Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 12

[Soupie]

So "beaming" down like in Star Trek would be to pulp the book, then ship it to another library where they would take the pulp and "press" (?) it out into paper and then re-print the book. {correct?) I think that would definitely devalue your first edition ... ;-) I also wouldn't want it done to my kid.

What you are talking about is just sending the PDF to planet X or Y and printing it off there. Correct? Just making a copy doesn't change my idea of selfhood. Now there are two kids and I would want both. If you destroy the original (kid), I would have you copied and executed, over and over and ... ;-) well, maybe not but it's a short story idea: "The Engine of Destruction"

Now in order for "one" (me) to accept destruction and replacement, then yes the way we think about personhood would have to change.

I think we’re all on the same page here. And something we are all capable of doing is imagining that this copying of people is ubiquitous. I do think it would change our feelings about it.

For example, one could have multiple copies of Moby Dick, but we don’t refer to them as Moby Dick 1, Moby dick 2, Moby dick 3.

Now, that’s copying on a mass scale. Human copying might even in this hypothetical case ever reach those numbers. So we might take the convention of Johnny 1, Johnny 2, etc.

It might also be the case that a copy diverges so quickly in behavior, thinking, temperament, skills level, etc that the original and the copy quickly become two distinct persons. Book copies are static so remain static copies. Perhaps people not so much.

Also, say the copy on Planet X recalls memories it has that were made in the original body on planet Y.

Is this different in principle from an organic space traveler living on Planet X who recalls memories made on planet Y 40 years in the past when she was a child. (The 40-year younger body having been composed of different organic matter.)

The only difference is the speed with which the organic matter is replaced. 40 years versus a matter of seconds.

But destroying the original would never be ethical.

 

[Randall]

I am going to drop out from this thread for awhile because I think my situation and circumstances are causing my thoughts to roam chaotically to the detriment of this thread.

I don't think that you are in any way a detriment to this thread.

I am not thinking clearly and don't want to throw off or deter the fruits of better (and more studied) contributors by my own stupidity.

I don't think you are in the slightest, stupid.

I'll be back though...once I've figured out how to be comfortable with my current situation.

Finding a solution to the discomfort is what drives the search forward. I'm probably just as discomforted in my own way by my inability to find purchase in our ascent. I take it for granted that you have some vision or understanding in your mind about what you're trying to convey to me, but it's just not coming into focus for me. So naturally I cannot help but question my own level of comprehension as well.

My brain is drifting like a ship with broken masts and no rudder....reading through my last posts has convinced me that I am chasing my own tail...moving in circles. This subject should not be approached lightly...and I've unfortunately depleted my "sense of humor" reserves.

When life hits you in the face, you stop questioning your basis of being able to BE....

Perhaps this is where the lesson ends...
Perhaps this is where a new lesson begins...

It's all part of the journey. Perhaps it's not necessary for you that I or anyone else really understand what it is you're trying to convey. But one of the things I find interesting when it comes to these problems, is the finding or building of the bridges that lead to common understanding. Yes it can be frustrating. I also totally get if you feel a break might help. I do it myself from time to time. But I'm also willing, if you have the patience, to go back with you, to what you might think of in your view as square one, and try to connect the dots.

For me square one is usually a premise. I have a copy of The Grain Problem if it will help. Or we can just step through it here, or perhaps here ? where I recently posted a primer on the the difference between Reductionism & Holism.

 

[Soupie]

In this and the child case, it's a matter of degree, suppose something goes wrong and the copy/teleport machines go down indefinitely, so to make it up to the couple waiting on their child and the person in need of expertise, I am physically going to send someone very very very similar, (we could send the original child (if we haven't destroyed it or maybe we will use that child to make a clone) but it will take 7 years and your child would then be a teenager (yikes!) so we will send an infant and along the way we will simulate their growing up with two people very like you and your wife and re-create the memories to a very high degree. According to the same view of personhood above this should be acceptable exactly to the degree that we get this process right and we will refund your money accordingly, instead of being completely unacceptable under the current view.

No, I don’t think so. This would be like Moby Dick being lost and another author writing a story that was pretty much like Moby Dick.

A story very similar to Moby Dick is not a copy of Moby Dick, or as we say, Moby Dick.

 

[Soupie]

If there is something deeper afoot with consciousness, then a newborn seven year old might not work. In other words, how do we know we have made that exact copy if we don't know everything about consciousness?

Yes this was my real purpose for bringing this up. The copy thing has been well explored in sci-fi.

I was curious if the copy idea would help suss out differences in how we all view consciousness.

On my view, both the original and the copy would have/be conscious(ness). And their conscious experiences would be as identical as their bodies. (Given that external and internal stimuli were the same.)

 

[smcder]

I think we’re all on the same page here. And something we are all capable of doing is imagining that this copying of people is ubiquitous. I do think it would change our feelings about it.

For example, one could have multiple copies of Moby Dick, but we don’t refer to them as Moby Dick 1, Moby dick 2, Moby dick 3.

Now, that’s copying on a mass scale. Human copying might even in this hypothetical case ever reach those numbers. So we might take the convention of Johnny 1, Johnny 2, etc.

It might also be the case that a copy diverges so quickly in behavior, thinking, temperament, skills level, etc that the original and the copy quickly become two distinct persons. Book copies are static so remain static copies. Perhaps people not so much.

Also, say the copy on Planet X recalls memories it has that were made in the original body on planet Y.

Is this different in principle from an organic space traveler living on Planet X who recalls memories made on planet Y 40 years in the past when she was a child. (The 40-year younger body having been composed of different organic matter.)

The only difference is the speed with which the organic matter is replaced. 40 years versus a matter of seconds.

But destroying the original would never be ethical.

The above would not change my sense of self hood, if that's what you mean by change our feelings about it. We might get used to the idea of copies but there would also be "copyism" like we have racism now.

Johnny2 has to be a distinct person with full rights and to what? He has no childhood and parents, so he shouldn't get half of what Johnny has...so? But otherwise, if there is no funeral needed for the avatar as @USI Calgary says, then we are all equally as expendable, because there is no reliable way to tell Johnny1 from Johnny2, Johnnyx now has every motive to kill any other Johnny.

 

[smcder]

No, I don’t think so. This would be like Moby Dick being lost and another author writing a story that was pretty much like Moby Dick.

A story very similar to Moby Dick is not a copy of Moby Dick, or as we say, Moby Dick.

Not "pretty much like" but very very much like. I've read Moby Dick many times and if it were wiped off the planet, all copies, then I would value a story very very much like it to the degree that it invoked in me the same feelings as the original. And we have agreed that the "copy" of the child is not identical, identical, correct? My argument is that if so much as one quark is out of place, it's not an identical copy, now maybe to my argument that means I accept the copy just one quark less than the original but it's still to your argument that the specialness of the organism is in the eye of the beholder:

Original art pieces, childhood dolls, ancient books... any specialness they have is in the eye of the beholder. There is no objective specialness. A near perfect copy would capture all the import stuff. There’s no reason (thus far presented) the same wouldn’t hold for organism.

So an exact copy of a child should have just as much "specialness" to the parent as the original, all we need to do is change our idea of self hood, and figure out what to do with the original.

And in fact, that was probably the case in societies in the past and among some people today, so why wouldn't everyone feel this way? Why would someone think that exchanging their kid for even a quark identical one should be repellent? Johnny1 is adopted now by a very rich couple and will have everything you can give him and I will give you Johnny2 (substitute your child's name here) and you can pick right up with things.

 

[Soupie]

The above would not change my sense of self hood, if that's what you mean by change our feelings about it. We might get used to the idea of copies but there would also be "copyism" like we have racism now.

Johnny2 has to be a distinct person with full rights and to what? He has no childhood and parents, so he shouldn't get half of what Johnny has...so? But otherwise, if there is no funeral needed for the avatar as @USI Calgary says, then we are all equally as expendable, because there is no reliable way to tell Johnny1 from Johnny2, Johnnyx now has every motive to kill any other Johnny.

I’m thinking of a scenario where a wealthy man was dying, and made a copy of himself. The copy is identical to the original and attempts to claim his assets, but family members argue that they have right to it.

 

[Soupie]

We certainly wouldn’t want copies of all the books in the library of Alexandria because they’d be mere copies. Meh.

 

[smcder]

Yes this was my real purpose for bringing this up. The copy thing has been well explored in sci-fi.

I was curious if the copy idea would help suss out differences in how we all view consciousness.

On my view, both the original and the copy would have/be conscious(ness). And their conscious experiences would be as identical as their bodies. (Given that external and internal stimuli were the same.)

Keep going ... because the interesting questions lie in how you know what to copy. How would you know you had built an exact matter duplicating machine? How would you know it duplicated all matter? How do we know we have detected all matter? Suppose there are gagabluons(tm) that we know nothing about and we copy everything but the gagabluons and ... either 1) what a mess or 2) evil Kirk? or 3) Zombie Kirk.

On your view, how do you know?

 

[smcder]

We certainly wouldn’t want copies of all the books in the library of Alexandria because they’d be mere copies. Meh.

They would be valuable to the extent that there are no other copies (i.e. if we suddenly found copies where we thought none existed) One is invaluable, two is very very very valuable, etc. See the Dead Sea Scrolls which in a very short time were available in mass edition paperback for a $1.25.

 

[Randall]

We certainly wouldn’t want copies of all the books in the library of Alexandria because they’d be mere copies. Meh.

You can have the copies. I'll take the originals by using my one-time wish granted to me by a Genie, to go back in time, steal them, and leave copies to burn. Which ones will fetch a higher price at the auction? The copies or the originals?

 

[smcder]

I’m thinking of a scenario where a wealthy man was dying, and made a copy of himself. The copy is identical to the original and attempts to claim his assets, but family members argue that they have right to it.

And that's an interesting case. I can argue life extension here but the judges will recognize consequences in other kinds of cases. However, they still have to deal with the identical person as an individual, what is he entitled to? What do you think? How long would he live though if he is an identical copy to a dying man?? ;-)

 

[smcder]

The value of the books at Alexandria or the individual person is dependent on the society. In a barbaric world, neither would have much value and the stronger son and more fertile daughter (or a substitute from a neighboring tribe) would be preferred. In an age of technological barbarism, Johnny's parents would be wise to accept Johnny2.

 

[smcder]

Edited version of my response above:

QUOTE="Soupie, post: 280103, member: 6548"]
No, I don’t think so. This would be like Moby Dick being lost and another author writing a story that was pretty much like Moby Dick.

A story very similar to Moby Dick is not a copy of Moby Dick, or as we say, Moby Dick.
[/QUOTE]

Not "pretty much like" but very very much like. I've read Moby Dick many times and if it were wiped off the planet, all copies, then I would value a story very very much like it to the degree that it invoked in me the same feelings as the original. And we have agreed that the "copy" of the child is not identical, identical, correct? My argument is that if so much as one quark is out of place, it's not an identical copy, now maybe to my argument that means I accept the copy just one quark less than the original but it's still to your argument that the specialness of the organism is in the eye of the beholder:

Original art pieces, childhood dolls, ancient books... any specialness they have is in the eye of the beholder. There is no objective specialness. A near perfect copy would capture all the import stuff. There’s no reason (thus far presented) the same wouldn’t hold for organism.

So an exact copy of a child should have just as much "specialness" to the parent as the original, all we need to do is change our idea of self hood, and figure out what to do with the original.

And in fact, that was probably the case in societies in the past and among some people today, so why wouldn't everyone feel this way? Why would someone think that exchanging their kid for even a quark identical one should be repellent? Johnny1 is adopted now by a very rich couple and will have everything you can give him and I will give you Johnny2 (substitute your child's name here) and you can pick right up with things.

 

[smcder]

I think we’re all on the same page here. And something we are all capable of doing is imagining that this copying of people is ubiquitous. I do think it would change our feelings about it.

For example, one could have multiple copies of Moby Dick, but we don’t refer to them as Moby Dick 1, Moby dick 2, Moby dick 3.

Now, that’s copying on a mass scale. Human copying might even in this hypothetical case ever reach those numbers. So we might take the convention of Johnny 1, Johnny 2, etc.

It might also be the case that a copy diverges so quickly in behavior, thinking, temperament, skills level, etc that the original and the copy quickly become two distinct persons. Book copies are static so remain static copies. Perhaps people not so much.

Also, say the copy on Planet X recalls memories it has that were made in the original body on planet Y.

Is this different in principle from an organic space traveler living on Planet X who recalls memories made on planet Y 40 years in the past when she was a child. (The 40-year younger body having been composed of different organic matter.)

The only difference is the speed with which the organic matter is replaced. 40 years versus a matter of seconds.

But destroying the original would never be ethical.

Why wouldn't destroying the original be ethical?

Also, why isn't aging a grounds for divorce? When you get a divorce the lawyer asks for cause - it really can be anything, but if I said, well, sir, I married my wife seven years ago today and today everything in her body, which is everything she is, has been replaced and I am certainly not going to remain married to a stranger!

 

[smcder]

I think we’re all on the same page here. And something we are all capable of doing is imagining that this copying of people is ubiquitous. I do think it would change our feelings about it.

For example, one could have multiple copies of Moby Dick, but we don’t refer to them as Moby Dick 1, Moby dick 2, Moby dick 3.

Now, that’s copying on a mass scale. Human copying might even in this hypothetical case ever reach those numbers. So we might take the convention of Johnny 1, Johnny 2, etc.

It might also be the case that a copy diverges so quickly in behavior, thinking, temperament, skills level, etc that the original and the copy quickly become two distinct persons. Book copies are static so remain static copies. Perhaps people not so much.

Also, say the copy on Planet X recalls memories it has that were made in the original body on planet Y.

Is this different in principle from an organic space traveler living on Planet X who recalls memories made on planet Y 40 years in the past when she was a child. (The 40-year younger body having been composed of different organic matter.)

The only difference is the speed with which the organic matter is replaced. 40 years versus a matter of seconds.

But destroying the original would never be ethical.

It might also be the case that a copy diverges so quickly in behavior, thinking, temperament, skills level, etc that the original and the copy quickly become two distinct persons. Book copies are static so remain static copies. Perhaps people not so much.

I'm not sure. How many people diverge in behavior and temperament? A radical change in environment may make a difference but the Big Five personality test relies on stability of lots of traits. I haven't known an introvert to become an extrovert for example and if you watch kids grow up you see who they are very early.

So if you have a forty year old at birth technician with all the memories of a long and happy marriage and family and no rights to continue that suddenly only planet y with every anticipation of returning to that life ... yeah, that would change the idea of personhood. Perhaps to have such a copy made you have to agree to share all that ... then the copy would have agreed to that too...but that is something I could see the copies then diverging on and the copy, having not been chosen to be created couldn't be legally held to the agreement, even though they have at least the memory of the intention of doing so ... so what then? Let the spouse choose? In fact, even if you were created with all the remembered intention in the world, you would immediately differ from the original in that you are not legally capable of being bound in contract and you would recognize that by the very terms of the contract, or (law school hypothetical) could I agree that any copy of me is legally killed once they have completed their task?

 

[smcder]

So I think it may only ever be ethical to make a copy if you agree to be destroyed and replaced by it. Meanwhile those poor people on planet xy are still waiting on their copy machine to be repaired!

 

[smcder]

Keep going ... because the interesting questions lie in how you know what to copy. How would you know you had built an exact matter duplicating machine? How would you know it duplicated all matter? How do we know we have detected all matter? Suppose there are gagabluons(tm) that we know nothing about and we copy everything but the gagabluons and ... either 1) what a mess or 2) evil Kirk? or 3) Zombie Kirk.

On your view, how do you know?

What if it's something more subtle than an entire component of matter missing? What if when consciousness arises, there is some kind of synchronization or resonance, something that sets it off, how is that kept if there is not an instantaneous copy? Even if instantaneous will all of the interactions and prior "motions" of matter be captured? How do you copy aspects of matter that are in motion, and if the motion matters to consciousness? It seems unlikely with what we know, but with what we know, we don't know how consciousness works.

Let's see if I can do an analogy. Let's say I see a pendulum clock and I copy it exactly and instantaneously and the pendulum is at the bottom of a swing, so that with the copy, the pendulum is not swinging and the clock doesn't keep time. Something like that. I'm not sure that's what you mean by:

@Soupie says:

One reason this is an interesting topic is that it may suds out some of our views/thoughts re consciousness. @Constance and @smcder don’t like to speculate much but in a discussion a few months ago they both seemed to hint that an organism’s consciousness is casually tied in some way to their causal history.

... but that's now two ways you could make an exact copy and not suss out consciousness.

 

[Constance]

Yes this was my real purpose for bringing this up. The copy thing has been well explored in sci-fi.

I was curious if the copy idea would help suss out differences in how we all view consciousness.

On my view, both the original and the copy would have/be conscious(ness). And their conscious experiences would be as identical as their bodies. (Given that external and internal stimuli were the same.)

What do you mean by 'external and internal stimuli'? And by their being 'the same' before and after copying by teleportation?

 

[Randall]

... why wouldn't everyone feel this way? Why would someone think that exchanging their kid for even a quark identical one should be repellent?

Isn't it rather obvious? It is to me. Perhaps if we imagine a child's mother who says, "I gave birth to my daughter, not that copy over there in the corner. That is not my child!" or as I said before, what loving parent would be happy sending their child off to school in the morning knowing they would be destroyed in the process of making a copy? Continuity of personhood is dependent first on on continuity, not simply of some select component, but of everything.

The question of how that continuity is maintained over time has been addressed, at least superficially, and currently to my satisfaction. I'm curious where others draw their lines. I'm fine with the idea that the cells of a particular person that are replicated by that person's original cells, qualify as continuity of the originals, and therefore overall, a continuity of the original person. This resolves the issues brought up with respect to aging and cellular replacement over time. Your thoughts?