Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 12

[Soupie]

This is McGinn's seminal paper on cognitive closure. It tracks with some of @Michael Allen ideas...name a thing and have power over it.

Haven’t finished the paper but very interesting. I think it’s a tricky argument.

while he focuses on the mbp he would seem to accept the challenge of the hp as legit. That is, he seems confident that the hp can be solved in principle. However he argues the solution is beyond our intellectual abilities to grasp.

that is, he says, consciousness does weakly emerge from the brain mechanistically. We just don’t have the cognitive ability to understand how.

do I have that correct @smcder ?

What I take MA to be saying, while there is some overlap of ideas, is that the mbp and hp are unique problems. Yes, part of “solving” them may be due to intellectual limits, but that is not the main reason they are unsolvable.

the real reason the mbp and hp can’t be solved (the impossible problem) is due to the nature of the problem, not the intellectual limits of humans.

it’s the problem of whether the knower can in principle (and therefore practice) understand the processes underlying its ability to know.

McGinn seems to be saying that the mbp is a valid scientific question and can be solved straight up in principal. Our cognitive limitations bar us from knowing the solution.

what I take MA to be saying is that the mbp while a valid scientific question is also a different class of question and this cannot be solved in principal. Not bc of our cognitive limitations per say but bc of the self-referential nature of the problem.

I will say as I’ve said that the self-referential nature of the mbp is a crucial element of the problem that many don’t recognize or do but assume it to be trivial. I think it’s significant.

also I think it’s tricky that mcginn says true understanding is beyond our cognitive capacity but at the same time rules out dualism and panpsychism as “too radical.” This is tricky bc any solution beyond our cognitive capacity will seem “too radical.” Once we understand it of course it will seem mundane. So I think it’s hard for him to rule out certain “solutions” while maintaining that solutions elude us do to our cognitive limits.

 

[smcder]

English Grammar 101 - Troublesome Words 2, Lesson 20: Apprehend vs. Comprehend

Learn more about apprehend versus comprehend. Our lessons offer detailed explanations along with exercises to test your knowledge.

www.englishgrammar101.com

As @Constance noted, the words have distinct meanings. Considering the subject matter, it's not surprising that McGinn (and others) would find such distinctions useful. You can find both words used in his writings, sometimes in close proximity, and see the distinction in context. He also writes broadly about "prehensive" terminology in "The Hand and the Emergence of Humanity":

"Our language is full of "prehensive" terminology for the mind: "apprehend", "comprehend", "grasp" ... "

So it seems clear that McGinn is aware of the distinction and likely that he uses one or the other for reasons of precision.

 

[smcder]

Haven’t finished the paper but very interesting. I think it’s a tricky argument.

while he focuses on the mbp he would seem to accept the challenge of the hp as legit. That is, he seems confident that the hp can be solved in principle. However he argues the solution is beyond our intellectual abilities to grasp.

that is, he says, consciousness does weakly emerge from the brain mechanistically. We just don’t have the cognitive ability to understand how.

do I have that correct @smcder ?

What I take MA to be saying, while there is some overlap of ideas, is that the mbp and hp are unique problems. Yes, part of “solving” them may be due to intellectual limits, but that is not the main reason they are unsolvable.

the real reason the mbp and hp can’t be solved (the impossible problem) is due to the nature of the problem, not the intellectual limits of humans.

it’s the problem of whether the knower can in principle (and therefore practice) understand the processes underlying its ability to know.

McGinn seems to be saying that the mbp is a valid scientific question and can be solved straight up in principal. Our cognitive limitations bar us from knowing the solution.

what I take MA to be saying is that the mbp while a valid scientific question is also a different class of question and this cannot be solved in principal. Not bc of our cognitive limitations per say but bc of the self-referential nature of the problem.

I will say as I’ve said that the self-referential nature of the mbp is a crucial element of the problem that many don’t recognize or do but assume it to be trivial. I think it’s significant.

also I think it’s tricky that mcginn says true understanding is beyond our cognitive capacity but at the same time rules out dualism and panpsychism as “too radical.” This is tricky bc any solution beyond our cognitive capacity will seem “too radical.” Once we understand it of course it will seem mundane. So I think it’s hard for him to rule out certain “solutions” while maintaining that solutions elude us do to our cognitive limits.

@Soupie wrote:

"that is, he says, consciousness does weakly emerge from the brain mechanistically. We just don’t have the cognitive ability to understand how.
do I have that correct @smcder ?"

McGinn writes:

"What I want to suggest is that the nature of the psychophysical connection has a full and non-mysterious explanation in a certain science, but that this is inaccessible to us as a matter of principle."

and then he explores whether this explanation would be accessible to some other kind of mind.

I'd also like to know if @Michael Allen thinks:

"the real reason the mbp and hp can’t be solved (the impossible problem) is due to the nature of the problem, not the intellectual limits of humans."

 

[Soupie]

I'd also like to know if @Michael Allen thinks:

"the real reason the mbp and hp can’t be solved (the impossible problem) is due to the nature of the problem, not the intellectual limits of humans."

I want to hear his answer, of course. But since the questioner is asking the question, we can’t get out of the self referential loop, right?

 

[Soupie]

Or rather the origin and nature of the question asker is the question, we can’t escape the self-referential horizon.

that could be construed as an intellectual limit I guess.

 

[Randall]

... So it seems clear that McGinn is aware of the distinction and likely that he uses one or the other for reasons of precision.

There is less precision in using the word apprehend than in using the word comprehend, unless that is, the word apprehend is being used according to one of it's other meanings e.g. to arrest or take someone into custody, which in no way seems to be McGinn's context of usage. Otherwise the meanings are identical, and all that using apprehend instead of comprehend does is add confusion.

If that is McGinn's intent, then he has certainly accomplished it. If he uses it in some personalized fashion that imparts some subtle but important nuance we should be aware of, perhaps you could reference that. Otherwise we're left to consider the two as synonymous, and he uses them both because it's just his style of writing, which makes it a minor quibble, certainly of less importance than the rest of my comment.

 

[Randall]

I'd also like to know if @Michael Allen thinks: "the real reason the mbp and hp can’t be solved (the impossible problem) is due to the nature of the problem, not the intellectual limits of humans."

It doesn't help that the "nature of the problem" seems different to different people. I've been saying from the start that the MBP and/or the HP are false problems, but then @smcder pointed out that perhaps those ways of looking at the situation was something intentional in order to evoke contemplation.

In other words, understanding why they are false problems reveals something about the situation that was previously not entirely evident or clear. I have no idea whether or not that is true, but at least if it's looked at that way, it can serve a useful purpose. Now when do we move on? Or am I wrong in assuming everyone here already gets this?

 

[Randall]

I don't see it as a false problem.

I don't recall us ever getting to the bottom of your reasoning for that. The only thing that would seem to make sense is that you're some sort of monist, and therefore the existence of multiple types of things are incompatible with your philosophical viewpoint. If that's not it, then what makes it a valid problem to you?

 

[Soupie]

It doesn't help that the "nature of the problem" seems different to different people. I've been saying from the start that the MBP and/or the HP are false problems, but then @smcder pointed out that perhaps those ways of looking at the situation was something intentional in order to evoke contemplation.

In other words, understanding why they are false problems reveals something about the situation that was previously not entirely evident or clear. I have no idea whether or not that is true, but at least if it's looked at that way, it can serve a useful purpose. Now when do we move on? Or am I wrong in assuming everyone here already gets this?

And the response to this absurd claim has been the same:

(1) Unless you can explain how the mind and body are related, the MBP is a problem for you. Simply stating that they coexist when conditions are just so is not an explanation.

(2) The problem posed by the HP can be avoided if one rejects its premise, ie that phenomenal consciousness weakly emerges from physical processes. But taken straight on, as many thinkers do, it is problem.

It may be the case that many kinds of things exist, a form of pluralism, not physicalist btw. But this position in itself doesn’t not answer the MBP not show the MBP to be a false problem.

I can’t speak for everybody else but I haven’t been responding to these claims of yours bc they aren’t helpful.

 

[Soupie]

Btw please answer my question:

Can one see with their naked eye the PCF of another person?

 

[Soupie]

It doesn't help that the "nature of the problem" seems different to different people. I've been saying from the start that the MBP and/or the HP are false problems, but then @smcder pointed out that perhaps those ways of looking at the situation was something intentional in order to evoke contemplation.

In other words, understanding why they are false problems reveals something about the situation that was previously not entirely evident or clear. I have no idea whether or not that is true, but at least if it's looked at that way, it can serve a useful purpose. Now when do we move on? Or am I wrong in assuming everyone here already gets this?

Do you understand that the MBP and the HP are very different problems? Perhaps this is why no one takes your ideas about them seriously?

 

[Constance]

I want to hear his answer, of course. But since the questioner is asking the question, we can’t get out of the self referential loop, right?

I'm interested in learning what you mean by 'the self-referential loop'.

 

[Soupie]

A short story idea I’ve had bouncing around for a while involves a protagonist who figures out that they’re a character who’s been developed in a short story.

Perhaps a fun conclusion to the story might be this character writing a short story about the author who wrote his story, but changing details of the story the author wrote in subtle ways to make it seem as if he was the author and not vice versa.

 

[Constance]

Or rather the origin and nature of the question asker is the question, we can’t escape the self-referential horizon.

that could be construed as an intellectual limit I guess.

I don't see why our tacit self- awareness/self-referentiality should constitute an 'intellectual limit'. This property is present even in prereflective/pre-thetic consciousness, and becomes clearer in reflective consciousness. It does not prevent the development of interrogations concerning self-world relations in either analytic philosophy (recently) or in phenomenological philosophy (over more than 100 years now). If sensed self-reference is a natural property of consciousness it becomes our task to understand and recogize its presence in our species and others developing in the natural evolution of species.

 

[Soupie]

I don't see why our tacit self- awareness/self-referentiality should constitute an 'intellectual limit'. This property is present even in prereflective/pre-thetic consciousness, and becomes clearer in reflective consciousness. It does not prevent the development of interrogations concerning self-world relations in either analytic philosophy (recently) or in phenomenological philosophy (over more than 100 years now). If sensed self-reference is a natural property of consciousness it becomes our task to understand and recogize its presence in our species and others developing in the natural evolution of species.

The self-reference im referring to is beyond the personal, psychological level. Beyond introspection. I’m saying that the pearl at the heart of the mbp is self reference.

 

[Soupie]

“Pure phenomenology will never provide the solution to the mind-body problem.” Colin McGinn

 

[smcder]

There is less precision in using the word apprehend than in using the word comprehend, unless that is, the word apprehend is being used according to one of it's other meanings e.g. to arrest or take someone into custody, which in no way seems to be McGinn's context of usage. Otherwise the meanings are identical, and all that using apprehend instead of comprehend does is add confusion.

If that is McGinn's intent, then he has certainly accomplished it. If he uses it in some personalized fashion that imparts some subtle but important nuance we should be aware of, perhaps you could reference that. Otherwise we're left to consider the two as synonymous, and he uses them both because it's just his style of writing, which makes it a minor quibble, certainly of less importance than the rest of my comment.

The distinction makes possible that a man's reach should exceed his grasp and "We apprehend many truths which we do not comprehend."

McGinn uses apprehend with the two faculties of introspection and perception.

There is less precision in using the word apprehend than in using the word comprehend, unless that is, the word apprehend is being used according to one of it's other meanings e.g. to arrest or take someone into custody, which in no way seems to be McGinn's context of usage. Otherwise the meanings are identical, and all that using apprehend instead of comprehend does is add confusion.

If that is McGinn's intent, then he has certainly accomplished it. If he uses it in some personalized fashion that imparts some subtle but important nuance we should be aware of, perhaps you could reference that. Otherwise we're left to consider the two as synonymous, and he uses them both because it's just his style of writing, which makes it a minor quibble, certainly of less importance than the rest of my comment.

apprehend - Wiktionary

en.m.wiktionary.org

"Usage notes

To apprehend, comprehend. These words come into comparison as describing acts of the mind. Apprehend denotes the laying hold of a thing mentally, so as to understand it clearly, at least in part. Comprehend denotes the embracing or understanding it in all its compass and extent. We may apprehend many truths which we do not comprehend."

 

[Constance]

A short story idea I’ve had bouncing around for a while involves a protagonist who figures out that they’re a character who’s been developed in a short story.

Perhaps a fun conclusion to the story might be this character writing a short story about the author who wrote his story, but changing details of the story the author wrote in subtle ways to make it seem as if he was the author and not vice versa.

That work would join a long history of fiction writers who have provoked questions within their texts about the reliability of their narrators.

 

[Constance]

The self-reference im referring to is beyond the personal, psychological level. Beyond introspection. I’m saying that the pearl at the heart of the mbp is self reference.

I'd like to read a paper or two explicating this proposition if you can point me to them. Thanks.

 

[Constance]

“Pure phenomenology will never provide the solution to the mind-body problem.” Colin McGinn

It would be good to know what McGinn means by "pure phenomenology." He might be referring to Husserl's early methodological works, written decades before Husserl's later works recognizing the 'lived experience' of subjects in his further explorations of consciousness, as MP and Zahavi have demonstrated.