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Consciousness and the Paranormal


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Soupie wrote: "If there were two substances that were fundamentally different, on account of this fundamental difference, these substances wouldn't be able to interact. Ergo anything that can interact must be made of the same fudamental substance."

I can't make sense of the above. I think the problem you're having is in hanging on to the term 'substance' so rigorously. It leads you, as Steve observed, to attempt to reduce both the physical and nonphysical aspects of reality to something essentially physical. At the same time, you refer frequently to nonphysical aspects of reality which you claim to take as 'real'. The core problem for you and all of us is still how to account for how unmistakeably nonphysical aspects of reality -- consciousness, mind, feeling, freedom, creativity, ethics, etc. -- arise in the world from physical substance. Tononi takes the question beyond 'substance' to 'information', which can hardly be thought of as itself a substance. The problem he presents for himself and anyone who follows him is the task of demonstrating in detail how information is produced and exchanged -- and universally entangled -- by interacting substances, fields, and forces to form a) the evolving universe we live in {evolved through complex systems}, and b) the human minds that are capable of consciously apprehending the universe's complexity and, indeed, their own complexity.
 
Constance said:
Soupie wrote: "If there were two substances that were fundamentally different, on account of this fundamental difference, these substances wouldn't be able to interact. Ergo anything that can interact must be made of the same fudamental substance."

I can't make sense of the above. I think the problem you're having is in hanging on to the term 'substance' so rigorously. It leads you, as Steve observed, to attempt to reduce both the physical and nonphysical aspects of reality to something essentially physical. At the same time, you refer frequently to nonphysical aspects of reality which you claim to take as 'real'. The core problem for you and all of us is still how to account for how unmistakeably nonphysical aspects of reality -- consciousness, mind, feeling, freedom, creativity, ethics, etc. -- arise in the world from physical substance. Tononi takes the question beyond 'substance' to 'information', which can hardly be thought of as itself a substance. The problem he presents for himself and anyone who follows him is the task of demonstrating in detail how information is produced and exchanged -- and universally entangled -- by interacting substances, fields, and forces to form a) the evolving universe we live in {evolved through complex systems}, and b) the human minds that are capable of consciously apprehending the universe's complexity and, indeed, their own complexity.
Click to expand...
I actually don't like the term substance, but I use it because it seemed to clarify my thoughts for all of you.

If you recall, when I started in this discussion, I used the term "unit" which none of you seemed to comprehend.

No, I don't think of this substance/unit as physical. That's just it! With all due respect, if it weren't for Chalmers and other theorists I think I'd go bonkers, because they at least seem to grok the ideas I have about the mind/body problem. And I don't even mean to imply that "I'm right." What I'm saying is that — at least — the three of you seem to think about mind/mental/phenomenal much different than I.

I'm not saying my way of thinking is best or right. I love what you guys have to offer and it's introduced me to so much.

An issue that you and Steve seem to have with my thinking is my idea that — yes, like the physical domain — the mental domain is populated with complex objects constituted of simpler objects.

Humph. I just tried to give a detailed example explaining this idea but I just know it will result in confusion. Sigh. All I can say is that Chalmers tackles this concept with Constitutive Russellian Panprotopsychism — the idea that quanta possess physical and mental properties and combine to constitute physical and mental objects, and Tonini does as well with IIT — the idea that mental objects (qualia) are constituted of information.

I appreciate that you guys have different views/ideas regarding the mental and spiritual; however, my view, as disagreeable as you may find it, is not as ludicrous or near-sighted as you may or may not think. I'm open to these other ideas and enjoy hearing/reading about them, but they don't resonate with me, which is why I don't mention or discuss them in my limited time here.
 
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The combination problem! That's the Chalmers reference ...


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Note 14 (page 18) in that paper tells us: "
An ancestor of this paper, “65,536 Definitions of Physicalism” (delivered at the Bowling Green conference on Formulating Physicalism in 2005) applied the method of elimination to the debate over physicalism in some detail, with the dispute between Dowell and Wilson at that conference serving as one focus."

I'd like to read that paper but can't find it online. Maybe he used it in his most recent book, Constructing the World.
 
Soupie said:
. . . An issue that you and Steve seem to have with my thinking is my idea that — yes, like the physical domain — the mental domain is composed of complex objects constituted of simpler objects.
Click to expand...

'Objects' is no more helpful to you (or us) than 'substance' was in coming to terms with mental and emotional phenomena and lived experience of the world.

Humph. I just tried to give a detailed example explaining this idea but I just know it will result in confusion. Sigh. All I can say is that Chalmers tackles this concept with Constitutive Russellian Panprotopsychism — the idea that quanta possess physical and mental properties

Would need to be demonstrated beyond a mere "idea," a hypothesis, which is what it is.

and combine to constitute physical and mental objects,

Chalmers uses the term 'mental objects'? Can you cite that?

and Tonini does as well with IIT — the idea that mental objects (qualia) are constituted of information.[/quote]

Qualia are not objects; they are sensations and feelings experienced by living beings. Reading Evan Thompson's Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind would open your thinking to another perspective that will make it less easy for you to attempt to objectivize consciousness, mind, and life. Unless you prefer to continue doing so, of course. ;)
 
Constance said:
Note 14 (page 18) in that paper tells us: "
An ancestor of this paper, “65,536 Definitions of Physicalism” (delivered at the Bowling Green conference on Formulating Physicalism in 2005) applied the method of elimination to the debate over physicalism in some detail, with the dispute between Dowell and Wilson at that conference serving as one focus."

I'd like to read that paper but can't find it online. Maybe he used it in his most recent book, Constructing the World.
Click to expand...

You probably found the PowerPoint?

Here's Chalmers blog entry:

fragments of consciousness: 65,536 definitions of physicalism


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He says the paper won't be published elsewhere, so PPT may be all we get.


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Unfortunately the blog provides no link to his paper or to the discussion of it he refers to:

"65,536 definitions of physicalism
I'm now back in Canberra. The US trip was very enjoyable (apart from the indictment). I've been intending to post a few things related to activities along the way. For now, I'll link to photos and papers from the Bowling Green conference on physicalism. The conference was mostly devoted to the issue of how physicalism should be formulated: what is it to be a core physical property, and what relation does everything in the world need to bear to these for physicalism to be true? In my wrap-up talk (which won't be published elsewhere) I tried to give some perspective on the previous talks and (applying my favorite philosophical methodology) figure out which of these issues are terminological and which are substantive. The Powerpoint is here: 65,536 Definitions of Physicalism.
Update: See the discussion of the paper by Brian Weatherson and others here. Update 2: This has turned into a really interesting and helpful discussion (for me, at least) of terminological disputes and some underlying foundational issues. This is something I'm currently writing a paper on, so if anyone would like to follow up e.g. in the comments here or there, or by e-mail, feel free."

Maybe his webpage will offer some clue to where that paper might be available.
 
smcder said:
He says the paper won't be published elsewhere, so PPT may be all we get.
Click to expand...

Not good enough. In the blog entry I reprinted above he said he was going to write a paper on the definitions of physicalism and which one(s) might work. It's certainly an issue he should deliver on.
 
Constance said:
Not good enough. In the blog entry I reprinted above he said he was going to write a paper on the definitions of physicalism and which one(s) might work. It's certainly an issue he should deliver on.
Click to expand...

We can email him. I'll look around some more. The link to "papers" connects to Bowling Green and that says it's down temporarily.


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Soupie said:
I actually don't like the term substance, but I use it because it seemed to clarify my thoughts for all of you.

If you recall, when I started in this discussion, I used the term "unit" which none of you seemed to comprehend.

No, I don't think of this substance/unit as physical. That's just it! With all due respect, if it weren't for Chalmers and other theorists I think I'd go bonkers, because they at least seem to grok the ideas I have about the mind/body problem. And I don't even mean to imply that "I'm right." What I'm saying is that — at least — the three of you seem to think about mind/mental/phenomenal much different than I.

I'm not saying my way of thinking is best or right. I love what you guys have to offer and it's introduced me to so much.

An issue that you and Steve seem to have with my thinking is my idea that — yes, like the physical domain — the mental domain is populated with complex objects constituted of simpler objects.

Humph. I just tried to give a detailed example explaining this idea but I just know it will result in confusion. Sigh. All I can say is that Chalmers tackles this concept with Constitutive Russellian Panprotopsychism — the idea that quanta possess physical and mental properties and combine to constitute physical and mental objects, and Tonini does as well with IIT — the idea that mental objects (qualia) are constituted of information.

I appreciate that you guys have different views/ideas regarding the mental and spiritual; however, my view, as disagreeable as you may find it, is not as ludicrous or near-sighted as you may or may not think. I'm open to these other ideas and enjoy hearing/reading about them, but they don't resonate with me, which is why I don't mention or discuss them in my limited time here.
Click to expand...

"Humph. I just tried to give a detailed example explaining this idea but I just know it will result in confusion."

Confusion we have already - so what can it hurt ... ? ;-) give us a try

http://www.philipgoffphilosophy.com...34/against_constitutive_russellian_monism.pdf

Combination problem ...




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Soupie said:
I think there is an elephant in the room too! But I'll tell you what I think the elephant is. Capital M-Meaning, or Ultimate Meaning (UM). (By Ultimate Meaning I mean, heh, meaning that is not subjective but objective.)

Physical Substance Monists tend to believe in a deterministic universe devoid of Ultimate Meaning.

I sense that the three of you - @smcder, @Constance, @Tyger - strongly disagree with that concept. You all three seem to believe that there is Ultimate Meaning, particularly for humans.

This UM seems to be related to a supposed non-physical, spiritual realm. A realm filled with souls, God, gods, demons, and angels. These beings are interested in us. We - our souls, spirits, and/or minds - may even "belong" to this realm. A realm where there is Ultimate Meaning.

My own view is that while such a realm might exist, it won't have Ultimate Meaning, just lower case m-meaning. :)

There may be "spiritual" beings that exist and interact with us, but 1) they gotta be made of something and if they can interact with us, it's gotta be something related to the stuff we're made of, 2) while what these beings have in mind for us may be Ultimate to us, it wouldn't be Ultimate to them. Meaning, if we have a backstory, they too must have a backstory. That is, if we having UM via these entities, then from their POV it is subjective meaning.

It's the old argument: if God created us, who created Him?

If there is a spiritual realm that created us in the physical realm, who created them in the spiritual realm?

Finally, while I'm not as big a proponent of Langan as it may seem, haha, he is apparently a Substance Monist who very strongly believes in a reality suffused with Ultimate Meaning. Thus Substance Monism does not preclude there being UM.
Click to expand...

Another way to think about meaning:

Existence precedes essence - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

"The proposition that existence precedes essence (French: l'existence précède l'essence) is a central claim of existentialism, which reverses the traditional philosophical view that the essence or nature of a thing is more fundamental and immutable than its existence."

The idea of "being condemned to be free"

I hope @Constance will respond to your statement above, your sense of how she and Tyger and I think about meaning.


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