Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2

[Soupie]

I would agree that something that has phenomenal experiences has a mind - I'm not sure that's a complete description or that a mind is phenomenal experiences except in a kind of "by definition" way ... what do you feel is radical about that idea?

Its certainly not a complete description as I've said ad nausea, haha. The mental-self, at least for humans, is certainly composed of more than the sensual-phenomenal stream.

I don't think it's radical per se, but many people seem to believe "we" are our neurons, or alternatively that "we" are a (non-local) mental homunculus that has phenomenal experiences.

I think of my mind as being capable of having phenomenal experiences, you could say all experiences are phenomenal maybe ... I think if self reflection and self awareness, sense of I or self - which can be seen more objectively in meditation as being "empty" ... Buddhism has five sense consciousnesses: seeing consciousness, hearing consciousness, etc and a sixth or consciousness of mental states ... I'll find a reference for you.

Now I have to wonder if your just being silly. Honestly.

Did we not jut have a discussion about phenomenal and conceptual mental aspects? Are you seriously suggesting that you've thought I meant the human mind only consists of phenomenal experiences?

In any case, again, keep in mind (heh) that the human mind may have all the richness and structures but some non-human minds likely do not. (That's one reason I think phenomenological investigation is limited.)

But I can't make sense of the bald statement "I am my phenomenal experiences" except in an obvious way.

Good, because I mean it in an obvious way.

 

[smcder]

Yes! Yes, this is what I've been saying from post one.

In the Vallee Ted Talk I posted, he says that the physics we have today are the physicas of matter and energy. They deal with matter/energy structure-processes. He calls for a new physics, a physics of information. This new physics would seek to explore information structure-processes. (Recall our 20+ page debate regarding me trying to "materialize" the spiritual.)

Just as matter/energy can differentiate into structure-processes, I believe so too can information differentiate (combine) into structure-processes.

The trick is, information (mental) is subjective. It's hard to "see," to measure, and to manipulate. But the concept absolutely thrills me.

One paranormal phenomenon I think it could be applied to (other than minds of course!) is poltergeist, which seem to be information somehow stored in the environment. I think past life memories could be explored as well.

Well, this is basically a re-hash from Chalmers' "Consciousness and Its Place in Nature" which we looked at in thread part one (maybe even the thread that preceded it) ... and then later in this post I quote "Nagel's Mind and Cosmos" - so the post needs to be taken in this full context.

"The trick is, information (mental) is subjective. It's hard to "see," to measure, and to manipulate. But the concept absolutely thrills me."

That's the basis of Nagel's argument in What Is It Like to Be A Bat? the mental is subjective, the measurable is objective ... And the combination problem compounds the problem in that for dual aspect monism the rules of combination for the subjective and objective somehow have to align.

 

[Constance]

"So, that's why I say the combination problem just shifts the hard problem around and why the CRpP theory leaves so much to be desired."

Agreed. Consciousness presents a much harder problem than what Chalmers has called the hard problem. I've got to go back and retrieve a paper I linked a week or more ago that I don't think got discussed yet, in which a suite of hard problems were discussed.

 

[smcder]

Its certainly not a complete description as I've said ad nausea, haha. The mental-self, at least for humans, is certainly composed of more than the sensual-phenomenal stream.

I don't think it's radical per se, but many people seem to believe "we" are our neurons, or alternatively that "we" are a (non-local) mental homunculus that has phenomenal experiences.

Now I have to wonder if your just being silly. Honestly.

Did we not jut have a discussion about phenomenal and conceptual mental aspects? Are you seriously suggesting that you've thought I meant the human mind only consists of phenomenal experiences?

In any case, again, keep in mind (heh) that the human mind may have all the richness and structures but some non-human minds likely do not. (That's one reason I think phenomenological investigation is limited.)

Good, because I mean it in an obvious way.

When I read:

"I don't think it's radical per se, but many people seem to believe "we" are our neurons, or alternatively that "we" are a (non-local) mental homunculus that has phenomenal experiences."

When you earlier said:

"I gather that none of you understand it. I suppose it is a pretty radical idea. I've tried to explain it several different times in several different ways. Based on questions you guys have asked, it's clear you don't understand; part of the reason is due to your own presuppositions: namely that the mind/subject exists non-locally."

Can you see how this is confusing? You've also repeatedly attributed views to me that I do not hold and ignored questions and objections to your ideas or not read them, and some have been repeated many times. So, there's been plenty of opportunity for you to address misunderstandings of your ideas. You seem primarily interested in stating your views as I see little evidence that you carefully read posts or follow links. But to be fair, you've said as much.

"Did we not jut have a discussion about phenomenal and conceptual mental aspects? Are you seriously suggesting that you've thought I meant the human mind only consists of phenomenal experiences?"

No, I'm not being silly - thats why I asked for clarification, all I see is the statement repeated without context, so that's all I have to go on.

And I don't read every single post, I don't have the time or energy - and I may go a few days without checking in and I rarely go back and review old posts - that's why I try to repeat key ideas and links in my posts because I know others don't have time either. If something's important I try to repeat it.

I can't commit to grasping the details of your thought, it's up to you to communicate that.

If I were putting forth a favored idea, I'd use a lot of repetition of my main points in each post or fairly often and I'd summarize as I went - I wouldn't depend on others being able to follow every post.

 

[Constance]

I get the impression from your questions, and due to the fact that you don't understand the concept "we are experiences."

I'll try to explain it one more time, but this will be the last.

Imagine a fragrant flower with a buzzing bee around it. Now imagine a mindless zombie observing it. This zombie neither phenomenally sees, hears, nor smells. Because this zombie does not phenomenally see, hear, or smell anything, we say it has no mind.

Now, imagine a fragrant flower with a buzzing bee around it. Now imagine a girl observing it. This girl phenomenally sees, hears, and smells a beautiful scene. Because this girl phenomenally sees, hears, and smells something, we say she has a mind.

So what is her mind? Her mind is a phenomenal sight, sound, and smell. She (her mental-self) is her phenomenal experiences.

What if she's a philosopher as well as a nature lover? Does the work of her mind in reading and writing philosophy have no connection with her phenomenal experiences in the world? Then what does she talk about when she talks about the world? Ideas already worked out in an informational integration that exists all unawares for her, exists within her entirely aside from her lived experience opening at every moment upon a world, an information process in which everything is explained? Then why does she have questions about the nature of the world and consciousness/mind which she attempts to work out through philosophy? Such a one would be as blind as Mary is to color, and write pointless dissertations on the nature of color. This makes no sense to me; it never did.

There is one stream of consciousness for the sane individual and it partakes of both the physically and consciously experienced world and the grasp of the mind upon it.

You recently used the words 'substance' and 'process' interchangeably. I forgot to make a note of where. Those words are not synonyms for one another. It's process that we need to focus on at all levels, including at their extremes: a) the microphysical processes that result in exchanges and entanglement of information yielding the ongoing complexity of nature as a system of systems, producing life and its evolution, and the evolution of consciousness and mind, and b) the process by which consciousness as we know it is involved in a process of integration of world and mind, a confluence of physical and mental experience that makes the world thinkable in the first place, and in which we are never finished with thought until we either blink out or move on to another dimension of being.

 

[Soupie]

You recently used the words 'substance' and 'process' interchangeably. I forgot to make a note of where. Those words are not synonyms for one another.

I was merely agreeing with your stated concept that it may be processes all the way down.

@Constance said: There appears to be no 'primal sustance' but a primal state or condition of interaction and integration repeated endlessly in the evolution of the universe/cosmos.


@Soupie said: I like this idea but as I said above, I have a hard time conceptualizing it. But yes, from this interaction seems to arise what we have labeled the physical and mental aspects of nature. My belief that these aspects ultimately arise from the same substance (process) is why I consider myself a monist.

There may be no primal substance at the bottom, only processes. Langan's concept of Unbound Telesis may be such a process-substance.

It's the idea that everything is grounded in infinite potential, that is, the potential for something and of course the potential for nothing.

Perhaps the "something" that has managed to self-sustainingly stay afloat are matter/energy and information structures.

 

[Soupie]

When I read:

"I don't think it's radical per se, but many people seem to believe "we" are our neurons, or alternatively that "we" are a (non-local) mental homunculus that has phenomenal experiences."

When you earlier said:

"I gather that none of you understand it. I suppose it is a pretty radical idea. I've tried to explain it several different times in several different ways. Based on questions you guys have asked, it's clear you don't understand; part of the reason is due to your own presuppositions: namely that the mind/subject exists non-locally."

I don't think it's radical, but I've never encountered the idea before. I assumed the reason neither you nor Constance could grok it was because it was so alien.

It makes perfect sense to me. Are you aware of a model of consciousness that incorporates this idea? Or is it a common idea I've expressed poorly?

 

[Constance]

Soupie replying to Steve, my interpolations added:

smcder said: ↑

I would agree that something that has phenomenal experiences has a mind - I'm not sure that's a complete description or that a mind is phenomenal experiences except in a kind of "by definition" way ... what do you feel is radical about that idea?

soupie: Its certainly not a complete description as I've said ad nausea, haha. The mental-self, at least for humans, is certainly composed of more than the sensual-phenomenal stream.

Question from Constance: So how is it then that you argue for two streams of consciousness, one phenomenal and the other conceptual?

soupie: I don't think it's radical per se, but many people seem to believe "we" are our neurons, or alternatively that "we" are a (non-local) mental homunculus that has phenomenal experiences.

Constance: not anywhere here so far as I have seen.


smcder/Steve: I think of my mind as being capable of having phenomenal experiences, you could say all experiences are phenomenal maybe ... I think if self reflection and self awareness, sense of I or self - which can be seen more objectively in meditation as being "empty" ... Buddhism has five sense consciousnesses: seeing consciousness, hearing consciousness, etc and a sixth or consciousness of mental states ... I'll find a reference for you.


soupie: Now I have to wonder if your just being silly. Honestly.

Did we not just have a discussion about phenomenal and conceptual mental aspects? Are you seriously suggesting that you've thought I meant the human mind only consists of phenomenal experiences?


{Interpolation by Constance: It's been unclear for ages what it is you are saying, soupie. Otherwise we would have groked it by now.}

soupie: In any case, again, keep in mind (heh) that the human mind may have all the richness and structures but some non-human minds likely do not. (That's one reason I think phenomenological investigation is limited.)

{Another interpolation by Constance: Phenomenological philosophy should be read and understood before being dismissed. You have no grasp of it because you refuse to do the homework. Phenomenology is concerned with human experience and consciousness. If you want to explore other animals' experience and protoconsciousness/consciousness you need to apply to another discipline: ethology.}

Steve/smcder: But I can't make sense of the bald statement "I am my phenomenal experiences" except in an obvious way.
​

soupie: Good, because I mean it in an obvious way.

Constance: Perhaps next time around you can try to make it obvious?

 

[Soupie]

Question from Constance: So how is it then that you argue for two streams of consciousness, one phenomenal and the other conceptual?

I'm not suggesting there are only two streams. Also, the term "stream" may be confusing and simplistic (as I've already said). Sorry. I'm not sure what word to use instead: aspect, module, facet, etc. the sensual and conceptual are just two of many aspects/streams of mind that humans possess.

many people seem to believe ... that "we" are a (non-local) mental homunculus that has phenomenal experiences.

Constance: not anywhere here so far as I have seen.

So why do you (specifically) seem utterly bewildered by my belief that the brain generates the mind. If you don't believe the mind is non-local and you don't believe it's generated by the brain, where in the $&@# do you think it, er, is or comes from, haha?

Constance: It's been unclear for ages what it is you are saying, soupie. Otherwise we would have groked it by now.

And for this I do apologize. It's been, I'm sure, a combination of simple disagreement, me using the wrong terms, and me explaining my ideas poorly.

Constance: Perhaps next time around you can try to make it obvious?

Haha, sadly I don't know how/what I said differently this time around that clarified the concept.

 

[Constance]

I'm not suggesting there are only two streams. Also, the term "stream" may be confusing and simplistic (as I've already said). Sorry. I'm not sure what word to use instead: aspect, module, facet, etc. the sensual and conceptual are just two of many aspects/streams of mind that humans possess.

Anything but 'module' (if you want me to quiet down).

So why do you (specifically) seem utterly bewildered by my belief that the brain generates the mind. If you don't believe the mind is non-local and you don't believe it's generated by the brain, where in the $&@# do you think it, er, is or comes from, haha?

That's what we've all been trying to figure out for several millenia. And particularly now in Consciousness Studies. Leave the nonlocal out of it for a moment. As I keep repeating, I believe with Mr. Homburg that "the spirit/Geist/mind comes from the body of the world," an outgrowth of the evolution of life achieved in the development of protoconsciousness into consciousness in various species. Consciousness cannot be fully understood outside a phenomenological analysis of it, which discloses its entanglement (and thus mind's entanglement) with the immediately experienced environment/situation in which it occurs. As for nonlocal aspects of consciousness, the evidence for those is manifest throughout our history, but they have been ruled out as unacceptable evidence by a science deadened by materialism for several centuries. We're only beginning to contemplate how (and why) these experiences occur -- and that there is veridical evidence that they do occur. When science moves beyond its present paradigm (including materialism, determinism, and the viewpoint that the universe is a closed system), it will open some of the doors that are closed to its thinking now. So that's what I think, fwiw.

 

[smcder]

I don't think it's radical, but I've never encountered the idea before. I assumed the reason neither you nor Constance could grok it was because it was so alien.

It makes perfect sense to me. Are you aware of a model of consciousness that incorporates this idea? Or is it a common idea I've expressed poorly?

This is why I've encouraged you to have a broader look at philosophy in general.

Because people are often natural philosophers and because the term philosophy covers a bewildering amount if ground and has so many schools and divisions with their own terminology - the tendency is to discount it as a subject of study. So the error is often more one of lack of breadth rather than depth.

People spend a lot of time reinventing the wheel when they first come to philosophy because they want to jump in and develop their own ideas - which is admirable, but isn't something they'd try to do in other fields. On the other hand this approach can work if the person then goes back and figures out where their thinking fits in and gets the vocabulary to convey it to others or to pursue it in more depth or finds out they have had a new idea after all. But mostly the wheel gets reinvented ...

This site:

The Basics of Philosophy: A huge subject broken down into manageable chunks

Seems very thorough and well organized - it has short outlines by branch and school, that then link to more in depth (but concise) entries.

You should be able to explore and see if similar ideas to yours have been expressed and also pick up terminology or key words.

Then you can either say. "I'm arguing for panexperientialism as developed by Whitehead" for example or "This seems to be a new idea - it's like panexperientialism but here's how it's different ... "

My experience has been that related ideas turn up in unexpected places - you can't just go to Philosophy of Mind and then Consciousness ... as we've seen on this thread, there aren't always hard divisions in philosophy and links can be made between what seem to be unrelated areas - I think this is what's going on with our difficulties in Phenomenology.

Also it seems that ideas usually show up much earlier than we ever thought and ancient philosophy isn't so ancient and most ideas began with Aristotle! This background is often assumed by philosophers and may not even be explicitly referred to in their writings, it's simply there. This is less true for people coming in to philosophy from other fields, such as the sciences and can again result in the wheel being reinvented.

In my experience, the worst thing you can do is indulge a distaste for/dismiss a major idea or school of thought in philosophy - it's survived because a lot of smart people thought about it and even if it's no longer in favor, parts of it almost certainly survive and/or it's lead to newer ideas.

And an idea almost never dies in philosophy - Nietzsche refers to Heraclitus, a pre Socratic who only left fragments ... and now Galen Strawson refers to Heraclitus. Strawson, along with other analytical philosophers, now also refer to Buddhism ... And some philosophers you have to engage just in order to get past them, such has been the suffocating weight of their ideas.

Another reason to go back is that most of the possible objections to any major idea have already been developed along with answers to those objections - even in newer fields because they've grown out of older ideas, radical breaks are rare - but I'm beginning to see that phenomenology is one of them.

For example, the Knowledge Argument has come up on this thread and it seems to me the first thing to do is check what's been said about it ( a LOT) - find what the various arguments are and the objections and replies to those objections and only then strike out to see if any territory is left.

 

[smcder]

Ok so below @Soupie is the idea you've put forward:

"Imagine a fragrant flower with a buzzing bee around it. Now imagine a mindless zombie observing it. This zombie neither phenomenally sees, hears, nor smells. Because this zombie does not phenomenally see, hear, or smell anything, we say it has no mind.

Now, imagine a fragrant flower with a buzzing bee around it. Now imagine a girl observing it. This girl phenomenally sees, hears, and smells a beautiful scene. Because this girl phenomenally sees, hears, and smells something, we say she has a mind.

So what is her mind? Her mind is a phenomenal sight, sound, and smell. She (her mental-self) is her phenomenal experiences."

I agree anything that phenomenally sees, hears and smells something has a mind ...

The second part:

Her mind (any mind) is a phenomenal sight, sound and smell - her mental self is her phenomenal experiences.

So you say there's more to the mind than phenomenal experiences, so you don't mean

Her mental self is ONLY her phenomenal experiences.

And you've contrasted your view with:

1. "we" are our neurons - which I think is called. "identity theory" for reference

2. "we" are a (non-local) mental homunculus that has phenomenal experiences - see Dennett's idea of "The Cartesian Theater" and Descartes conception of the soul.

"Because brains don't feel feelings, they make them!

"Once my brain generates the feeling of anger, this feeling does not need to be "felt" by my brain nor some mental, Soupie homunculus. Once my brain generates anger, that's it. That's my anger. That anger is me, my mental me. I am anger.

This anger can't therefore float over to smcder so his brain can "feel" it, if my brain doesn't feel it, his certainly won't either. Furthermore, this anger won't float over to smcder so some mental, smcder homunculus can "feel" my feeling.

My feeling is. It stands alone."

So you assert that phenomenal experience just is, it's basic and it doesn't need to be mediated by neurons or soul ...

"It makes perfect sense to me. Are you aware of a model of consciousness that incorporates this idea? Or is it a common idea I've expressed poorly?"

I think this is panexperientialism - the idea that the subjective is inherent in everything, as Russell would put it: the phenomenal is the intrinsic property of basic physical entities. This solves the problem of

how can neurons "feel"

And discards the notion of a soul

And trades them in for the combination problem:

"how can basic bits of consciousness come together to form subjects"

 

[smcder]

Gregory M. Nixon, From Panexperientialism to Conscious Experience: The Continuum of Experience - PhilPapers

"When so much is being written on conscious experience, it is past time to face the question whether experience happens that is not conscious of itself. The recognition that we and most other living things experience non-consciously has recently been firmly supported by experimental science, clinical studies, and theoretic investigations; the related if not identical philosophic notion of experience without a subject has a rich pedigree. Leaving aside the question of how experience could become conscious of itself, I aim here to demonstrate that the terms experience and consciousness are not interchangeable. Experience is a notoriously difficult concept to pin down, but I see non-conscious experience as based mainly in momentary sensations, relational between bodies or systems, and probably common throughout the natural world. If this continuum of experience — from non-conscious, to conscious, to self-transcending awareness — can be understood and accepted, radical constructivism (the “outside” world as a construct of experience) will gain a firmer foundation, panexperientialism (a living universe) may gain credibility, and psi will find its medium."

 

[smcder]

Why I became a Panexperientialist

"Agar went on to give a picture of cosmic evolution and the evolution of mind. The majority of biologists picture mind as emerging at some stage in the evolution of animals. Before that time there was no mind. From no mind comes mind. Agar proposed the alternative that there has been no moment in evolution when mind made its first appearance. Minds and bodies evolved together even though that body be only a proton or an atom. It is more reasonable to suppose that both objective and subjective have existed as long as anything has existed than to suppose that the subjective has emerged from the nonsubjective or that it does not exist at all."

 

[smcder]

From the same article:

"A common caricature of panexperientialism is to say that its exponents believe that rocks have feelings."

(or bowling balls)

"The mistake arises because of failure to make the distinction between individual entities that feel (Whitehead 1978), compound individuals that feel as compounds individuals (Hartshorne 1936) and aggregates that do not feel as aggregates though they are constituted of individual entities that do feel (Whitehead 1978)."

 

[smcder]

And on emergence:

"A form of dualism which poses as monism commonly asserts that mind emerges from matter. A parallel is drawn between the evolutionary emergence of wings (in birds) from scales (in reptiles) or the emergence of the pentadactyl limb from the fin to the origin of mind. To regard the two sorts of emergence as equivalent is what Griffin (1988, pp.l9, 147,151 and 1994) calls the emergence category mistake.

The doctrine of emergent evolution was formulated by Lloyd Morgan in his book Emergent Evolution (Morgan 1923). According to Morgan, in the course of evolution there were a number of miracles that were interposed into the stream of evolutionary events. He recognised two as having special importance, the emergence of life and the emergence of mind. Their appearance were miracles in the sense that they were not to be understood and could not be understood in terms of physics and chemistry. Morgan believed that when these properties emerged in evolution, new laws besides those of physics and chemistry came into existence. This doctrine would hardly be of more than historic interest now except that the doctrine of emergence, shorn of the miracles posited by Morgan, is part of the framework of thought implicit, if not explicit, in the writings of many biologists. Dobzhansky (1967), for example, refers to the emergence of life and mind as 'emergences or transcendences, in the evolutionary process' (p.32). He made it clear that something completely new came into existence when life emerged from the lifeless and mind emerged from the mindless.

To say that this or that property emerges is to say nothing more than that from A comes B. It explains nothing, Rather the term emergence signifies a problem requiring solution. How one anatomical structure such as a wing emerges from another sort of anatomical structure such as a leg can be explained by normal evolutionary theory. But how livingness and mentality can be derived from something which totally lacks these qualities cannot.

To say that when sodium and chlorine are combined in the molecule sodium chlorine the quality of saltiness emerges is to tell us nothing about what is happening. According to classical materialism that informs the mechanistic model, the sodium and chlorine atoms are unaffected by their combination. Hence, in principle, all the properties of salt should be discoverable in sodium and chlorine atoms investigated in isolation. But this proves impossible. Hence many scientists speak of the emergence of saltiness in sodium chlorine. But that explains nothing."

 

[smcder]

And AI:

"The most complex computer designed for AI will always be a machine and not an organism in any real sense. The parts of the computer are not organisms like cells in the brain. The total computer is an aggregate and not an individual entity. Aggregates such as computers and motor cars have lots of properties, but they do not have the property of a unified experience. It is true that their ultimate components of electrons and atoms are, in panexperientialism, said to be experiential but these components are not organised into a hierarchy of compound individuals. A direct jump from atoms that experience in their lowly way to humanlike experience would be impossible. The fact that billions of years of evolution occurred before human experience arose suggests that the intervening levels of experience were necessary. From a panexperientialist perspective even the most complex computer would not have mind and consciousness, so long as it remained an aggregate of individual entities. To attempt to make a computer by building up a hierarchy or compound entities that think and feel would be to attempt to repeat evolution from scratch! There would not be much point to such a programme in view of the fact that we are surrounded by living organisms that came into existence just that way."

 

[Constance]

Steve, the Birch article is excellent and should be read as a whole. It clarifies Whitehead's process philosophy better than anything else I've read. I want to copy it all into a post but first I'll just post this paragraph:

"Panexperientialism generalises experience (feeling) to all individual entities. Consciousness is understood as a high level experience which involves memory of past events and conscious anticipation of future events. At its highest levels it involves richness of experience with its components of zest and harmony. Experience generalised to all individual entities is conceived to have two components, something akin to memory of the immediate past and something akin to anticipation. Together these give meaning to the phrase 'to take account of the environment internally'. We can get clues to the meaning of this generalised experience both by analogy with ourselves and from quantum physics when it conceives the individual entities, not as parts of a clockwork but as a network of relations (Birch 1990)."

 

[Soupie]

I think this is panexperientialism - the idea that the subjective is inherent in everything, as Russell would put it: the phenomenal is the intrinsic property of basic physical entities.

There are definitely strong parallels with my view, especially regarding experience without a subject and the fundamental nature of mental. However, there are other elements that don't parallel my view. I'll have to read more about it.

 

[Soupie]

As I keep repeating, I believe with Mr. Homburg that "the spirit/Geist/mind comes from the body of the world," an outgrowth of the evolution of life achieved in the development of protoconsciousness into consciousness in various species.

Okay. I agree with this. But where we apparently disagree (but I don't see how) is that I would say the reason protoconsciousness developed into consciousness in various species is directly related to the evolution of their brains and central nervous systems.

You don't agree. You're still searching for the reason some species have consciousness and some only protoconsciousness. You do not believe brains are the answer. Okay.

As for nonlocal aspects of consciousness, the evidence for those is manifest throughout our history, but they have been ruled out as unacceptable evidence by a science deadened by materialism for several centuries. We're only beginning to contemplate how (and why) these experiences occur -- and that there is veridical evidence that they do occur.

So while you don't believe the "mental-self" is non-local, you do believe "aspects" of consciousness are non-local.

So some aspects of an organism's consciousness are deeply embedded in and directly dependent in their physical environment (but not their brains), while other aspects of an organism's consciousness are (sometimes or always) non-local.

Do I have that right?