Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 13

[smcder]

Like Feynman infers in the interview I posted, it's not that the questions are bad questions. They can be excellent questions. However unless we have a clearer understanding of the different contexts that I ( and the article ) are talking about, we can find ourselves answering "why" type questions with "how" type answers, and the result will either be a dead-end or make no sense. This is the point I've been trying to get across.

I'll have to get to that later ( assuming you're genuinely interested ). Sometimes I get the feeling we're just trading points and counterpoints without actually applying the process to the problem.

No problem.

I am sure from an evolutionary perspective that it's completely safe to assume consciousness must be beneficial, at least in the manner we've already discussed, not simply just because we have it, but because of the functions mentioned. Whether or not some other system could perform the same functions non-consciously is beside the point, because the functions are beneficial either way. That however doesn't mean consciousness doesn't have limitations.

Like Feynman infers in the interview I posted, it's not that the questions are bad questions. They can be excellent questions. However unless we have a clearer understanding of the different contexts that I ( and the article ) are talking about, we can find ourselves answering "why" type questions with "how" type answers, and the result will either be a dead-end or make no sense. This is the point I've been trying to get across.

Again - we're not doing that here, we have plenty of context - and as I said, we point back to the established definitions of the problems.

I am sure from an evolutionary perspective that it's completely safe to assume consciousness must be beneficial, at least in the manner we've already discussed, not simply just because we have it, but because of the functions mentioned. Whether or not some other system could perform the same functions non-consciously is beside the point, because the functions are beneficial either way. That however doesn't mean consciousness doesn't have limitations.

To be clear - I am talking about phenomenal consciousness, not access consciousness - the actual "what it is like" aspect, which could be epiphenomenal.

Humphrey's paper makes a good argument...but it's against this background:

"To sum up. I’ve discussed four features of consciousness that people find hard to explain, the four that Fodor picks out as being those nobody has the slightest idea about: ‘what consciousness is, what it’s made of, what it’s for, and how it does what it’s for."

and he concludes:

"I’ve tried to dispel the aura of invincibility that surrounds these questions. I’ve proposed candidate answers, within a materialist scientific framework, that could provide relatively easy explanations for the central phenomena, while at the same time explaining why these answers are far from obvious. These answers may not be correct. But they provide a proof of principle that the hard problem can be solved."

And Clark's paper discusses it in terms of "accompanies" and "representational necessity".

" I suggest that naturalistic approaches to explaining consciousness should acknowledge the representational relation and the non-objectivity of experience, and be constrained by evidence that consciousness accompanies certain sorts of behavior-controlling representational functions carried out by complex, physically-instantiated mind-systems. I evaluate a variety of current hypotheses about consciousness on that basis, and suggest that a science of representation could help explain why, perhaps as matter of representational necessity, experience arises as a natural but not objectively discoverable phenomenon."

 

[smcder]

Thanks. I've finally been able to gather that much, and I don't agree.

Also, I thought I was responding to post by Randall that included extracts of posts you'd made to him. There seems to be a nest of cross-talk that I'd rather not try to sort out. You won't blame me, I think.

Nope!

 

[Randall]

Again - we're not doing that here, we have plenty of context - and as I said, we point back to the established definitions of the problems.

There is no context that can resolve these problems other than to recognize the problem in the first place and translate it to another context that makes sense. Why not just start with the latter instead of inserting an extra assumption that leaves the door open for confusion?

Until then, here are the questions and answers:

Q. Why is there consciousness.
A. Consciousness is there because it was born into us.

Q. What is consciousness?
A. Consciousness is our experience of what it's like to be in the world.

Q. How do we explain consciousness.
A. We explain consciousness by describing in the finest detail possible the situation(s) in which consciousness is presumed to be present.

Why not just start with: Describe in the finest detail possible the situation(s) in which consciousness is presumed to be present.

 

[smcder]

I had just posted a couple of promising links on Jackson, hadn't checked them...not sure what the strangled icon is but I didn't insert it unless by accident.

 

[Constance]

And Clark's paper discusses it in terms of "accompanies" and "representational necessity".

" I suggest that naturalistic approaches to explaining consciousness should acknowledge the representational relation and the non-objectivity of experience, and be constrained by evidence that consciousness accompanies certain sorts of behavior-controlling representational functions carried out by complex, physically-instantiated mind-systems. I evaluate a variety of current hypotheses about consciousness on that basis, and suggest that a science of representation could help explain why, perhaps as matter of representational necessity, experience arises as a natural but not objectively discoverable phenomenon."

Excellent distinctions that Clark makes and that you bring forward.

I had just posted a couple of promising links on Jackson, hadn't checked them...not sure what the strangled icon is but I didn't insert it unless by accident.

Perhaps it was a disgruntled philosopher who typed the data in the link and included the strangled icon to express his unhappiness with Jackson? I'm looking forward to learning what Jackson said in taking up the term 'representationalism'. Perhaps Clark's distinction is the one Jackson made?

 

[Constance]

There is no context that can resolve these problems other than to recognize the problem in the first place and translate it to another context that makes sense. Why not just start with the latter instead of inserting an extra assumption that leaves the door open for confusion?

Until then, here are the questions and answers:

Q. Why is there consciousness.
A. Consciousness is there because it was born into us.

Q. What is consciousness?
A. Consciousness is our experience of what it's like to be in the world.

Q. How do we explain consciousness.
A. We explain consciousness by describing in the finest detail possible the situation(s) in which consciousness is presumed to be present.

Why not just start with: Describe in the finest detail possible the situation(s) in which consciousness is presumed to be present.

"Why not just start with: Describe in the finest detail possible the situation(s) in which consciousness is presumed to be present."

We don't actually need to do that since phenomenological philosophy as a whole for over a century has recognized that experienced, lived, reality, involves awareness, affectivity, and consciousness {in varying degrees in the pre-human evolution of species and obviously, plainly, in us}. I have a paper around here somewhere that might make this clearer and will post the link when I find it.

But if you follow the papers and books by Jaak Panksepp in the field of Affective Neuroscience, which I have posted for several years now, you will see how well the basis of consciousness has been demonstrated in the biological kingdom, in life. And if you read Evan Thompson's book Waking, Dreaming, Being: Self and Consciousness in Neuroscience, Meditation, and Philosophy, you will recognize the evidence of consciousness remaining marginally active even in sleep. Also, as I have reported several times in this thread, Pim von Lommel has reported in the second edition of his book Consciousness Beyond Life: The Science of the Near-Death Experience the discovery in cases of longterm coma the sudden increases in brain activity recorded among individuals whose life-support has been decided by next of kin and/or hospital boards to be about to be turned off.

 

[smcder]

Excellent distinctions that Clark makes and that you bring forward.



Perhaps it was a disgruntled philosopher who typed the data in the link and included the strangled icon to express his unhappiness with Jackson? I'm looking forward to learning what Jackson said in taking up the term 'representationalism'. Perhaps Clark's distinction is the one Jackson made?

The IEP has a section on Jackson's retraction (section 7 here):

Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

www.iep.utm.edu

Also, the Zahnoun paper you linked above is very interesting, but I haven't gotten to the part about Merleau-Ponty yet.

 

[Constance]

The IEP has a section on Jackson's retraction (section 7 here):

Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

www.iep.utm.edu

Also, the Zahnoun paper you linked above is very interesting, but I haven't gotten to the part about Merleau-Ponty yet.

Thanks. I'll go read that IEP article now.

 

[smcder]

This is another article co-written by Zahnoun on Feigl's identity theory.

Reincarnating the Identity Theory

The mind/brain identity theory is often thought to be of historical interest only, as it has allegedly been swept away by functionalism. After clarifying why and how the notion of identity implies that there is no genuine problem of explaining how the mental derives from something else, we point...

www.frontiersin.org

 

[Constance]

The IEP has a section on Jackson's retraction (section 7 here):

Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

www.iep.utm.edu

Thanks greatly for that link. Torin Alter, the author of that entry, has done an excellent job of presenting all the arguments and counter-arguments regarding phenomenal knowledge. So good that I've done a search for Alter's papers and books and want to read more from him. Here's a link to his work:

Torin Alter, papers and books - Bing

Intelligent search from Bing makes it easier to quickly find what you’re looking for and rewards you.

www.bing.com

 

[Constance]

Thanks greatly for that link. Torin Alter, the author of that entry, has done an excellent job of presenting all the arguments and counter-arguments regarding phenomenal knowledge. So good that I've done a search for Alter's papers and books and want to read more from him. Here's a link to his work:

Torin Alter, papers and books - Bing

Intelligent search from Bing makes it easier to quickly find what you’re looking for and rewards you.

www.bing.com

Here is a link to a pdf of Alter's paper "The Structure and Dynamics Argument against Materialism," which seems to be the most relevant of his papers for our current discussion.

(PDF) The Structure and Dynamics Argument against Materialism

 

[Soupie]

Indirectly-relevant-to-this-thread story:

I have two Pug dogs. A 2 yo and a 1 yo. We have dog doors so they can come and go as they please.

I was out and about running errands, my wife was on the patio, and the dogs were in the house pining for me as they do.

My wife said about an hour later, the 2 yo came out onto the patio and lay on the carpet in front of her. He stared at her while glancing at the dog door ( or inside the house ) for a minute or two.

Finally, my wife said: what is going on inside that you want me to come see?

She went into the house and discovered the 1 year old chewing on one of my flip flops. Lol Busted. His older brother tattled on him.

——-

A brief glance at Feigl makes me think that his form of identity approach is closer to what I have been arguing. I’ll read his works ASAP.

 

[Soupie]

@smcder we’ve read ( and probably discussed ) this paper before. We could probably search the old thread and find our discussion.

https://www.academia.edu/37116372/Identity_Reconsidered_taking_a_dual_perspective_on_the_Hard_Problem_of_Consciousness

 

[smcder]

@smcder we’ve read ( and probably discussed ) this paper before. We could probably search the old thread and find our discussion.

https://www.academia.edu/37116372/Identity_Reconsidered_taking_a_dual_perspective_on_the_Hard_Problem_of_Consciousness

I did a search "everywhere" on "zahnoun" and on "identity reconsidered" ....

 

[smcder]

I did a search "everywhere" on "zahnoun" and on "identity reconsidered" ....

Part 12

Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 12

Color is the result of evolution and very much tied into the biological imperative that animals need to find food/mate etc, to use this to define specific elements of consciousness I think you would first need to argue that color perception is the opposite to this which it is clearly not from a...

www.theparacast.com

 

[smcder]

Part 12

Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 12

Color is the result of evolution and very much tied into the biological imperative that animals need to find food/mate etc, to use this to define specific elements of consciousness I think you would first need to argue that color perception is the opposite to this which it is clearly not from a...

www.theparacast.com

From the conclusion:

"However, it is important to stress that all of the above doesn’t mean that phenomenal consciousness is something that principally eludes all explanation or that it is entirely miraculous. True, the assumed fact that some physical event-structures are identical with phenomenality means ex hypothesi that the physical does not cause the qualitative nature of experience. However, to the extent that the phenomenal is identical with something that can be studied as a causal phenomenon from the objective perspective, causal explanations in that field will also be relevant for our understanding of experiential phenomena. On the identity theoretical account, it is impossible to explain in causal physical terms why it is that a toothache feels like a toothache, but on the assumption that the toothache experience is identical with certain situated bodily events, a better causal understanding of the latter should also help explain why someone has this specific sensation, and not some other experience (or no experience at all). Of course, this is easier said than done. For although it manages to escape the HPC’s gravitational pull, for many, identity theory has a few recalcitrant problems of its own. From an empirical point of view, perhaps the most pertinent question is why it is that certain physical event-structures (dynamical situated bodily activity) are, as a matter of fact, experienced, while others are not. Of course, we can no longer expect to account for these identities (or non-identities) causally, for this makes no sense. From an identity theoretical point of view, the physical does not “give rise” to the phenomenal, as Hardcastle still puts it. Yet, we might nevertheless still legitimately wonder what it is about certain physical event-structures, but not others, that make these events identifiable, not with, but as an experience. To be clear, this is not the same as asking, nonsensically, for an explanation of the strict identity relation. Compare, for instance, the question “What causes a collection of H2O molecules to be identical with water?” to the question “What is it about this liquid, but not another, that makes it identifiable as water?” On the assumption of a strict identity between water and H2O, the first question is impossible to answer because it makes no sense. But the second question is not. It is answerable, and we know what the answer is: “The fact that the liquid is identical with a collection of H2O molecules”. In other words, from an empirical point of view, we might still want to know which physical event-structures can be identified as phenomenal consciousness, and how this can be determined. Indeed, assuming strict phenomenal-physical identity does not absolve us from these questions (which are questions for probably all mind-body theories). However, compared to the Hard Problem of Consciousness, these questions are probably just hard, and not downright impossible."

 

[Soupie]

Apologies in advance but I want to investigate the phrase “representational necessity.”

But I wonder if it relates to what I was saying earlier about a “something it’s like” being necessary for certain representations.

So we ask, we do some neural representations feel like something? If certain neural processes are instantiating a representation of, say, a self burning a finger, it’s hard to imagine such a _representation_ ( not mere neural signaling ) not including the sensation of pain. Ie pain feeling just is how tissue damage is represented by organisms such as humans.

If the neural representation was not of a self experiencing pain, but, say, of a noise in the distance ( that is, with _no_ representation of a self hearing the noise ) then such a neural processes carry no “necessary” feels. And thus, though the brain may have neural processes representing the noise, there would be no reportable feels.

Also, I feel like there needs to be some synthesis between freigl’s and Clark’s et al views.

Not only is “the brain the mind perceiving itself” but I do believe that there is representation/modeling/signaling/symbolizing/interfacing going on.

I know that’s not super clear, but I think it amounts to 2 layers of form between the mind and the brain, making is doubly hard to see their identity ( IMO ).

You have subjectivity itself, but then you have Clark’s “representational privacy” ( iirc ); that we won’t see intersubjectively the terms of our subjectivity.

 

[Randall]

From the conclusion:

"True, the assumed fact that some physical event-structures are identical with phenomenality means ex hypothesi that the physical does not cause the qualitative nature of experience."​

The above is misleading. As @marduk has keenly pointed out in the past, the mere fact that our very physical sensory systems are connected in some as of yet undetermined way with phenomenality means that phenomenality must be physical in nature. If it weren't, then our very physical sensory systems would not play any part in our experience of phenomenality. But they obviously do. Therefore the premise or "assumption" made at the start ( above ) cannot be correct.

The flaw is in the reasoning that an identicalness to phenomenality is required in order for it to be considered "physical". Let's look at that time tested analogy you find so annoying again: Magnetism is not identical to a magnet, therefore magnetism is not physical? Incorrect. Magnetism isn't a magnetic material like ALNICO, but I don't know of any physicist who would say it's not part of the "physical" world.

The only requirement for something to part of physical world is that it can be detected in our physical world, and phenomenality is no exception, unless that is, one subscribes to the notion that nobody including one's self is detecting anything physical because everything, including materials, are all purely mental fabrications. I cannot prove that is not the case. But not being able to prove that doesn't make it true either.

 

[smcder]

The above is misleading. As @marduk has keenly pointed out in the past, the mere fact that our very physical sensory systems are connected in some as of yet undetermined way with phenomenality means that phenomenality must be physical in nature. If it weren't, then our very physical sensory systems would not play any part in our experience of phenomenality. But they obviously do. Therefore the premise or "assumption" made at the start ( above ) cannot be correct.

The flaw is in the reasoning that an identicalness to phenomenality is required in order for it to be considered "physical". Let's look at that time tested analogy you find so annoying again: Magnetism is not identical to a magnet, therefore magnetism is not physical? Incorrect. Magnetism isn't a magnetic material like ALNICO, but I don't know of any physicist who would say it's not part of the "physical" world.

The only requirement for something to part of physical world is that it can be detected in our physical world, and phenomenality is no exception, unless that is, one subscribes to the notion that nobody including one's self is detecting anything physical because everything, including materials, are all purely mental fabrications. I cannot prove that is not the case. But not being able to prove that doesn't make it true either.

Did you read the whole paper?

 

[smcder]

Apologies in advance but I want to investigate the phrase “representational necessity.”

But I wonder if it relates to what I was saying earlier about a “something it’s like” being necessary for certain representations.

So we ask, we do some neural representations feel like something? If certain neural processes are instantiating a representation of, say, a self burning a finger, it’s hard to imagine such a _representation_ ( not mere neural signaling ) not including the sensation of pain. Ie pain feeling just is how tissue damage is represented by organisms such as humans.

If the neural representation was not of a self experiencing pain, but, say, of a noise in the distance ( that is, with _no_ representation of a self hearing the noise ) then such a neural processes carry no “necessary” feels. And thus, though the brain may have neural processes representing the noise, there would be no reportable feels.

Also, I feel like there needs to be some synthesis between freigl’s and Clark’s et al views.

Not only is “the brain the mind perceiving itself” but I do believe that there is representation/modeling/signaling/symbolizing/interfacing going on.

I know that’s not super clear, but I think it amounts to 2 layers of form between the mind and the brain, making is doubly hard to see their identity ( IMO ).

You have subjectivity itself, but then you have Clark’s “representational privacy” ( iirc ); that we won’t see intersubjectively the terms of our subjectivity.

I read "representational necessity" along with:

" I suggest that naturalistic approaches to explaining consciousness should acknowledge the representational relation and the non-objectivity of experience, and be constrained by evidence that consciousness accompanies certain sorts of behavior-controlling representational functions carried out by complex, physically-instantiated mind-systems."

So the behavior-controlling is done by representational functions carried out by physically instantiated systems that are accompanied by consciousness ... which could mean epiphenomenal, but necessary...or unavoidable, or most weakly, the way it happened to come out as nature did her contingent best.

Helpful? Does it unravel or change anything for your thoughts above?