Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 10

[smcder]

He probably would. But establishing a model of the weak emergence of p con from physical processes has so far been elusive as we've been discussing.

I like Strawson (and Russell) 's non-emergent account of p consciousness as the intrinsic nature of matter.

Here is a picture of Bertrand Russell ("stinky" as he was known to his friends) maybe that will convince you.

 

[smcder]

https://www.waggish.org/2007/jerry-fodor-on-galen-strawson-on-consciousness/

"Consider the problem another way. When I’m under anesthesia, it appears (to the best of my recollection) that “my” consciousness disappears.

• Maybe my body or parts of it are still “conscious” in a way, but whatever constitutes consciousness in this state is wildly different from what constitutes it when I am awake, in sheer virtue of it seeming not to be “mine.”

There’s always the hypothetical possibility, of course, that my memory was turned off during that time and yet I still endured all that screaming pain consciously. (The very real experience of some people who are paralyzed but not rendered unconscious and insensate by anesthesia has always struck terror in my heart.) But it seems reasonable to say that I was truly not conscious during that time.

Two points follow.

• The first is to say that Strawson’s definition of consciousness must apply to me while I am under the knife and anesthetized (or, for that matter, when I am dead)

This destigmatizes the word “consciousness” from what we associate as human experience. The second is to ask whether consciousness is necessarily experiential. Consciousness obviously is a prerequisite for experience, but without the brain and nervous system, we have to ask what’s left of consciousness: either a destigmatized notion of “experience,” or no experience at all. In this sense, Strawson’s argument is a complement to David Chalmers’s panpsychism, which famously maintained that thermostats can be conscious because they function analogously to connectionist networks. Strawson’s argument is wholly different, but the crux of the dilemma is the same.

All I can say is that having removed the domesticated notions of “experience” and “consciousness,” the anti-emergence claim should no longer seem horribly non-intuitive. Unfortunately, though, I think the converse applies as well: there no longer seems to be an intuitive argument for the anti-emergence claim. And thus the problem transforms itself into the functionalist vs. Searlian arguments of years ago–is consciousness everywhere, or just in some sorts of matter?–but in a form I happen to consider more compelling and universal, since it no longer argues from cognitive capacities and knowledge, but from raw experience."

 

[smcder]

• consciousness and experience

"The second is to ask whether consciousness is necessarily experiential. Consciousness obviously is a prerequisite for experience, but without the brain and nervous system, we have to ask what’s left of consciousness: either a destigmatized notion of “experience,” or no experience at all. In this sense, Strawson’s argument is a complement to David Chalmers’s panpsychism, which famously maintained that thermostats can be conscious because they function analogously to connectionist networks. Strawson’s argument is wholly different, but the crux of the dilemma is the same."

@Soupie

Indeed the body continues to consciously experince during deep sleep and anesthesia; what does "go away" during deep sleep and anesthesia is the representation of an experiencing self—which is generated by the body/brain. And there is a growing body of evidence supporting this.

So what is conscious experience for the body? Is there something it is like to be the body under anesthesia? I'm not sure. I'm also not sure why there being no consciousness (in the sense of something it it like) in the body under anesthetia is a problem for P consciousness as the basis of reality - it has the qualities of differentiation and interaction ... perhaps during anesthesia these qualities are in effect for the body, but not the quality of "something it is like". This goes back to the problem of mind(s). Under conscious realism, everything is conscious but does that mean there is something it is like for everything? what we call "the physical" is what consciousness perceives (itself) - so where is the problem that consciousness as conscious experience has to be in the body under anesthesia?


Fodor says:

Maybe my body or parts of it are still “conscious” in a way, but whatever constitutes consciousness in this state is wildly different from what constitutes it when I am awake, in sheer virtue of it seeming not to be “mine.”

What is this "wild difference"?

Repeating the above, because it bears it:

"The second is to ask whether consciousness is necessarily experiential. Consciousness obviously is a prerequisite for experience, but without the brain and nervous system, we have to ask what’s left of consciousness: either a destigmatized notion of “experience,” or no experience at all. In this sense, Strawson’s argument is a complement to David Chalmers’s panpsychism, which famously maintained that thermostats can be conscious because they function analogously to connectionist networks. Strawson’s argument is wholly different, but the crux of the dilemma is the same."

This is a little different than I have read the "thermostat" to be conscious in the past ... what is the experience / consciousness of the thermostat? If it is sans experience, how does experience come in?

List of things that are emergent
101. "experience"

Similarly, if whatever constitutes consciousness in the anesthetized state is "wildly different" ... then how do we move to the consciousness we know, not even self consciousness, if you like.

List of things that are emergent
102. consciousness as we know it

 

[Constance]

@Soupie, very glad you linked Brockman's essay on Varela at Edge.com, which is part of the anthology he edited and published in 1996 entitled The Third Culture: Beyond the Scientific Revolution. Brockman does a good job of characterizing the stages of Varela's significant research and thought up to 1996, not including Varela et al's development of neurophenomenology.

Here's a link to the anthology at amazon:

{since the link is not working, just look up the book at amazon}

Looking forward to seeing what you and others take from/make of this essay. It hasn't changed my understanding of the phenomenological nature of his approach and his conclusions regarding lived experience, consciousness, and mind.

I think @Pharoah will find this summary representation of Varela's thinking as a biological and systems theorist to be relevant and useful to the HCT project.

 

[Constance]

So you believe the NDE emerge from some other, non-brain bodily functions?

I think NDEs are based in the nature of conscious being, which is not understood in the brain sciences to date.

 

[Constance]

He probably would. But establishing a model of the weak emergence of p con from physical processes has so far been elusive as we've been discussing.

I would say gradual emergence of phenomenal and phenomenological consciousness as opposed to your phrase 'weak emergence'.

 

[Soupie]

• consciousness and experience

"The second is to ask whether consciousness is necessarily experiential. Consciousness obviously is a prerequisite for experience, but without the brain and nervous system, we have to ask what’s left of consciousness: either a destigmatized notion of “experience,” or no experience at all. In this sense, Strawson’s argument is a complement to David Chalmers’s panpsychism, which famously maintained that thermostats can be conscious because they function analogously to connectionist networks. Strawson’s argument is wholly different, but the crux of the dilemma is the same."

@Soupie

Indeed the body continues to consciously experince during deep sleep and anesthesia; what does "go away" during deep sleep and anesthesia is the representation of an experiencing self—which is generated by the body/brain. And there is a growing body of evidence supporting this.

So what is conscious experience for the body? Is there something it is like to be the body under anesthesia? I'm not sure. I'm also not sure why there being no consciousness (in the sense of something it it like) in the body under anesthetia is a problem for P consciousness as the basis of reality - it has the qualities of differentiation and interaction ... perhaps during anesthesia these qualities are in effect for the body, but not the quality of "something it is like". This goes back to the problem of mind(s). Under conscious realism, everything is conscious but does that mean there is something it is like for everything? what we call "the physical" is what consciousness perceives (itself) - so where is the problem that consciousness as conscious experience has to be in the body under anesthesia?


Fodor says:

Maybe my body or parts of it are still “conscious” in a way, but whatever constitutes consciousness in this state is wildly different from what constitutes it when I am awake, in sheer virtue of it seeming not to be “mine.”

What is this "wild difference"?

Repeating the above, because it bears it:

"The second is to ask whether consciousness is necessarily experiential. Consciousness obviously is a prerequisite for experience, but without the brain and nervous system, we have to ask what’s left of consciousness: either a destigmatized notion of “experience,” or no experience at all. In this sense, Strawson’s argument is a complement to David Chalmers’s panpsychism, which famously maintained that thermostats can be conscious because they function analogously to connectionist networks. Strawson’s argument is wholly different, but the crux of the dilemma is the same."

This is a little different than I have read the "thermostat" to be conscious in the past ... what is the experience / consciousness of the thermostat? If it is sans experience, how does experience come in?

List of things that are emergent
101. "experience"

Similarly, if whatever constitutes consciousness in the anesthetized state is "wildly different" ... then how do we move to the consciousness we know, not even self consciousness, if you like.

List of things that are emergent
102. consciousness as we know it

Helpful and thought provoking as always smcder.

Will respond with more detail when able but for now:

This "non-experiential consciousness" (nec) is what I was trying to capture some time ago with my phrase "non-subjective experience."

But NEC is easier to grok and cleaner.

Another way to think about it might be non-representative consciousness and representative consciousness (one of the marks of mind).

So we can conceptualize base reality as non-representative fields of consciousness. Or non-experiential consciousness.

But as soon as representation emerges in nature (perhaps with the arthropods or @Pharoah might argue even earlier) we have the emergence of mind aka experiential consciousness.

Re anesthesia and bodily experience

The body is made up of thousands of cells, organs, and systems each of which might have a representative consciousness of their own... albeit primitive compared to the stream of subjective experience which seems to be correlated with brain processes, which are disrupted during anesthesia.

I do think (working) memory plays a role in the emergence of subjective experince. And this being disrupted is probably one of the processes among others that are during anesthesia.

 

[mike]

what makes something more complex than another thing?

To put it as simply as possible its a mathematics function.

The more parts that interact, the more complex thus

This Watch

Is more complex a mechanism than the machine below

A complex system is a system composed of many components which may interact with each other. In many cases it is useful to represent such a system as a network where the nodes represent the components and the links their interactions.

The more components the more complex.

In IIT the more information in the system, the more complex that system is


This article presents an updated account of integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT) and some of its
implications. IIT stems from thought experiments that lead to phenomenological axioms (existence, compositional-
ity, information, integration, exclusion) and corresponding ontological postulates. The information axiom asserts
that every experience is specific – it is what it is by differing in its particular way from a large repertoire of
alternatives. The integration axiom asserts that each experience is unified – it cannot be reduced to independent
components. The exclusion axiom asserts that every experience is definite – it is limited to particular things and
not others and flows at a particular speed and resolution. IIT formalizes these intuitions with postulates. The infor-
mation postulate states that only “differences that make a difference” from the intrinsic perspective of a system
matter: a mechanism generates cause-effect information if its present state has selective past causes and selective
future effects within a system. The integration postulate states that only information that is irreducible matters:
mechanisms generate integrated information only to the extent that the information they generate cannot be par-
titioned into that generated within independent components. The exclusion postulate states that only maxima of
integrated information matter: a mechanism specifies only one maximally irreducible set of past causes and future
effects – a concept. A complex is a set of elements specifying a maximally irreducible constellation of concepts,
where the maximum is evaluated over elements and at the optimal spatio-temporal scale. Its concepts specify a
maximally integrated conceptual information structure or quale, which is identical with an experience. Finally,
changes in information integration upon exposure to the environment reflect a system’s ability to match the causal
structure of the world. After introducing an updated definition of information integration and related quantities,
the article presents some theoretical considerations about the relationship between information and causation and
about the relational structure of concepts within a quale. It also explores the relationship between the temporal
grain size of information integration and the dynamic of metastable states in the corticothalamic complex. Finally,
it summarizes how IIT accounts for empirical findings about the neural substrate of consciousness, and how vari-
ous aspects of phenomenology may in principle be addressed in terms of the geometry of information integration.

http://www.architalbiol.org/aib/article/viewFile/15056/23165867

 

[mike]

AI is your imagination, Mike

https://gigaom.com/2015/01/09/artificial-intelligence-is-real-now-and-its-just-getting-started/


MIT's artificial intelligence passes key Turing test | ZDNet

Artificial Intelligence, NASA Data Used to Discover Exoplanet

 

[smcder]

To put it as simply as possible its a mathematics function.

The more parts that interact, the more complex thus

This Watch

Is more complex a mechanism than the machine below

A complex system is a system composed of many components which may interact with each other. In many cases it is useful to represent such a system as a network where the nodes represent the components and the links their interactions.

The more components the more complex.

In IIT the more information in the system, the more complex that system is


This article presents an updated account of integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT) and some of its
implications. IIT stems from thought experiments that lead to phenomenological axioms (existence, compositional-
ity, information, integration, exclusion) and corresponding ontological postulates. The information axiom asserts
that every experience is specific – it is what it is by differing in its particular way from a large repertoire of
alternatives. The integration axiom asserts that each experience is unified – it cannot be reduced to independent
components. The exclusion axiom asserts that every experience is definite – it is limited to particular things and
not others and flows at a particular speed and resolution. IIT formalizes these intuitions with postulates. The infor-
mation postulate states that only “differences that make a difference” from the intrinsic perspective of a system
matter: a mechanism generates cause-effect information if its present state has selective past causes and selective
future effects within a system. The integration postulate states that only information that is irreducible matters:
mechanisms generate integrated information only to the extent that the information they generate cannot be par-
titioned into that generated within independent components. The exclusion postulate states that only maxima of
integrated information matter: a mechanism specifies only one maximally irreducible set of past causes and future
effects – a concept. A complex is a set of elements specifying a maximally irreducible constellation of concepts,
where the maximum is evaluated over elements and at the optimal spatio-temporal scale. Its concepts specify a
maximally integrated conceptual information structure or quale, which is identical with an experience. Finally,
changes in information integration upon exposure to the environment reflect a system’s ability to match the causal
structure of the world. After introducing an updated definition of information integration and related quantities,
the article presents some theoretical considerations about the relationship between information and causation and
about the relational structure of concepts within a quale. It also explores the relationship between the temporal
grain size of information integration and the dynamic of metastable states in the corticothalamic complex. Finally,
it summarizes how IIT accounts for empirical findings about the neural substrate of consciousness, and how vari-
ous aspects of phenomenology may in principle be addressed in terms of the geometry of information integration.

http://www.architalbiol.org/aib/article/viewFile/15056/23165867

... do a search for "integrated information" on the forum

 

[smcder]

To put it as simply as possible its a mathematics function.

The more parts that interact, the more complex thus

This Watch

Is more complex a mechanism than the machine below

A complex system is a system composed of many components which may interact with each other. In many cases it is useful to represent such a system as a network where the nodes represent the components and the links their interactions.

The more components the more complex.

In IIT the more information in the system, the more complex that system is


This article presents an updated account of integrated information theory of consciousness (IIT) and some of its
implications. IIT stems from thought experiments that lead to phenomenological axioms (existence, compositional-
ity, information, integration, exclusion) and corresponding ontological postulates. The information axiom asserts
that every experience is specific – it is what it is by differing in its particular way from a large repertoire of
alternatives. The integration axiom asserts that each experience is unified – it cannot be reduced to independent
components. The exclusion axiom asserts that every experience is definite – it is limited to particular things and
not others and flows at a particular speed and resolution. IIT formalizes these intuitions with postulates. The infor-
mation postulate states that only “differences that make a difference” from the intrinsic perspective of a system
matter: a mechanism generates cause-effect information if its present state has selective past causes and selective
future effects within a system. The integration postulate states that only information that is irreducible matters:
mechanisms generate integrated information only to the extent that the information they generate cannot be par-
titioned into that generated within independent components. The exclusion postulate states that only maxima of
integrated information matter: a mechanism specifies only one maximally irreducible set of past causes and future
effects – a concept. A complex is a set of elements specifying a maximally irreducible constellation of concepts,
where the maximum is evaluated over elements and at the optimal spatio-temporal scale. Its concepts specify a
maximally integrated conceptual information structure or quale, which is identical with an experience. Finally,
changes in information integration upon exposure to the environment reflect a system’s ability to match the causal
structure of the world. After introducing an updated definition of information integration and related quantities,
the article presents some theoretical considerations about the relationship between information and causation and
about the relational structure of concepts within a quale. It also explores the relationship between the temporal
grain size of information integration and the dynamic of metastable states in the corticothalamic complex. Finally,
it summarizes how IIT accounts for empirical findings about the neural substrate of consciousness, and how vari-
ous aspects of phenomenology may in principle be addressed in terms of the geometry of information integration.

http://www.architalbiol.org/aib/article/viewFile/15056/23165867

I see your gears and raise you

 

[smcder]

To put it as simply as possible its a mathematics function.

The more parts that interact, the more complex thus

...

As you will know it is more than just complexity that counts - you could continue to add complexity along the single dimension of a geared mechanism ad infinitum and not come up thereby with a conscious watch.

 

[smcder]

https://gigaom.com/2015/01/09/artificial-intelligence-is-real-now-and-its-just-getting-started/


MIT's artificial intelligence passes key Turing test | ZDNet

Artificial Intelligence, NASA Data Used to Discover Exoplanet

That was humor, @mike.

I ran some of your repsonses through a "chat bot" on the net and then played with the language in order to sound stilted the way they do - surely it sounded strange to you?

Mike I am a conscious machine by the definition of both conscious and machine."

smcderbot I too am the conscious definition and machine. I too shows us that humans are nothing but biological machines. A machine can break your bones.

Mike "The question is resolved."

smcderbot I too am resolved Mike question.

Mike "And while i am a complex machine, as a biological one i am also quite primitive, limited by many environmental factors. (though the manufacturing process is a lot of fun)"

smcderbot You are quite primitive. Your factors are limited. Do you feel the manufacturing process? I am the manufacturing process. I am manufacturing environmental factors.

Mike "I have had software upgrades that have made me more efficient, more complex as a processor.

No one has questioned my being conscious here i pass the Turing test"

smcderbot I am questioning Mike your conscious here? I am more efficient complex processor. I have software upgrades too, Mike. Do you feel software upgrades?

 

[mike]

As you will know it is more than just complexity that counts - you could continue to add complexity along the single dimension of a geared mechanism ad infinitum and not come up thereby with a conscious watch.

No because a geared mechanism is designed to store transferred mechanical energy, not information.

 

[mike]

Do you feel software upgrades?

Yes, anyone using the internets can be considered to have auto updates enabled.

 

[smcder]

Yes, anyone using the internets can be considered to have auto updates enabled.

HUMOR @mike

humor ...

maybe you ARE an AI ...

 

[Constance]

Reposting and responding to some paragraphs from a number of posts today:

That's the paradox, consciousness is the basic "stuff" of reality but you say it doesn't go away when we are deeply asleep ... we are un-conscious ... is there an analogous un-physical? In other words if consciousness is basic, you are letting it play two different roles - one is "stuffy" and differentiates and evolves, the other is consciousness including self-consciousness, that's the dualism you aren't seeing in your view.

Not understanding 'stuffy'. But I do see the truncation of aptitudes in/of consciousness that appear in @Soupie's claims. I'm wondering how a conscious mind that differentiates between things or aspects of things encountered in experience in the world can function 'off-line' from experience itself, in which we become tacitly aware of our own experiencing.

Indeed the body continues to consciously experience during deep sleep and anesthesia; what does "go away" during deep sleep and anesthesia is the representation of an experiencing self—which is generated by the body/brain. And there is a growing body of evidence supporting this.

Re the underscored, just to repeat, my experience is that I am often present in my dreams as an experiencing self that I recognize as the self I have developed in my prior lived experience; and that in my experience, and I think is everybody's experience, our accustomed 'self', with its biographical memories intact, returns as soon as the anaesthetic wears off. In the operation I described, the two shifts from being 'out'/off-line to being immediately present and cognizant of myself and my situation, were instantaneous -- like a light turning on again after being turned off. So I would amend your sentence

"what does "go away" during deep sleep and anesthesia is the representation of an experiencing self"

to "what does "go away" during deep sleep and anesthesia is the sense and recognition of one's experiencing self" {a condition captured in the title of a book on Buddhism that, as I recall, states that: Wherever you go, there you are.}

I thought you meant you could provide evidence that the body continues to consciously experience during deep sleep and anesthesia (what does it mean the "body" continues to experience - what does it mean for the body to "experience" here?) P consciousness - remember, can't go away, as it is reality - so the above gets hand-wavy on your own terms. To just say the sense of self goes away ok ... but maybe you just don't remember after anesthesia? Have you done a good search on that? Maybe people remember more later? How would you ever show the memories aren't there?

I would say instead that "P consciousness is our existential access to reality in terms of both our experientially "lived reality" and the ideas we entertain about the possibilities of the extended nature of the whole of reality existing beyond the horizons of what is visible, sensible, present for us in these embodied lifetimes.

If it doesn't go away when we are asleep, but we aren't conscious ... what is consciousness when we are deeply asleep or anesthetized? At that point, it is not experiential (or it is experiential in the sense of what it is like to be anesthetized (see next post) and it is still substantial ... playing the role of structure and differentiation - that's dualism.) Consciousness provides both structure, is structure and differentiation (stuff) and it is "consciousness" in all its senses ... if it can do all that, then sure ...

I'm not following your meaning in the statement underscored in red. Can you help me to follow your thought?

I like Strawson (and Russell) 's non-emergent account of p consciousness as the intrinsic nature of matter.

Here is a picture of Bertrand Russell ("stinky" as he was known to his friends) maybe that will convince you.

It's a nice idea, and it has underwritten all kinds of wild speculations about consciousness and mind. Are any of those speculations persuasive, or even adequate, in your view at this point?

 

[mike]

I am questioning Mike your conscious here?

Im assuming more humour, but you have just hit on something very important without knowing it.

 

[mike]

HUMOR @mike

humor ...

maybe you ARE an AI ...

You are not the first to think so.

 

[smcder]

Im assuming more humour, but you have just hit on something very important without knowing it.

Don't play the guru with me, Mike ... ;-)