Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 11

[smcder]

I think 'mediation' is the correct term to apply concerning the consciousness-brain relation, but a critical ambiguity resides in your question, if I read it correctly: are you supposing that neurons and neural nets are prerequisites for experience, or do you think it is possible that neurons and neural nets are formed as a biological response to the challenges of lived experience in a phenomenally and temporally sensed world -- an environing world in which changing circumstances require adaptation and learning by evolving species of life?

If we follow the insights of Maturana and Varela and the more recent insights of Jaak Panksepp, we need to recognize the emergence of sensing, awareness, and seeking behavior in primordial organisms, long before the appearance of neurons in the evolution of biological species.

We can also address the question of how and why specific neural nets become compounded and synaptically interconnected in response to changing and developing individual interests and desires in our own species. Take the case of a young man {I have a specific individual in mind} formerly immersed in scientific subject matter under the influence of parents and teachers who encourage that direction of inquiry and activity as the only route to understanding the nature of reality [truth] and to achieving a pathway to personal success by pursuing a career in science. How does this young man suddenly lose interest in science and instead pursue music, and by concentrating his energies in this discipline develop increasing practical and theoretical knowledge in his newly chosen field of interest? Surely this individual's development of increasingly broad and deep appreciation of the complexity and nuances of this new subject matter, and perhaps also development of personal skills as a musician, lead to the development of new or expanding neural nets and synapses that facilitate both his deepening understanding of music and/or his own musicianship.

I think we will never understand the open-ended nature of consciousness as it responds to lived experiences in the world if we begin with the belief that everything that happens to a conscious being and everything that being selects for further attention and investment is generated in and by its neurons and neural nets. Neurons and neural nets do not give us our integrated, comprehensive, experience of living in the world; rather, they facilitate our increasing aptitudes in navigating the world both practically and intellectually, pragmatically and philosophically. But these physiological and mental aptitudes are not all that we develop; we also develop emotional intelligence and empathy, and we sense and sometimes pursue spiritual dimensions of our existence. How do neurons and neural nets generate these felt aspects of our experience?

As to experience, I think you put it well:

"I think we will never understand the open-ended nature of consciousness as it responds to lived experiences in the world if we begin with the belief that everything that happens to a conscious being and everything that being selects for further attention and investment is generated in and by its neurons and neural nets. Neurons and neural nets do not give us our integrated, comprehensive, experience of living in the world; rather, they facilitate our increasing aptitudes in navigating the world both practically and intellectually, pragmatically and philosophically. But these physiological and mental aptitudes are not all that we develop; we also develop emotional intelligence and empathy, and we sense and sometimes pursue spiritual dimensions of our existence. How do neurons and neural nets generate these felt aspects of our experience?"

And that last sentence was my question to @Pharoah.

 

[Constance]

[Burge]"On my view, it would be more philosophically parsimonious to say that in successfully perceiving the strawberry, the primate discriminated the strawberry from out of the ambient array of energy surrounding the strawberry. Another way of putting it would be that in perceiving the red strawberry the primate attended to the information specific to the features of the strawberry that were relevant to its internal needs, namely, hunger."

That sounds a lot like a qualitative ontology.

Not by comparison with Pharoah's, nicht wahr?

"What I am proposing, in broad terms, is that replication ultimately facilitates the emergence and ongoing evolution—courtesy of a generational discourse—of a meaningful correspondence that qualifies a unique qualitative ontology: physiological function inevitably imposes assignations of qualitative relevance on the physical properties of the environment. Clearly then, this thesis opposes the view that environmental properties possess qualities or qualitative information independently from the observing subject (see Dennett 1991, pp. 375–83; Lycan 1996, pp.

 

[Constance]

"HCT offers a different, dare I say, explanatory narrative.
What I am trying to lay the foundations for is a narrative that describes the relationship of and between a hierarchy of novel ontological categories that give an intuitive and viable account of why you can get characteristics that are typically associated with subjectivity, from matter."

 

[smcder]

Not by comparison with Pharoah's, nicht wahr?

"What I am proposing, in broad terms, is that replication ultimately facilitates the emergence and ongoing evolution—courtesy of a generational discourse—of a meaningful correspondence that qualifies a unique qualitative ontology: physiological function inevitably imposes assignations of qualitative relevance on the physical properties of the environment. Clearly then, this thesis opposes the view that environmental properties possess qualities or qualitative information independently from the observing subject (see Dennett 1991, pp. 375–83; Lycan 1996, pp.

How it compares is a question I had for @Pharoah while reading Burge.

Burge writes about representation as an early indication of mind's appearance (first occuring in arthropods)...in what I think of as an orthodox or standard view of mind.

In this quote, orthodox visual science would be Burges view and the writer contrasts his view with this.

"Take the example of a hungry primate perceiving a juicy red strawberry. Orthodox visual science would say that in successfully perceiving the strawberry the primate must have accurately represented the red strawberry as a red strawberry, (and not, say, as a purple poisonberry). This is the classic representationalist explanation. On my view, it would be more philosophically parsimonious to say that in successfully perceiving the strawberry, the primate discriminated the strawberry from out of the ambient array of energy surrounding the strawberry. Another way of putting it would be that in perceiving the red strawberry the primate attended to the information specific to the features of the strawberry that were relevant to its internal needs, namely, hunger."
...

That sounds like Berrybug to me.
...

"On this account, the primate can be said to perceive the red strawberry as nutritious, not as a strawberry. Notice how this is starkly different from the representationalist interpretation. For the representationalist, the primate’s perception of the strawberry is cashed out in terms of how accurately the internal representation is in comparison to the objective features of the strawberry. If the primate represents the strawberry as being red, and the strawberry really is red, then the primate’s perception of the strawberry is said to be “accurate”, and thus successful. It is then said that the brain consults the representation when forming its intentions to act. Orthodox visual theory is thus committed to what some philosophers have called the sense-represent-plan–act model. The primate receives proximal sense-data, tries to form an accurate representation of distal stimulus, consults the representation to form a plan, and then executes a motor command to pluck the strawberry and bring it into its mouth."

The author goes on from there and that provides important context beyond what I've quoted.

 

[smcder]

That video is probably v v embarrassing lol...

the biosemiotic submission below:
http://www.mind-phronesis.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Obj-sub-02-12-17-para.pdf

I think the videos are clear and succinct.

I find the Newtonian-equilibrium starting point for HCT to be interesting. I think I posted some of the papers in non-linear dynamics that I've been reading (90s I think-but maybe later) that look at resonant ideas.

 

[Pharoah]

I think the videos are clear and succinct.

I find the Newtonian-equilibrium starting point for HCT to be interesting. I think I posted some of the papers in non-linear dynamics that I've been reading (90s I think-but maybe later) that look at resonant ideas.

Oh good.

On equilibrium, each paragraph below is a quotation. The last is particularly relevant. I think of each hierarchy in HCT as pursuing a distinct equilibrium... but this is not proposed below in these quotes. Nevertheless, I find the quotes engaging.

It seems then that the quantity of space encompassed by our perception and the place of the zone of clear vision in the phenomenal field express certain modes of organization of the sensory field related to the characteristics of the objects presented to the eye much more than the geometrical projection of objects on the retina, and depend upon certain laws of equilibrium proper to the nervous system much more than upon anatomical structures.

functional reorganization, as well as the putting into effect of substitute actions {Ersatzleistungen) in which a member or an organ takes upon itself the function of another, takes place in a characteristic manner only if a vital interest is at stake and not if a "made to order" act is involved. Which is to say that it represents the means of a return to equilibrium for the whole nervous system and not the releasing of a local anatomical device.

Form, in the sense in which we have defined it, possesses original properties with regard to those of the parts which can be detached from it. Each moment in it is determined by the grouping of the other moments, and their respective value depends on a state of total equilibrium the formula of which is an intrinsic character of "form." In this sense it seems to fulfill all the conditions necessary for giving an account of nerve functioning.

The notion of form which was imposed on us by the facts was defined like that of a physical system, that is, as an ensemble of forces in a state of equilibrium or of constant change such that no law is formulable for each part taken separately and such that each vector is determined in size and direction by all the others. Thus, each local change in a form will be translated by a redistribution of forces which assures the constancy of their relation; it is this internal circulation which is the system as a physical reality. And it is no more composed of parts which can be distinguished in it than a melody (always transposable) is made of the particular notes which are its momentary expression.

Thus each organism, in the presence of a given milieu, has its optimal conditions of activity and its proper manner of realizing equilibrium; and the internal determinants of this equilibrium are not given by a plurality of vectors, but by a general attitude toward the world.

Let us say in other words that each form constitutes a field of forces characterized by a law which has no meaning outside the limits of the dynamic structure considered, and which on the other hand assigns its properties to each internal point so much so that they will never be absolute properties, properties of this point.

Descriptive biology would be a preliminary inventory of the superstructures which are supported by the physics of living things; and explanation in biology as well as in physics would have to be reduced to the unique type of explanation by laws. The character-istics of the organic individual—the property which it has of itself setting the conditions of its equilibrium, then of creating its milieu— would be only the macroscopic result of a multitude of elementary actions identical to those of physical systems. Explanation could in principle be coextensive with description. One would have to grant only that, in biology as well as in physics, an exhaustive analysis of the de facto structures is inconceivable: the physical and chemical actions into which we decompose a function can themselves be produced only in a stable context; thus the laws explain a given structure only by presupposing another structure, and in this sense the physics of the organism is also obliged to start with a certain "historical given." But it does not differ from the other physics on this point, and the structures of the organism would be only a particular case of those of the physical world.

 

[Constance]

Our question at this point has become "How do neurons and neural nets generate these felt aspects of our experience?"

I think the editor's introduction to the "Comparative Cognition" issue of the journal Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences and the research in the directions described in that volume will eventually lead to an understanding of lived experience, emotion, cognition, and behavior as ontologically primary, replacing the vague notion that 'information' and 'energy' received by neurons and neural nets can account for the developments of experience-based cognition in the 'worlds worlded' by various living species. To cite a few key paragraphs from that introduction:

"Animal cognition is a venerable field of inquiry, with antecedents in the nineteenth century, and in ethology, and evolutionary anthropology, psychology, and field biology. The field has a rich tradition of providing elegant causal explanations of behavior at multiple levels of analysis. Some researchers seek to discover the mechanistic and computational bases of behavior [1,2]. For others, the scientific goal is to understand the proximate and ultimate causes of behaviors by systematically comparing cognition in species with shared versus distinct phylogenies and environmental pressures [3]. And for still others the scientific goal is to understand the natural history of human cognition, and its evolutionary foundations [4]. Beyond these bases, many scholars seek to understand the behaviors of model organisms for neuroscience, and as models of psychiatric disease [5]. All of these pursuits are interrelated, and each is necessary in order to explain the complex causes of behavior, and determine how human minds are built.

The role of animal cognition research in modern science is ever more critical as scientists adjust to new technologies for measuring the neural bases of behavior. New molecular techniques are revolutionizing neuroscience, neural networks are transforming artificial intelligence and cognitive science, futuristic imaging techniques are enhancing psychology, and robotics seems tangibly close to self-driving cars. But despite the excitement, these areas are experiencing a crisis of confidence. These fields are bumping up against hard limits on their interpretations of the data, and many discoveries are proving to be sterile, because we lack a sophisticated understanding of behavior (see discussion in [6,7]). As a consequence, advocates of those fields have recently taken a turn toward understanding behaviors, and the situations in which they arise. And that in turn means understanding animals in their environments, including humans in our ancestral environment.

. . .

The contributions to this special issue represent the many levels of analysis and explanation available for the study of behavior. All of these approaches have been incubated and refined by animal researchers, with cognition at the nexus between brain and behavior. The rich theoretical and methodological traditions of comparative cognition research will be an important bridge between behavior and the interpretation of neural signals. The study of animal cognition will tell us how various species (including humans) behave in ways that are well adapted to their environments, while also retaining robust flexibility. These endeavors are central to answering three essential questions in modern science: how behavior is caused, how it is implemented by the brain, and what it means to be human."


It's important I think to take up and contemplate the meaning of the term 'implemented' in the concluding sentence above. Here, in the research disciplines of biology and comparative cognition, the question of 'how behavior is caused' has been distinguished from, differentiated from, the question of 'how [behavior] is implemented by the brain'. So the answer to the question "How do neurons and neural nets generate these felt aspects of our experience?" becomes "they don't." Instead their organically evolved function is to facilitate the integration and organization of information obtained directly in the living organism's contact with its environing world.

 

[Constance]

On equilibrium, each paragraph below is a quotation. The last is particularly relevant. I think of each hierarchy in HCT as pursuing a distinct equilibrium... but this is not proposed below in these quotes. Nevertheless, I find the quotes engaging.

I do too, though with doubts concerning the last quotation. Do you have in your notes citation to the sources of each of these quotes? If so, would you attach them?

Re the last quotation:

"Descriptive biology would be a preliminary inventory of the superstructures which are supported by the physics of living things; and explanation in biology as well as in physics would have to be reduced to the unique type of explanation by laws. The characteristics of the organic individual—the property which it has of itself setting the conditions of its equilibrium, then of creating its milieu— would be only the macroscopic result of a multitude of elementary actions identical to those of physical systems. Explanation could in principle be coextensive with description. One would have to grant only that, in biology as well as in physics, an exhaustive analysis of the de facto structures is inconceivable: the physical and chemical actions into which we decompose a function can themselves be produced only in a stable context; thus the laws explain a given structure only by presupposing another structure, and in this sense the physics of the organism is also obliged to start with a certain "historical given." But it does not differ from the other physics on this point, and the structures of the organism would be only a particular case of those of the physical world."

It reads to me like another attempt to claim that the 'physics' of the universe [to the limited extent that human physicists have been able to comprehend and account for all-that-is in the perceivable universe, short of what-is or might be in the multiverse or in the cosmos] must still be taken as the ultimate explanation for everything that exists in the biologically lived world. I don't think that that conclusion is merited, and it's clear that in the biological sciences, and in phenomenological philosophy of mind and nature, researchers and theorists have moved beyond accepting that claim. I think that your hierarchical construct theory has also moved beyond it.

 

[Pharoah]

I do too, though with doubts concerning the last quotation. Do you have in your notes citation to the sources of each of these quotes? If so, would you attach them?

Re the last quotation:

"Descriptive biology would be a preliminary inventory of the superstructures which are supported by the physics of living things; and explanation in biology as well as in physics would have to be reduced to the unique type of explanation by laws. The characteristics of the organic individual—the property which it has of itself setting the conditions of its equilibrium, then of creating its milieu— would be only the macroscopic result of a multitude of elementary actions identical to those of physical systems. Explanation could in principle be coextensive with description. One would have to grant only that, in biology as well as in physics, an exhaustive analysis of the de facto structures is inconceivable: the physical and chemical actions into which we decompose a function can themselves be produced only in a stable context; thus the laws explain a given structure only by presupposing another structure, and in this sense the physics of the organism is also obliged to start with a certain "historical given." But it does not differ from the other physics on this point, and the structures of the organism would be only a particular case of those of the physical world."

It reads to me like another attempt to claim that the 'physics' of the universe [to the limited extent that human physicists have been able to comprehend and account for all-that-is in the perceivable universe, short of what-is or might be in the multiverse or in the cosmos] must still be taken as the ultimate explanation for everything that exists in the biologically lived world. I don't think that that conclusion is merited, and it's clear that in the biological sciences, and in phenomenological philosophy of mind and nature, researchers and theorists have moved beyond accepting that claim. I think that your hierarchical construct theory has also moved beyond it.

Yep... it's out of context... I was searching for what Merleau-Ponty has to say about equilibria. All the quotes are his.

Here's a paragraph that comes two paragraphs before the "Descriptive biology..." quote
"It is impossible for the intellect to compose images of the organism on the basis of partitive physical and chemical phenomena; and nevertheless life is not a special cause. In biology as well as in physics the structures must be submitted to an analysis which finds in them the combined action of laws. What we are looking for in the idea of life "is not the terminal stone of a building, but the building itself in which the partial phenomena, at first insignificant, appear as belonging to a unitary, ordered and relatively constant formation of specific structure . . . ; we are not looking for a real foundation (Seinsgrund) which constitutes being, but for an idea, a reason in knowledge (Er\entnissgrund) in virtue of which all the particular facts become intelligible." It is necessary only to accept the fact that the physico-chemical actions of which the organism is in a certain manner composed, instead of unfolding in parallel and independent sequences (as the anatomical spirit would want it), instead of intermingling in a totality in which everything would depend on everything and in which no cleavage would be possible, are constituted, following Hegel's expression, in "clusters" or in relatively stable "vortices"—the functions, the structures of behavior —in such a way that the mechanism is accompanied by a dialectic."

I like this too:
"But in any case, to understand these biological entities is not to note a series of empirical coincidences; it is not even to establish a list of mechanical correlations; it is to unite the ensemble of known facts by means of their significations, to dis- cover in all of them a characteristic rhythm, a general attitude toward certain categories of objects, perhaps even toward all things. Thus it is necessary in this sense to go beyond mechanism."

and
"While a physical system equilibrates itself in respect to the given forces of the milieu and the animal organism constructs a stable milieu for itself corresponding to the monotonous a prions of need and instinct, human work inaugurates a third dialectic."

 

[smcder]

"I don't think of a mechanism as being mechanical or mechanistic."

Mechanisms in Science (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

>50 uses in latest hct

Does this expand the vocabulary of "mechanism" to accommodate its use in HCT?

 

[Pharoah]

"I don't think of a mechanism as being mechanical or mechanistic."

Mechanisms in Science (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

>50 uses in latest hct

Does this expand the vocabulary of "mechanism" to accommodate its use in HCT?

that's a good link... I've taken a few references from it. I think the notion that a mechanism can be multitiered and darn complex is handy when one wishes to avoid the dreaded 'but how!?' Q?

 

[Pharoah]

"Thinking Dynamically About Biological Mechanisms: Networks of Coupled Oscillators
William Bechtel
Adele A. Abrahamsen
Abstract

Explaining the complex dynamics exhibited in many biological mechanisms requires extending the recent philosophical treatment of mechanisms that emphasizes sequences of operations. To understand how nonsequentially organized mechanisms will behave, scientists often advance what we call dynamic mechanistic explanations. These begin with a decomposition of the mechanism into component parts and operations, using a variety of laboratory-based strategies. Crucially, the mechanism is then recomposed by means of computational models in which variables or terms in differential equations correspond to properties of its parts and operations. We provide two illustrations drawn from research on circadian rhythms. Once biologists identified some of the components of the molecular mechanism thought to be responsible for circadian rhythms, computational models were used to determine whether the proposed mechanisms could generate sustained oscillations. Modeling has become even more important as researchers have recognized that the oscillations generated in individual neurons are synchronized within networks; we describe models being employed to assess how different possible network architectures could produce the observed synchronized activity. "

 

[Constance]

Online pdf of that article is available here:

https://mechanism.ucsd.edu/research/Thinking Dynamically About Biological.for Foundations of Science.pdf

Extract:

"One of the simplest forms of dynamical behavior that exhibits sustained activity is oscillation: the values of variables characterizing the behavior of the system repeatedly rise and fall rather than remain constant. Delayed negative feedback in a system driven by an energy source can readily produce such oscillations. For example, adding a thermostat to a heating system turns the furnace off whenever the target temperature is achieved and back on when it drops below the target. Given the inevitable time delay between the thermostat and furnace, room temperature oscillates rather than being maintained at exactly the target value: the temperature gradually rises while the furnace is on and then declines while the furnace is off. Often, as in this example, oscillations are viewed as nuisances and the goal for engineers is to minimize or dampen them as much as possible. When data collected from biological systems reveal oscillations, the oscillations are frequently regarded by investigators as noise to be removed by statistical techniques; what remains is regarded as the signal to be analyzed. But such oscillations are a resource that can be used by the system in generating important biological phenomena. It is then a mistake to treat them as noise; oscillations that are exploited by the system are, rather, an important part of the signal."

 

[smcder]

"Thinking Dynamically About Biological Mechanisms: Networks of Coupled Oscillators
William Bechtel
Adele A. Abrahamsen
Abstract

Explaining the complex dynamics exhibited in many biological mechanisms requires extending the recent philosophical treatment of mechanisms that emphasizes sequences of operations. To understand how nonsequentially organized mechanisms will behave, scientists often advance what we call dynamic mechanistic explanations. These begin with a decomposition of the mechanism into component parts and operations, using a variety of laboratory-based strategies. Crucially, the mechanism is then recomposed by means of computational models in which variables or terms in differential equations correspond to properties of its parts and operations. We provide two illustrations drawn from research on circadian rhythms. Once biologists identified some of the components of the molecular mechanism thought to be responsible for circadian rhythms, computational models were used to determine whether the proposed mechanisms could generate sustained oscillations. Modeling has become even more important as researchers have recognized that the oscillations generated in individual neurons are synchronized within networks; we describe models being employed to assess how different possible network architectures could produce the observed synchronized activity. "

At the macro scale...I've always been interested in walking robots...the move has been from computationally intensive reverse kinematics (like the old story of the caterpillar that started thinking about which leg to move next) to coupled oscillators / the emergence of distinct gait patterns from a central pattern generator or more basically from mechanical structure alone (passive dynamic walking)

This biped robot uses mechanics instead of a computer brain to stay upright

Weak, Brainless Quadruped Robot Autonomously Generates Gaits

 

[Constance]

Steve / @smcder, I know you're interested in Charles Taylor's work and have come across one of his many books that especially interests me, The Language Animal: The Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity, linked at amazon:

{link won't take but you'll have no trouble finding it}

I'd be interested in your comments on the book if you've read it. There are some other books concerning Taylor that I've been looking into and I'll provide information about them soon.

 

[Pharoah]

Another couple of quotes from a different author (? ):

"What is first precipitated in the mind's conception is being. A thing is knowable because existence is pointed to. Therefore being is the proper object of mind; it is the primary intelligible as sound is the primary audible."

"In speaking of the known as actual we imply a distinction between the thing known and its being known. Similarly, in speaking of an abstract universal meaning we imply a distinction between the very nature of the thing meant and its abstractness or universality. The nature itself, of which being understood is a circumstance, exists only in singular things; but its being understood or abstracted, in other words its character or universality, exists in the mind."

 

[Pharoah]

St Thomas aquinas... The quotes above

 

[Constance]

Another couple of quotes from a different author (? ):

"What is first precipitated in the mind's conception is being. A thing is knowable because existence is pointed to. Therefore being is the proper object of mind; it is the primary intelligible as sound is the primary audible."

"In speaking of the known as actual we imply a distinction between the thing known and its being known. Similarly, in speaking of an abstract universal meaning we imply a distinction between the very nature of the thing meant and its abstractness or universality. The nature itself, of which being understood is a circumstance, exists only in singular things; but its being understood or abstracted, in other words its character or universality, exists in the mind."

I appreciate both quotes, especially the first one, and thanks for identifying their source. Several years ago I read a paper on St. Augustine that interested me because I found parallels there with ontological recognitions in phenomenological philosophy. That paper might interest you as well, and I'm presently trying to locate it, or a reference to it, in my mass of Word docs. If I find the reference or a link I'll post it.

 

[smcder]

All..."life happening" here...I'm also travelling this week.

I hope to catch up soon...just one more appointment after this one and I won't be travelling for 12 weeks.

Hope everyone is well.

 

[Constance]

All..."life happening" here...I'm also travelling this week.

I hope to catch up soon...just one more appointment after this one and I won't be travelling for 12 weeks.

Hope everyone is well.

Good to hear from you, and to hear that you'll have a 12-week break from all the travelling.

I just had a notice from academia.edu of a new paper by Matteo Grasso entitled "Fair Competition in the Quest for Consciousness: A Comparative Analysis of Predictive Processing and Integrated Information Theory."

Here's a snip of the conclusions section:

"Conclusions & open questions: We have shown analogies between PP and IIT concerning the respective notions of priors, generative model, and refinement of the generative model via PEM and synaptic regulation (PP), and concepts, maximally irreducible conceptual structures, and matching for IIT. These are common explanantes between the theories. However, it is important to point out some crucial differences concerning their explananda: while PP is mainly concerned with the overall structure and mechanisms of cognition, IIT is a neurocomputational theory of consciousness that overtly attempts to explain the qualitative aspects of consciousness. Some open questions for further research are: • To what extent the different mathematical formalisms of the two theories can be bridged? • Do the fundamental assumptions of the theories in regards to phenomenal consciousness result in a radical incompatibility? • Can experimental evidence in favour of one of the two theories support the other and vice versa? A deeper analysis along these lines can be beneficial to the understanding and development of both theories and should not be focused on PP and IIT only, but expanded to the inclusion of other theories of consciousness, such as Global Neuronal Workspace, Attention Schema Theory, and Free Energy."


Link: Fair Competition in the Quest for Consciousness: A Comparative Analysis of Predictive Processing and Integrated Information Theory