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Why does science have such an issue with the paranormal?

I don't know what kind of God Platinga believes in. But it still looks like mental gymnastics to argue you don't have to offer evidence for an extraordinary claim. I go with Hitchen's Maxim: That which is proposed without evidence, can be dismissed without evidence. But I'm open to clearly defining an idea of God(s).

That's a shame to hear. Thanks for sharing.

To respond to an earlier question: No, I haven't heard of Michael Ruse.

I don't know what kind of God Platinga believes in.

He sets it out pretty clearly in his writings.

But it still looks like mental gymnastics to argue you don't have to offer evidence for an extraordinary claim.

His arguments have to be worked through - there's no easy way to summarize it.

Extraordinary claims - I think both of these were posted in another thread, I believe the extraordinary claims statement originated with Truzzi:

UFO Skeptic

Skeptical Investigations - Investigating Skeptics - Anomalistics - On Some Unfair Practices towards Claims of the Paranormal

But I'm open to clearly defining an idea of God(s).

I am too.

No, I haven't heard of Michael Ruse.

"Michael Ruse, FRSC is a philosopher of science who specializes in the philosophy of biology and is well known for his work on the relationship between science and religion, the creation-evolution controversy and the demarcation problem in science."

Michael Ruse | The Guardian
 
Certainly the evidence may not be extraordinary, but the claim itself is.

On detection, I'll summarize what someone from another forum said:

There are a number of reasons for our failure to detect ETI. We've only made a sketchy survey of the possible combinations of signal strengths, frequencies and expected points of origin. ETI could be using an unfamiliar modulation scheme. We could be receiving their signals right now and mistaking them for part of the background noise.

We already know that the most efficient signals closely approximate the appearance of radio noise, without the key to interpret them. A multitude of extremely short bursts of signals of a wide bandwidth could easily pass for noise, as could signals that hop very rapidly from one discrete frequency to another.

We should also consider the possibility of other electromagnetic ranges used for communications. Some SETI work has been done in the optical range, but, again, it has scarcely scratched the surface of a world of possibilities. Light offers the advantage of much greater available bandwidth than radio.

Credit: We Haven't Been Visited? Examining Arguments Against ET Visitation. , page 1

This conjecture points to the fact that our instruments aren't yet calibrated to pick up other signs of intelligent life. There are too many hurdles for SETI to deliver a credible conclusion. We've only been searching for a few decades...it's no surprise we haven't found anything yet. We may not be able to pin down a location for ETI, but surely we can infer its existence thru other methods.
 
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sagan was excited by seti for 1 hour, then got bored, he thought there would be noise a plenty, when there wasnt, he tired quickly, if memory serves me right.

several people have coined a version of the extraordinary claims require etc etc, over the last 2 century's.
 
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Certainly the evidence may not be extraordinary, but the claim itself is.

On detection, I'll summarize what someone from another forum said:



Credit: We Haven't Been Visited? Examining Arguments Against ET Visitation. , page 1

This conjecture points to the fact that our instruments aren't yet calibrated to pick up other signs of intelligent life. There are too many hurdles for SETI to deliver a credible conclusion. We've only been searching for a few decades...it's no surprise we haven't found anything yet. We may not be able to pin down a location for ETI, but surely we can infer its existence thru other methods.

Plantinga's claim is about basicality and warrant, both fundamental to epistemology. The logic is clear and I think may be of broad use to those interested in the paranormal.

Truzzio, who sounds a bit as if he is sorry he ever said that bit about extraordinary evidence (or maybe just that Sagan got credit for it) makes a recommendation:

A Recommendation.
In addition to recognizing and working through the issues I have raised above, we need scaled terms to deal with levels of evidence for the best of the extraordinary claims put forth by protoscientists. Scientists might well distinguish between extraordinary claims that are: suggestive, meaning interesting and worthy of attention but generally of low priority; compelling, meaning the evidence is strongly supportive and argues for assigning a higher scientific priority for greater investigation; and convincing, meaning most reasonable scientists examining the evidence would agree at least a preponderance of evidence supports the claim. Using such graded language might help us turn from our present debates, with room only for winners and losers, into dialogues between peers, all of whom should want to see science judiciously progress. We can all be winners.


Skeptical Investigations - Investigating Skeptics - Anomalistics - On Some Unfair Practices towards Claims of the Paranormal
 
Truzzio, who sounds a bit as if he is sorry he ever said that bit about extraordinary evidence (or maybe just that Sagan got credit for it) makes a recommendation

neither of them 'coined' the phrase they modernised it, as did david hume ["A wise man ... proportions his belief to the evidence" ] from ......... laplace, the original [ "The weight of evidence for an extraordinary claim must be proportioned to its strangeness'' ].

truzzio did however coin the phrase pseudoskepticism in response to skeptics who, made negative claims without any proof of their claims.

quote

There are some members of the skeptics' groups who clearly believe they know the right answer prior to inquiry. They appear not to be interested in weighing alternatives, investigating strange claims, or trying out psychic experiences or altered states for themselves (heaven forbid!), but only in promoting their own particular belief structure and cohesion...I have to say it—most of these people are men. Indeed, I have not met a single woman of this type
 
oops sorry the above quote was from susan blackmore another fellow csicop.

this was truzzio.

They tend to block honest inquiry, in my opinion. Most of them are not agnostic toward claims of the paranormal; they are out to knock them. [...] When an experiment of the paranormal meets their requirements, then they move the goal posts. Then, if the experiment is reputable, they say it's a mere anomaly.
 
Truzzio, who sounds a bit as if he is sorry he ever said that bit about extraordinary evidence (or maybe just that Sagan got credit for it) makes a recommendation

neither of them 'coined' the phrase they modernised it, as did david hume ["A wise man ... proportions his belief to the evidence" ] from ......... laplace, the original [ "The weight of evidence for an extraordinary claim must be proportioned to its strangeness'' ].

truzzio did however coin the phrase pseudoskepticism in response to skeptics who, made negative claims without any proof of their claims.

quote

There are some members of the skeptics' groups who clearly believe they know the right answer prior to inquiry. They appear not to be interested in weighing alternatives, investigating strange claims, or trying out psychic experiences or altered states for themselves (heaven forbid!), but only in promoting their own particular belief structure and cohesion...I have to say it—most of these people are men. Indeed, I have not met a single woman of this type

I wonder if this last bit is true? I have know women who are just as ferocious as men at defending status quo so I wonder if it's something about paranormal experience or if (when) she wrote this - the skeptic's groups were "good ol' boy's" clubs (and may still be) . . . but it's an interesting comment.
 
I read Truzzio's article before. I agree with its main points. But I don't think skepticism toward extraordinary claims is unwarranted or unfair. The problem with the God claim is that Platinga argues it's free from scrutiny as a consequence of some special status. This is really an elaborate form of special pleading. Moreover, it contradicts our idea of existence. We can talk about existence in the abstract. But even with unobservables (e.g. we can't strictly see or touch an atom), we have models which anticipate their existence and are reasonably confident in such.

No deity has any measurable effect on the Universe. We have anecdotes alleging He does, but that's not the same. Whether that be the Bible, the Qur'an, or some purported religious experience. Theists like to skirt the topic by stating He exists out of time or the Universe...but then why suppose His existence at all? There's no way it constitutes a properly basic belief, unless of course you redefine that to lose meaning. If it's consistent with some worldview, then it must be a detached worldview to start with.

Theologians attempt to solve particular issues and raise larger ones.

For reference, I'm an ex-Christian atheist.
 
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I read Truzzio's article before. I agree with its main points. But I don't think skepticism toward extraordinary claims is unwarranted or unfair. The problem with the God claim is that Platinga argues it's free from scrutiny as a consequence of some special status. This is really an elaborate form of special pleading. Moreover, it contradicts our idea of existence. We can talk about existence in the abstract. But even with unobservables (e.g. we can't strictly see or touch an atom), we have models which anticipate their existence and are reasonably confident in such.

No deity has any measurable effect on the Universe. We have anecdotes alleging He does, but that's not the same. Whether that be the Bible, the Qur'an, or some purported religious experience. Theists like to skirt the topic by stating He exists out of time or the Universe...but then why suppose His existence at all? There's no way it constitutes a properly basic belief, unless of course you redefine that to lose meaning. If it's consistent with some worldview, then it must be a detached worldview to start with.

Theologians attempt to solve particular issues and raise larger ones.

For reference, I'm an ex-Christian atheist.

But I don't think skepticism toward extraordinary claims is unwarranted or unfair.

The problem I think Truzzio is trying to solve is that of having a good definition of "extraordinary". By recommending a graded skepticism (suggestive, compelling, convincing) he wants to avoid the winner/loser dichotomy set up by hard skeptics.

The problem with the God claim is that Platinga argues it's free from scrutiny as a consequence of some special status.

The answer to an objection of special pleading is by a wider claim that many of the beliefs we have are basic beliefs.

There's no way it constitutes a properly basic belief, unless of course you redefine that to lose meaning.

Plantinga appears to me to have a solid case for basicality. In foundationalism, properly basic beliefs do not depend upon justification of other beliefs, but on non-doxastic justification.

Another approach is to critique foundationalism: that non-doxastic states mental states cannot be reasons or that there are no beliefs so obvious that they require no support from other beliefs - but that's a strong form of skepticism and it calls perception and memory into question - but it does point up that foundationalists have a hard time providing an account of which beliefs are self-evident - which I think gets at more where you are coming from, however you have quite a lot to account for when you critique foundationalism and I suspect Plantinga is more than well aware of that.

For reference, I'm an ex-Christian atheist.

No problem - I'm not interested in debating beliefs - I'm interested in the structure of Plantinga's arguments, I find him very challenging.
 
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