Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 13

[Constance]

I have a paper downloaded on my PC and I ask myself: why- I mean, "under what conditions..." oh never mind! I've got a paper on here I don't remember anything about -

Identity Reconsidered: taking a dual perspective on the Hard Problem of Consciousness
Farid Zahnoun

The abstract is very interesting:

Abstract
Despite functionalism’s long reign in philosophy of mind, it has never fully managed to carry off the older idea that the mind-matter relation might be a relation, not of multiple realizability, but of strict identity. Nowadays, we see a resurgence of identity-theoretical proposals in the so-called E-approaches to cognition, and especially in enactive and radical enactive approaches. Here, it is claimed that assuming a strict identity between certain physical structures and phenomenal consciousness isn’t merely a viable option, it is perhaps the only way to avoid the Hard Problem of Consciousness. This paper wants to argue that the Hard Problem of Consciousness is a pseudo-problem that should indeed be avoided, rather than solved, and that this can be done by adopting a specific version of identity theory, one which isn’t neuro-centric and which also avoids collapsing into ontological reductionism. This version of identity theory is based on classic work by Herbert Feigl, who provides one of the most elaborated, yet at the same time most overlooked identity theories. Inspired by his work, I will defend, what I will call, a dual perspective theory. The theory will be contrasted with, on the one hand, neuro-centric and reductionist identity theories, and, on the other hand, with other mind-body relation proposals such as supervenience, neutral monism and dual aspect theory. To explain the idea of ‘dual perspectives’, I shall rely on some of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological insights.

Here's a link to this paper:
https://www.academia.edu/37116372/I...spective_on_the_Hard_Problem_of_Consciousness

 

[smcder]

A google search "frank jackson representationalism" turns up a lot of relevant links on Jackson's change of mind. Poor Mary ... I wonder if she went back in her room?

 

[Constance]

A google search "frank jackson representationalism" turns up a lot of relevant links on Jackson's change of mind. Poor Mary ... I wonder if she went back in her room?

Thanks. I think if Mary went back into her room it was only because she had to do so to earn a living, such as it was.

 

[smcder]

This looks promising - requires a login...

https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:eek:so/9780199267989.001.0001/acprof-9780199267989-chapter-9

also interesting:

(PDF) Does Representationalism Undermine the Knowledge Argument?

PDF | The knowledge argument aims to refute physicalism - the view that the world is entirely physical. The argument first establishes the existence of... | Find, read and cite all the research you need on ResearchGate

www.researchgate.net

Abstract
The knowledge argument aims to refute physicalism - the view that the world is entirely physical. The argument first establishes the existence of facts (or truths or information) about consciousness that are not a priori deducible from the complete physical truth, and then infers the falsity of physicalism from this lack of deducibility. Frank Jackson gave the argument its classic formulation, but has since rejected the argument claiming that it relies on a false conception of sensory experience, which should be replaced with representationalism (also known as intentionalism) - the view that phenomenal states are just representational states. This chapter argues that Jackson's representationalist response to the knowledge argument fails. Physicalists face a representationalist version of the knowledge argument that inherits the force of the original. Reformulating the challenge in representationalist terms does little to help physicalists answer it.

 

[smcder]

just edited my last post with the Abstract of the second paper:


Abstract
The knowledge argument aims to refute physicalism - the view that the world is entirely physical. The argument first establishes the existence of facts (or truths or information) about consciousness that are not a priori deducible from the complete physical truth, and then infers the falsity of physicalism from this lack of deducibility. Frank Jackson gave the argument its classic formulation, but has since rejected the argument claiming that it relies on a false conception of sensory experience, which should be replaced with representationalism (also known as intentionalism) - the view that phenomenal states are just representational states. This chapter argues that Jackson's representationalist response to the knowledge argument fails. Physicalists face a representationalist version of the knowledge argument that inherits the force of the original. Reformulating the challenge in representationalist terms does little to help physicalists answer it.

 

[Randall]

I think Coleman's example of the bird with red plumage is on point with Humphrey's explanation about consciousness (the paper uses the word "why" ten times) and with the answer to "why is the sky blue?":

The Short Answer: Gases and particles in Earth's atmosphere scatter sunlight in all directions. Blue light is scattered more than other colors because it travels as shorter, smaller waves. This is why we see a blue sky most of the time.

But why does blue scatter more than other colors, and why should that color be seen as blue. Why not green? We can continue this for as long as you want because there is no non-superficial answer as to "why". We could however answer it superficially in a number of ways.

Q. Why is the sky blue?
A. The sky is blue because it's not obscured by clouds.

You write:
A more useful approach would be: Describe the situation required for the sky to appear blue.

Without the context of this paragraph, I'm not sure what this means ... I could say first it would require someone for it to appear to, the sky would have to be clear, it would have to be daylight...it seems better to me to say "why is the sky blue?" then if it's a kid and you get to questions that can't be answered, if they are ready you can say why they can't be answered or just say "well, we can't know that"

And your example:

Why is it that we experience what it's like to be in the world? is ok given the context of this thread, outside of it, I'm not sure it would be clear.

Here's an example from Humphrey's paper:

Anyhow, so much for ‘what consciousness is made of’. Following Fodor’s agenda, we’re left with the question of ‘what it is for, and
how it does what it’s for’. The design question. Why is this so difficult? Fodor has explained: ‘There are several reasons why consciousness
is so baffling. For one thing, it seems to be among the chronically unemployed… What mental processes can be performed only because
the mind is conscious, and what does consciousness contribute to their performance? As far as anybody knows, anything that our conscious
minds can do they could do just as well if they weren’t conscious’ (Fodor, 2004, p. 31).

Yet I realize, as does Chalmers, that a particular question hangs over the idea that consciousness makes mental life more vivid and
distinctive at whatever level. Why should phenomenal properties be restricted to sensations? Why have the other attitudes not been invited
to the party: beliefs, desires, and so on? When it comes to modelling — and valuing — our own and others’ minds, wouldn’t it be extra
helpful if every kind of mental state had its own phenomenal signature? As Chalmers says, ‘it is not really clear why access to a
[sensory] modality as opposed to an attitude should make such a striking difference’ (2018, p. 24).

Would you re-write these examples? If so, how?

Yes I would rewrite those examples. I think that if you get the reasoning behind the context of "why" type questions, you could rewrite them yourself just as easily. This would remove the fuzziness in the contexts of the word "why" ( as given in point form earlier ), and provide a specific direction for further investigation that would be less confusing for participants, especially any new ones.

I wonder what great literature would be like re-written without why questions. Reminds me of e-prime.

Literature and critical thinking are two entirely separate contexts. In literature a "why" type question evokes a pondering of the ways a question might be approached and the relevance to a wider range of possible answers, some of which the author may not even have thought of. It's a paint splatter approach that leaves the mind to fill-in the blanks with what it wants.

Also, as mentioned earlier, it provides a shortcut for psychological and emotional portrayals e.g. "Why did you do that?" She said as she picked up the broken glass.

 

[smcder]

But why does blue scatter more than other colors, and why should that color be seen as blue. Why not green? We can continue this for as long as you want because there is no non-superficial answer as to "why". We could however answer it superficially in a number of ways.

Q. Why is the sky blue?
A. The sky is blue because it's not obscured by clouds.


Yes I would rewrite those examples. I think that if you get the reasoning behind the context of "why" type questions, you could rewrite them yourself just as easily. This would remove the fuzziness in the contexts of the word "why" ( as given in point form earlier ), and provide a specific direction for further investigation that would be less confusing for participants, especially any new ones.

Literature and critical thinking are two entirely separate contexts. In literature a "why" type question evokes a pondering of the ways a question might be approached and the relevance to a wider range of possible answers, some of which the author may not even have thought of. It's a paint splatter approach that leaves the mind to fill-in the blanks with what it wants.

Also, as mentioned earlier, it provides a shortcut for psychological and emotional portrayals e.g. "Why did you do that?" She said as she picked up the broken glass.

"But why does blue scatter more than other colors, and why should that color be seen as blue. Why not green? We can continue this for as long as you want because there is no non-superficial answer as to "why".

But we're not doing that here. Did you read the Humphrey paper?

Yes I would rewrite those examples. I think that if you get the reasoning behind the context of "why" type questions, you could rewrite them yourself just as easily. This would remove the fuzziness in the contexts of the word "why" ( as given in point form earlier ), and provide a specific direction for further investigation that would be less confusing for participants, especially any new ones.

We do very occasionally have new participants and I can't imagine what that is like for them .... but for me, it's a little late to change the way we do things and I see very little advantage to do so ... but if everyone else wants to, I might give it a try. @Soupie? @Constance?

"Literature and critical thinking are two entirely separate contexts."

*sigh* do you think I don't know that? ... but that "mistake" is what the humor is built on ...

For me, this is a bit too much of a digression, if everyone else wants to implement the rule, let me know ... otherwise, let's move on.

 

[Randall]

"But why does blue scatter more than other colors, and why should that color be seen as blue. Why not green? We can continue this for as long as you want because there is no non-superficial answer as to "why".

But we're not doing that here. Did you read the Humphrey paper?

I perused it for relevance to these posts. If there's something specific about it you want to explore, please post it as a specific example or question.

Yes I would rewrite those examples. I think that if you get the reasoning behind the context of "why" type questions, you could rewrite them yourself just as easily. This would remove the fuzziness in the contexts of the word "why" ( as given in point form earlier ), and provide a specific direction for further investigation that would be less confusing for participants, especially any new ones.

We do very occasionally have new participants and I can't imagine what that is like for them .... but for me, it's a little late to change the way we do things and I see very little advantage to do so ... but if everyone else wants to, I might give it a try. @Soupie? @Constance?

"Literature and critical thinking are two entirely separate contexts."​

*sigh* do you think I don't know that? ... but that "mistake" is what the humor is built on ...

Of course I think you know the difference between the two, but you're also the one who posed the question, as if it was relevant. If you meant it rhetorically, then it would cause less confusion if that were more clear when you post your points. I don't like making even the smallest assumptions, because they tend to get me in trouble, and you've caught me a number of times yourself.

For me, this is a bit too much of a digression, if everyone else wants to implement the rule, let me know ... otherwise, let's move on.

It's not a matter of implementing a "rule". It's that when someone formulates the MBP as a "why" type question, there is no non-superficial "why" type answer. If everyone wants to continue without accepting that, go ahead and keep banging your heads against the wall. I certainly won't stop you.

 

[Constance]

The natural world we live in, out of which we have emerged, have come into existence, cannot be understood in terms of/via ‘representations’, and especially not in terms of the restricted representations Clark et al propose. This paper will help us to see why and confirm us in our growing understanding of the temporality of consciousness as of 'world' as and when we come to inhabit it. The author works with both Kant’s and Husserl’s transcendental philosophies, enables us to understand what ‘transcendental' means for both (despite differences in their philosophies), and brings forward some critically important unpublished texts by Husserl that illuminate the importance of lived consciousness in lived reality. It is out of lived reality and lived consciousness that members of our species over generations have been able ask the scientific and philosophical questions we continue to ask here. The paper also clarifies the meaning of ‘transcendental philosophy’ as expressed in Kant’s philosophy and later, in Husserl’s philosophy, the latter carried forward in phenomenological philosophy as a whole.

Francesco Pisano, "The material residue. Kant and Husserl on an aspect of the transcendental foundation of the science of nature"

https://www.academia.edu/36948108/T...cendental_foundation_of_the_science_of_nature

A few extracts:

“The living present makes facticity into something that is always already exposed into an intuitable horizon of intentional relations (i. e., into a horizon of potential phenomenological perspectives.)"

One quotation from Husserl’s yet untranslated and unpublished manuscripts (among others in the paper):

“Natur als Universum der Realitäten hat universalen Formen der Zeitlichkeit nach Simul-taneität und Sukzession, in der die Realitäten, die seienden Körper, sind. […] Genauerbesehen hat die Welt und zunächst in unserer abstraktiven Beschränkung die universalekörperliche Natur eine konkrete Form, die sich abstraktiv in folgender Weise schichtet.In äußerster Abstraktion ist die Natur eine Allheit zeitlich Seiender, und zwar eine Allheitim zeitlichen nacheinander Verharrender. 10

10—Translation: “Nature as the universe of realities has universal forms of temporality in accordance with simultaneity and succession, in which the realities, the existing bodies, are. […] More exactly, the world and, first of all, in our abstract limitation, the universal physical nature has a concrete form, which layers itself abstractly in the following way. In the utmost abstraction, nature is a totality of temporal beings, and indeed a totality in a temporal succession, i.e. in the successive continuous time”. Italics added, translation is mine.”

 

[Constance]

Randall, would you toggle on the devices that allow me to quote and respond to your last three posts? Thanks. In other words, when I click 'Reply' nothing shows up in the posting screen for me to reply to. Thanks.

 

[Randall]

Randall, would you toggle on the devices that allow me to quote and respond to your last three posts? Thanks. In other words, when I click 'Reply' nothing shows up in the posting screen for me to reply to. Thanks.

You should have all your editing commands available. I cannot toggle them on or off for you. You can try doing that using the the little gear icon on the far right hand side of the toolbar. If that doesn't work the only thing I could suggest is that you empty your browser cache and reload the page. If that doesn't work, there's nothing further I can do from my end, but if you have technical help on your end, they might be able to help you figure it out.

 

[smcder]

I perused it for relevance to these posts. If there's something specific about it you want to explore, please post it as a specific example or question.

Of course I think you know the difference between the two, but you're also the one who posed the question, as if it was relevant. If you meant it rhetorically, then it would cause less confusion if that were more clear when you post your points. I don't like making even the smallest assumptions, because they tend to get me in trouble, and you've caught me a number of times yourself.

It's not a matter of implementing a "rule". It's that when someone formulates the MBP as a "why" type question, there is no non-superficial "why" type answer. If everyone wants to continue without accepting that, go ahead and keep banging your heads against the wall. I certainly won't stop you.

Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

plato.stanford.edu

Section 5 How Can Consciousness Exist?

Section 6 Why Does Consciousness Exist?

 

[Randall]

Consciousness (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

plato.stanford.edu

Section 5 How Can Consciousness Exist?

Section 6 Why Does Consciousness Exist?

I read through them ( above ). They make very similar points to ones I've been making, especially with relevance to form and function. However the section on the "How" question has problems that are relevant to the nature of "how" type questions and parts of it could just as easily be reworded to fall under the descriptive section: The Descriptive Question ( The link isn't perfect. Scroll up a couple of paragraphs to the start ).

The whole article could probably do with some fine tuning. But I really like the SEP. It's an excellent resource.

 

[Constance]

You should have all your editing commands available. I cannot toggle them on or off for you. You can try doing that using the the little gear icon on the far right hand side of the toolbar. If that doesn't work the only thing I could suggest is that you empty your browser cache and reload the page. If that doesn't work, there's nothing further I can do from my end, but if you have technical help on your end, they might be able to help you figure it out.

I'll try to toggle your posts so that I can respond to them.

Here's another recent post of yours in responses to Steve. It doesn't open up in detail, but can be clicked to open fully, though it seems fragmented and unclear who's talking some of the time.

This seems to be part of a post by Randall, opening with an earlier response by Steve:

"But why does blue scatter more than other colors, and why should that color be seen as blue. Why not green? We can continue this for as long as you want because there is no non-superficial answer as to "why".

But we're not doing that here. Did you read the Humphrey paper?

Yes I would rewrite those examples. I think that if you get the reasoning behind the context of "why" type questions, you could rewrite them yourself just as easily. This would remove the fuzziness in the contexts of the word "why" ( as given in point form earlier ), and provide a specific direction for further investigation that would be less confusing for participants, especially any new ones.

We do very occasionally have new participants and I can't imagine what that is like for them .... but for me, it's a little late to change the way we do things and I see very little advantage to do so ... but if everyone else wants to, I might give it a try. @Soupie? @Constance?

"Literature and critical thinking are two entirely separate contexts."

*sigh* do you think I don't know that? ... but that "mistake" is what the humor is built on ...

For me, this is a bit too much of a digression, if everyone else wants to implement the rule, let me know ... otherwise, let's move on.

I'm bewildered, but have three questions I can ask:

1. What is the rule again?

2. re (what I take to be) Randall's remark that "Literature and critical thinking are two entirely separate contexts," critical thinking goes on in all properly academic disciplines. Half of what academics in Literary Studies work on is Literary Criticism, which for the past 40 years has contributed to, and in fact contributed to the foundation of what is called Critical Theory as carried on in multiple disciplines in the Humanities, including philosophy, social theory, anthropology, art history etc.

3. What is the change in the way we are doing things that is being proposed by Randall? I've seen but not been able to comment on a series of four or more posts by Randall with responses from Steve, but I can't follow the thread of what we're being urged to change. But, what's wrong with the way we proceed in this forum. If 'newcomers' have a problem with it, they'll just have to sit and read awhile or, better, take some courses in the fields we're commenting on, in my humble opinion.

 

[smcder]

I read through them ( above ). They make very similar points to ones I've been making, especially with relevance to form and function. However the section on the "How" question has problems that are relevant to the nature of "how" type questions and parts of it could just as easily be reworded to fall under the descriptive section: The Descriptive Question ( The link isn't perfect. Scroll up a couple of paragraphs to the start ).

The whole article could probably do with some fine tuning. But I really like the SEP. It's an excellent resource.

Good. Because those are the questions we are asking.

What are the similarities to the points you've been making?

Laptop is down....so my replies on phone are short.

On another line:
Humphrey has a good phrase on evolution: doing its "contingent best" -so not sure you can assume consciousness must be beneficial just because we have it ...the total evolved fitness of the organism just has to outweigh the bad

 

[Randall]

That's a lot of trouble to go to just to ...

If you're on a PC, emptying your browser cache takes less than a minute. I have no idea how to deal with it on a phone or tablet.

1. What is the rule again?

There is no "rule". There's just a more fine tuned way of looking at the problems that are less likely to result in dead-ends with respect to sorts of things we're trying to establish.

 

[smcder]

I'll try to toggle your posts so that I can respond to them.

Here's another recent post of yours in responses to Steve. It doesn't open up in detail, but can be clicked to open fully, though it seems fragmented and unclear who's talking some of the time.

This seems to be part of a post by Randall, opening with an earlier response by Steve:



I'm bewildered, but have three questions I can ask:

1. What is the rule again?

2. re (what I take to be) Randall's remark that "Literature and critical thinking are two entirely separate contexts," critical thinking goes on in all properly academic disciplines. Half of what academics in Literary Studies work on is Literary Criticism, which for the past 40 years has contributed to, and in fact contributed to the foundation of what is called Critical Theory as carried on in multiple disciplines in the Humanities, including philosophy, social theory, anthropology, art history etc.

3. What is the change in the way we are doing things that is being proposed by Randall? I've seen but not been able to comment on a series of four or more posts by Randall with responses from Steve, but I can't follow the thread of what we're being urged to change. But, what's wrong with the way we proceed in this forum. If 'newcomers' have a problem with it, they'll just have to sit and read awhile or, better, take some courses in the fields we're commenting on, in my humble opinion.

No how or why questions.

 

[Constance]

If you're on a PC, emptying your browser cache takes less than a minute. I have no idea how to deal with it on a phone or tablet.

As I said I'll try to toggle your posts so that they copy so I can in turn respond to parts of them. As for deleting my browser cache, that sounds like a radical thing to do since likely I'll lose many links etc. Don't want to do that since I have a half-dozen philosophy papers I'm moving between.

There is no "rule". There's just a more fine tuned way of looking at the problems that are less likely to result in dead-ends with respect to sorts of things we're trying to establish.

Please link me to the best description of these 'more fine tuned ways or way of looking at problems [that we discuss here]'. I should say right away, though, that I do not think we can deal with consciousness without asking 'how' and 'why' questions.

 

[Randall]

Good. Because those are the questions we are asking.

Like Feynman infers in the interview I posted, it's not that the questions are bad questions. They can be excellent questions. However unless we have a clearer understanding of the different contexts that I ( and the article ) are talking about, we can find ourselves answering "why" type questions with "how" type answers, and the result will either be a dead-end or make no sense. This is the point I've been trying to get across.

What are the similarities to the points you've been making?

I'll have to get to that later ( assuming you're genuinely interested ). Sometimes I get the feeling we're just trading points and counterpoints without actually applying the process to the problem.

Laptop is down....so my replies on phone are short.

No problem.

On another line:
Humphrey has a good phrase on evolution: doing its "contingent best" -so not sure you can assume consciousness must be beneficial just because we have it ...the total evolved fitness of the organism just has to outweigh the bad

I am sure from an evolutionary perspective that it's completely safe to assume consciousness must be beneficial, at least in the manner we've already discussed, not simply just because we have it, but because of the functions mentioned. Whether or not some other system could perform the same functions non-consciously is beside the point, because the functions are beneficial either way. That however doesn't mean consciousness doesn't have limitations.

 

[Constance]

No how or why questions.

Thanks. I've finally been able to gather that much, and I don't agree.

Also, I thought I was responding to post by Randall that included extracts of posts you'd made to him. There seems to be a nest of cross-talk that I'd rather not try to sort out. You won't blame me, I think.