sensations and everything else.

The perception of self seems to be unique to our age (ancient Greeks may not have had this perception) and I argue that it may be unique to humans and some other Earth organisms).

This boundary — so real on the lived, macro, phenomenal level — may only be as real as the boundary between our temporal, dynamic physical bodies and the rest of the physical universe.

Another pathway to explaining this concept is to say that:

1) There is an organism (body self), that has...

2) Experiences (the mental self).

This opposed to traditional views like so:

1) There is an organism (body self), that has...

2) a subject (mental self), that has...

3) experiences.

On my view, 2) and 3) or collapsed in to one.

If I'm right and this is the case, this will ale the Hard Problem even harder, haha. As it is now, we have experiences, and we know we have experiences, but we don't know why we have experiences and we don't know why we know we have experiences!

If my view is correct, organisms can have experiences and not know (in the self-aware sense) that they are having experiences. Wtf would that be the case?

To me, this is farther, indirect "evidence" that "mental/consciousness" is fundamental.

Cognition and phenomenal consciousness are intertwined; where there is physical material capable of cognition, there will be phenomenal experience.

Did you see the "thick " and "thin" selves terminology ... ? Strawson paper or video - seems to relate to what you're saying as you edge ever closer to the Buddhist view ;-)



Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk

 

[smcder]

Another way of thinking about "the self" is to say that the mental self is the perceived boundary between our thoughts/feelings/sensations and everything else.

The perception of self seems to be unique to our age (ancient Greeks may not have had this perception) and I argue that it may be unique to humans and some other Earth organisms).

This boundary — so real on the lived, macro, phenomenal level — may only be as real as the boundary between our temporal, dynamic physical bodies and the rest of the physical universe.

Another pathway to explaining this concept is to say that:

1) There is an organism (body self), that has...

2) Experiences (the mental self).

This opposed to traditional views like so:

1) There is an organism (body self), that has...

2) a subject (mental self), that has...

3) experiences.

On my view, 2) and 3) or collapsed in to one.

If I'm right and this is the case, this will ale the Hard Problem even harder, haha. As it is now, we have experiences, and we know we have experiences, but we don't know why we have experiences and we don't know why we know we have experiences!

If my view is correct, organisms can have experiences and not know (in the self-aware sense) that they are having experiences. Wtf would that be the case?

To me, this is farther, indirect "evidence" that "mental/consciousness" is fundamental.

Cognition and phenomenal consciousness are intertwined; where there is physical material capable of cognition, there will be phenomenal experience.

The terminology thick and thin "particulars" used here

Galen Strawson and Radical Self-Awareness - waggish



Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk