Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2

[smcder]

Here's the "guts" of the video - it seems to me this is the minimum we all have to know to understand Chalmer's basic argument. I don't know if we have touched on all this in the discussion (I know we haven't nailed down the Zombie thing and I don't think we examined Kripke's general argument) or just have it under out belts, if nothing else anyone who comes in to the discussion or views it later can use this background info:

from Kripke to Chalmers

the first part takes you from classical logic to Kripke's modal logic,

then at 42:00 minutes we get Kripke's argument from modal logic which is the basis for Chalmer's argument against physicalism which hinges on the brute relationship in coherent - the appearance of pain is pain, this is unlike any other facts. There is no such thing as "fool's pain".

53:00 Chalmer’s basic argument, epistemic claim:
Physical science explains structure and function, explaining structure and function doesn’t explain consciousness, there is no explanatory link from structure and function to consciousness,

and

Chalmers claims functional reduction – in order for something to be physical, you have to be able to explain something in terms of function and structure (this is what @Constance I take it you are asking for? An explanation of consciousness in terms of structure and function?)

Then he reviews some of the arguments Chalmers is going to put together into his final argument:

Inverted qualia – (consciousness is private, I experience red, you experience green but we both call it green) given exactly the same brain state
Zombie argument P&~Q

Knowledge Argument – knowing all the physical facts isn’t what “it’s like” to see red

Chalmers golden triangle - Chalmers uses Kripke’s argument to restore the Golden Triangle and connect reasoning to meaning via
Primary and Secondary intenSion

Empirically discovered identities have a contingent primary intension and a necessary secondary intension, the primary intension is false on some world, the secondary intension is necessary (true in every possible world) – if that's true, Chalmers says it is inelegant, because consciousness is then the only thing that is brutely identical to something - the appearance of pain is pain, in some possible world water is xyz, but in no possible world do we have the appearance of pain without the experience of pain ... from here Chalmers argues
1:13:30 the Zombie world is a coherent world, and if that's the way to make a world, then consciousness doesn’t seem to be a part of the physical stuff … it's something God added later (Chalmer's phrase)
note, counterargument Ned Block – says no, it’s the way for water and lightning too
Conclusion –
Either physicalism is false (brute identity)
- And some kind of epiphenomenism is true (substance dualism)
- but Epiphenomenalism is far out

Or some kind of panpsychism is true.

NOTE
Ned Block’s counter-argument – it's that way with water and lightning too

 

[smcder]

Phenomenal consciousness as the intrinsic nature of mass I think goes on the list of essential background


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[Constance]

@Constance you write:

I'd like to start with something more specific than the generalities Chalmers gives us concerning microconsciousness and microexperience without, so far as I have seen, an attempt to delve into description of what these general terms mean. Has anyone come to a place where something concrete or specific is hazarded? On what basis (other than 'conceivability') is it claimed that microparticles and their interactions are 'conscious' and 'experienced'? If 'protoconscious' is meant, where is an illustration such as the one provided by Maturana and Varela in biology with the demonstrable autopoiesis of the single-celled organism?

No - I haven't seen specifics on the level you're asking ... it seems to me the crux, or rather a crux is here:

To rule out standard forms of materialism from counting as panprotopsychism, these special properties
must be (i) distinct from the structural/dispositional properties of microphysics and (ii) their
constitutive relation to phenomenal properties must reflect an a priori entailment from protophenomenal
to phenomenal truths. - The Combination Problem for Panpsychism, David Chalmers

On what basis (other than 'conceivability') is it claimed that microparticles and their interactions are 'conscious' and 'experienced'?
Two questions here:

1. what would such a solution look like? In the first part of the video of Goff he notes that science set the mind outside, narrowed the scope of inquiry to what could be condensed to mathematical truth and he disputes the conception of science as being able to capture the complete metaphysical truth (4 minutes) - he notes that metaphysics (philosophical investigation into the nature of reality) is "a mess" with no proper methodology, he notes "common sense" intuition is a poor tool for the metaphysician. Giving up on physicalism he states leads to a methodology:

1. facts about causal structure facts about existence and
2. nature of consciousness from first-person experience (introspection)

And metaphysics is bringing together these two kinds of facts for a complete description of the natural world, he calls this a neo-Cartesian defintion of metaphysics.

Unfortunately, if he had details, he didn't share them in the lecture nor indicate that there are any details in his work ... but it's something to look for - a sophisticated model for using introspection

2. what are the alternatives? What else would consciousness be like? What other options do we have? Is this really an attempt to give up physcialism in a broad way - or is this still just trying to do something with all the little particles we know exist?

You write:

Too much in the philosophy and neuroscience we've read seems to be written in a vacuum of pure abstraction. To quote Lee Smolin,

"The metaphor about information and computation is interesting. There are some people in physics who have begun to talk as if we all know that what's really behind physics is computation and information, who find it very natural to say things like anything that's happening in the world is a computation, and all of physics can be understood in terms of information. There's another set of physicists who have no idea what those people are talking about. And there's a third set — and I'm among them — who begin by saying we have no idea what you're talking about, but we have reasons why it would be nice if it was useful to talk about physics in terms of information."

What do you take from this? A statement about the limits of what's know about information in physics?

What I take from it is that 'information' is a term not yet well-defined in philosophy or science, too abstract at this point to carry enough water in theories such as Tononi's Integrated information theory or in Chalmer's current theories. I think Smolin expresses the situation well.

 

[smcder]

What I take from it is that 'information' is a term not yet well-defined in philosophy or science, too abstract at this point to carry enough water in theories such as Tononi's Integrated information theory or in Chalmer's current theories. I think Smolin expresses the situation well.

He does - "infiltrate" is apt.


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[smcder]

So where do we find specifics?

Russell's idea of phenomenal consciousness as the intrinsic nature of mass is specific.

If you don't like that - then the fact That we don't even know what a solution to the combination problem would look like makes me suspicious that the hard problem has only changed guises.


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[Constance]

@Constance - how would you most simply answer the question:

"What is consciousness?"

I imagine explaining it to my nephew, who's 12 and pretty sharp:

I would answer: "It is what it is like to be you. And the details of that are lacking. We can't build something that has a quality of being something it is like to be that thing - we have no idea how to go about this whatsoever."

In my view consciousness goes beyond experienced qualia to reflection and questions about how it enables us to think about the nature of reality, to ask epistemological and ontological questions based in our individual phenomenological experience and to develop them in dialogue with others, developing the history of human thought based in these questions in company with other minds. Without consciousness as an open-ended transaction with nature at the macrolevel, the entire history of human philosophy, science, and other disciplines could not have been produced and be on its way to comprehending the world. Equally important, it is consciousness that enables us to share a common world -- the actual world we live in with others like ourselves -- a process generated at the level of feeling and intuition as well as thinking, that which is expressed in bonding with others and the development of our societies and cultures. Embodied consciousness is also the root of our responsiveness to nature, the generation of our capacities for spirituality as the expression of our sense of connectedness with one another and with the cosmos.

Now, I imagine talking to an intelligent computer and trying to explain what consciousness is without referring to my subjective experience, "what it is like to be" is the single most useful phrase I have in this conversation.

It's certainly a good place to begin that conversation. Before I could be convinced that a computer possesses consciousness, though, I would need to learn from communicating with it what the origins of its ideas are and the level of complex thought and feeling involved and developed in its thinking.

Another answer to what is consciousness? is: an emergent property of the interaction or combination of particles that make up the world and these particles might each carry a little bit of "what it is like"-edness.

From reading more of Goff I gather that 'emergence' is increasingly out of favor as an explanation in contemporary philosophical discussions of consciousness. I think that's why Chalmers prefers the 'constitutive' aspect of Russellian monism. The difference appears to be a major issue for the philosophers we've been reading. It seems to me that it makes more sense to consider consciousness as we experience it as having evolved through quantum entanglement from microphysical structures of interaction (subject-object interactions at a primitive level) that appear to be present in the quantum substrate from which we currently think the physical universe we inhabit has evolved to its present complexity. A deep sense of these processes and evolving primordial structures might lie almost inchoate in the collective unconscious and the subconscious mind {'subconscious mind' is a subject that we need to develop in our time, beginning with F.W.H. Myers's insights at the end of the 19th century, which are carried forward in Kelly and Kelly et al's major book Irreducible Mind)}. I disagree with Chalmer's recently expressed view that consciousness and mind are 'constituted' by, explained by, microphysical processes or microphenomenal properties. I think rather that those processes and/or properties have enabled over immense tracts of time the emergence of life and the development of experiential consciousness and mind. I think Evan Thompson's books (the first with Varela, the second developing Varela's thought and his own) present a far more useful guide to accounting for consciousness than the current assumption in Chalmers et al and Tonini and Koch that 'information' -- yet undefined in the physical sciences -- is the path to follow, especially if restricted to the microphysical substrate.

Another is: there are two kinds of stuff in the world, mental and physical stuff. We don't know how they work together.

I dislike the term 'stuff', though I'm aware that Chalmers and several other philosophers we've consulted resort to it. I also feel at this point that consciousness and mind are too integrated with the physical world for us to imagine that the explanation for consciousness lies in two different kinds of 'stuff' that can yet be understood as one kind of 'stuff'. Has the abstract and almost empty concept of 'information' approached an account of how two substances are identical to one? Far from it, and that is the task that lies before those who propose 'information' as the answer. I think that many scientists and certain philosophers have been immensely attracted to the idea of 'information' as the ultimate explanation for 'everything including consciousness and mind' because of the influence of the dominant contemporary meme that identifies mind with computation, the view that we are biological computers and that the world is the result of a pre-loaded computational system. There appears to be no tangible evidence to support that metaphor either.

What other answers could we give?

There are already many theories available in response to the question what is consciousness/mind? All still very airy-fairy in my opinion.

 

[smcder]

I my view consciousness goes beyond experienced qualia to reflection and questions about how it enables us to think about the nature of reality, to ask epistemological and ontological questions based in our individual phenomenological experience and to develop in them in dialogue with others, developing the history of human thought based in these questions in company with other minds. Without consciousness as an open-ended transaction with nature at the macrolevel, the entire history of human philosophy, science, and other disciplines could not have been produced and be on its way to comprehending the world. Equally important, it is consciousness that enables us share a common world -- the actual world we live in with others like ourselves -- a process generated at the level of feeling and intuition as well as thinking, that which is expressed in bonding with others and the development of our societies and cultures. Embodied consciousness is also the root of our responsiveness to nature, the generation of our capacities for spirituality as the expression of our sense of connectedness with one another and with the cosmos.




It's certainly a good place to begin that conversation. Before I could be convinced that a computer possesses consciousness, though, I would need to learn from communicating with it what the origins of its ideas are and the level of complex thought and feeling involved and developed in its thinking.



From reading more of Goff I gather that 'emergence' is increasingly out of favor as an explanation in contemporary philosophical discussions of consciousness. I think that's why Chalmers prefers the 'constitutive' aspect of Russellian monism. The difference appears to be a major issue for the philosophers we've been reading. It seems to me that it makes more sense to consider consciousness as we experience it as having evolved through quantum entanglement from microphysical structures of interaction (subject-object interactions at a primitive level) that appear to be present in the quantum substrate from which we currently think the physical universe we inhabit has evolved to its present complexity. A deep sense of these processes and evolving primordial structures might lie almost inchoate in the collective unconscious and the subconscious mind {'subconscious mind' is a subject that we need to develop in our time, beginning with F.W.H. Myers's insights at the end of the 19th century, which are carried forward in Kelly and Kelly et al's major book Irreducible Mind)}. I disagree with Chalmer's recently expressed view that consciousness and mind are 'constituted' by, explained by, microphysical processes or microphenomenal properties. I think rather that those processes and/or properties have enabled over immense tracts of time the emergence of life and the development of experiential consciousness and mind. I think Evan Thompson's books (the first with Varela, the second developing Varela's thought and his own) present a far more useful guide to accounting for consciousness than the current assumption in Chalmers et al and Tonini and Koch that 'information' -- yet undefined in the physical sciences -- is the path to follow, especially if restricted to the microphysical substrate.



I dislike the term 'stuff', though I'm aware that Chalmers and several other philosophers we've consulted resort to it. I also feel at this point that consciousness and mind are too integrated with the physical world for us to imagine that the explanation for consciousness lies in two different kinds of 'stuff' that can yet be understood as one kind of 'stuff'. Has the abstract and almost empty concept of 'information' approached an account of how two substances are identical to one? Far from it, and that is the task that lies before those who propose 'information' as the answer. I think that many scientists and certain philosophers have been immensely attracted to the idea of 'information' as the ultimate explanation for 'everything including consciousness and mind' because of the influence of the dominant contemporary meme that identifies mind with computation, the view that we are biological computers and that the world is the result of a pre-loaded computational system. There appears to be no tangible evidence to support that metaphor either.



There are already many theories available in response to the question what is consciousness/mind? All still very airy-fairy in my opinion.

Perfect.



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[Constance]

Phenomenal consciousness as the intrinsic nature of mass I think goes on the list of essential background.

It's a hypothesis.

 

[Constance]

Perfect.

Thanks, but it's just a description of the partial maps we've drawn, and an attempt to indicate the complexity of the territory in which we remain mystified.

 

[smcder]

Thanks, but it's just a description of the partial maps we've drawn, and an attempt to indicate the complexity of the territory in which we remain mystified.

No, perfect type of response ... what I was hoping was that we could capture the idea of consciousness we each hold - the computer I thought of as being "intelligent" but not conscious ... Maybe that's not possible, but it's asking questions about what consciousness is - it has no facts at hand from introspection, or from not being embodied - maybe I can write the imagined dialog.


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[smcder]

It's a hypothesis.

The Analysis of Mind by Bertrand Russell - Free Ebook

5,6 and last chapter, causation and an interesting concept of matter - essential in that it's the basis of his monism, out of which Chalmers mature view came ... All hypotheses


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[smcder]

I my view consciousness goes beyond experienced qualia to reflection and questions about how it enables us to think about the nature of reality, to ask epistemological and ontological questions based in our individual phenomenological experience and to develop in them in dialogue with others, developing the history of human thought based in these questions in company with other minds. Without consciousness as an open-ended transaction with nature at the macrolevel, the entire history of human philosophy, science, and other disciplines could not have been produced and be on its way to comprehending the world. Equally important, it is consciousness that enables us share a common world -- the actual world we live in with others like ourselves -- a process generated at the level of feeling and intuition as well as thinking, that which is expressed in bonding with others and the development of our societies and cultures. Embodied consciousness is also the root of our responsiveness to nature, the generation of our capacities for spirituality as the expression of our sense of connectedness with one another and with the cosmos.




It's certainly a good place to begin that conversation. Before I could be convinced that a computer possesses consciousness, though, I would need to learn from communicating with it what the origins of its ideas are and the level of complex thought and feeling involved and developed in its thinking.



From reading more of Goff I gather that 'emergence' is increasingly out of favor as an explanation in contemporary philosophical discussions of consciousness. I think that's why Chalmers prefers the 'constitutive' aspect of Russellian monism. The difference appears to be a major issue for the philosophers we've been reading. It seems to me that it makes more sense to consider consciousness as we experience it as having evolved through quantum entanglement from microphysical structures of interaction (subject-object interactions at a primitive level) that appear to be present in the quantum substrate from which we currently think the physical universe we inhabit has evolved to its present complexity. A deep sense of these processes and evolving primordial structures might lie almost inchoate in the collective unconscious and the subconscious mind {'subconscious mind' is a subject that we need to develop in our time, beginning with F.W.H. Myers's insights at the end of the 19th century, which are carried forward in Kelly and Kelly et al's major book Irreducible Mind)}. I disagree with Chalmer's recently expressed view that consciousness and mind are 'constituted' by, explained by, microphysical processes or microphenomenal properties. I think rather that those processes and/or properties have enabled over immense tracts of time the emergence of life and the development of experiential consciousness and mind. I think Evan Thompson's books (the first with Varela, the second developing Varela's thought and his own) present a far more useful guide to accounting for consciousness than the current assumption in Chalmers et al and Tonini and Koch that 'information' -- yet undefined in the physical sciences -- is the path to follow, especially if restricted to the microphysical substrate.



I dislike the term 'stuff', though I'm aware that Chalmers and several other philosophers we've consulted resort to it. I also feel at this point that consciousness and mind are too integrated with the physical world for us to imagine that the explanation for consciousness lies in two different kinds of 'stuff' that can yet be understood as one kind of 'stuff'. Has the abstract and almost empty concept of 'information' approached an account of how two substances are identical to one? Far from it, and that is the task that lies before those who propose 'information' as the answer. I think that many scientists and certain philosophers have been immensely attracted to the idea of 'information' as the ultimate explanation for 'everything including consciousness and mind' because of the influence of the dominant contemporary meme that identifies mind with computation, the view that we are biological computers and that the world is the result of a pre-loaded computational system. There appears to be no tangible evidence to support that metaphor either.



There are already many theories available in response to the question what is consciousness/mind? All still very airy-fairy in my opinion.

I think panpsychism and the critique of emergence may be growing - but as I understand it materialistic monism and emergence or one of the three reductive classes of theories (Chalmers) is dominant.

This is the new "hard problem" of consciousness and a good survey of the field

Phenomenal vs Noumenal Consciousness | Personal Identity | Philosophy of Consciousness


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[Constance]

Here's another, longer paper, by Lee Smolin (also a video), under the title "Think About Nature":

THINK ABOUT NATURE | Edge.org

 

[smcder]

FWH Myers
subconscious knowledge
Varela/Thompson

... Is the idea that consciousness is not only fundamental but pervasive and indivisible on the table? We speak of it as an aspect or a piece or a constituent, or as being entangled or evolving with ... but it may be the whole game - which doesn't deny matter or reality or say that consciousness is without bounds - although that might be the goal, ... that gets us to teleology.


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[smcder]

"Varela, Thompson, and Rosch argue that it is only by having a sense of common ground between mind in science and mind in experience that our understanding of cognition can be more complete. To create this common ground, they develop a dialogue between cognitive science and Buddhist meditative psychology and situate this dialogue in relation to other traditions, such as phenomenology and psychoanalysis. The existential concern that animates our entire discussion in this book results from the tangible demonstration within cognitive science that the self or cognizing subject is fundamentally fragmented, divided, or nonunified.... Our view is that the current style of investigation is limited and unsatisfactory, both theoretically and empirically, because there remains no direct, hands-on, pragmatic approach to experience with which to complement science.... Our concern is to open a space of possibilities in which the circulation between cognitive science and human experience can be fully appreciated and to foster the transformative possibilities of human experience in a scientific culture.... In writing the book, we have aimed for a level of discussion that will be accessible to several audiences. Thus we have attempted to address not only working cognitive scientists but also educated laypersons with a general interest in the dialogue between science and experience, as well as those interested in Buddhist or comparative thought. "

Sounds good to me




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[Soupie]

It seems to me that it makes more sense to consider consciousness as we experience it as having evolved through quantum entanglement from microphysical structures of interaction (subject-object interactions at a primitive level) that appear to be present in the quantum substrate from which we currently think the physical universe we inhabit has evolved to its present complexity. A deep sense of these processes and evolving primordial structures might lie almost inchoate in the collective unconscious and the subconscious mind {'subconscious mind' is a subject that we need to develop in our time, beginning with F.W.H. Myers's insights at the end of the 19th century, which are carried forward in Kelly and Kelly et al's major book Irreducible Mind)}. I disagree with Chalmer's recently expressed view that consciousness and mind are 'constituted' by, explained by, microphysical processes or microphenomenal properties. I think rather that those processes and/or properties have enabled over immense tracts of time the emergence of life and the development of experiential consciousness and mind. ...

Can you talk a little more about the process of quantum entanglement and how it may be related to phenomenal consciousness? You've mentioned it several times, and I've never encountered it before. (Not that I'm very well read in philosophy of mind.)

Also, why might quantum entanglement relate to macro-level phen. consciousness, but the potential of the micro-phenomenal and micro-physical relation to it seem dubious?

It seems to me that though we experience on the macro level, there are surely micro processes behind this — whether micro physical and/or phenomenal.

Also, while Chalmers does discuss "information" and it's potential role in consciousness, Russelian Panprotopsychism doesn't seem to deal with pure info exactly.

I'd like to write much more on the questions you and @smcder have asked in these last posts — especially about info and the Hard Problem — but I'm away from a PC for several days.

 

[smcder]

"The existential concern that animates our entire discussion in this book results from the tangible demonstration within cognitive science that the self or cognizing subject is fundamentally fragmented, divided, or nonunified."

That's a good description of Anatta "not self" or emptiness (sunyata)


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[Constance]

I think panpsychism and the critique of emergence may be growing - but as I understand it materialistic monism and emergence or one of the three reductive classes of theories (Chalmers) is dominant.

This is the new "hard problem" of consciousness and a good survey of the field

Phenomenal vs Noumenal Consciousness | Personal Identity | Philosophy of Consciousness

Thanks for this insightful paper by Jackson. Do you know if Chalmers, Goff, et al have responded to it? When I first came upon this sentence midway through:

"The specificity of this resultant consciousness is a temporal illusion."

my response was: "Nonsense. Temporality is a real property in nature, and it is lived, recognized, and known by and through consciousness. The temporality of existence is a sine qua non of phenomenological philosophy, a body of thought of which too many philosophers writing about consciousness these days remain ignorant. It's immensely ironic to find analytic philosophers such as Chalmers (and Russell before him) building their theories on 'phenomena' without consulting the phenomenological philosophers of the last hundred years.

Then I read the rest of the paper and realized that Frank Jackson has not made that error. His conclusion in the paper is important:

". . . although unable to determine the empirical object of consciousness, one can use a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience to divide consciousness into constituent phenomenal parts and be satisfied with the formulation of an underlying quantum model whose correspondence limit gives rise to the classical characteristics that we all recognize as our specific conscious experience… which is phenomenal.

7. Conclusion

The phenomenon of our experience is the property we identify as consciousness, which is why a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience would seem to explain consciousness. However, the specificity of our conscious experience tells us, that following a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience, questions as to the exact nature of consciousness remain unanswered. We are still left with the question as to why each of us happens to be the individual we are, rather than anyone else. Nevertheless, the lack of observational reference does not prevent explorating quantum principles to explain the noumenon of consciousness. Indeed, this is an attractive prospect:

1. It assigns value to the vocation of individual choice and free will.
2. It identifies an evolutionary purpose to individual choice in terms of its effect on the path of consciousness.
3. Advancing the concept could demonstrate that the consciousness state is irreconcilably instrumental in the formation of the physical fabric of the universe, thereby entwining our concept of consciousness with the intrinsic properties of our physics concepts both classical and quantum.

Despite the Hierarchical Systems Theory reductive explanation of phenomenal experience, one could interpret nature in the manner of a type-F monist (Chalmers, 2003) as consisting of entities with intrinsic quantum consciousness properties that stand in causal relation within a space-time manifold, where physics emerges from the relations between entities and consciousness emerges from their intrinsic nature."

I'm fairly sure that when I read that 2003 catalogue by Chalmers of approaches to consciousness and the mind/body problem I identified as a Type-F monist. And as I recall, that was one of two positions favored at the time by Chalmers. So far as I can see, he is still waffling around among several positions, a situation that could be improved if he were to read the phenomenologists.

 

[Constance]

FWH Myers
subconscious knowledge
Varela/Thompson

... Is the idea that consciousness is not only fundamental but pervasive and indivisible on the table? We speak of it as an aspect or a piece or a constituent, or as being entangled or evolving with ... but it may be the whole game - which doesn't deny matter or reality or say that consciousness is without bounds - although that might be the goal, ... that gets us to teleology.

On whose table? That idea is certainly on the table for many thinkers, including thinkers in disciplines that the 'hard sciences' won't touch, such as parapsychology, psi, spirituality, and even phenomenological philosophy. That table is for people who don't accede to the persistent reductiveness of 'normal science'. Not all of the thinkers at that table are trying to 'get to teleology'. It's a big blooming world full of perspectives and ideas and experiences, many (indeed most) of which are not entertained by analytical science and philosophy and certainly not by those who are conditioned by now to think of the mind (and even the world) as the product of computation {i.e., the "slightly destestable operandum" in that Stevens poem.

 

[Constance]

"The existential concern that animates our entire discussion in this book results from the tangible demonstration within cognitive science that the self or cognizing subject is fundamentally fragmented, divided, or nonunified."

That's a good description of Anatta "not self" or emptiness (sunyata)

Can you provide or cite the context of that sentence? Alva Noe and his coauthor in their major paper on sensorimotor contingencies, following insights of Varela and Evans, are at the forefront of a combined project in which phenomenologists and neuroscientists are participating. Cognitive science might have presented some evidence that "the self or cognizing subject is fundamentally fragmented, divided, or nonunified," but that might not turn out to be their ultimate conclusion (a radical overstatement to begin with) when/if consciousness becomes more fully understood.