Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 11

[Soupie]

Do DR and IR describe two different processes of perception or do they describe the same process differently?

If the former, someone please elucidate.

 

[Soupie]

How many speckles on the hen? Using only the sense datum, don't look at the hen.

First of all, as far as I can tell, the notion of sense-datum, as @Pharoah suggested is no longer in use. However IR is still very in play.

So arguing against IR by arguing against sense-datum I think is misleading.

I think a current IR would use the term brain states instead of sense datum.

As an argument against indirect perception. If we perceive via sense-datum, we should know how many speckles, instead we have to look and count.

I don't think this is a valid argument against IR. It is a realist model. So to perceive reality we have to interact with reality.

In other words on both accounts IR and DR, perception involves looking.

I've never read an IR account of perception which didn't involve looking.

Kane n says we see surface reflectance as color.

We see <HEN> as hen.

 

[Soupie]

Another issue is that "sense datum" seems to be a philosophical term and not a biological or neuroscientific term.

Google

Sense datum

"an immediate object of perception, which is not a material object; a sense impression"

I don't think a scientific IR would ever say that we perceive non-material objects.

As it is, the distinction between IR and DR is so vague and semantic-based as to be unhelpful.

 

[smcder]

First of all, as far as I can tell, the notion of sense-datum, as @Pharoah suggested is no longer in use. However IR is still very in play.

So arguing against IR by arguing against sense-datum I think is misleading.

I think a current IR would use the term brain states instead of sense datum.


I don't think this is a valid argument against IR. It is a realist model. So to perceive reality we have to interact with reality.

In other words on both accounts IR and DR, perception involves looking.

I've never read an IR account of perception which didn't involve looking.


We see <HEN> as hen.

Argument against sense data and therefore against indirect realism a la the Speckled Hen

Sense-Data (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

 

[Constance]

On various philosophy forums I've participated on, there have been arguments between those who call themselves 'direct realists' and those who call themselves 'indirect realists'. The question is apparently about perception. Do we experience reality directly, or do we experience it indirectly?

Let us take as an example of what we 'perceive' the current atrocities being committed against helpless children (and their parents) who arrive at our southern border seeking asylum. What do you see, perceive, understand about that reality? What do Trump's followers see, perceive, understand? How can quantum mechanics or speculations about photons help us to understand this contentious and debased reality in which we are living?

 

[Soupie]

Ok, we've cited this Wikipedia entry many times, but here it is once more:

"The question of direct or naïve realism, as opposed to indirect or representational realism, arises in the philosophy of perceptionand of mind out of the debate over the nature of conscious experience;[1][2] the epistemological question of whether the world we see around us is the real world itself or merely an internal perceptual copy of that world generated by neural processes in our brain."

[The term "generated" could be significant as it implies a duality between neural processes and the internal, perceptual copy.]

But so far, the above is clearly a philosophical question and seems to be unclear whether the answer involves dualism or monism. Right?

[If this question is one of dualism, then the difference is abundantly clear. I haven't gotten that sense though. Please correct me if wrong. I don't think this is the case bc below IR is suggested to be roughly equivalent to the scientific model. Thus IR shouldn't be understood to be a dualist position.]

"Naïve realism is known as direct realism when developed to counter indirect or representative realism, also known as epistemological dualism,[3] the philosophical position that our conscious experience [do they mean our perception?] is not of the real world itself but of an internal representation, a miniature virtual-reality replica of the world."

Just focusing on the philosophical side of this debate, there is one issue. (Note that sense datum hasnt been mentioned. Instead we have "internal representation.")

The one issue: we can quibble over the term "representation." Does it mean miniature replica? Or can it simply mean humancentric?

In other words, one can be an IR and not hold that the "representations" are miniature replicas but rather human-embodied. Right?

So, the philosophical side of the argument turns on the following:

[T]the philosophical position that our [perception] is not of the real world (direct realism) itself but of an internal representation (indirect realism).

As the quote in the blog entry above succinctly put it: what exactly is the fuss about?

How shall we tell the difference? I suggest there isn't a difference. The difference is semantics.

Now for the scientific side of the question. Note the both philosophical IR and DR accept the following:

"Indirect realism is broadly equivalent to the accepted view of perception in natural science that states that we do not and cannot perceive the external world as it really is but know only our ideas and interpretations of the way the world is.[4]"

DR Kane: we see surface reflectance as color.

One a DR makes the above concession, there is no difference between it and IR other than name.

Since both philosophical IR and DR accept the scientific picture of perception, this indicates even more strongly that the difference is semantics.

Essentially, do we perceive the world via our nervous system or do we perceive our nervous system which represents the world?

I say the difference is semantics.

 

[Soupie]

Let us take as an example of what we 'perceive' the current atrocities being committed against helpless children (and their parents) who arrive at our southern border seeking asylum. What do you see, perceive, understand about that reality? What do Trump's followers see, perceive, understand? How can quantum mechanics or speculations about photons help us to understand this contentious and debased reality in which we are living?

Of course they can't. But you don't seem to be speaking of strictly perception, you're also talking about conceptions, ideologies, culture, etc.

 

[Soupie]

Argument against sense data and therefore against indirect realism a la the Speckled Hen

Sense-Data (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Yes, sense-data models of IR seem to be MB dualist models.

"Critics of sense data have objected to the theory's commitment to mind-body dualism..."

But obviously not all IR models are dualist models. Current, clearly monist, scientific models of perception are IR.

 

[Soupie]

So this has been clarifying. The confusion between DR and IR seems to boil down to the following:

IR that is monist

IR that is dualist

And the meaning of "representation" in IR.

Representation - miniature replica of reality

Representation - embodied and enactive

An IR model of perception that is monist and embodied and enactive seems to be pretty much consistent with DR models of perception.

 

[Constance]

Just focusing on the philosophical side of this debate, there is one issue. (Note that no mention of sense datum has been mentioned. Instead we have "internal representation."

The one issue: we can quibble over the term "representation." Does it mean miniature replica? Or can it simply mean humancentric?

'Quibble?' Reductive hypotheses concerning consciousness and mind, including the long-disputed reliance on 'representation' as explanation, constitute the core of disputation in Consciousness Studies as developed over the last thirty years. I've cited and quoted texts concerning this issue, and written about them in this thread for at least the last two years. We might have to take up and discuss a number of those already cited texts and examine others in order to refine our understanding of the relation between presentation and re-presentation in human understanding of the reality in which we find ourselves existing. I think that until we do that, we are left spinning our wheels looking for remote 'monist explanations' of how that which is presented to us in conscious experience (and even in preconscious, pre-reflective, experience) is never captured in discrete 'representations'.

 

[Constance]

continuing from that last sentence I posted:

I think that until we do that, we are left spinning our wheels looking for remote 'monist explanations' of how that which is presented to us in conscious experience (and even in preconscious, pre-reflective, experience) is never captured in discrete 'representations'.

Let us look again at the 'representations' of the atrocities at the border that Trump's followers are willing to accept against all evidence of their illegality and immorality. These are well-summarized in the following text published at MSNBC.com today:

Trump sees immigrant children as bargaining chips in political fight

 

[Constance]

Here is a recent paper introducing a forthcoming volume that should be helpful to us at this point:

Bringing Darwin into the social sciences and the humanities: cultural evolution and its philosophical implications

Stefaan Blancke1,2 • Gilles Denis3

https://link.springer.com/content/p...&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=toc_40656_40_2

 

[Pharoah]

Im saying the difference is semantics.

How would you characterize the difference between DR and IR?

And I'm saying that I don't believe that DR philosophers would say "the difference between DR and IR is semantics"...
How would I characterize the difference? I probably wouldn't.
Incidentally, if one is not a DR does one become, by default, IR?... if one is a realist, that is...

 

[smcder]

And I'm saying that I don't believe that DR philosophers would say "the difference between DR and IR is semantics"...
How would I characterize the difference? I probably wouldn't.
Incidentally, if one is not a DR does one become, by default, IR?... if one is a realist, that is...

@Soupie what @Pharoah is pointing at is the history of the debate ... and there always is one. Things make more sense often in that context. Sometimes it does wash out to semantics.

It takes more than an afternoon on Google to go through one of these things, but once you've done it for a few, you're certainly not an expert in the history of philosophy but you know a few things ... for example that there is rarely a neat and tidy finish to the debate, some find it incredible that philosophers are still talking about panpsychism for example, others think those who find it incredible, are themselves incredible ... and so it goes ... and that leads to 2) (or B. if you prefer), which is that there is no eight count in philosophy, resurrection of the long dead is the norm - in fact, rarely does an idea go all the way down - so are sense datum passe? Maybe.

Here is what claims to be

"... the only book available that combines thorough discussion of the arguments behind both direct and indirect realism in a single resource, and is required reading for neuroscientists, neurophilosophers, cognitive scientists and anyone interested in conscious perception and the mind-brain connection."

Published in January of this year ...

Direct versus Indirect Realism - 1st Edition

"Direct versus Indirect Realism: A Neurophilosophical Debate on Consciousness brings together leading neuroscientists and philosophers to explain and defend their theories on consciousness. The book offers a one-of-a-kind look at the radically opposing theories concerning the nature of the objects of immediate perception—whether these are distal physical objects or phenomenal experiences in the conscious mind. Each side—neuroscientists and philosophers—offers accessible, comprehensive explanations of their points-of-view, with each side also providing a response to the other that offers a unique approach on opposing positions."

 

[smcder]

Derek H. Brown, A study in deflated acquaintance knowledge: Sense-datum theory and perceptual constancy. - PhilPapers

We perceive the objective world through a subjective perceptual veil. Various perceived properties, particularly “secondary qualities” like colours and tastes, are mind-dependent. Although mind-dependent, our knowledge of many facts about the perceptual veil is immediate and secure. These are well-known facets of sense-datum theory. My aim is to carve out a conception of sense-datum theory that does not require the immediate and secure knowledge of a wealth of facts about experienced sense-data (§1). Such a theory is of value on its own, given well-known challenges to epistemic foundationalism. Beyond this such a theory helps demonstrate how sense-datum theory can accommodate challenging perceptual phenomena like shape and size constancies (§3). These ideas are bridged by the roots of perceptual ambiguity (§2). In brief, tapering acquaintance knowledge creates space for perceptual representation to resolve the ambiguities in presented objects seemingly inherent in scenarios involving perceptual constancies. Thus, I offer a two-factor (acquaintance-representation) sense-datum theory to meet the challenge posed by constancies. Following Smith (2002), from whom this challenge is drawn, my focus is on shape and size constancies. Other constancies, notably colour constancy, are treated elsewhere (Brown 2014).

 

[Pharoah]

@Soupie what @Pharoah is pointing at is the history of the debate ... and there always is one. Things make more sense often in that context. Sometimes it does wash out to semantics.

It takes more than an afternoon on Google to go through one of these things, but once you've done it for a few, you're certainly not an expert in the history of philosophy but you know a few things ... for example that there is rarely a neat and tidy finish to the debate, some find it incredible that philosophers are still talking about panpsychism for example, others think those who find it incredible, are themselves incredible ... and so it goes ... and that leads to 2) (or B. if you prefer), which is that there is no eight count in philosophy, resurrection of the long dead is the norm - in fact, rarely does an idea go all the way down - so are sense datum passe? Maybe.

Here is what claims to be

"... the only book available that combines thorough discussion of the arguments behind both direct and indirect realism in a single resource, and is required reading for neuroscientists, neurophilosophers, cognitive scientists and anyone interested in conscious perception and the mind-brain connection."

Published in January of this year ...

Direct versus Indirect Realism - 1st Edition

"Direct versus Indirect Realism: A Neurophilosophical Debate on Consciousness brings together leading neuroscientists and philosophers to explain and defend their theories on consciousness. The book offers a one-of-a-kind look at the radically opposing theories concerning the nature of the objects of immediate perception—whether these are distal physical objects or phenomenal experiences in the conscious mind. Each side—neuroscientists and philosophers—offers accessible, comprehensive explanations of their points-of-view, with each side also providing a response to the other that offers a unique approach on opposing positions."

OK... there is only one book on dr v ir.... you guys are batting the ball from one side of the court to the other. Perhaps one of you needs to read that book!
I ask these questions not because I don't know the answer or want to know what the answers are (and should therefore google it) but to provoke you into thinking about them as a way of exploring what the terms imply etc.

 

[smcder]

OK... there is only one book on dr v ir.... you guys are batting the ball from one side of the court to the other. Perhaps one of you needs to read that book!
I ask these questions not because I don't know the answer or want to know what the answers are (and should therefore google it) but to provoke you into thinking about them as a way of exploring what the terms imply etc.

"I ask these questions not because I don't know the answer or want to know what the answers are (and should therefore google it) but to provoke you into thinking about them as a way of exploring what the terms imply etc."

Pulling a Socrates, eh? ;-)

I haven't followed closely enough to know what "these questions" or "what the terms imply" above refers to? :-(

 

[smcder]

@Soupie resources on dr/ir

Direct and Indirect Perception - Bibliography - PhilPapers

"About this topic

Summary

This area is structured by three central questions. A first question is: What does it mean to perceive something directly? There are two standard ways in which this question has been answered."

followed by a listing of key works.

Search on:

"philpapers topics in direct realism"

...or any "topics in x" gives a bibliography sortable by year, author, etc.

For example:

Naive and Direct Realism - Bibliography - PhilPapers

399 in this category and it lists sibling categories

 

[Constance]

. . . Here is what claims to be "... the only book available that combines thorough discussion of the arguments behind both direct and indirect realism in a single resource, and is required reading for neuroscientists, neurophilosophers, cognitive scientists and anyone interested in conscious perception and the mind-brain connection."
Direct versus Indirect Realism - 1st Edition

Looks like a source we need to read at this point. One to get from the library given the price.

 

[Constance]

@Soupie resources on dr/ir

Direct and Indirect Perception - Bibliography - PhilPapers

"About this topic

Summary

This area is structured by three central questions. A first question is: What does it mean to perceive something directly? There are two standard ways in which this question has been answered."

followed by a listing of key works.

Search on:

"philpapers topics in direct realism"

...or any "topics in x" gives a bibliography sortable by year, author, etc.

For example:

Naive and Direct Realism - Bibliography - PhilPapers

399 in this category and it lists sibling categories

Excellent help, Steve. Thank you for these guides to research.