Thanks. Let's just forget about this little kerfuffle. I'm frustrated too, as is obvious in my persistence in pressing the importance of phenomenology for a full appreciation of the nature and structure of human consciousness and its influence on what we think and do within the existential conditions of our lived world.Sorry Constance. I suppose I’m just frustrated. Of course I don’t want you to stop asking questions. I have actually appreciated your conversation with MA over the past few weeks.
As I've said before, I think the mbp as foregrounded in analytical philosophy is overcome in phenomenological philosophy with contributing insights from biology, psychology, and affective neuroscience. I evidently haven't succeeded in making that case here despite many efforts. Nevertheless I understand the attractions of the theories you want to pursue and will stand by and read more about them.We know you value phenomenology. If there is anything we may have learned from this years-long discussion, it’s that the pathway to solving the mbp is still wide open.
I do see the 'intrinsic nature argument' you've been presenting with the succession of theorists you've brought forward, and I recognize the power of its attraction. I'm reading the paper linked in the OUP material you cited yesterday and will follow your lead as discussions ensue here. Re Penrose and Hameroff, I mentioned them because their contributions to the recognition of quantum processes in the brain seemed to me to support your pursuit of quantum field explanations of consciousness. Perhaps they do? Anyway, I will do more listening for awhile.Re asking questions: I’ve been discussing and presenting material on the intrinsic nature argument since we discussed Hoffman and Strawson a real materialism probably a year or two ago. Never have we mentioned Penrose, etc. I guess it just confuses me how you could think that’s what I’ve been saying.
ETA: here is the link to that paper at OUP:
Information generation as a functional basis of consciousness