Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 12

[Constance]

"Physicalist reductionism I take to be the view that the physical story about what is going on in the brain and the world with which it interacts is in some sense the whole story. "
[source: http://consc.net/event/reef/lockwoodgrain.pdf]

Interesting lad...states that physicalist reduction as a physical story. The obvious stumbling block here resides in the terms *view and *story...and if you are Sherlock Holmes, even the word *physical has some really major baggage. The problem with such a formulation is that any story provided by the very mechanisms that have such capabilities are themselves part of the world in need of explanation.

Responding to the Lockwood paper you linked on the grain problem, I enjoyed the paper and admire the scope, energy, and clarity of the author's writing. I have the impression you do not approve of this paper, which leads me to wonder why you linked it?

ETA: there's more to respond to in your post #612, but I'll have to come back to that in a day or two.

 

[Michael Allen]

@Michael Allen, read through your responses to what I posted earlier today and can respond at least to this part:

I wrote: "Husserl was, of course, essential and foundational for the development of phenomenological philosophy and many of his insights continue to be debated in this school of philosophy and increasingly in analytical philosophy. It's a vast task to attempt to learn all that he discovered and to work through the details of his writing regarding hyletic experience, internal time consciousness, and other topics. We do need to understand the phenomenological reduction in the context of the series of reductions he proposed, and this paper/book chapter should provide the understanding we need: . . ."

You wrote: "[nope...read the words carefully and extract meaning that resonates with the mechanism under examination...there is no debate unless you have a dasien that wishes to embrace the myths (Santa) that help remove the need for questioning.

which leads to my first rule:

Axiom of the Mind: Never trust a thought pattern that ends the desire to question ..."

My response in turn: Do you actually think phenomenological philosophy has sought and found "myths that help remove the need for questioning?" If so, why does this field of inquiry continue to re-examine in expanding detail the last century of major texts constituting this inquiry?

You add: "[questions are always the source of consciousness and mind...if you find the answer to the mega question...you will cease to be a mind]"

So I gather that philosophy of mind itself is what troubles you? If not, please clarify.

I can't respond..."philosophy of mind" this makes me laugh to the point where I can barely type any coherent answer. I cannot clarify anything which is already a part of the thing we dare to provide such a term as "philosophy" ... how can you type "philosophy of mind" without laughing yourself out of your chair? Please understand that I don't mean to be rude...

So to answer your question directly...philosophy of mind causes me to spasm uncontrollably (i.e. laughter)... what on earth can that possibly mean to the mind constructing the "philosophy"

Edit: ... I must ask the question directly-->What is "philosophy of mind?" I think I must have missed something very fundamental ... or you have touched a very laughable nerve.

 

[Michael Allen]

Responding to the Lockwood paper you linked on the grain problem, I enjoyed the paper and admire the scope, energy, and clarity of the author's writing. I have the impression you do not approve of this paper, which leads me to wonder why you linked it?

ETA: there's more to respond to in your post #612, but I'll have to come back to that in a day or two.

I linked the paper and added my comments that showed how the clarity, energy and scope were in the wrong direction... (I rarely link what I agree with)

 

[Randall]

Past experience, mine and that of others here, has been that attempted conversations with you on these complex subjects have ended with your spending time challenging/rejecting my/our terminology and/or linking us to your 'critical thinking' website, which turns out to be very limited in critical thinking. What I prefer is the seminar model in which everyone involved reads the same text before discussing it.

Fine. Be like a file bot while scoffing at the examples of critical thinking I've offered. You call it "limited". I wonder if you can even name the 8 Elements of thought in their "limited" introduction to the Elements & Standards ( let alone describe them )? Maybe also write and tell Dr. Brian Barnes, who holds a Ph.D. in Interdisciplinary Humanities and an MA in Philosophy from the University of Louisville your opinion.

BTW: While you're at it, have you got any of that nice soft jazz music I can listen to?

 

[Constance]

I can't respond..."philosophy of mind" this makes me laugh to the point where I can barely type any coherent answer. I cannot clarify anything which is already a part of the thing we dare to provide such a term as "philosophy" ... how can you type "philosophy of mind" without laughing yourself out of your chair? Please understand that I don't mean to be rude...

Machts nichts whether you do or don't. The only thing that interests me is whether you can explain the joke or not.

So to answer your question directly...philosophy of mind causes me to spasm uncontrollably (i.e. laughter)... what on earth can that possibly mean to the mind constructing the "philosophy"

That's hardly a direct answer to my question, which was whether it is philosophy of mind that troubles you.

Edit: ... I must ask the question directly-->What is "philosophy of mind?" I think I must have missed something very fundamental ... or you have touched a very laughable nerve.

So now you want me to tell you what philosophy of mind is? Google and the library are your friends.

 

[Constance]

Hope this cartoon comes over:

https://i.chzbgr.com/full/939542502...U17lx1bD1iDSyG-ytAnCgBBeP0YuVoGWWqnLt28JC-TBI

 

[Randall]

I can't respond..."philosophy of mind" this makes me laugh to the point where I can barely type any coherent answer ...

Your sense of humor is certainly more sophisticated than most, and like every bit of good humor, the situation does contain an element of truth. In this case, that the mind is capable of self-analysis. Carl Sagan — 'The cosmos is within us. We are made of star-stuff. We are a way for the universe to know itself.'

 

[Michael Allen]

Machts nichts whether you do or don't. The only thing that interests me is whether you can explain the joke or not.



That's hardly a direct answer to my question, which was whether it is philosophy of mind that troubles you.



So now you want me to tell you what philosophy of mind is? Google and the library are your friends.

Philosophy of mind troubles me only because it seems to be a solution in search for a problem. The attempt of a mind to determine the foundations of its own nature and ability to formulate a framework or theory that is accepted by the same is what I find comical. I am simply troubled by the obvious issues of self-reference. If I remember correctly, Heidegger begins by dismissing the "mind-body" problem...which is the comedy that starts the entire enterprise, along with its more sophisticated corollary under the name "the hard problem of consciousness."


Summarized better here:

"The meta-problem of consciousness is (to a first approximation) the problem of explaining why we think that there is a [hard] problem of consciousness. "

http://consc.net/papers/metaproblem.pdf

 

[Michael Allen]

Your sense of humor is certainly more sophisticated than most, and like every bit of good humor, the situation does contain an element of truth. In this case, that the mind is capable of self-analysis. Carl Sagan — 'The cosmos is within us. We are made of star-stuff. We are a way for the universe to know itself.'

Perhaps the capability is limited by self-analysis to the extent that the analysis of "self-analysis" fails for the same reason that "self-analysis" is already experienced.

 

[Randall]

Perhaps the capability is limited by self-analysis to the extent that the analysis of "self-analysis" fails for the same reason that "self-analysis" is already experienced.

If we accept that Philosophy of Mind includes the concept of intelligence, and that intelligence can exist separately from any first hand experience of it, e.g. a computer can perform intelligent analysis, but may not have any experience of doing so, then for us as intelligent beings, the experience of self-analysis is of little relevance to the performance of self-analysis. Consequently, whether or not experience is a limiting factor in self-analysis, depends on whether or not the analysis provides a comfortable experience. When it doesn't, then we run into trouble.

 

[Michael Allen]

If we accept that Philosophy of Mind includes the concept of intelligence, and that intelligence can exist separately from any first hand experience of it, e.g. a computer can perform intelligent analysis, but may not have any experience of doing so, then for us as intelligent beings, the experience of self-analysis is of little relevance to the performance of self-analysis. Consequently, whether or not experience is a limiting factor in self-analysis, depends on whether or not the analysis provides a comfortable experience. When it doesn't, then we run into trouble.

The problem lies with the assumption that "intelligence can exist separately from any first hand experience of it [what do you mean by "it" in this sentence?]"

"e.g. a computer can perform intelligent analysis, but may not have any experience of doing so"

How do you know this? Interestingly enough you may be just a more advanced "computer" which has abandoned the basis of it's own ability to _______

And what do you mean by "first hand" when the term "experience" in these discussions is very well limited to the first by truism. WE only say "first hand" because there is a concept of "second hand" which comes from some other experiencer telling us a story...but the comprehension or understanding of the story can only arise due to the shared world of experience which we are trying to ascertain ...

The notion that "experience" is limited by some factor of "self-analysis" is in our own language of grok a truism--i.e. food that "satisfies the hunger of questioning." What we find in the way of trouble is nothing more than our own surprise at not having a full understanding of the mechanism that allowed us to feel understanding, comprehension and the entire basis of self-awareness or even self-analysis. "WE" must come full circle...and of course it is only due to a world that allows a "we" that certain unspeakable "mysteries" of "our" or "us" or "mine" come into Dasein. In other words, that we run into trouble thinking about "our" ability to think...we are mystified by the very foundations of our own abilities.

To be a sentient being is to be constantly mystified by being..[and the background which allows such mystification and therein "consciousness"]; for without such foundations we have the curiousity of a rock...the irony is that such curiosities are engendered by ordered reactions of being vs itself....a billiard ball bouncing from the wall or another, which is a rudimentary or elementary form of "consciousness."


To summarize:

The food of sentience, self-awareness, consciousness is the very elements which are not fully understood, ascertained, groked, comprehended by the "thing of self-aware-world-beingness" we are trying to explain in words to other's who must exist like ourselves for such common understandings to exist. In other words, there is no such thing as an intelligence which exists seperately from the first hand experience of the same...

 

[Michael Allen]

...Consequently, whether or not experience is a limiting factor in self-analysis, depends on whether or not the analysis provides a comfortable experience. When it doesn't, then we run into trouble.

Interesting that the term "comfortable" comes into play...I would say that it is precisely there where the plot "thickens."

 

[Michael Allen]

***WARNING...PURE TROLL HERE***

(1) Can consciousness understand the limits of its own self-grok-ness?
(2) Have we reached either point (1) or it's negation?

 

[Michael Allen]

(1) Consciousness understanding...

My answer: consciousness comes about through a mechanism that allows "understanding"...so the limit of "self-understanding" is not a something that is a figment or element that brings about "consciousness." The notion of consciousness is itself a simulation created by the very framework under examination...for if consciousness actually fully comprehended it's ability of reflecting to itself the ability to reflect and simulate itself to itself would be a contradiction: a video window tied to the camera taking the picture of the window trying to replicate the image of the window...a reflection of a reflection, like standing with your eyes fixed on a mirror that stands perfectly opposite to another mirror behind the "observer."

There is no amount of buffering of memories internal to the recorder taking in the image of the image of the image...in such a situation that will fully grasp the vanishing point of the multiple infinite reflections. A recorder to understand must also understand nothing...for the recorder must not invade in the self-mirroring...but because such devices take up space (and time)...the head that stares into the infinity of two mirrors facing each other must end in itself...breaking the chain of understanding to an entity which didn't require perfect visibility of the vanishing point...

Thus I say the only way a being in possession of consciousness can fully understand the foundation of it's own is to not be consciousness and in some way "remember" how it did such a trick.

So...trick.

(2) We understand the limits of our own foundational ability to formulate understanding

No, and by "no" we arrive at "yes"

(2a) We do not understand the limits of our own foundational ability to formulate understanding

Yes, and by "yes" we arrive at "no"

 

[Randall]

The problem lies with the assumption that "intelligence can exist separately from any first hand experience of it [what do you mean by "it" in this sentence?]" "e.g. a computer can perform intelligent analysis, but may not have any experience of doing so"

What I mean is that intelligence is a form of data processing; whereas consciousness is the experience of existing. Consequently, intelligent processing may be possible without the processor having any experience of it [ intelligent processing ].

How do you know this?

I suppose we might ask the same question about any sort of knowledge. From my perspective, it boils down to an acceptance of the existence of fundamentally different classes of concepts, of which intelligence and consciousness are two examples. While it is true that we cannot know whether an intelligent piece of technology has any consciousness or not, we can be sure that the reason we deem it intelligent is because of the way it performs, and that such performance can be traced back to the way it's been engineered. Consequently the situation leaves us in the position of knowing that while such technology is intelligent, it may or may not be conscious.

Interestingly enough you may be just a more advanced "computer" which has abandoned the basis of it's own ability to _______

We need to bear in mind that the human brain is a very different kind of processor than a microchip. Therefore it may be the case that consciousness can only arise from our specific type of bio-processor, while microchips simply don't have the right properties. Until we know for sure, we cannot assume that consciousness can be uploaded the same way that digital data can.

And what do you mean by "first hand" when the term "experience" in these discussions is very well limited to the first by truism. WE only say "first hand" because there is a concept of "second hand" which comes from some other experiencer telling us a story...but the comprehension or understanding of the story can only arise due to the shared world of experience which we are trying to ascertain ...

I use "first-hand" to differentiate the situation where the intelligence we're speaking of is the experiencer, from an intelligence that is relaying to us a second-hand description of how some other intelligence might respond. This is one of the issues I have with Constance, who tends to reply to questions about what she thinks, with papers written by someone else. Those sorts of responses I would expect from Siri or Google, not a person with their own mind. She tends to get upset with me over this issue, but I think it is a very valid point to make.

The notion that "experience" is limited by some factor of "self-analysis" is in our own language of grok a truism--i.e. food that "satisfies the hunger of questioning." What we find in the way of trouble is nothing more than our own surprise at not having a full understanding of the mechanism that allowed us to feel understanding, comprehension and the entire basis of self-awareness or even self-analysis. "WE" must come full circle...and of course it is only due to a world that allows a "we" that certain unspeakable "mysteries" of "our" or "us" or "mine" come into Dasein. In other words, that we run into trouble thinking about "our" ability to think...we are mystified by the very foundations of our own abilities.

Indeed. The specific example I was alluding to is the discomfort caused by cognitive dissonance, where we find that our worldview is in conflict with our analysis of it. When that happens, we feel discomfort; sometimes to the point of fight or flight. Unless that is, we can learn and adapt.

To be a sentient being is to be constantly mystified by being..[and the background which allows such mystification and therein "consciousness"]; for without such foundations we have the curiousity of a rock...the irony is that such curiosities are engendered by ordered reactions of being vs itself....a billiard ball bouncing from the wall or another, which is a rudimentary or elementary form of "consciousness."

I don't think that the movement of billiard balls is in any way a rudimentary form of consciousness. At best it is only a reflection of the consciousness of the players ( if such players experience what it's like to play billiards ). Similarly the consequences built-in by the engineers of the game reflect intelligence. Apart from that, the movement is determined by the physical properties of the materials. Hypothetically, an intelligent robot with zero consciousness could play the game.

To summarize:

The food of sentience, self-awareness, consciousness is the very elements which are not fully understood, ascertained, groked, comprehended by the "thing of self-aware-world-beingness" we are trying to explain in words to other's who must exist like ourselves for such common understandings to exist. In other words, there is no such thing as an intelligence which exists seperately from the first hand experience of the same...

While an intelligence that experiences what it's like to be intelligent cannot logically also be separate from it's own experience of being intelligent, it is logically possible for something intelligent to exist that has no experience ( period ) of what it's like to be intelligent. Ignoring this possibility exposes us to the danger of assuming that AI = Consciousness. It doesn't. The Cylons may be highly intelligent, but do they have any experience of being Cylons?

 

[Constance]

(1) Consciousness understanding...

My answer: consciousness comes about through a mechanism that allows "understanding"...so the limit of "self-understanding" is not a something that is a figment or element that brings about "consciousness." The notion of consciousness is itself a simulation created by the very framework under examination...

Trying to follow what you've written above. Why do you take 'self-understanding' to be the primary problem or task of consciousness? I don't think that's how consciousness works for any of us. We first develop consciousness prereflectively out of our given creaturely affectivity and awareness of our sensed concrete situatedness in a 'world' -- an environment in which we have to learn to navigate, get our needs met, and survive. Our earliest sense of self is autopoietic, in Maturana and Varela's term, beginning with a sense or experience of boundaries between our own organism and the enveloping world, boundaries that are not completely closed but permeable. As MP expressed it, it is the environing world that calls forth our awareness and responsiveness, our interactions and integrations, leading in time to the development of reflective consciousness within which we become aware of our awareness, having moved beyond the prereflective cogito to the reflective cogito and to our eventual questions about the nature of our consciousness and its relation to the world in which we exist. I'm rambling here and too tired to go on now, except to add that I don't think understanding ourselves is our greatest existential challenge. Given that our conscious minds are influenced by our subconscious minds, and indeed by the collective unconscious whose traces we carry forward in evolution, we might not understand our personal egoic, biographical, selves very well at all. I don't personally find consciousness to be vexing though; I'm comfortable with it and grateful for it. But others mileage may vary.

Look forward to continuing this later, including to the terms 'mechanism' and 'simulation' that I underscored in the first part of your post.

 

[Michael Allen]

Constance...I am thinking your's over

For Randal I will do last is first...

While an intelligence that experiences what it's like to be intelligent cannot logically also be separate from it's own experience of being intelligent, it is logically possible for something intelligent to exist that has no experience ( period ) of what it's like to be intelligent. Ignoring this possibility exposes us to the danger of assuming that AI = Consciousness. It doesn't. The Cylons may be highly intelligent, but do they have any experience of being Cylons?

Interesting...you say "something intelligent" to exist...but in order to make a statement you have to be something like that to observe and report from the outside. The "existence" seems to be dependent on there being more than one being in a world that can possess this thing we are trying to grok. If that is the case then how is it possible for an observer to see something like it's own foundation of self-reflection in others without the component of experience which brought about the entire framework?

On the other hand I think you are alluding to something like the difference between first-order experience (simple experience channel) vs. a kind of second-order (experience of the fact that experience is a happening). This is a deep question...and word substitution will suffice to bring us back to the drawing board: "Humans may be highly intelligent, but do they have any experience of being Humans? " It is most illuminating that you should create a punchline after the comma and "but" and combine the term experience with a plurality in the case of the "cylons"...which with word substitution leads us to plurality either way.

So this brings us full circle to the first point I made ... "existence" seems to be dependent on [i.e. an unspoken and almost unthinkable plurality] there being more than one being in a world [for how else do you get "being" or even a "world?"] that [sic] possesses this thing we are trying to grok...

I will think further on your earlier points and respond in due time.

 

[Randall]

Interesting...you say "something intelligent" to exist...but in order to make a statement you have to be something like that to observe and report from the outside.

I'm not sure what you mean. We'll have to clear that one up somehow.

The "existence" seems to be dependent on there being more than one being in a world that can possess this thing we are trying to grok.

For me, existence, consciousness, and intelligence, are three separate concepts, and I'm not sure what "thing" you're referring to.

If that is the case then how is it possible for an observer to see something like it's own foundation of self-reflection in others without the component of experience which brought about the entire framework?

Seeing is a subjective experience that is a facet of consciousness. To explain how it's possible, is, to my knowledge, beyond anyone's present ability. However I think it's fair to say that most of us know that seeing must be possible, because of our own experience of it, but I don't know how that relates to your question, because I don't know for sure how to interpret it.

On the other hand I think you are alluding to something like the difference between first-order experience (simple experience channel) vs. a kind of second-order (experience of the fact that experience is a happening). This is a deep question...and word substitution will suffice to bring us back to the drawing board: "Humans may be highly intelligent, but do they have any experience of being Humans? "

It seems safe to assume that humans in general experience what it's like to be human because we're all made about the same, therefore we should all function about the same. It doesn't seem reasonable to assume that out of billions of humans, only one person ( one's self ) is the only one of our kind that experiences what it's like to be human, while all the rest are oblivious bio-robots. On the other hand, an AI built on microchips, functions very differently, therefore we cannot safely assume that it can experience anything.

It is most illuminating that you should create a punchline after the comma and "but" and combine the term experience with a plurality in the case of the "cylons"...which with word substitution leads us to plurality either way.

I never intended to relay plurality. It was a generalization on a type, which might be considered synonymous with species or model, the assumption being that all instances of a type, species, or model, are very similar in form and function.

Word substitution doesn't suggest any commonality with the type of examples we're discussing, because of fundamental differences in materials, e.g. you can wrap a wire around an iron core, apply electricity, and the result is a strong magnetic field. If we substitute the word "wood" for the word "iron", we get no magnetic field, even though other physical properties such as size and shape may be identical.

Substituting the word "human" for the word "cylon" is essentially the same idea. If anything, the word substitution here implies that we cannot safely assume that things that look superficially the same, all function the same way.

So this brings us full circle to the first point I made ... "existence" seems to be dependent on [i.e. an unspoken and almost unthinkable plurality] there being more than one being in a world [for how else do you get "being" or even a "world?"] that [sic] possesses this thing we are trying to grok...

Sure. Existence implies being because "existence" and "being" are essentially synonyms ( to me ). If they mean something radically different to you, then we ought to try to reconcile that somehow.

 

[Farlig Gulstein]

Regarding consciousness:

Here is a Hebrew program from Israel that I found on youtube about a little Druze boy called “O’Neal” in the north of Israel who, at a little after two years old, instead of starting to speak Arabic words like his parents and family and village, started talking in English with a bit of a UK accent.

The producers of this episode of the show, P’nim Ah’mee’tee’yote, presented the evidence for a possible case of reincarnation. During the course of the show, the producers interviewed four professionals, a career nurse-midwife, an education administrator, a brain researcher / clinical psychologist, and a speech therapist / linguist. The first two were well acquainted with the boy and were thoroughly convinced the case is genuine. The last two were very surprised about what they saw of the case. The speech therapist / linguist actually tested the boy and concluded that somehow, he’d developed very good language skills in English, but was noticeably deficient in his Arabic development, even though the Druze village is Arabic speaking. The producers tried to find a rational way to explain the situation, but the case remained tantalizingly unexplained. The producers also even interviewed a spiritual medium, but of course she offered no critical check for the idea of reincarnation.

For those who need to brush up on their Near Eastern religious groups, the Druze are a centuries-old offshoot of Islam that after many centuries have turned into their own peculiar religion. Reincarnation is very much a part of their worldview. Druze are found in Israel, Lebanon, Syria. Druze are loyal to any government they find themselves under. Druze in Israel speak Hebrew well, a language akin to Arabic, and the interviews are in Hebrew. Druze serve in Israel’s army and take part in Israeli politics too.

The program P’nim Ah’mee’tee’yote is a regular series in Israel that has been going for at least five seasons and covers all kinds of topics, some of them on the para side of the normal. I suppose it might be compared to something like Sixty Minutes, except that its about 35 minutes long, and that just doesn’t have a real ring to it as far as a name goes.

The boy, and some other people, occasionally speak English during the program that you’d understand. I decided for your edification, to translate and transcribe the show, and it’s accurate enough to understand what is going on here. It is attached. I’ve added many time stamps so you can check the video at the time if you like. I suggest reading the attached transcript before watching the video if you want to watch it.

To me the case looks legitimate for a para-normal explanation, even though I am not a proponent of reincarnation. I would explain it with so-called incorporeal entities who influence humans with all manner of paranormal phenomena and who have directly influenced the child in a range of ways. Admittedly, final proof for any paranormal view is lacking, as is a “rational” explanation. YMMV.

 

[Michael Allen]

It seems safe to assume that humans in general experience what it's like to be human because we're all made about the same, therefore we should all function about the same.

Indeed.