Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 11

[Randall]

Here is a recent paper introducing a forthcoming volume that should be helpful to us at this point: Bringing Darwin into the social sciences and the humanities: cultural evolution and its philosophical implications Stefaan Blancke1,2 • Gilles Denis3 https://link.springer.com/content/p...&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=toc_40656_40_2

It reads to me like the old Nature vs. Nurture debate wrapped-up in new packaging. Not long ago I took a tour through that for the purpose of discerning the extent to which monogamy in humans is the product of social conditioning versus inborn instinct. From that tour it I discovered that some evolutionary psychologists feel that over time the line between nature and nurture breaks down, each influencing the other in aco-evolutionary manner. But it takes a long time. Many generations. Genetically, we're still pretty much identical to the way we were in Roman times ( even before ).

Consequently moral values ( like monogamy ) which have their roots in ancient Roman law that was perpetuated and spread by the church, haven't influenced human nature sufficiently to breed humans who are genetically predisposed to monogamy. Hence humans remain a non-monogamous species with an overlay of mono social conditioning ( especially in Western culture ) that begins pretty much at birth. So Western culture is constantly at odds with its core nature, and that manifests as a significant issue in many relationships, over half of which ( depending on the year and source of stats ) break-up over issues of insecurity, jealousy, dishonesty, and betrayals surrounding the issue of monogamy.

Now back to your regular programming.

 

[smcder]

continuing from that last sentence I posted:



Let us look again at the 'representations' of the atrocities at the border that Trump's followers are willing to accept against all evidence of their illegality and immorality. These are well-summarized in the following text published at MSNBC.com today:

Trump sees immigrant children as bargaining chips in political fight

Thank you for posting about this issue @Constance. It's been difficult lately to think about anything else lately.

 

[Constance]

I think everyone here will be interested in this paper:

THE ROLE OF REGULATION IN THE ORIGIN AND SYNTHETIC MODELLING OF MINIMAL COGNITION
Published in BioSystems
The final publication is available at Elsevier via: The role of regulation in the origin and synthetic modelling of minimal cognition - ScienceDirect

Abstract
In this paper we address the question of minimal cognition by investigating the origin of some crucial cognitive properties from the very basic organisation of biological systems. More specifically, we propose a theoretical model of how a system can distinguish between specific features of its interaction with the environment, which is a fundamental requirement for the emergence of minimal forms of cognition. We argue that the appearance of this capacity is grounded in the molecular domain, and originates from basic mechanisms of biological regulation. In doing so, our aim is to provide a theoretical account that can also work as a possible conceptual bridge between Synthetic Biology and Artificial Intelligence. In fact, we argue, Synthetic Biology can contribute to the study of minimal cognition (and therefore to a minimal AI), by providing a privileged approach to the study of these mechanisms by means of artificial systems.
Keywords: minimal cognition; regulation; stability; biological autonomy; normativity; Synthetic Biology

Also available in pdf here:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/116..._synthetic_modelling_of_minimal_cognition.pdf

 

[Constance]

. . . and this:

Minds and Machines
June 2018, Volume 28, Issue 2, pp 287–310

"Rethinking Causality in Biological and Neural Mechanisms: Constraints and Control"
Jason Winning, William Bechtel

Abstract
Existing accounts of mechanistic causation are not suited for understanding causation in biological and neural mechanisms because they do not have the resources to capture the unique causal structure of control heterarchies. In this paper, we provide a new account on which the causal powers of mechanisms are grounded by time-dependent, variable constraints. Constraints can also serve as a key bridge concept between the mechanistic approach to explanation and underappreciated work in theoretical biology that sheds light on how biological systems channel energy to actively respond to the environment in adaptive ways, perform work, and fulfill the requirements to maintain themselves far from equilibrium. We show how the framework applies to several concrete examples of control in simple organisms as well as the nervous system of complex organisms.

Keywords: Mechanistic explanation Causal powers
Constraints Dissipative structures Heterarchical control Biological autonomy

Rethinking Causality in Biological and Neural Mechanisms: Constraints and Control

 

[smcder]

I'm not sure what I would have responded at the time, as I was just naively dipping my toes into the mind-body problem and the related hard problem of consciousness (thanks to @smcder at the CAP thread).

Currently, I would say, after exploring the topic for 5 years, that the proposed relationship between mind and body that TO describes is a viable resolution to the MBP and the HP.

It took me 5 years to find/arrive at the picture TO articulates above—which in 5 years I haven't seen articulated quite like that; and to see it articulated so plainly and concisely was a bit shocking.

Mind–body problem - Wikipedia

Hard problem of consciousness - Wikipedia

Here is the post from @trainedobserver that @Soupie refers to.

"I hear what you are saying and I agree somewhat. All that is or can be experienced by an individual is the individual's mind itself.

However, I think the thought vs. physical is a false dichotomy. "Thoughts" are physical events occurring in the brain. The "material" that the brain is composed of comprises the thoughts within it. A (the real world in which we exist and have our being) does not equal B (the illusionary or perhaps more correctly hallucinatory world experienced by the mind) not because it is of a different substance, but because it is an incomplete and largely inaccurate representational model, but its made of the same "stuff" whatever that actually is outside of our perceptional limitation of it."

In hope it's ok to repost here from the thread

"Consciousness & Magic."

If not I'll remove it and maybe we can put a link here.

 

[smcder]

@Soupie quotes TO above:

"All that is or can be experienced by an individual is the individual's mind itself."

We can quibble over how "direct" this is ... but the big question is addressed below: which is

What is the relationship between the mind and the world?

"However, I think the thought vs. physical is a false dichotomy. "Thoughts" are physical events occurring in the brain. The "material" that the brain is composed of comprises the thoughts within it. A (the real world in which we exist and have our being) does not equal B (the illusionary or perhaps more correctly hallucinatory world experienced by the mind) not because it is of a different substance, but because it is an incomplete and largely inaccurate representational model, but its made of the same "stuff" whatever that actually is outside of our perceptional limitation of it."

"but because it is an incomplete and largely inaccurate representational model, "

Incomplete yes...but if it's largely inaccurate, this writing is also claiming that
among the minority of things we do get right is arguably one of the largest: the relationship of the real world to the hallucinatory world experienced by the mind ...namely they aren't the same....but if we get that right, is it "a largely inaccurate representational model"? (perception/conception).

But that feels like Plantinga's defeater....I'm fine with the mind evolving for our purposes...but either those purposes get the world right enough that we can then arrive correctly at conclusions about the world or the above argument, that we live in a hallucinatory world of the mind that gets it mostly wrong about the world, somehow manages to get the relationship between a hallucinatory and a real world right? But why should we trust that conclusion is not the result of another largely inaccurate hallucination?

Also...the mind experiences and the individual experiences the mind?

1. "All that is or can be experienced by an individual is the individual's mind itself."

2."the illusionary or perhaps more correctly hallucinatory world experienced by the mind"

Confusing because it refers to what is experienced by the mind and then to the individual's mind...I thought this was one of your gripes @Soupie?

 

[smcder]

"Currently, I would say, after exploring the topic for 5 years, that the proposed relationship between mind and body that TO describes is a viable resolution to the MBP and the HP."

How does this resolve:

"The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining how and why we have qualia or phenomenal experiences—how sensations acquire characteristics, such as colors and tastes." ?

 

[Soupie]

@Soupie quotes TO above:

"All that is or can be experienced by an individual is the individual's mind itself."

We can quibble over how "direct" this is ... but the big question is addressed below: which is

What is the relationship between the mind and the world?

The question of directness is in regards to perceptual experience, not experience per se.

"However, I think the thought vs. physical is a false dichotomy. "Thoughts" are physical events occurring in the brain. The "material" that the brain is composed of comprises the thoughts within it. A (the real world in which we exist and have our being) does not equal B (the illusionary or perhaps more correctly hallucinatory world experienced by the mind) not because it is of a different substance, but because it is an incomplete and largely inaccurate representational model, but its made of the same "stuff" whatever that actually is outside of our perceptional limitation of it."

"but because it is an incomplete and largely inaccurate representational model, "

Incomplete yes...but if it's largely inaccurate, this writing is also claiming that
among the minority of things we do get right is arguably one of the largest: the relationship of the real world to the hallucinatory world experienced by the mind ...namely they aren't the same....but if we get that right, is it "a largely inaccurate representational model"? (perception/conception).

But that feels like Plantinga's defeater....I'm fine with the mind evolving for our purposes...but either those purposes get the world right enough that we can then arrive correctly at conclusions about the world or the above argument, that we live in a hallucinatory world of the mind that gets it mostly wrong about the world, somehow manages to get the relationship between a hallucinatory and a real world right? But why should we trust that conclusion is not the result of another largely inaccurate hallucination?

It's perception that is non-veridical. Not necessarily conceptions. Can we have largely veridically conceptions of the world based on non-veridical perceptions? It doesn't seem like the earth orbits the sun but we know it does. How?

The comment about hallucination is misleading but not inaccurate. The same area of the brain active during hallucination is the same area active during perceptual experience. I don't think we should be surprised by that, but obviously this immediately causes us to question the veridicality of perception. And is particularly troubling for DRs.

A Neuroscientist Explains: where perception ends and hallucination begins - podcast

Also...the mind experiences and the individual experiences the mind?

1. "All that is or can be experienced by an individual is the individual's mind itself."

2."the illusionary or perhaps more correctly hallucinatory world experienced by the mind"

Confusing because it refers to what is experienced by the mind and then to the individual's mind...I thought this was one of your gripes @Soupie?

Of course it's confusing. Every conversation ever held in this thread has been confusing. It's a confusing topic.

We have experience (consciousness), perceptual experience, the individual/organism, and the world. (And I'm sure anyone can ask a thousand questions about those "simple" terms.)

1. "All that is or can be experienced by an individual is the individual's mind itself."

Here is referring to the indirectness of perception, whether you call it causal indirectness or just scientific realism.

2."the illusionary or perhaps more correctly hallucinatory world experienced by the mind"

Here he is referring to the distinction between the world as it is and the world as it is in human perception.

Yes, I would not say the mind "experiences" perceptions. But I don't think that's what he is saying and it's besides the point anyhow. The thing is, I get exactly what he is saysing. And he said it four years ago. As noted, something which took me about 4-5 years to understand myself. The role perception plays in the MBP. Amazing.

 

[smcder]

The question of directness is in regards to perceptual experience, not experience per se.


It's perception that is non-veridical. Not necessarily conceptions. Can we have largely veridically conceptions of the world based on non-veridical perceptions? It doesn't seem like the earth orbits the sun but we know it does. How?

The comment about hallucination is misleading but not inaccurate. The same area of the brain active during hallucination is the same area active during perceptual experience. I don't think we should be surprised by that, but obviously this immediately causes us to question the veridicality of perception. And is particularly troubling for DRs.

A Neuroscientist Explains: where perception ends and hallucination begins - podcast


Of course it's confusing. Every conversation ever held in this thread has been confusing. It's a confusing topic.

We have experience (consciousness), perceptual experience, the individual/organism, and the world. (And I'm sure anyone can ask a thousand questions about those "simple" terms.)

1. "All that is or can be experienced by an individual is the individual's mind itself."

Here is referring to the indirectness of perception, whether you call it causal indirectness or just scientific realism.

2."the illusionary or perhaps more correctly hallucinatory world experienced by the mind"

Here he is referring to the distinction between the world as it is and the world as it is in human perception.

Yes, I would not say the mind "experiences" perceptions. But I don't think that's what he is saying and it's besides the point anyhow. The thing is, I get exactly what he is saysing. And he said it four years ago. As noted, something which took me about 4-5 years to understand myself. The role perception plays in the MBP. Amazing.

That is amazing.

 

[smcder]

I think everyone here will be interested in this paper:

THE ROLE OF REGULATION IN THE ORIGIN AND SYNTHETIC MODELLING OF MINIMAL COGNITION
Published in BioSystems
The final publication is available at Elsevier via: The role of regulation in the origin and synthetic modelling of minimal cognition - ScienceDirect

Abstract
In this paper we address the question of minimal cognition by investigating the origin of some crucial cognitive properties from the very basic organisation of biological systems. More specifically, we propose a theoretical model of how a system can distinguish between specific features of its interaction with the environment, which is a fundamental requirement for the emergence of minimal forms of cognition. We argue that the appearance of this capacity is grounded in the molecular domain, and originates from basic mechanisms of biological regulation. In doing so, our aim is to provide a theoretical account that can also work as a possible conceptual bridge between Synthetic Biology and Artificial Intelligence. In fact, we argue, Synthetic Biology can contribute to the study of minimal cognition (and therefore to a minimal AI), by providing a privileged approach to the study of these mechanisms by means of artificial systems.
Keywords: minimal cognition; regulation; stability; biological autonomy; normativity; Synthetic Biology

Also available in pdf here:
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/116..._synthetic_modelling_of_minimal_cognition.pdf

"While AI usually aims at studying and modelling high-level cognitive properties (e.g. at the human level), surprisingly interesting properties for understanding the origin of cognition can be found also in simpler biological systems such as bacteria and invertebrates, and they can provide insights into the functioning of more complex forms of cognition (Bechtel, 2014). Hence, an AI focused on the investigation of cognition at the minimal level requires an approach that is directly linked to biological processes, and this is what SB can provide 4 . The connection between the two disciplines has not been explored exhaustively yet, and the two disciplines still use distinct languages: cognitive for AI and biochemical for SB."

This reminds me of Rodney Brooks work on subsumptive architecture in the 80s I think and relates both to Dreyfuss' critique of AI and the modelling of robits on simpler biological systems like insects.

 

[smcder]

"this paper we will mainly focus on how some essential requirements for cognition have appeared. In particular, we will argue that specific mechanisms of internal compensation for perturbations are those responsible for the emergence of a capacity to distinguish between specific features of the interactions with the environment which, otherwise, would constitute only a mere source of noise for the system. In Sections 2 and 3, we will distinguish between two forms of compensation for perturbations: respectively, dynamic stability and adaptive regulation. And we will show how only the second ─ based on a decoupling between constitutive metabolism and regulatory mechanisms, and on the capacity to produce endogenous interpretations and evaluations of environmental stimuli ─ enables more complex interactions between an organism and its environment, in which a world of ‘meaningful’ (i.e. functional for the system) specificities emerges for the system." fascinating and relevant to the discussion of perception here.

 

[Soupie]

That is amazing.

If you're implying that there is something incoherent in the above, you're welcome to explain.

(1) Do we perceive the world exactly as it is? No.

(2) Do we conceive of the world exactly as it is? No.

(3) Does this mean everything we think we know about the world is false? No.

 

[smcder]

"What is necessary to overcome the inherent limitations of basic structural stability is the instantiation of a dedicated regulatory subsystem able to endow the system with the capability of acting on its own internal dynamics by modifying them in relation to changing external conditions. However, this is not a trivial question. The realisation of a regulatory subsystem does not simply amount to an addition of a new functional structure or subsystem to the basic self-maintaining metabolic network. Adding an additional node, in fact, would just result in a larger functional network, which would still compensate for perturbations through stability behaviours. Hence, what is required for achieving effective regulatory control is a subsystem ‘that is sufficiently independent of the dynamics of the controlled processes, and which can be varied without disrupting these processes, but it is still able to be linked to parts of the mechanism controlled system [(the regulated subsystem)] so as to be able to modulate their operations."

 

[smcder]

If you're implying that there is something incoherent in the above, you're welcome to explain.

(1) Do we perceive the world exactly as it is? No.

(2) Do we conceive of the world exactly as it is? No.

(3) Does this mean everything we think we know about the world is false? No.

I agree with all of that - My responses to your previous post were in my original post so I didn't respond to your response.

Incoherent? I think it's much more about what is conveyed by emphasis, nuance, rhetoric ("hallucinatory" for example) and stance. Conception and perception interact in complex ways that negotiate for our final view of the world.

 

[smcder]

There are initially startling things about perception and cognitive biases. I'm sure we don't know about many others...but these are things we begin to work into a philosophical position as the excitement fades - things to take on board as exceptions proving rules rather than ... the incoherence does come in at drawing conclusions by the very things that we claim to be unreliable.

Plantinga's arguments might not be an exact fit but the point is in the epistemic stance. The resolution to me is that evolutionary purposes coincide, with seeing the world "as is is" to the extent that a pursuit of truth--->Truth and r----Reality is encouraged.

(Read: The limit of little "t" truth tends to big "T" truth as x goes to infinity.)

 

[smcder]

"Let us consider now the role of regulation in relation to our discussion of the roots of cognition, and compare it to the case of stability. The fundamental difference between the two cases analysed here is that when a mechanism of regulation is at work, the environment is not only a source of indistinguishable perturbations, but also of specific and recognizable ones. The crucial point is that the system endowed with regulatory mechanisms reacts in a very new way: it does things according to what it distinguishes in its interactions with the environment ─ i.e. what activates the regulatory subsystem. Actually, the ‘recognition’ in fact is a complex process, since the specific features of the interactions with the environment which are responsible for triggering the regulatory subsystem do not drive directly the response of the system, such as in the case of basic network responses. In fact, the perturbation activates the regulatory subsystem, which in turns modulates the basic constitutive network in such a way as to cope with the specific environmental feature which triggered the regulatory response: the organism eats a new source of food, or secrets chemicals to neutralise a lethal substance, etc. In other words, the fact of recognition is both a consequence of the specificity of the perturbation and of the internal normative organisation of the system."

 

[smcder]

 

[smcder]

Chemical basis for minimal cognition. - PubMed - NCBI

"The system consists simply of an oil droplet in an aqueous environment. A chemical reaction within the oil droplet induces an instability, the symmetry of the oil droplet breaks, and the droplet begins to move through the aqueous phase. The complement of physical phenomena that is then generated indicates the presence of feedback cycles that, as will be argued, form the basis for self-regulation, homeostasis, and perhaps an extended form of autopoiesis."

Search: minimal cognition leads to numerous papers like this and to minimal cognition in evolutionary robotics...

 

[Soupie]

the incoherence does come in at drawing conclusions by the very things that we claim to be unreliable.

The conclusion I am drawing is that we don't know anything about <MATTER> that would disqualify it from being the ground of mind.

Is that incoherent?

 

[smcder]

The conclusion I am drawing is that we don't know anything about <MATTER> that would disqualify it from being the ground of mind.

Is that incoherent?

I posted what looked possibly incoherent to me in TOs writing above.