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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 11

Discussion in 'General Freewheeling Chit-Chat' started by Gene Steinberg, Dec 26, 2017.



  1. Constance

    Constance Paranormal Adept

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    Here is an NDPR review of this book by Taylor for our mutual enlightenment on the issue of the relationship between language and consciousness/mind.

    Charles Taylor, The Language Animal: The Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity, Harvard University Press, 2016, 352pp., $35.00 (hbk), ISBN 9780674660205.

    Reviewed by Michael N. Forster, Universität Bonn

    This is a rich and important book. Its main topic is the nature of human language. But it also contains several long, semi-digressive, and very interesting discussions of additional topics, including meta-ethics and art (chapter 6). This review will focus on the book's official topic. It will begin by sketching the main contents before going on to offer some critical comments on the historical and philosophical theses developed.

    The Preface sets up a fundamental contrast between two conceptions of human language: what Taylor calls 'HHH theories', named after Hamann, Herder, and Humboldt, and what he calls 'HLC theories', named after Hobbes, Locke, and Condillac. Taylor's project is basically to champion the former theories against the latter (ix).

    Chapter 1, "Designative and Constitutive Views," explains that what distinguishes these two types of theory is above all that HLC theories are "enframing" theories that "understand language within the framework of a picture of human life, behavior, purposes, or mental functioning, which is itself described and defined without reference to language," whereas HHH theories see language as "constitutive," that is, "as making possible new purposes, new levels of behavior, new meanings" (3-4). Taylor next explores this contrast, focusing mainly on the HHH, "constitutive" side. Here he focuses on Herder's famous idea in his Treatise on the Origin of Language (1772) that what is distinctive of human language, as opposed to animal signs, is Besonnenheit, which Taylor, like Herder, understands as a conception of linguistic "rightness" and which (again like Herder) he sees as distinguishing human beings from animals (6-12). The chapter goes on to discuss and champion various further features of HHH theories and variants of them that Taylor endorses: several forms of linguistic holism (12-25); a broadening of the conception of linguistic "rightness" to include not only designative or descriptive but also non-designative, non-descriptive uses of language (25-9, 47); a thesis of an essential dependence of thought on language (30-1), together with some Wittgensteinian considerations that support it (32-3); a rejection of the assumption common to HLC theories and their (post-)Fregean descendants that description, or furnishing information, is the fundamental function of language (35-6); a recognition of the fundamental role of bodily "enactment," or body-language, in constituting meanings and thereby enabling language proper (38-9); and a distinction between two sorts of disclosure that enactment and linguistic expression make possible: "accessive" (i.e., descriptive) disclosure vs. "existential" disclosure (40-4).

    Chapter 2, "How Language Grows," explores how human language develops, both ontogenetically and phylogenetically. Concerning ontogeny, Taylor basically follows Michael Tomasello in arguing (contrary to the epistemology of HLC theories) for a chronological priority of shared intentions over individual subjectivity in child development (52-67). Taylor considers the evidence concerning phylogeny to be less clear, but he tentatively endorses Merlin Donald's suggestion that the development of human language and culture began with a mimetic phase, then passed through a mythic (and ritualistic) phase, before finally attaining a theoretic phase (67-76). One of Taylor's most interesting ideas in this connection concerns how the transition from a mythic(-ritualistic) to a theoretic phase occurred: the latter's distinctions between literal vs. figurative uses of language, the natural vs. the supernatural, myth vs. its underlying meanings, and myth vs. history all had to be created (78).

    Chapter 3, "Beyond Information Encoding," argues against the view that human language is continuous in nature with animal signs (84-7). It also argues that the error of seeing them as continuous has encouraged the further mistake of thinking of human language as fundamentally descriptive (86). Finally, it argues (in preparation for a case to be developed more fully in the chapters ahead) that HLC-style theories are fatally flawed because (a) description is not the exclusive function of human language and (b) description presupposes human language's other functions. These other functions include articulating what Taylor calls "human meanings" (e.g., morality); holistic ways of "inhabiting the world" (à la Heidegger); symbolic forms other than language proper but on which language proper depends; the body-language and gesture that are connected to discourse (as opposed to writing); and language's constitution of what Taylor calls "social footings" (90-9).

    Chapter 4, "The Hobbes-Locke-Condillac Theory," begins with a sketch of the main lines of the HLC approach (103-10). It then argues that (post-)Fregean philosophy of language to a significant extent continues the HLC approach, and thereby inherits the latter's deficiencies (111-12). In order to make this case, the chapter begins by outlining the main respects in which Frege and his followers by contrast depart from the HLC position (e.g., by introducing anti-psychologism, the primacy of the sentence over the word, and the distinction between sense and reference) (112-16). It then focuses on the residue of continuity: a conception of language as fundamentally descriptive in character, together with an epistemological project of treating language as primarily a tool for acquiring reliable knowledge (116-24). Finally, the chapter argues that while theories of this sort, such as Donald Davidson's, may be able to capture the character of a part of language, they cannot capture the character of language as a whole, and, moreover, the part whose character they can capture is essentially dependent on the parts whose character they cannot. The latter parts are (a) a certain "Cratylist" dimension (which centrally includes figurative or metaphorical uses of language) and (b) "thick" cultural meanings (e.g., moral meanings and ones that constitute social roles and political institutions) (126-8). (Chapter 5 will then go on to discuss case (a) in detail, while Chapters 6 and 7 will go on to do the same for case (b).)

    Chapter 5, "The Figuring Dimension of Language," argues that whereas HLC theories hold that figurative uses of language add nothing new to our cognitive access to the world, some such uses in fact do (133-46). The chapter then goes on to discuss several aspects of this. One of these is the fundamental role of embodied engagement with the world in structuring both our vocabulary and our figurative uses of it: human beings tend to acquire words for pragmatically essential discriminations first (e.g. "dog"), those for less pragmatically important ones only later (e.g., "mammal" or "dachshund"); and they also tend to develop figurative extensions of the meanings of prepositions (e.g. from "over" in the sense of being above to "over" in the sense of being beyond) in a way that is guided by practical activity (in order to get to a point "over" the bridge in the latter sense we need to do so by first passing "over" it in the former sense) (146-56). Another aspect is the role in structuring our language and cognition of what Taylor, following Mark Johnson and George Lakoff, calls "template" metaphors (i.e., very fundamental and widely applied metaphors such as "in" and "out") (156-64). A third aspect is a certain "symbolic" use of language, as, for example, when in the moral domain we speak of people as "upright" or employ the concept of a moral "stain" (164-9). Taylor argues that the essential role of such figurative uses of language within language cannot be accounted for by HLC theories and their (post-)Fregean descendants, such as Davidson's truth-conditional theory, so that such theories fail as accounts of our grasp of language (170-2).

    Chapter 6, "Constitution 1," argues that feelings are internal to our understanding of many terms, including moral terms (180-7), and that language is essential to the constitution of both of these as well, which is something that HLC theories, with their focus on the descriptive function of language, cannot account for (187-90). This character of the moral sphere does not preclude the existence of better and worse views within it, however (193-223; cf. 339-40). In this area bodily enactment, sensuous and linguistic articulation, and, finally, explanation all play important roles, forming a sort of hierarchy of levels (223-4). But, in addition, there is also the sort of non-assertive "portrayal" that is characteristic of the arts, such as music and painting (235-7). In particular, music often expresses and creates new human meanings and experiences (242-6), even while remaining "ontically indefinite" (248). So this sort of portrayal needs to be included in the aforementioned hierarchy as well (see for this 250-2; though there seems to be some confusion in Taylor's characterization of the finally resulting hierarchy here, and later on also some wobbling concerning whether or not artistic "portrayal" is really as essential as its inclusion here implies (334)). In the domain of "human meanings," language proper therefore requires a whole range of symbolic forms, including bodily enactment and the "portrayal" of art, which contradicts the HLC assumption that it can occur without these (260). Moreover, this also applies to language tout court, since scientific meanings are only possible in the context of a background of "human meanings" (262). The facts that figurative uses of language are fundamental to language (chapter 5) and that the "human meanings" that are fundamental to all language presuppose enactment and artistic "portrayal" (chapter 6) defeat HLC theories and their (post-)Fregean descendants, which conceive language as fundamentally descriptive (262).

    Chapter 7, "Constitution 2," completes this case against such theories by adding that, like "human meanings," "social footings" (such as engaging with someone in an avuncular manner), social orders, and political institutions are also constituted and transformed through discourse -- as, for example, when notions of "equality" entered ancient Greek political life or notions of "identity" enter modern political debates in connection with such issues as homosexual rights (280-4). As in the case of "human meanings," this challenges HLC theories and their descendants, which focus exclusively on the descriptive function of language (285-7). A similar point applies to ritual as well (288).

    The remaining chapters complement the fundamental case that has been developed up to this point with what Taylor calls "Further Applications." Chapter 8, "How Narrative Makes Meaning," argues that in order to understand the moral of a novel, the current condition of a person, or the present nature of a society one needs to know the diachronic narrative that led up to it (309-17). It also argues that doing this in an autobiographical mode is an essential part of what it is to be a self (317-18).

    Chapter 9, "The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis," considers Sapir and Whorf's famous hypothesis that different languages (especially in virtue of their different grammars) constitute different worldviews. Taylor basically argues that where everyday descriptive language is concerned, for example, different ways of using count nouns vs. mass nouns, or different vocabularies for colors, this hypothesis is not plausible (322-4); that on a more "metaphysical" plane, for example, in relation to different ways of conceiving time, it is indeed plausible, but this does not matter very much because our own positions in this area are clearly superior to the rival ones (325-7); and that the domain where the hypothesis applies most clearly and importantly is that of cultural differences, that is, the domain of the sorts of "human," in particular moral, meanings, "social footings," social orders, and political institutions that Taylor has discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 (327-8). The chapter concludes by appending a (perhaps less important) discussion of differences in linguistic "register" (329-31).

    Finally, the "Conclusion: The Range of Human Linguistic Capacity" summarizes the book's overall case (332-4). It also adds some further reflections concerning the differences between human beings and (other) animals: in particular, concerning joint attention, play, and the sort of flexibility (in the sense of freedom from narrow instinct) that language allows human beings unlike animals (Taylor again takes over the last of these features, flexibility, from Herder's Treatise on the Origin of Language) (334-42). Lastly, the chapter points out that the HHH theory of language led historically to certain views of the significance of poetry and ritual among the German Romantics that Taylor proposes to take up and develop further in a companion volume (342-5).

    This is an extraordinarily rich and rewarding book, the product not only of a lifetime of deep thinking and writing about the issues involved, but also of an admirable attempt to take the current state of research into account (many of the works that Taylor cites and draws on only appeared during the last decade or so). The present reviewer is very much in sympathy with many of the book's arguments: especially, with its thesis of the superiority of the Hamann-Herder-Humboldt tradition. However, I also find a number of the book's positions concerning both historical and philosophical matters problematic, and would therefore now like to discuss a number of these.

    Let us begin with some historical questions. Taylor is a real expert on the history of German philosophy, and to a certain extent also the history of philosophy more broadly. He always works with the primary texts in the original languages and forms his own judgments rather than just picking up interpretations from the secondary literature (as so often happens). Accordingly, his remarks on the history of philosophy, especially those on the German HHH tradition, are for the most part both reliable and illuminating. Nonetheless, there are a number of weaknesses in this whole area.

    One concerns the book's conception of its main opponent: the HLC tradition together with its alleged (post-)Fregean continuers. For while there are indeed some very striking continuities between the positions of Hobbes, Locke, and Condillac themselves (as well as Hume, incidentally, who is strangely missing from Taylor's account), it is much less clear that (post-)Fregean philosophy of language should be seen as continuing their project. It is quite true that the two sides share a certain epistemological focus, a conception of the core of language as descriptive, and a concern to make language a reliable tool for the acquisition of scientific knowledge (116-24.). Pointing this out seems to me one of the main achievements of Taylor's book. But besides the several important (post-)Fregean departures from the HLC tradition that Taylor himself lists (112-16), there are also several further ones. In particular, Frege himself (albeit only equivocally) and then successors such as Davidson (unequivocally) take on board one of the central ideas of the HHH tradition: that language is constitutive of thought (i.e., that without language there cannot be thought). And Frege, followed by most post-Fregean philosophy of language, emphatically rejects the sort of equation of meanings with subjective mental "ideas" that constituted the central thesis of the HLC tradition (this is a second sort of anti-"psychologism" in Frege that is quite distinct from the sort of anti-"psychologism" concerning the status of logical laws that Taylor himself rightly attributes to him (112)). Taylor's attempt to force all of the theories that he dislikes into one Procrustean bed results in various further interpretive mutilations as well. For example, he argues that the project of seeing human language as continuous with animal signs "encourages the concentration on description, or alternatively on coding information as the main function of language" (86), whereas in fact animal signs have traditionally been seen as precisely not usually descriptive or information-encoding (which is why the recent discovery by Dorothy Cheney and Robert Seyfarth that vervet monkeys do use signs to convey information was so revolutionary).

    This sort of problem is slightly less severe in connection with the HHH tradition and its descendants, since the thinkers involved there -- Hamann, Herder, Humboldt, and then the Romantics -- really do share a lot of common ground. Nonetheless, here too Taylor's historical account has certain deficiencies, especially concerning "Herder, who has been my inspiration throughout" (342). One problem is that Taylor gives only an extremely incomplete picture of the achievements of Herder and his tradition in the philosophy of language. For example, while Taylor does recognize that they championed a thesis that language is constitutive of thought (30-1), he leaves the exact import of this thesis vague and then jumps to Wittgenstein for arguments in its support (32-3). But Herder had articulated an unusually precise and, moreover, plausible version of the thesis, namely that thought is essentially dependent on and bounded in its scope by language (i.e., that someone can only think if s/he has a language and can only think what s/he is able to express linguistically). He had also developed serious arguments in support of the thesis, including one that is arguably more compelling than any to be found in successors such as Wittgenstein. Moreover, he defended the thesis convincingly against important prima facie counterexamples (e.g., the seeming occurrence of thought without language in certain animals and the seeming ability of other expressive media than language, such as instrumental music, sculpture, and painting, to express thoughts without language). Another omission: Herder not only developed the thesis just mentioned but also a second closely related one that Taylor entirely overlooks: that meanings consist not in designated objects, Platonic forms, subjective mental "ideas," or whatnot, as much of the philosophical tradition had held, but in the use of words. (This second thesis is another case in which Herder strikingly anticipates Wittgenstein. It also constitutes the core of the especially cogent argument for the first thesis that I alluded to above.)

    Taylor overlooks another set of important contributions that Herder made to the philosophy of language. Taylor himself rightly points out the great importance for the philosophy of language of a sensitive "hermeneutics," a hermeneutics that, for example, acknowledges and accepts the so-called "hermeneutical circle." (Taylor should have added here that this is something that the HLC tradition and its (post-)Fregean descendants have strikingly failed to provide.) Taylor attributes this achievement to Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur (216-19). However, it was in fact Herder -- followed by the Romantic philosopher Schleiermacher – who first developed a sensitive hermeneutics of the sort in question, including an acknowledgment and acceptance of the hermeneutical circle. Herder did this on the basis of his philosophy of language and his recognition of historicism, in the sense of the phenomenon of deep divergences in concepts, beliefs, values, types of feelings, and so on between different historical periods and different cultures (a recognition that Friedrich Meinecke correctly credits him with in his well-known book on the subject). By contrast, Heidegger and Gadamer's hermeneutics in part merely borrows from Herder and Schleiermacher's and in part perverts it.

    Taylor also ignores the fact that Herder -- again followed by Schleiermacher -- was the first to develop a radical new theory and methodology of translation, namely, what would today be called a "foreignizing" (as opposed to "domesticating") theory. This theory, besides having exercised an enormous beneficial impact on the practice of translation in Germany, continues to constitute the core of the most important translation theories/methodologies developed in recent decades (e.g., those of Antoine Berman and Lawrence Venuti).

    One final example of Taylor's omissions here: Among the most central and interesting parts of Taylor's own argument against HLC theories is his thesis in Chapter 5 that figurative uses of language are fundamental to language as a whole. In this connection, he cites much contemporary literature, such as the work of Mark Johnson and George Lakoff. However, this is yet another area in which Herder had in fact already shown the way, especially in the essay On Image, Poetry, and Fable (1787) and in his Metacritique. Indeed, there was a whole early tradition of such theories that Taylor fails to mention in which Herder constituted a central link: a tradition that already began before him with Condillac (a fact that, incidentally, again complicates Taylor's sharp HHH vs. HLC opposition) and which then continued after him with Nietzsche (especially in On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense).

    Finally, the historical dimension of Taylor's account is also handicapped by a one-sided picture of Herder that focuses almost exclusively on a single text from a single phase of his career, the Treatise on the Origin of Language (1772). Taylor neglects other highly relevant texts (e.g., besides those already mentioned above, the Fragments on Recent German Literature (1767-8), This Too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity (1774), On the Cognition and Sensation of the Human Soul (1778), and Ideas for a Philosophy of History of Humanity (1784-91)). He also neglects changes/developments in Herder's position. For example, whereas the version of the thesis of thought's essential dependence on language that is found in the Treatise is on closer inspection merely verbal, consistent in substance with a sharp dualism of thought vs. language in the manner of the Enlightenment, other texts from both before and after the Treatise develop a genuine, radical, and philosophically superior version of the thesis. Whereas the Treatise retains an atomistic view of language in the manner of the Enlightenment and has only a very confused conception of the nature of grammar, the later Ideas sees language-use as always presupposing a grammar and as to this extent holistic, eliminates the earlier confusions concerning grammar, and, in addition, argues that grammars vary deeply between languages (a position that would later give birth to modern linguistics in Friedrich Schlegel and Humboldt -- which, incidentally, is yet another example of an achievement of Herder's in the philosophy of language that Taylor ignores). Finally, whereas the Treatise argues for a sharp difference between human language and animal signs, and a corresponding sharp difference between humans and animals themselves, the Ideas rather argues for continuity between the two sides. (Readers who are interested in pursuing any of these issues might consult my After Herder: Philosophy of Language in the German Tradition (OUP, 2010) and German Philosophy of Language: From Schlegel to Hegel and Beyond (OUP, 2011), where they are all discussed in some detail.)

    Let us now turn to consider some aspects of Taylor's philosophical argument. A first problem is that there is a vacillation in his conception of the main target against which he is arguing. Is it, as his opening distinction between "enframing" and "constitutive" theories implies, the position that thought and meaning, together with whatever psychological states and psychologically laden practice ("purposes" and "behavior") presuppose them, are essentially independent of language? Or is it rather, as much of the book implies, that language is fundamentally designative and descriptive (and that the philosophy of language should strive to facilitate accurate description)? These positions are logically independent of each other: an "enframer" could without any contradiction either be such a descriptivist or not; such a descriptivist could without any contradiction either be an "enframer" or not. Of course, there is nothing wrong with attacking several logically independent targets in one book, but the failure to distinguish between these two clearly tends to both obscure and weaken Taylor's case.

    A second problem is that there is a deep tension between Taylor's central thesis, taken from Herder, that what is distinctive of human language (as opposed to animal signs) is a sense of linguistic "rightness," on the one hand, and Taylor's rejection of descriptivism, on the other hand. In fairness to Taylor, it is true that he broadens the relevant notion of linguistic "rightness" to include non-descriptive cases, so there is no flat contradiction here. But in Herder descriptive cases were precisely the ones in question. Moreover, it seems difficult to avoid treating them as at least the paradigm cases of linguistic "rightness," which would arguably be enough to give a descriptivist all he really needs.

    A third problem concerns the deep role of figurative uses of language in constituting language as a whole for which Taylor argues very effectively and interestingly in Chapter 5. This role is indeed incompatible with a widespread perception in the HLC tradition and its aftermath in (post-)Fregean philosophy of language that such uses are merely secondary, superficial, and even pernicious. But it does not seem to be in principle incompatible with either of Taylor's main targets from that tradition: the "enframing" view of language and the descriptivist view of language. After all, metaphors could be seen as fundamentally just a certain kind of thoughts, so there seems to be no tension here with an "enframing" position; and both metaphors and the features that they serve to illuminate are normally descriptive in character, so there seems to be no tension with a descriptivist position either.

    A fourth problem concerns the other main pillar of Taylor's case: his argument in Chapters 6 and 7 that language is constitutive of "human meanings" such as moral values, "social footings," social orders, political institutions, and the like. The problem here lies in a certain one-sidedness of the argument. The standard position in the HHH tradition was that all thought and meaning essentially depend on language. If that were plausible, then one would think that would be the position Taylor should mainly focus on, his "human meanings," "social footings," and so on being merely a sort of special case of language's much broader constitutive function. However, Taylor seems not to see things this way. While he does consider the standard position in question sympathetically, his discussion of it is strangely brief and thin (30-3), and he implies that the sort of constitutive function that language has in "human meanings," "social footings," and so forth is not to be found in other areas, such as the description of natural objects (though he also implies in some rather obscure remarks that it is involved there indirectly due to a certain dependence of the latter uses of language on the former ones (262)). This all seems to amount to a sort of side-stepping of the central issue in the "enframing" vs. "constitutive" debate.

    Why does Taylor side-step it in this way? As far as I can see, he does not tell us, but two possible reasons can be extracted from his book -- although, unfortunately, neither turns out to be adequate in the end. A first possible reason concerns a certain ambiguity in the conception of a "constitutive" theory of language: Constitutive of thoughts and meanings? Or constitutive of those and thereby also of the phenomena with which they are concerned? To the extent that Taylor was thinking of the latter meaning of "constitutive" (perhaps encouraged to do so by the failure to distinguish clearly between the issues of "enframing" vs. designation/description discussed above), this would give him a reason for seeing "human meanings," "social footings," and so on as cases in which a constitutive theory applies but for seeing natural objects as cases in which it does not, since it is plausible to think that language is essentially involved in the constitution of such things as moral badness, democracy, and so forth, but not that it is essentially involved in the constitution of, say, the solar system. But then the former sort of "constitutive" theory (which is what Taylor's opening characterization of a "constitutive" theory rather suggested) still seems to be extremely important as well, so that his relative neglect of it remains unsatisfactory.

    A second possible reason lies in the sort of alleged asymmetry between everyday descriptions of nature (using count nouns, mass nouns, color terms, and so on) together with more "metaphysical" descriptions vs. cultural meanings that Taylor argues for when discussing the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis in Chapter 9. His core idea here is that whereas different languages may constitute very different cultural meanings, nature constrains us all to more or less the same concepts for everyday descriptions. But this is again an inadequate reason. For one thing, such constraint would not, strictly speaking, be incompatible with language playing an essential constitutive role in the concepts in question. For another, the idea of such an asymmetry -- notwithstanding its anticipation by one member of the HHH tradition (not Herder, but Schleiermacher in his famous essay on translation) and its popularity in contemporary Anglophone philosophy -- is mistaken. Consider, for example, the case of color conceptualization that Taylor himself cites. As I have shown elsewhere, the central empirical research done by the soi-disant "anthropologists" Brent Berlin and Paul Kay that purports to discover massive conceptual common ground concerning colors across all peoples is a house built on sand. In particular, it depends on an unholy combination of conceptual confusion (e.g., the assumption that if two color terms share the same paradigm cases, they must connote the same concept, even if their extensions are strikingly different) and empirical errors (e.g., false interpretations of Homeric color vocabulary -- a central case, since it was this case that originally sparked the whole debate about color conceptualization in the nineteenth century -- that no competent classical philologist would even take seriously, let alone accept). Or to mention a different sort of example that undermines Taylor's position: while it is no doubt true that salient features of nature tend to be referred to by virtually all languages (as Taylor argues), as Frege has taught us, reference and sense (or concept) are quite different matters. For instance, while the Greeks with their word "Helios" and we with our word "sun" indeed refer to the same object, the concepts involved are radically different (e.g., their concept implies a sort of (divine) personhood, intelligence, purposiveness, performance of actions, etc., whereas ours definitely does not).

    A fifth problem concerns the two closely related questions of whether human language and animal signs are similar or dissimilar (or in Taylor's vocabulary: "continuous" or not) and whether human beings and animals themselves are similar or dissimilar. Taylor's position here is problematic in a number of ways. For one thing, these questions, when posed in the naïve form in which he poses them, are extremely unclear, indeed, hardly more than pseudo-questions (a little like the question 'How long is a piece of string?'). For another thing, his ground for giving the answer "dissimilar" to the first question, namely that only human beings have a sense of linguistic "rightness," whereas animals are merely conditioned, is very dubious empirically (as that acute observer of animal behavior, Darwin, already noted in The Descent of Man, and as the more recent research of Irene Pepperberg has confirmed, even parrots do not merely "parrot"). For yet another thing, Taylor's answer to the second question is flatly inconsistent: whereas his book bears the title The Language Animal, at one point he describes taking a human for an animal as nothing less than a "category mistake" (139). For yet a fourth thing, in building a case in support of the latter sort of answer (which is the one that he usually seems to favor) by citing a set of characteristics that he thinks distinguish human beings from all (other) animals -- including, besides the sense of linguistic "rightness," also joint attention, culture, and flexibility (in the sense of a certain freedom from instinct) -- he seems not to notice the following sorts of problems that would arise even if the choice of this set were warranted. (a) It will presumably be possible to do something similar to this for any animal species in comparison with all the others. (b) Any temptation to exalt these particular characteristics over the ones that work for the other species stands under justified suspicion of being merely speciocentric (if cheetahs were able to reflect and talk, one could imagine them saying, "Linguistic 'rightness,' joint attention, culture, and flexibility hooey! Being the fastest mammal, that's where it's really at, man!"). (c) Even the attempt to justify such an exalting to a modest extent by appealing to more fundamental values which do not necessarily claim to be more than human runs into the difficulty that it is actually very unclear whether the characteristics in question make a net positive rather than a net negative contribution to the realization of the values in question: knowledge-acquisition? (but don't forget that these characteristics also generate human beings' massive susceptibility to cognitive illusions, for example geocentrism, a belief in the objectivity of secondary qualities, and the fantasies of myth and religion); morality? (but don't forget that these characteristics also generate human beings' pervasive propensity for lying, deceiving, torturing, waging war, and committing genocide); evolutionary fitness? (but don't forget that these characteristics also generate the very real possibility, or even likelihood, that human beings will one day achieve the unprecedented evolutionary own goal of being the first species to go the way of the dinosaurs through its own voluntary activities (e.g., the development of nuclear weapons) and in full awareness of the risk that they entailed). Finally, Taylor also seems to overlook the fact that answers to the two questions at issue of the sort that he favors are likely to be deeply ideological in character, that is, not only confused or false but also, thereby, supportive of the selfish interests of human beings against those of other animals (through furnishing rationalizations for our quantitatively massive and qualitatively appalling exploitation of, and cruelty towards, them) and, moreover, attractive to human beings mainly because they are so. (An apt footnote on p. 145 concerning the injustice to wolves involved in Hobbes's dictum homo homini lupus (man is a wolf to man) suggests that Taylor might himself not be incorrigibly closed to this sort of worry if it were pointed out to him.)

    A sixth problem concerns Taylor's tendency to be too concessive toward some of the modern theories in the philosophy of language that he criticizes, such as Chomsky's and Davidson's. For example, he suggests at one point that Davidson's theory may adequately capture one part of language, though not all of it (126-8), whereas in fact the theory seems open to fatal objections. One such objection is that whereas its model of radical interpretation may seem plausible in application to someone who already has a first language and then sets about interpreting a second one, it seems patently absurd when applied to a key case of radical interpretation that we all actually experience at one time in our lives: that of acquiring a first language. And Davidson's strong version of linguistic holism entails a position of the sort that he eventually himself makes explicit and endorses in "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs," namely, that there are no such things as chronologically stable or intersubjectively shared meanings but only "passing theories of meaning" -- a conclusion that Davidson himself apparently considers tenable and interesting but which is far more plausibly taken as a reduction of his theory to absurdity. (Incidentally, Taylor's own enthusiasm for the linguistic holism that he finds in the HHH tradition shows no awareness that strong versions of it, such as Davidson's, run into this sort of problem.)

    Notwithstanding these arguable historical and philosophical weaknesses, Taylor's book is a richly informative and admirable attempt to delineate "the full shape of the human linguistic capacity" (as its subtitle has it). More than that, it affords a model of what it is to be a genuine philosopher: at an age when most philosophers have either given up altogether or else fallen into dogmatically repeating views that they have long since held, Taylor continues an open-minded search for the right answers, drawing not only on the older literature from philosophy and several other disciplines that he has long since mastered but also on a wealth of newer literature from an equally wide range of sources.


     
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  2. Constance

    Constance Paranormal Adept

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  3. USI Calgary

    USI Calgary J. Randall Murphy Staff Member

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    I guess that depends on what we mean by "derivable". It seems to me that at the root of our biological functioning is a set of physical materials and principles, and that whenever those are put together in a way that makes a normal human, we get consciousness. Therefore we can say with reasonable certainty that consciousness is derivable through those physical processes, even if we don't understand exactly how that happens.

    We can also say with reasonable certainty that it has something to do with the construction of a functioning brain in its waking state. We even know which areas appear to be primarily responsible ( the thalamocortical loop ). So how different is that in principle from knowing that the right combination of materials wrapped around another right combination of materials and energized suddenly produces a magnetic field?

    That's pretty much just as magical, involving notions of "virtual photons" and such. We may never know exactly what consciousness is composed of in a physical context. But that doesn't mean we won't necessarily be able to engineer it once we have principles analogous to Maxwell's equations in place. The problem I'm still seeing with a lot of the talk ( not so much here as in general ), is the idea that consciousness is something that can be downloaded.

    I don't think t can work like that until we know how the transceivers of the field ( for lack of a better term ) work, and even if we get that figured out, the best we could hope for is a copy that is indistinguishable from the original. Is that really the same? I don't think so.
     
  4. Constance

    Constance Paranormal Adept

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    “Visible and mobile, my body is a thing among things; it is one of them. It is caught in the fabric of the world, and its cohesion is that of a thing. But because it sees and moves itself, it holds things in a circle around itself. Things are an annex or prolongation of my body; they are incrusted in its flesh, they are part of its full definition; the world is made of the very stuff of the body. These reversals, these antinomies, are different ways of saying that vision is caught or is made in the middle of things, where something visible undertakes to see, becomes visible for itself and through the vision of all things, where the indivision of the sensing and the sensed persists, like the original fluid within the crystal.”
    ― Maurice Merleau-Ponty, L'Œil et l'Esprit

    Lived experience is the key to understanding what consciousness is, as MP clarifies throughout his work. Life is at the bottom of it, grounds consciousness, and neither life nor consciousness can be explained, accounted for, by physics.
     
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  5. Constance

    Constance Paranormal Adept

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  6. USI Calgary

    USI Calgary J. Randall Murphy Staff Member

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    Nowadays, it is well-established that the way we account for word meaning is bound to have a major impact in tipping the balance in favor or against a given picture of the fundamental properties of human language: Word Meaning (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
     
  7. Constance

    Constance Paranormal Adept

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    The SEP page you quote from and link to might be a good place to begin research into and discussion of the relation of language and meaning, which is never fixed given the temporal evolution and development of human languages. Dictionaries always stabilize the significations of words, terms, and indeed concepts in accord with dominant ideas, presuppositions, practices, and ideologies in any given human historical culture. Thus word meanings -- as lexically fixed -- are fragile, open to and subject to change through usage by changing populations of thinkers and actors. An extract from the SEP page:

    ",,, This feature of historical-philological semantics makes it a forerunner of the stress on context-sensitivity encouraged by many subsequent approaches to word meaning in philosophy (Section 3) and linguistics (Section 4). Second, the psychological conception of word meaning fostered by historical philological-semantics added to the agenda of linguistic research the question of how word meaning relates to cognition at large (Geeraerts 2010). If word meaning is essentially a psychological phenomenon, how can we characterize it? What is the dividing line separating the aspects of our mental life that are relevant to the knowledge of lexical meaning from those that are not? As we shall see, this question will constitute a central concern for cognitive theories of word meaning (Section 5)."

    Wasn't it Humpy Dumpty who famously said "words mean exactly what I say they mean"? Or more fully:

    "When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean- neither more nor less."

    More fully still:

    The Humpty-Dumpty Theory of Language
     
  8. Constance

    Constance Paranormal Adept

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    ETA, meant to amend the sentence you quoted above with an additional phrase:

    "the way we account for word meaning is bound to have a major impact in tipping the balance in favor [of] or against a given picture of the fundamental properties of human language and indeed on the picture we hold concerning the nature of the world's being and of our own being within it and as an expression of it."
     
  9. Constance

    Constance Paranormal Adept

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    Hoping we'll all get back here from our current hiatus in the coming days.

    Here to perhaps spur us on is Galen Strawson in a five-minute portion of an interview that Steve linked to long ago, early in Part 2 of our thread. I find him to be at his most lucid here.

    Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2
     
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  10. Michael Allen

    Michael Allen Administrator Staff Member

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    One of the simplest proofs that "ground" consciousness in the physical is the every so slight changes in brain chemistry that can kick us out of consciousness and we end up with discontinuities and "missing time"--this occurs everyday when we sleep (deep sleep without any REM whatsoever). We know that chemical (and hence physicsl) disruptions (knock to the jaw, too much alcohol, ambien...etc) will send us reeling out of focused consciousness...so we go back to our 20th and 21st century physicalism to try to "explain" the situation. Which leads to the next problem, how do we actually know what these physical "elements" are by using the very same consortiums of "elements" (quarks, leptons, hadrons, atoms, molecules) in the form of our own bodies (or "genetic survival machines")? In short, "we" are inside the universe and it is in us ... and when you try to capture the "essence" of the interaction by the very elements of the transactional affair we call "consciousness" we end up with contradictions. Can such a "transactional" entity be "downloaded" into another being without replicating the entire nexus of connections between that being and the rest of the universe? Not sure that is even feasible.
     
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  11. Soupie

    Soupie Paranormal Adept

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    I have a few pieces to share that I've read over the past couple months. Here's more of the same from Strawson.

    http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/
     
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  12. Constance

    Constance Paranormal Adept

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    Splendid post, and good to see you here. I very much like your kinda phenomenological insight that '"we" are inside the universe and it is in us."

    And I agree with this:


    In accord with you, I don't think that's "even feasible."
     
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  13. USI Calgary

    USI Calgary J. Randall Murphy Staff Member

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    At best, downloading is replicating ( copying ). Logically therefore, regardless of what consciousness is physically composed of, or how it's done, or how sophisticated the process is, or how true to the original the copy is, a copy cannot be the original. Therefore there can only be one "you". This makes the whole idea about downloading consciousness hollow. It also brings up other philosophical questions we've touched on. No need at the moment to reiterate that as well.
     
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  14. Michael Allen

    Michael Allen Administrator Staff Member

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    Might also be able to approach from the perspective of the continual atomic/molecular changes that occur in the human body. In a way your consciousness from one moment to the next is being "downloaded" into new material (cell death and replacement, etc). The idea that our body "replaces itself every 7 years" is a rough approximation--excepting of course the neurons--which are not replaced once they die; this means of course that neurons do not have any fixed lifetime. But the neuron physical material itself might change over time -- in the same way the body replaces blood cells...neurons probably undergo electrochemical changes over their lifetime (which can in theory outlive all other human cells).

    So--setting the neurons in the brain aside--we are constantly in the process of seamlessly transplanting our feeling of self into another body--but doing so gradually provides us with the "illusion" (perhaps too strong a word) of continuity.
     
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  15. USI Calgary

    USI Calgary J. Randall Murphy Staff Member

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    That's one of the other philosophical issues I alluded to, the Ship of Theseus paradox. It is essentially a temporal issue. If time is quantized, then we're literally never the same person for more that one clock cycle, and indeed any sense of true self is purely illusory. However there is still a difference between that and downloading, because downloading typically leaves the original intact while duplicating it at another location. So we have the original and the copy existing in the same temporal frame of reference. @Constance, being the resident Ponty expert, does he ever touch on this issue?
     
    Last edited: Mar 27, 2018
  16. Soupie

    Soupie Paranormal Adept

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    Playing devils advocate, there is good reason to believe that subjective experience is an executive summary of the body-environment interaction. So although the entire body is causally involved with SE, it is only indirectly.

    Also, there are at least a few qualia which correspond to multiple stimuli, for ex bitterness and green. The taste of bitterness can be triggered by several different chemicals and the color green is triggered by a range of em wavelengths.

    So again playing devils advocate, theoretically one wouldn't have to create a full copy of an organism to get similar subjective experience.
     
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  17. len1867

    len1867 Skilled Investigator

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    Carlos the man - great composer!!


    Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
     
  18. Frank Stalter

    Frank Stalter Paranormal Adept

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    Randal, the notion that a human individual's consciousness could be contained and frozen as a 'thing', an object of some sort, and transferred -- 'downloaded' into or duplicated in another living being or a computational network -- is sheerest nonsense. Embodied consciousness is a living, ongoing, experiential phenomenon grounded in bodily experience increasingly aware of itself and its situated being -- thus an existential phenomenon, a continuous presence to its own being in situ in its ongoing openness to its environing world in the temporality of that world's perpending being. What each of us is, becomes, in the lived being of our consciousnesses and minds at any time, is dependent upon and carries along what we have made present to ourselves in the personal history of living in our situation within a luminous environment. The world that we world [verb] is a composite of what we are . . . always existing within changing circumstances and changing feelings and thoughts arising in our contact with the world and what we meet in it, today and tomorrow and so on. No momentary 'slice' of the resulting worlding world known in any consciousness could ever capture and maintain the experienced history of an individual's integrations with the physical and phenomenally known being of the world it has existed in and continues to exist in, including the knowledge of and connections felt with others in this environment, thus the whole context of that which is lived by a particular individual consciousness. Much less could such a 'copy' be capable of carrying forward that which living consciousness continues to absorb -- consciously and subconsciously -- in every moment of its embodied and lived being.




    Which issue? You seem to have referenced two issues. Btw, Randal, his surname is a compound: 'Merleau-Ponty', first name 'Maurice'.

    You'd have to read a great deal of MP's writing to understand even what I've said just above. If you're asking for an answer to the question whether MP 'touched' on the ontological nature of consciousness as an outgrowth of nature, he more than 'touched' on this; he developed a philosophy in which the ontological nature of lived being is revealed.

    If you're asking if he had anything to say concerning the contemporary project in our time of producing an artificial consciousness within 'artificial intelligence' in computational technologies, I'm not certain he did not, and he might have; many of his drafts and notes maintained by his colleagues at the time of his premature death, at age 53 in 1961, remain untranslated and unpublished. But I know from some texts I've read that he was in his last years aware of and interested in technological developments in computer science and, as I recall, AI projects begun or projected in discussions at that time. Now I need to search out what traces of his expression of that awareness are available in the published body of his work in English, and I'll do so and get back to you with concrete details if I can find them.

    I've long wished that he had remained in this world longer, much longer. If he had I would want, need, to read what he wrote in responding to the concept of 'artificial consciousness'. I'm certain that he would have found such a thing to be impossible without the development of a living biological substrate for AI, based in his own development of insights into the natural, organic, roots of consciousness in embodied being: in life.

    The article at the following link and posted extracts concerning what Aaron Gurwitz brought to phenomenological philosophy might be helpful to you at this point in entering into a sense of what is learned in studying the phenomenology of consciousness:

    Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 6
     
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  19. Frank Stalter

    Frank Stalter Paranormal Adept

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    ?? Don't know why the link to a post of mine also brings up the THE UFO PARTISAN from some post made by Frank Stalter. Perhaps the forum software is being worked on, and the work underway is not yet completed.
     
  20. Frank Stalter

    Frank Stalter Paranormal Adept

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    I am not Frank Stalter, though I admire him greatly in his work in THE UFO PARTISAN.
     
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