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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 6

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Constance, you, I, and everyone else in this thread had discussed at sickening length the fact that our concepts are based on our experiences. We get it already. Seriously.

I don't think you do, Soupie, and Pharoaoh has just argued against the funding of thinking from the basis of experience.

Trying to have a discussion with you is exhausting.

I could say the same about you (and indeed have, but privately).

You are arguing, outright arguing with @Pharoah and I for no reason. No reason at all. We are all simply trying to discuss the problem of consciousness. Yes, yes, you love phenomenology and all it has to offer. That's great. It's wonderful. But it does not offer us an answer to the mind body problem. If it did there would of course be no mind body problem; or at the very least you have been able to articulate phenomenology's answer/response to the mind body problem by now. (It's been 2 years.)

The mind-body problem has a very long history in philosophy with no answer to it yet in sight. But when did that problem become the focus of this thread? Our goal at the outset was to make progress in understanding what consciousness is, and so far as I can see that is still the general goal here.

{S, you interpolated this quote from my last post to you}
"I have quoted, cited, written about, and linked the major phenomenologists' writing at length for two years here to clarify phenomenology's theory of consciousness and the direct experience of being-in-the-world on which it is based. It's all still here in this thread, available for you to read again if you did not read or understand it before. I cannot summarize all that for you in a single post or even a dozen long posts. And why should I? The resources you need to read and understand it are still linked and explicated here, going back to Part I of this thread, for you to read again, or perhaps for the first time."

{and you replied as follows}

You said the same about Velmans, and yet Pharoah was able to do so in a very nice post.

To do what? As I recall, he attempted to dismiss Velmans, and in a way you very likely 'liked'.

I find it hard to believe that you can't offer a brief outline of how phenomenological philosophy resolves the mind-body problem.

Who said that phenomenology "resolves the mind-body problem"? Not I. What I have said is that phenomenology overcomes Descartes' radical mind-body dualism, enabling us to understand the chiasmic interrelation of subjectivity and objectivity in uncovering the nature of experiential reality.


I don't know what has triggered this petulant outburst from you. Perhaps it's because I posed a direct question to you today [with which you begin this screed] that you are not prepared to answer. I've asked you in earlier posts in this lengthy thread to respond to questions I've posed and frequently received no response. Your acting out in this post is hardly a response.


ps: Here, again, is the question I posed to you today in case you've forgotten it:

"If our concepts are not based in and constructed on the basis of our experiences in the world, what do you take to be the origin of our concepts? This is a critical question that you need to respond to if our discussion is to proceed."
 
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@Constance
When I read, I do so analytically. To critique something is not to say it isn't valid or engaging or progressive.
When I read B&T, velman et al. There is such a protective resistance to my assimilation and criticism and the response is generally that I need to read more or am not understanding it sufficiently. I have read that Sartre misinterpreted Heidegger too but something positive came out of that, non? I am a disciple to HCT and therefore, while I am very interested in the phenomenological philosophers and applying their methodology, I am no convert. I will follow where my intuitions take me and will be reading more MP in due course.
 
The mind-body problem has a very long history in philosophy with no answer to it yet in sight. But when did that problem become the focus of this thread? Our goal at the outset was to make progress in understanding what consciousness is, and so far as I can see that is still the general goal here.
Constance, in order to understand what consciousness is we will need to understand what mind and body are and how they relate, ie, the mind body problem.

"If our concepts are not based in and constructed on the basis of our experiences in the world, what do you take to be the origin of our concepts? This is a critical question that you need to respond to if our discussion is to proceed."
This is why I say talking with you is exhausting. Ive said, and have said, that I agree that our concepts are based on our experiences. Indeed michael allens comments on this recently really brought this home for me, as well as the work of Hoffman (and @Pharoah) and the enactive approach that our experiences are grounded in our physiology. So much so that "seeing beyond" our experiences and our concepts grounded in them is a challenge, perhaps an insurmountable challenge.

If you want to bring insights from phenomenology to this discussion, by all means do, but i politely request that you stop lecturing, demanding, and berating me for not being a phenomenologist.

I feel like the four of us, you, smcder, pharoah, and myself have reached a point in this discussion where we are conceptually open to moving beyond physicalism as it is generally understood and ready to discuss some interesting metaphysics, etc.
 
I feel like the four of us, you, smcder, pharoah, and myself have reached a point in this discussion where we are conceptually open to moving beyond physicalism as it is generally understood and ready to discuss some interesting metaphysics, etc.

I'll be happy to see a change in subject matter here. We have been going around in circles for quite a while. And I'm officially giving up the effort to persuade you and Pharoah to engage phenomenological approaches. Metaphysics will be an invigorating sea change.
 
@Constance
When I read, I do so analytically. To critique something is not to say it isn't valid or engaging or progressive.
When I read B&T, velman et al. There is such a protective resistance to my assimilation and criticism and the response is generally that I need to read more or am not understanding it sufficiently. I have read that Sartre misinterpreted Heidegger too but something positive came out of that, non? I am a disciple to HCT and therefore, while I am very interested in the phenomenological philosophers and applying their methodology, I am no convert. I will follow where my intuitions take me and will be reading more MP in due course.

Do you mean you have a 'protective resistance' to assimilating phenomenology, or that I express a 'protective resistance' to your dismissive responses to it and to Velmans? It's probably both and time to let it all go. Where did you read that Sartre misinterpreted Heidegger? I'd like to see that text. Btw, we all read 'analytically', but we don't all read from the premises and presuppositions of the British 'analytic school' of philosophy, as you do. @Soupie suggests we move on to metaphysics. Let's do.
 
Do you mean you have a 'protective resistance' to assimilating phenomenology, or that I express a 'protective resistance' to your dismissive responses to it and to Velmans? It's probably both and time to let it all go. Where did you read that Sartre misinterpreted Heidegger? I'd like to see that text. Btw, we all read 'analytically', but we don't all read from the premises and presuppositions of the British 'analytic school' of philosophy, as you do. @Soupie suggests we move on to metaphysics. Let's do.
Yes let's move onto metaphysics. I am sick of this bickering treadmill. Incidentally, just to get back on the treadmill for a second (lol) I did not dismiss Velmans... Soupie wanted an explanation and I did my best to provide one. I could not resolve some apparent inconsistencies arising from that particular paper: that's not my fault!
Where did I read about Sartre's misreading of MH? I searched the pdfs that I have been reading of late (several on phenomenology I'll have you know) and did not find the relevant section. But I found this on wiki:

The influence of Heidegger on Sartre's Being and Nothingness is marked, but Heidegger felt that Sartre had misread his work, as he argued in later texts such as the "Letter on 'Humanism.'" In that text, intended for a French audience, Heidegger explained this misreading in the following terms:
Sartre's key proposition about the priority of existentia over essentia [that is, Sartre's statement that "existence precedes essence"] does, however, justify using the name "existentialism" as an appropriate title for a philosophy of this sort. But the basic tenet of "existentialism" has nothing at all in common with the statement from Being and Time [that "the 'essence' of Dasein lies in its existence"]—apart from the fact that in Being and Time no statement about the relation of essentia and existentia can yet be expressed, since there it is still a question of preparing something precursory"
I am sure there are texts about MH's influence on JPS.
It does nt surpris me that someone might misinterprt MH. Which is clearly not a bad thing. As Searle said... It allows others some creative and argumentative wriggle room. Make it too simple and straightforward and one's work sounds like something anyone else could have written [words to that affect]. Searle basically admits to writing not too straightforwardly, (as far as I can make out in his preface to "Intentionality").
 
@Pharoah, thanks for your response. Not to get too metaphysical yet, but Heidegger as you probably know declared 'the end of metaphysics' in his later works. My impression so far is that he was giving up on his attempt to disclose essences in Being and coming around to Sartre's position that 'existence precedes essence'. That core Sartrean proposition makes sense to me in that concepts of 'essences' are works of mind, and works of mind begin with species evolved to the extent that our species is. Heidegger is probably the most difficult philosopher to read with immediate understanding and requires guidance from a Heidegger scholar who has studied all of his works. Nevertheless, many analytic as well as most phenomenological philosophers in our time recognize him alike as one of the major philosophers of the 20th C.
 
These two sections extracted from the entry on Heidegger in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy might be helpful as a background for our future discussions here of what we mean by 'metaphysics' and clarifies what H meant by 'the end of metaphysics'. I don't follow him in that line of his thought. His difficult works are tremendously significant for our ability to think about being and Being, with which I think human existents such as ourselves will never be done, and Heidegger has been vitally important for the development of phenomenology in MP and existentialism in Sartre.


4. The Quest for the Meaning of Being
Throughout his long academic career, Heidegger was preoccupied with the question of the meaning of being. His first formulation of this question goes as far back as his high school studies, during which he read Franz Brentano’s book On the Manifold Meaning of Being in Aristotle. In 1907, the seventeen-year-old Heidegger asked: “If what-is is predicated in manifold meanings, then what is its leading fundamental meaning? What does being mean?” The question of being, unanswered at that time, becomes the leading question of Being and Time twenty years later. Surveying the long history of the meaning attributed to “being,” Heidegger notes that in the philosophical tradition it has generally been presupposed that being is at once the most universal concept, the concept indefinable in terms of other concepts, and the self-evident concept. In short, it is a concept that is mostly taken for granted. However, Heidegger claims that even though we seem to understand being, its meaning is still veiled in darkness. Therefore, we need to restate the question of the meaning of being.

In accordance with the method of philosophy which he employs in his fundamental treatise, before attempting to provide an answer to the question of being in general, Heidegger sets out to answer the question of the being of the particular kind of entity that is the human being, which he calls Dasein. The vivid phenomenological descriptions of Dasein’s being-in-the-world, especially Dasein’s everydayness and resoluteness toward death, have attracted many readers with interests related to existential philosophy, theology, and literature. The basic concepts such as temporality, understanding, historicity, repetition, and authentic or inauthentic existence were carried over into and further explored in his later works. Still, from the point of view of the quest for the meaning of being, Being and Time was a failure and remained unfinished. As Heidegger himself admitted in his later essay, “Letter on Humanism” (1946), the third division of its first part, entitled “Time and Being,” was held back “because thinking failed in adequate saying of the turning and did not succeed with the help of the language of metaphysics.” The second part also remained unwritten.

“The turn” (Kehre) that occurs in the 1930’s is the change in Heidegger’s thinking mentioned above. The consequence of “the turn” is not the abandoning of the leading question of Being and Time. Heidegger stresses the continuity of his thought over the course of the change. Nevertheless, as “everything is reversed,” even the question concerning the meaning of Being is reformulated in Heidegger’s later work. It becomes a question of the openness, that is, of the truth, of being. Furthermore, since the openness of being refers to a situation within history, the most important concept in the later Heidegger becomes the history of being.

For a reader unacquainted with Heidegger’s thought, both the “question of the meaning of being” and the expression “history of being” sound strange. In the first place, such a reader may argue that when something is said to be, there is nothing expressed which the word “Being” could properly denote. Therefore, the word “being” is a meaningless term and the Heideggerian quest for the meaning of being is in general a misunderstanding. Secondly, the reader may also think that the being of Heidegger is no more likely to have a history than the being of Aristotle, so the “history of being” is a misunderstanding as well. Nevertheless, Heidegger’s task is precisely to show that there is a meaningful concept of being. “We understand the ‘is’ we use in speaking,” he claims, “although we do not comprehend it conceptually.” Therefore, Heidegger asks: Can being then be thought? We can think of beings: a table, my desk, the pencil with which I am writing, the school building, a heavy storm in the mountains . . . but being? If the being whose meaning Heidegger seeks seems so elusive, almost like no-thing, it is because it is not an entity. It is not something; it is not a being. “Being is essentially different from a being, from beings.” The “ontological difference,” the distinction between being (das Sein) and beings (das Seiende), is fundamental for Heidegger. The forgetfulness of being that, according to him, occurs in the course of Western philosophy amounts to the oblivion of this distinction.

The conception of the history of being is of central importance in Heidegger’s thought. Already in Being and Time its idea is foreshadowed as “the destruction of the history of ontology.” In Heidegger’s later writings the story is considerably recast and called the “history of being” (Seinsgeschichte). The beginning of this story, as told by Heidegger especially in the Nietzsche lectures, is the end, the completion of philosophy by its dissolution into particular sciences and nihilism—questionlessness of being, a dead end into which the West has run. Heidegger argues that the question of being would still provide a stimulus to the research of Plato and Aristotle, but it was precisely with them that the original experience of being of the early Greeks was covered over. The fateful event was followed by the gradual slipping away of the distinction between being and beings. Described variously by different philosophers, being was reduced to a being: to idea in Plato, substantia and actualitas in Medieval philosophy, objectivity in modern philosophy, and will to power in Nietzsche and contemporary thought. The task which the later Heidegger sets before himself is then to make a way back into the primordial beginning, so that the “dead end” can be replaced by a new beginning. And since the primordial beginning of western thought lies in ancient Greece, in order to solve the problems of contemporary philosophy and reverse the course of modern history, Heidegger ultimately turns for help to the Presocratics, the first western thinkers.

5. Overcoming Metaphysics
For the later Heidegger, “western philosophy,” in which there occurs forgetfulness of being, is synonymous with “the tradition of metaphysics.” Metaphysics inquires about the being of beings, but in such a way that the question of being as such is disregarded, and being itself is obliterated. The Heideggerian “history of being” can thus be seen as the history of metaphysics, which is the history of being’s oblivion. However, looked at from another angle, metaphysics is also the way of thinking that looks beyond beings toward their ground or basis. Each metaphysics aims at the fundamentum absolutum, the ground of such a metaphysics which presents itself indubitably. In Descartes, for example, the fundamentum absolutum is attained through the “Cogito” argument. Cartesian metaphysics is characterized by subjectivity because it has its ground in the self-certain subject. Furthermore, metaphysics is not merely the philosophy which asks the question of the being of beings.At the end of philosophy—i.e., in our present age where there occurs the dissolution of philosophy into particular sciences—the sciences still speak of the being of what-is as a whole. In the wider sense of this term, metaphysics is thus, for Heidegger, any discipline which, whether explicitly or not, provides an answer to the question of the being of beings and of their ground. In medieval times such a discipline was scholastic philosophy, which defined beings as entia creatum (created things) and provided them with their ground in ens perfectissimum (the perfect being), God. Today the discipline is modern technology, through which the contemporary human being establishes himself in the world by working on it in the various modes of making and shaping. Technology forms and controls the human position in today’s world. It masters and dominates beings in various ways.

“In distinction from mastering beings, the thinking of thinkers is the thinking of being.” Heidegger believes that early Greek thinking is not yet metaphysics. Presocratic thinkers ask the question concerning the being of beings, but in such a way that being itself is laid open. They experience the being of beings as the presencing (Anwesen) of what is present (Anwesende). Being as presencing means enduring in unconcealment, disclosing. Throughout his later works Heidegger uses several words in order rightly to convey this Greek experience. What-is, what is present, the unconcealed, is “what appears from out of itself, in appearing shows itself , and in this self-showing manifests.” It is the “emerging arising, the unfolding that lingers.” He describes this experience with the Greek words phusis (emerging dominance) and alêtheia (unconcealment).He attempts to show that the early Greeks did not “objectify” beings (they did not try to reduce them to an object for the thinking subject), but they let them be as they were, as self-showing rising into unconcealment. They experienced the phenomenality of what is present, its radiant self-showing. The departure of Western philosophical tradition from concern with what is present in presencing, from this unique experience that astonished the Greeks, has had profound theoretical and practical consequences.

According to Heidegger, the experience of what is present in presencing signifies the true, unmediated experience of “the things themselves” (die Sache selbst). We may recall that the call to “the things themselves” was included in the Husserlian program of phenomenology. By means of phenomenological description Husserl attempted to arrive at pure phenomena and to describe beings just as they were given independently of any presuppositions. For Heidegger, this attempt has, however, a serious drawback. Like the tradition of modern philosophy preceding him, Husserl stood at the ground of subjectivity. The transcendental subjectivity or consciousness was for him “the sole absolute being.” It was the presupposition that had not been accounted for in his program which aimed to be presuppositionless. Consequently, in Heidegger’s view, the Husserlian attempt to arrive at pure, unmediated phenomena fails. Husserl’s phenomenology departs from the original phenomenality of beings and represents them in terms of the thinking subject as their presupposed ground. By contrast, Heidegger argues, for the Presocratics, beings are grounded in being as presencing. Being, however, is not a ground. To the early Greeks, being, unlimited in its dis-closure, appears as an abyss, the source of thought and wonder. Being calls everything into question, casts the human being out of any habitual ground, and opens before him the mystery of existence.

The departure of western philosophical tradition from what is present in presencing results in metaphysics. Heidegger believes that today’s metaphysics, in the form of technology and the calculative thinking related to it, has become so pervasive that there is no realm of life that is not subject to its dominance. It imposes its technological-scientific-industrial character on human beings, making it the sole criterion of the human sojourn on earth. As it ultimately degenerates into ideologies and worldviews, metaphysics provides an answer to the question of the being of beings for contemporary men and women, but skillfully removes from their lives the problem of their own existence. Moreover, because its sway over contemporary human beings is so powerful, metaphysics cannot be simply cast aside or rejected. Any direct attempt to do so will only strengthen its hold. Metaphysics cannot be rejected, canceled or denied, but it can be overcome by demonstrating its nihilism. In Heidegger’s use of the term, “nihilism” has a very specific meaning. It refers to the forgetfulness of being. What remains unquestioned and forgotten in metaphysics is Being; hence, it is nihilistic.

According to Heidegger, Western humankind in all its relations with beings is sustained by metaphysics. Every age, every human epoch, no matter however different they may be—
Greece after the Presocratics, Rome, the Middle Ages, modernity—has asserted a metaphysics and, therefore, is placed in a specific relationship to what-is as a whole. Metaphysics inquires about the being of beings, but it reduces being to a being; it does not think of being as being. Insofar as being itself is obliterated in it, metaphysics is nihilism. The metaphysics of Plato is no less nihilistic than that of Nietzsche. Consequently, Heidegger tries to demonstrate the nihilism of metaphysics in his account of the history of being, which he considers as the history of being’s oblivion. His attempt to overcome metaphysics is not based on a common-sense positing of a different set of values or the setting out of an alternative worldview, but rather is related to his concept of history, the central theme of which is the repetition of the possibilities for existence. This repetition consists in thinking being back to the primordial beginning of the West—to the early Greek experience of being as presencing—and repeating this beginning, so that the Western world can begin anew.

Heidegger, Martin | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
 
@Constance
When I read, I do so analytically. To critique something is not to say it isn't valid or engaging or progressive.
When I read B&T, velman et al. There is such a protective resistance to my assimilation and criticism and the response is generally that I need to read more or am not understanding it sufficiently. I have read that Sartre misinterpreted Heidegger too but something positive came out of that, non? I am a disciple to HCT and therefore, while I am very interested in the phenomenological philosophers and applying their methodology, I am no convert. I will follow where my intuitions take me and will be reading more MP in due course.

How can you be a disciple to your own work?
 
@Constance
interesting stuff
"Still, from the point of view of the quest for the meaning of being, Being and Time was a failure and remained unfinished."
when I expressed my concerns on reading B&T—re being—you and @smcder said I was being closedminded or words to that effect. I'd have to look through the thread archive and my B&T notes to check exactly what I was querying...
How can you be a disciple to your own work?
I don't know. Sounded good at the time.
Actually... The truth is, I don't come up with any of it. I know when the thinking about it happens but it is not me that is doing it... and then when the thinking is done, it is revealed to me. And people say that I am absent when the thinking is happening... and in a way, I am, though where I go I am not too sure. I feel enslaved to it in a timeless nonexistent space.
It's a strange existence this 'being' malarky.
 
"abstract"... difficult to define.
do they exist independently IYO?

No .... abstract can be defined concretely.

(E) Existence
There are mathematical objects.

(A) Abstractness
Mathematical objects are abstract.

(I) Independence
Mathematical objects are independent of intelligent agents and their language, thought, and practices.

E^M^I - the conjunction of E and M and I = mathematical platonism
 
The truth is, I don't come up with any of it. I know when the thinking about it happens but it is not me that is doing it... and then when the thinking is done, it is revealed to me. And people say that I am absent when the thinking is happening... and in a way, I am, though where I go I am not too sure. I feel enslaved to it in a timeless nonexistent space.
It's a strange existence this 'being' malarky.

Well expressed. I think we're all "absent" from our egoic selves when we're thinking deeply about philosophical questions. That's part of the profound good of philosophy, the joy of philosophy.

Re "this 'being' malarky": thinking about being -- our own and that of the things among which we exist in the world -- provides us with our only authentic path to approaching a partial understanding of the Being of all that is. :)
 
No .... abstract can be defined concretely.

(E) Existence
There are mathematical objects.

(A) Abstractness
Mathematical objects are abstract.

(I) Independence
Mathematical objects are independent of intelligent agents and their language, thought, and practices.

E^M^I - the conjunction of E and M and I = mathematical platonism
I read SEP on abstract objects Abstract Objects (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Suggested that it cannot be defined.
From my view, mathematical objects are basically concepts, which are founded on qualitative and therefore quantitative roots. So we can abstract with concepts, but they are all grounded. So, determining whether abstract objects exist or not would depend on the definition of what qualifies abstract, and that is a goal post that can be moved maybe... ?
 
No .... abstract can be defined concretely.

(E) Existence
There are mathematical objects.

(A) Abstractness
Mathematical objects are abstract.

(I) Independence
Mathematical objects are independent of intelligent agents and their language, thought, and practices.

E^M^I - the conjunction of E and M and I = mathematical platonism

Very helpful, Steve, and timely for me. I've spent the afternoon investigating the relationship of linguistics, semiotics, and philosophies of language. Unlike mathematics, language as a semiotic system is not independent of intelligent agents. (note: the development of mathematics has relied on humans specialized in mathematical logic, but in maths the logic rules the thinking). There was a time in the mid-twentieth century when linguistic theorists claimed that semiotics is a subdiscipline of linguistics, but that claim was overcome by Umberto Eco in his Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language.
 
I read SEP on abstract objects Abstract Objects (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Suggested that it cannot be defined.
From my view, mathematical objects are basically concepts, which are founded on qualitative and therefore quantitative roots. So we can abstract with concepts, but they are all grounded. So, determining whether abstract objects exist or not would depend on the definition of what qualifies abstract, and that is a goal post that can be moved maybe... ?

1 ... 2 ... 3 sheep

but one is the identity element, it is its own root

two is the only even number that is prime

as for three:
the guy counting sheep didn't know all that when he assigned the number three to the amount of sheep he owned ... and how did he first make the match up to the number of sheep and the number three? And then on what trust did he have that there were 87 sheep - we can only keep up with a few things at a time - here, try this game:

Counting Challenge
 
I read SEP on abstract objects Abstract Objects (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Suggested that it cannot be defined.
From my view, mathematical objects are basically concepts, which are founded on qualitative and therefore quantitative roots. So we can abstract with concepts, but they are all grounded. So, determining whether abstract objects exist or not would depend on the definition of what qualifies abstract, and that is a goal post that can be moved maybe... ?

suggested

anyway, who are you going to believe ... SEP ... or me, your buddy?
 
I read SEP on abstract objects Abstract Objects (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Suggested that it cannot be defined.
From my view, mathematical objects are basically concepts, which are founded on qualitative and therefore quantitative roots. So we can abstract with concepts, but they are all grounded. So, determining whether abstract objects exist or not would depend on the definition of what qualifies abstract, and that is a goal post that can be moved maybe... ?

Merriam Webster
Dictionary.com
etc have definitions ... let's look at who pays the salaries on the SEP.

Here is the etymology:

Online Etymology Dictionary

Here are some more etymologies:

boundaries = bound + aries (the roman god of war)
sublime = "under the lime"
con+science = conscience "against science"
 
Before we kiss phenomenology good-bye in this thread, I'd like to recommend to all a quick reading of this key lecture by the later Heidegger, "What is Called Thinking," which I hope will be a last clarifying touch concerning phenomenological philosophy:

http://hermitmusic.tripod.com/heidegger_thinking.pdf

I re-read all the PDFs on my laptop yesterday (no internet at home, remember) including Heideggerean AI by Dreyfus and the Basic Problems of phenomenology by H himself.

Also a wonderful paper on Stevens poetry and phenomenology ...

will print the above link to take home with me tonight.

S
 
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