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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2

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I'm not certain I completely understand the arguments being presented above, but they seem to be suggesting that phenomenal experience (consciousness) is a fundamental aspect of reality, occurring with even the most basic organisms (and indeed, perhaps with even non-organisms...), and it is essentially representational (at least the Mitchell essay argues that).

I agree with all of this. And I would be curious to hear Chalmer's take on this. I've never liked his Hard Problem as I think it creates a false duality between information and qualia. That is, I think (integrated) information and qualia are one and the same, and to cast them as distinct - as Chalmer's does with the HP - is an error.

I think phenomenal consciousness does arise (or as I say, is generated) from what we might think of as very basic information processing systems. I would say that any physical "system" - like the example of tree rings given above - that can be said to create and/or store information that is "representative" of physical reality, can be said to generate phenomenal consciousness (although such phenomenal consciousness would be incredibly non-rich).

Chalmers has argued for the HP via his conceivability argument re zombies. That we can conceive of a zombie that was physically isomorphic to humans in every way, but that did not experience phenomenal consciousness. I have always rejected this argument. In my view, information = phenomenal consciousness. Thus, if a system, such as a zombie, were to create integrated information, it would, by my definition, be creating phenomenal consciousness.

In other words, it's false to say the zombie could create integrated information but not phenomenal consciousness.

A bad analogy might be to argue that it's conceivable that one could create water but not a liquid. In other words, what the conceivability arguments deals with is semantics and concepts, both of which may not be isomorphic with reality.

Below are two non-philosophical papers that I feel indirectly address these issues:


The above paper is a little unclear, but the ability to chemically process sugars does not seem genetically related to being able to taste sugars. So, via Chalmer's argument, Hummingbirds could still seek out sugar and benefit nutritionally from sugars, but not phenomenally experience them...

However, what this paper seems to suggest is that the genetic ability to "detect" sugars is synonymous with being able to "taste" sugars. This would suggest that if zombie hummingbird could detect sugar, it would also be able to taste sugar. If a zombie hummingbird couldn't detect/taste sugar, well then it wouldn't be a hummingbird.


Again, smell and touch are regarded as measurements (information) of physical reality external to the organism (information processing system). If a "zombie" system were capable of measuring the chemical composition of the air and skin pressure, then they would be phenomenally experiencing. The "processing" and/or "creation" of representational information structures is the generating of phenomenal experience.

I don't see where Chalmers makes a false duality in his theories ... but maybe ... the problem itself does not, it's simply:

"The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining how and why we have qualia or phenomenal experiences — how sensations acquire characteristics, such as colours and tastes." - as conceived by Nagel in What It's Like to Be a Bat it was a problem presented to physicalism - and largely rhetorical - he essentially says you can't objectively explain subjectivity.

To solve the hard problem then, your theory needs to answer the how and why questions above.
 
And this may be the difference between the "mindless" Babylonians and ourselves. They subjectively experienced themselves as physically/mentally embedded in reality whereas we subjectively experience ourselves as set apart. That's not to say that our Babylonians weren't self-aware, but it does seem that some conceptual shift has taken place; and I'm not convinced there will be any going back.

If I understand correctly, my experiences in meditation are such that I experience myself as physically/mentally embedded in reality and more and more I experience myself not "set apart" ... I know a lot of people feel this way who pursue various types of awareness and certainly its more common in other cultures, past and present ... if we begin to move back to this kind of culture (for example if peak oil narratives are correct or for some other reason) we could easily move back to something like this kind of awareness as it seems to be adaptive to lives that are more directly affected by and dependent on the immediate environment.

To say we will never go back is to assert the myth of progress.
 
To solve the hard problem then, your theory needs to answer the how and why questions above.
Ok. But do I have his conceivability argument right or no?

My current thinking is that these questions can potentially be answered via the "consciousness is information and information is fundamental" model.

So how does consciousness (information) exist? It is a fundamental aspect of reality. (So it gets lumped in with the bigger question: how does anything exist?)

Why do humans have consciousness? Because humans are physical systems that integrate information.

Of course this model could be wrong.

Re the mindless Babylonian. That I don't think society as a whole will ever revert to this subjective way of experiencing being isn't necessarily a good thing in my opinion.
 
I'm not certain I completely understand the arguments being presented above, but they seem to be suggesting that phenomenal experience (consciousness) is a fundamental aspect of reality, occurring with even the most basic organisms (and indeed, perhaps with even non-organisms...), and it is essentially representational (at least the Mitchell essay argues that).

I agree with all of this. And I would be curious to hear Chalmer's take on this. I've never liked his Hard Problem as I think it creates a false duality between information and qualia. That is, I think (integrated) information and qualia are one and the same, and to cast them as distinct - as Chalmer's does with the HP - is an error.

I think phenomenal consciousness does arise (or as I say, is generated) from what we might think of as very basic information processing systems. I would say that any physical "system" - like the example of tree rings given above - that can be said to create and/or store information that is "representative" of physical reality, can be said to generate phenomenal consciousness (although such phenomenal consciousness would be incredibly non-rich).

Chalmers has argued for the HP via his conceivability argument re zombies. That we can conceive of a zombie that was physically isomorphic to humans in every way, but that did not experience phenomenal consciousness. I have always rejected this argument. In my view, information = phenomenal consciousness. Thus, if a system, such as a zombie, were to create integrated information, it would, by my definition, be creating phenomenal consciousness.

In other words, it's false to say the zombie could create integrated information but not phenomenal consciousness.

A bad analogy might be to argue that it's conceivable that one could create water but not a liquid. In other words, what the conceivability arguments deals with is semantics and concepts, both of which may not be isomorphic with reality.

Below are two non-philosophical papers that I feel indirectly address these issues:


The above paper is a little unclear, but the ability to chemically process sugars does not seem genetically related to being able to taste sugars. So, via Chalmer's argument, Hummingbirds could still seek out sugar and benefit nutritionally from sugars, but not phenomenally experience them...

However, what this paper seems to suggest is that the genetic ability to "detect" sugars is synonymous with being able to "taste" sugars. This would suggest that if zombie hummingbird could detect sugar, it would also be able to taste sugar. If a zombie hummingbird couldn't detect/taste sugar, well then it wouldn't be a hummingbird.


Again, smell and touch are regarded as measurements (information) of physical reality external to the organism (information processing system). If a "zombie" system were capable of measuring the chemical composition of the air and skin pressure, then they would be phenomenally experiencing. The "processing" and/or "creation" of representational information structures is the generating of phenomenal experience.

Openness and responsiveness to the environment (a subject-object interaction) seems to be at the core of various understandings and misunderstandings [misrepresentations] of what happens in the evolution of life and even in the evolution of systems in nature. The subject side of this interaction is that which is uncomfortable for traditional scientists (no wonder since there is a reason why they have avoided the recognition of subjectivity and consciousness throughout the modern period, stuck in an objective and machine-like idea about what is real). Information theory overly influenced by computational thinking is in danger of missing the difference that arises with life and increasing subjectivity (sense of self and other arising in 'affectivity' in primordial organisms -- see Panksepp). The most interesting question is actually why nature has produced the affordances that support the development of consciousness and mind.

As Mitchell observes:

"A tacit assumption of information theory is that the meaning of information is carried in the signal. It can be easily shown that this assumption can pertain only to “intended” information, but is in general false. The meaning of information is assigned by the percipient. Even if the originator of information intended a meaning for the signal, there is no assurance that that any percipient will recognize the intended meaning. Information is just a pattern of energy that requires perception to utilize and an information base (experience) from which to assign meaning. “Meaning” is internally created information which connects the perceived information to the information base residing in memory. To assign meaning is a fundamental function of “mentality”, the evolutionary component of consciousness. At very simple levels of living matter, behaviors such as the search for food, mating opportunities, predator avoidance, etc. require that information from the environment be perceived and given meaning. And since information does not carry within the signal, but is just a pattern of energy to be interpreted, assigning a meaning is an evolved, learned behavior. Learning is precisely the activity of giving meaning to information and retaining the meaning for future use. Non-local resonance allows experience to be shared."
 
fyi, I have sent Panksepp these pdfs:
http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/Do-fish-have-feelings-pdf.pdf
http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/Emergence-&-Evolution-of-Consciousness-Hierarchical-Construct-Theory.pdf
The second pdf is a bit stirgid but not as much as it used to be - I'll never hear from him again most probably. :)

Wonderful. I look forward to reading them. I do think you'll hear from Panksepp again, and I look forward to reading the conversation. Any chance you could invite his responses to those two papers on your website?

"A bit stirgid" is excellent. A stirring of the turgid subject matter? ;)
 
Openness and responsiveness to the environment (a subject-object interaction) seems to be at the core of various understandings and misunderstandings [misrepresentations] of what happens in the evolution of life and even in the evolution of systems in nature. The subject side of this interaction is that which is uncomfortable for traditional scientists (no wonder since there is a reason why they have avoided the recognition of subjectivity and consciousness throughout the modern period, stuck in an objective and machine-like idea about what is real). Information theory overly influenced by computational thinking is in danger of missing the difference that arises with life and increasing subjectivity (sense of self and other arising in 'affectivity' in primordial organisms -- see Panksepp). The most interesting question is actually why nature has produced the affordances that support the development of consciousness and mind.

As Mitchell observes:

"A tacit assumption of information theory is that the meaning of information is carried in the signal. It can be easily shown that this assumption can pertain only to “intended” information, but is in general false. The meaning of information is assigned by the percipient. Even if the originator of information intended a meaning for the signal, there is no assurance that that any percipient will recognize the intended meaning. Information is just a pattern of energy that requires perception to utilize and an information base (experience) from which to assign meaning. “Meaning” is internally created information which connects the perceived information to the information base residing in memory. To assign meaning is a fundamental function of “mentality”, the evolutionary component of consciousness. At very simple levels of living matter, behaviors such as the search for food, mating opportunities, predator avoidance, etc. require that information from the environment be perceived and given meaning. And since information does not carry within the signal, but is just a pattern of energy to be interpreted, assigning a meaning is an evolved, learned behavior. Learning is precisely the activity of giving meaning to information and retaining the meaning for future use. Non-local resonance allows experience to be shared."

The most interesting question is actually why nature has produced the affordances that support the development of consciousness and mind.

I agree ... and the variety of human interests is well, interesting - some can be seen to evolve partially from seeking mates, food, safety - such as dancing, fashion, gourmet food ... others like collecting rail transfer tickets require a bit of puzzling and some "just so" reasoning - we can always tie them back to something, because a preceding link in the chain is available ... but I think we can each find puzzlement over something we find interesting which indicates the meaning of meaning and interest is puzzling and I think transcends an evolutionary benefit story.

Some things are just interesting in themselves - and fascination has gotten many more than one person killed and thus removed from the gene pool. Back to my comments on the evolution of perversity ...
 
Ok. But do I have his conceivability argument right or no?

My current thinking is that these questions can potentially be answered via the "consciousness is information and information is fundamental" model.

So how does consciousness (information) exist? It is a fundamental aspect of reality. (So it gets lumped in with the bigger question: how does anything exist?)

Why do humans have consciousness? Because humans are physical systems that integrate information.

Of course this model could be wrong.

Re the mindless Babylonian. That I don't think society as a whole will ever revert to this subjective way of experiencing being isn't necessarily a good thing in my opinion.

He uses the Zombie argument but doesn't rely on it (nobody relies on zombies) ... he took a poll on what philosophers believe:

http://philpapers.org/archive/BOUWDP

... ding ding ding ... survey says!

"30. Zombies: conceivable but not metaphysically possible 35.6%; metaphysically possible
23.3%; inconceivable 16.0%; other 25.1%."

Interesting that 35.6% of philosophers believe we can conceive of metaphysically impossible things ... is that itself conceivable or metaphysically possible ... ? I'm just kidding.

The above's not really a model at all, unless we can pin it to explaining certain facts in a parsimonious way and better than competing models, this is why we don't have a leading model of consciousness, if any of them are right, no one knows it for sure ... the leading experts don't agree ... remember the article I posted where the philosopher went through and played around with the likelihood of a given model being right for consciousness? Or any available model turning out to be right ... if I had to bet, I'd say no one has it right or is even close, it won't look like anything we are kicking around now ... but the fun is in the kicking nonetheless, just don't get hung up on it.

And there's plenty of problems with a seemingly simple statement like humans are physical systems that integrate information - I think that's what you very much want to be true and I think you should try to figure out why you want it to be true ... but we've been through that.

As for the MBT, you must believe for some reason that human society more or less won't go "back" technologically? What makes you so sure? How are we going to fuel and build all those advances in technology? All our eggs are in petroleum now. Alternatives don't provide anywhere near the return and what do you think windmills are made of and how are they transported and how do people get from one to another to maintain them? Nuclear is problematic and it's hard to imagine personal nuclear powered technology. Some believe we hit a unique, finite fuel source about three hundred years ago and that we've more or less blown through it.
 
Information theory overly influenced by computational thinking is in danger of missing the difference that arises with life and increasing subjectivity (sense of self and other arising in 'affectivity' in primordial organisms -- see Panksepp). ...

As Mitchell observes:

"A tacit assumption of information theory is that the meaning of information is carried in the signal. It can be easily shown that this assumption can pertain only to “intended” information, but is in general false. The meaning of information is assigned by the percipient. Even if the originator of information intended a meaning for the signal, there is no assurance that that any percipient will recognize the intended meaning. Information is just a pattern of energy that requires perception to utilize and an information base (experience) from which to assign meaning. “Meaning” is internally created information which connects the perceived information to the information base residing in memory. To assign meaning is a fundamental function of “mentality”, the evolutionary component of consciousness. At very simple levels of living matter, behaviors such as the search for food, mating opportunities, predator avoidance, etc. require that information from the environment be perceived and given meaning. And since information does not carry within the signal, but is just a pattern of energy to be interpreted, assigning a meaning is an evolved, learned behavior. Learning is precisely the activity of giving meaning to information and retaining the meaning for future use. Non-local resonance allows experience to be shared."
@Constance, very, very well said! I love this.

I sense that this is an issue/concept that you have been driving at for some time with the understanding that I wasn't sensitive to this. I am.

I am no expert in Information Theory, or Information Philosophy for that matter, but I do gather that they are different in regard to the very concept so wonderfully noted above. I've tried to address this issue in my bumbling way many times in this thread. I think this was the issue you were driving at when you directly asked me if I thought human consciousness could be replicated with an algorithm or two. My answer was no. Also, consider the example I gave of the thunder storm and the "meaning" the organism gave to it or made from it.

Because organisms give subjective meaning to objective "information" I say that our experiences are limited, subjective views of the totality of reality. That's not to say that our experiences are "illusions" but they are subjective and different from the experiences of all other organims, including other humans.

I've described humans as "meaning making" systems. All organisms could be described this way. But meaning doesn't arrive arbitrarily or in a one-sided fashion.

The meaning and phenomenal experience (mind) possessed by organisms isn't something that just arbitrarily exists; it's not some program, algorithm, or predetermined computation! Meaning and experience are things that have developed -- and continue to develop -- over millions of years.
 
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The most interesting question is actually why nature has produced the affordances that support the development of consciousness and mind.

I agree ... and the variety of human interests is well, interesting - some can be seen to evolve partially from seeking mates, food, safety - such as dancing, fashion, gourmet food ... others like collecting rail transfer tickets require a bit of puzzling and some "just so" reasoning - we can always tie them back to something, because a preceding link in the chain is available ... but I think we can each find puzzlement over something we find interesting which indicates the meaning of meaning and interest is puzzling and I think transcends an evolutionary benefit story.

Some things are just interesting in themselves - and fascination has gotten many more than one person killed and thus removed from the gene pool. Back to my comments on the evolution of perversity ...
The Information Philosopher describes three processes of information creation. The thoughts, volitions, behaviors, affect states, etc. that seem to transcend the "adaptive model" I chalk up to his third process: Creativity.

The third process of information creation, and the most important to philosophy, is human creativity (<-- Link). ...

Creativity requires that new information come into the world. It must be information that was not implicit in earlier states of the world.
Human creativity requires the same freedom of thought and action needed for free will, our Cogito Model.

If everything created was predetermined, then all the works of Mozart would have been implicit in the first beat of an aboriginal drum.
Einstein's E=mc2 would have been in the first Aristotle syllogism.

Cosmological systems are creative, because atoms and molecules did not exist in the first three minutes of the universe. And the great astrophysical structures made from atoms, like galaxies, stars, and planets, did not exist in the first million years.

Biological systems are creative. Darwinian evolution accounts for the creation of new species of organisms.

Many organisms create informational structures outside of themselves, in the world, like beehives, bird nests, and beaver dams.

Humans are the most conspicuous creators and consumers of new informational structures, altering the face of planet Earth. And they create the constructed ideal world of thought, of intellect, of spirit, including the laws of nature, in which we humans play a role as co-creator. We call this the Sum.

All creative processes have the same underlying physics as the cosmic creative process.

Biological processes add the element of natural selection. This is accomplished by something Jacques Monod called the teleonomic information, the purposive element in all life.
I've noted this several times in the past as well (probably clumsily). I've noted that I believe the human mind can transcend the supposed deterministic nature of physical reality. I point to meta-cognition and creativity as the mechanism. (@smcder I know you've said that meta-cognition can't be the seat of free will.)

Also, I think an argument could be made that even many of the human behaviors/thoughts that seem least adaptive may actually - in the long run - be adaptive. Reality is a dynamic processes of both physical and mental structures forming - not all are adaptive but some are. Variety is important, even if some varieties are failures.
 
Here is the abridge version of the stirgid paper - in two sections:
http://mind-phronesis.co.uk/Abridge-Emergence-Evolution-HCT.pdf
I have had a reply from P:
He forwards the following:
http://faculty.bennington.edu/~sherman/neuro/Drug-sensitive reward in crayfish.pdf
Behavioral and neurophysiological correlates of regret in rat decision-making on a neuroeconomic task.Steiner AP, Redish AD.Nat Neurosci. 2014 Jul;17(7):995-1002. doi: 10.1038/nn.3740.

Looks interesting. I'll read it after I read your new papers. You might be interested in the thread on consciousness and ayahuasca in this forum, and possibly in the one just started on the topic Death! by Steve [smcder]. I'll link them here:

Thoughts on conscience, entities, ufos plus AYAHUASCA | The Paracast Community Forums

Death! | The Paracast Community Forums
 
The Information Philosopher describes three processes of information creation. The thoughts, volitions, behaviors, affect states, etc. that seem to transcend the "adaptive model" I chalk up to his third process: Creativity.

I've noted this several times in the past as well (probably clumsily). I've noted that I believe the human mind can transcend the supposed deterministic nature of physical reality. I point to meta-cognition and creativity as the mechanism. (@smcder I know you've said that meta-cognition can't be the seat of free will.)

Also, I think an argument could be made that even many of the human behaviors/thoughts that seem least adaptive may actually - in the long run - be adaptive. Reality is a dynamic processes of both physical and mental structures forming - not all are adaptive but some are. Variety is important, even if some varieties are failures.

... just that the determinist's will go looking for "free will" in meta-cognition, so best not to hide it there ...
 
It's hard to tell. I've looked for critiques of it and posted two. Computer scientists and computational neuroscientists probably like it. I think we'll probably see a dramatic division of opinions among consciousness researches and philosophers of mind once they've looked into it. What's your impression so far?
 
The Information Philosopher describes three processes of information creation. The thoughts, volitions, behaviors, affect states, etc. that seem to transcend the "adaptive model" I chalk up to his third process: Creativity.

I've noted this several times in the past as well (probably clumsily). I've noted that I believe the human mind can transcend the supposed deterministic nature of physical reality. I point to meta-cognition and creativity as the mechanism. (@smcder I know you've said that meta-cognition can't be the seat of free will.)

Also, I think an argument could be made that even many of the human behaviors/thoughts that seem least adaptive may actually - in the long run - be adaptive. Reality is a dynamic processes of both physical and mental structures forming - not all are adaptive but some are. Variety is important, even if some varieties are failures.

The phrase "just so story" is often leveled at evolutionary explanations ... especially evolutionary psychology and some (non-falsifiable) story can always be told, but even Dawkins very early on talked about selfish genes launching the brain away from immediate self interest in its ability to make decisions "freely".

But chaos happens ... see the Information Philosopher's entry on Ergod.

So the point is you don't have to explain everything evolutionarily, evolution is a process of selection from variation. It shapes the chaos up a bit and other forces are at work too.

I'm not sure you have to transcend determinism ... at any rate I would want to see you fight a little harder than that for your free will ... we are probably tickling the edges of compatibilism about which I know nothing, but let's go ahead and invent it on the fly ... it's not like we have sensors that can detect free will, it's not like we feel bound, we generally feel free or we can ... that's often the reaction to thinking about not having free will, is suddenly we don't feel free ... on the other hand, total freedom - would be maddening ... at the practical level, we can usually do something to open up our options.

Creativity and meta-cognition aren't mechanisms, that would be contradictory: here is a mechanism for free will! similarly, if you have a mechanism for creativity, you will know what's going to come out the other end, so it's not creative, because there is no surprise ... now if you're saying it's something like a function that produces a complex behavior with feedback then we are talking about the same kind of freedom ... and there is a surprise, but not in theory ... so let's call that something else; at any rate what you are running into is a "gaps" problem of where to stick free will as the brain gets more and more explained and already it looks like meta-cognition is no more or less amenable to explanation than cognition, it just takes cognition a level below as its input - rather, I think, the freedom is in there at each step, it doesn't go anywhere as the explanations increase - make sense?

"Man must first be free enough from his egoistic emotions if he is to make real use of the idea that the cosmos is impersonal. Otherwise, he equates impersonality with lifelessness, causal order with indifference."

"It is as much a presumption to believe we are able to grasp the idea of the body as a machine as it is to believe we are able to bear the idea of an infinite universe. We cannot bear either truth until we have a more intelligent grasp of reality as a conscious organization of laws and purposeful energies to which man may become openly receptive."

Needleman A Sense of the Cosmos

That's a different relation then to the universe than either science or common conceptions of religion offers.
 
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It's hard to tell. I've looked for critiques of it and posted two. Computer scientists and computational neuroscientists probably like it. I think we'll probably see a dramatic division of opinions among consciousness researches and philosophers of mind once they've looked into it. What's your impression so far?
I gave it some detailed consideration:
I just thought that it is so fundamentally flawed, and obviously so, that nobody would be giving it a second glance. I am hoping it will disappear into the ether of its own accord
 
I gave it some detailed consideration:
I just thought that it is so fundamentally flawed, and obviously so, that nobody would be giving it a second glance. I am hoping it will disappear into the ether of its own accord

** ouch **
 
Actually, this quote from Panksepp is anti IIT:
"Metaphorically, cortical columns resemble the monotonous random-access memory (RAM) chips of digital computers. Can intrinsic biological consciousness originate there? Can the subjective aspects of mind really be computed? There is no consistent body of credible data to support either of these guiding assumptions of modern cognitive science. The prevailing Computational Theory of Mind seems fundamentally flawed. It remains a torso in search of a sophisticated neurobiological Affective Theory of Mind. The neocortex, the supposed repository of consciousness, is intrinsically unconscious, notwithstanding its remarkable capacity to generate the detailed and refined “mental solids” that obscure all else from view." p. 165 (Id paper)
 
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