Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 6

[Soupie]

@Michael Allen I appreciate your intermittent forays into this sprawling "discussion."

I can only assume you are pondering the same questions the other participants in this thread have been pondering, the nature of consciousness and its relation to the "physical" world. However you use a very idiosyncratic language. So perhaps you are asking different questions.

In any case, from what I can make of your occasional posts, you seem to be continuing with the same theme: something along the lines of our inability to get behind ourselves.

In any case, whether I am able to grok the meaning/questions you mean to convey, sometimes even a random mutation can push a system in the right direction. Cheers.

 

[Pharoah]

@Constance @Soupie

The first thing that I note is that Velmans' argument seems to be focused on critiquing the naive realist stance (to strengthen his critical realist stance)—easy prey as far as I am concerned. From this criticism he points out that from Lehar's perspective, if the phenomenal world is inside the brain, the real skull must be outside the phenomenal world. p.23 Velmans agrees that "the location and extension of the phenomenal and real skull and brain closely correspond."
"physical bodies can have real extension and location in space." p.24 But for Velmans phenomenal space is located in real space (not in the brain).

For Velmans there are two aspects to reality, one phenomenal (which is observer-dependent p.26) the other real (which is observer-independent p.26); they bear close correspondence. Note, "Reflexive Monism is a dual-aspect theory." p.29
Velmans seems, tentatively, to hold the view “that what is evidently one reality should be in two places at once,
both in outer space and in a person’s mind.”

"the phenomenal cat is in fact a psychological . . . representation" "of something that exists out there in the world" p.30
"According to the reflexive model, phenomenal space provides a natural representation . . . of the distance and location of objects viewed from the perspective of the embodied observer. . ." p.25 [This is a problem for me, namely, the notion of an 'embodied observer' witnessing the phenomenal world—Refer to Voerman's criticism p.28]

Velmans dual aspect stance is further indicated: "even our understanding of 'real' [I interpret Velmans 'real' as, 'our understanding of objective reality' i.e., the world that is not phenomenal]. . . is underpinned by our experience of phenomenal location." p.26

Thus for Velmans,
the phenomenal world is projected onto objects. p.26 In a way, the objective world is assigned a phenomenal value by the 'embodied observer' that witnesses only the phenomenal world (my interpretation).
Phenomenal objects do not have an observer-independent existence out there in the world (p.28: paraphrased); for phenomenal objects to exist, they must have the 'embodied observer' to witness them: However, "experiences are … roughly where they seem to be." [i.e. they are "not nowhere" (dualism) or "in the brain" (reductionists).] p.9 "the phenomenal cat . . . is out in the phenomenal world"

How can a monist make sense of the embodied observer?
Reflexive Monism assumes that each phenomenal feature of the cat has a distinct neural correlate that encodes the same information . . . From the perspective of an external observer, this correlate will appear as a form of neural encoding . . while from the subject’s perspective the same information . . . appears in the form of the phenomenal cat (in phenomenal space)." [Again "the subject's perspective" = "the embodied observer"] Nevertheless, the phenomenal cat is not in the brain. Yes, it requires neural encoding (ensuring observer-dependence) but the phenomenal cat is still out there (not in the brain).

"a phenomenal cat . . . [is] a visual representation containing information about the shape, size, location, colour and texture of an entity that currently exists out in the world beyond your body surface."

@Soupie Good luck if you want to interpret Velmans' stance. Personally, I don't think it is worth the effort.

 

[Soupie]

Well done, Pharoah. And thanks.

But for Velmans phenomenal space is located in real space (not in the brain).

But he doesn't seem to offer an explanation of how this can be so, right? Perceptual projection.

Velmans seems, tentatively, to hold the view “that what is evidently one reality should be in two places at once,
both in outer space and in a person’s mind.”

And this seems to contradict the idea that phenomenal space and real space, one subjective and one objective, are nonetheless in the same 3D space. Unless he is suggesting that an individual mind is spread out in real 3D space? (What about other minds?)

"the phenomenal cat is in fact a psychological . . . representation" "of something that exists out there in the world" p.30

Ok.

However, "experiences are … roughly where they seem to be." [i.e. they are "not nowhere" (dualism) or "in the brain" (reductionists).] p.9 "the phenomenal cat . . . is out in the phenomenal world"

The phenomenal cat may be out in the "phenomenal" world, but he doesn't provide an explanation of how it could be out in the "real" world.

Nevertheless, the phenomenal cat is not in the brain. Yes, it requires neural encoding (ensuring observer-dependence) but the phenomenal cat is still out there (not in the brain).

Haha, ok. It just is, huh?

And it might be, Velmans just hasn't explained how or why.

Again, thanks Pharoah, I feel less crazy. I mean, we shouldn't make the assumption that the solution to the mind-body problem will make sense, but we should point out where and be honest about where it doesn't make sense.

 

[Soupie]

The symbols may be the basis for an afterthought of our living in the world, but the "fore-thoughts" (or pre-reflective background of our fore-thought) must themselves be the ground of the very relations that allow us to construct the symbols!

It is as if a computer, in rallying and reading its own infinite arrays of 1s and 0s, tried in vain to determine the physical source (or if you are a creationist, the name company owning the fabrication facilities) of its own microchip...unless the maker left a digital mark somewhere in memory--and what would validate such findings? Such a system wouldn't even have the ability to self-analyze its own reality...

Again, I don't necessarily follow you, but it's obvious that our language is too course-grained to capture reality; but it's also evident that our experience of the world is too course-grained to capture he world.

This approach comes to mind:

Donald Hoffman: Do we see reality as it is? | TED Talk | TED.com

 

[Pharoah]

Well done, Pharoah. And thanks.


But he doesn't seem to offer an explanation of how this can be so, right? Perceptual projection.


And this seems to contradict the idea that phenomenal space and real space, one subjective and one objective, are nonetheless in the same 3D space. Unless he is suggesting that an individual mind is spread out in real 3D space? (What about other minds?)


Ok.


The phenomenal cat may be out in the "phenomenal" world, but he doesn't provide an explanation of how it could be out in the "real" world.


Haha, ok. It just is, huh?

And it might be, Velmans just hasn't explained how or why.

Again, thanks Pharoah, I feel less crazy. I mean, we shouldn't make the assumption that the solution to the mind-body problem will make sense, but we should point out where and be honest about where it doesn't make sense.

Of course, if there is a phenomenal world (outside of brain) then all creatures that become witnesses to it, will see those phenomena as the same. It would seem that a snake, for example, will see the same phenomenal world that I do: it sees the same phenomenal mouse as me and you. This, to my mind, is an absurdity.
So, alternatively, for different creatures to see different kinds of experience phenomena 'in the world' is to suggest that there must be something about the way they see that determines the very nature of the phenomenal character of their particular world: to argue that there is a phenomenal world out there, effectively becomes meaningless when the embodiment of that character becomes entirely dependent on the creature's anatomical specifics. Inevitably, as soon as an RM advocate tries to counter this issue (which is equally damning as the 'embedded observer' issue) their argument turns into spaghetti soup.

 

[Soupie]

Of course, if there is a phenomenal world (outside of brain) then all creatures that become witnesses to it, will see those phenomena as the same. It would seem that a snake, for example, will see the same phenomenal world that I do: it sees the same phenomenal mouse as me and you. This, to my mind, is an absurdity.
So, alternatively, for different creatures to see different kinds of experience phenomena 'in the world' is to suggest that there must be something about the way they see that determines the very nature of the phenomenal character of their particular world: to argue that there is a phenomenal world out there, effectively becomes meaningless when the embodiment of that character becomes entirely dependent on the creature's anatomical specifics. Inevitably, as soon as an RM advocate tries to counter this issue (which is equally damning as the 'embedded observer' issue) their argument turns into spaghetti soup.

Right, so if there is an objective "real" world and a subjective "phenomenal" world overlaid on top of it, then it must be the case that each of us has a personal phenomenal world out there overtop of the real world.

So there is the real world and billions of phenomenal worlds laying on top of it.

If that's not the case, then it's as you say, each of us views the phenomenal world differently... But isn't that just kicking the can down the road. Shan't we just say we each view (experience) the objective, real world differently?

[It seems to me that this is a spot where someone who took the Multiple Worlds approach might say objective reality is out there in a superposition and when each conscious individual observes this super positioned reality, it manifests subjectively for each observer, which is to say slightly differently.]

 

[Soupie]

This paper seems to be generating quite a buzz (sorry).

What insects can tell us about the origins of consciousness. - PubMed - NCBI

"How, why, and when consciousness evolved remain hotly debated topics. Addressing these issues requires considering the distribution of consciousness across the animal phylogenetic tree. Here we propose that at least one invertebrate clade, the insects, has a capacity for the most basic aspect of consciousness: subjective experience. In vertebrates the capacity for subjective experience is supported by integrated structures in the midbrain that create a neural simulation of the state of the mobile animal in space. This integrated and egocentric representation of the world from the animal's perspective is sufficient for subjective experience. Structures in the insect brain perform analogous functions. Therefore, we argue the insect brain also supports a capacity for subjective experience. In both vertebrates and insects this form of behavioral control system evolved as an efficient solution to basic problems of sensory reafference and true navigation. The brain structures that support subjective experience in vertebrates and insects are very different from each other, but in both cases they are basal to each clade. Hence we propose the origins of subjective experience can be traced to the Cambrian."

@Pharoah

 

[Pharoah]

Right, so if there is an objective "real" world and a subjective "phenomenal" world overlaid on top of it, then it must be the case that each of us has a personal phenomenal world out there overtop of the real world.

So there is the real world and billions of phenomenal worlds laying on top of it.

If that's not the case, then it's as you say, each of us views the phenomenal world differently... But isn't that just kicking the can down the road. Shan't we just say we each view (experience) the objective, real world differently?

[It seems to me that this is a spot where someone who took the Multiple Worlds approach might say objective reality is out there in a superposition and when each conscious individual observes this super positioned reality, it manifests subjectively for each observer, which is to say slightly differently.]

The idea that there are as many phenomenal worlds as individual creatures is one way out of the RM 'problems', but it does not make much sense then to say that there is "a" phenomenal world out there. As you say, it kicks the can down the road; intuitively it is a poor stance that requires an increasingly convoluted explanatory thesis. If there is a danger in a subjective approach, due to subjective presuppositions, RM may illustrate it.

 

[Nathaniel]

I wonder if anybody here is familiar with the teachings of Barry Long?

 

[Michael Allen]

@Michael Allen I appreciate your intermittent forays into this sprawling "discussion."

I can only assume you are pondering the same questions the other participants in this thread have been pondering, the nature of consciousness and its relation to the "physical" world. However you use a very idiosyncratic language. So perhaps you are asking different questions.

In any case, from what I can make of your occasional posts, you seem to be continuing with the same theme: something along the lines of our inability to get behind ourselves.

In any case, whether I am able to grok the meaning/questions you mean to convey, sometimes even a random mutation can push a system in the right direction. Cheers.

I may be pondering different questions...only because I have as my basis for questioning an insight into the pre-question existence that founded my observance of the same... in order to understand being, we must understand the necessary mechanisms (even if formally indicated, they aren't really "mechanisms," since that is strictly a metaphor which fits--so don't misunderstand my direction as being purely materialistic, even if it is...and we simply use the word "material" as a placeholder for a black box ) that underlie our own encounter of being-ness...or at least make explicit what is usually passed over in silence. If we are to attach ourselves to either the fully functionalist or representationalist view of our encounter with being, we will lose sight and miss the full realities of the embedded "encounter."

In layman's terms, we don't understand the full totality of implications of any given human statement

"The grass is green"
"That tree is over there"
"I need a saw to cut down that tree"
"I use a hammer to pound nails into that board in order to fasten that board to another in order to build a wall, in order to have a place to .... and finally in order to shelter myself from _____"

All of these statements we "understand" and work with, but we do not have the same kind of language to describe our own abilities to formulate and communicate as well as act upon such...

This is the real mystery...we must use the language developed by relations between our own isolated forms to others for which we interact with...that language cannot reach inside the very mechanism that creates and sustains such records.

What I mean by "full totality" is simply the union or combination of all possible points of view and relations for a given even with respect to ONE important relation ("I use ___ in order to ___ in order to ____ and finally to ___")...but how can one thread in a tapestry "understand" the full structure of the tapestry? In other words, the answer to the mystery actually dissolves itself in the explication of the very question formulated by the ONE individual...the ONE viewpoint vs object for which both are part of the same "system" of "existence."

In talking about being we almost have to put quotations around every object and then try to formulate a meta-language that further "explains" these needed relations...the final question "why does anything exist at all...and what is IT" is left unanswered. Perhaps the question itself is as invalid as asking for a universally valid "time" which is meaningful for all frames of reference (Special and General Relativity analogy).

Putting our experience of existence into words means defining words that live outside our framework of relations with the very things we label ...the more we try to do this, the further we dig ourselves into a hole...then we end up calling the missing "answer" to a fabricated and humanely poignant question a "mystery." This may work for object relations in the world ("I pick up a rifle to ward off a dangerous animal X") ...but it fails in describing the same process which underlies the entire process that brought such statements to our own understanding. We understand nothing more than relations between our bodies and the external "objects"...and our language is fully equipped to help us survive most encounters, but it is not necessarily equipped to reconstruct that primordial foundations of its own "existence." Every question must be viewed with caution...because there are no such things as questions without unanswerable assumptions. Same goes for human consciousness...every awareness or emergence of something in our field of view must be partially unknown...otherwise we have no boundary for which to even have a foundation for experience. The knowledge of everything (omniscience) means being completely without consciousness. By this logic absolute knowledge (omniscience) == absolute unconsciousness. Awareness requires a boundary ...a lack.

 

[Constance]

Putting our experience of existence into words means defining words that live outside our framework of relations with the very things we label ...the more we try to do this, the further we dig ourselves into a hole...then we end up calling the missing "answer" to a fabricated and humanely poignant question a "mystery." This may work for object relations in the world ("I pick up a rifle to ward off a dangerous animal X") ...but it fails in describing the same process which underlies the entire process that brought such statements to our own understanding. We understand nothing more than relations between our bodies and the external "objects"...and our language is fully equipped to help us survive most encounters, but it is not necessarily equipped to reconstruct that primordial foundations of its own "existence." Every question must be viewed with caution...because there are no such things as questions without unanswerable assumptions. Same goes for human consciousness...every awareness or emergence of something in our field of view must be partially unknown...otherwise we have no boundary for which to even have a foundation for experience. The knowledge of everything (omniscience) means being completely without consciousness. By this logic absolute knowledge (omniscience) == absolute unconsciousness. Awareness requires a boundary ...a lack.

Hi Michael. It's good to see you here again. I follow and appreciate what you express in this post, which as I read it expresses the relationship of prereflective awareness and increasingly reflective awareness in consciousness and its enabling of what we experience and contemplate as 'mind'. As you write, "Awareness requires a boundary...a lack," and in prereflective awareness we (and the living organisms and animals that preceded us in the evolution of species and consciousness) have 'always already' [MP's term] been on the way to becoming capable of disclosing the boundary by which we stand out from nature while still standing in nature. That is, through prereflective awareness we are always already oriented to our situatedness in an environing 'world'. Heidegger gave us the term 'ek-stase' to refer to our opening a space, a personal place, a situation and situated perspective within the natural world from which we engage things in the world and gradually develop the ability to think about the whole in which we are contained and our unique relationship to the whole as consciousness -- the meeting place between objective and subjective realities. I think the primary struggle in contemporary consciousness studies is between those who follow the desire of modern science to understand and define 'what-is' objectively as a complete and closed structure that can at some point become definable once and for all from a perspective outside of it (of which we are not capable, to which we have no access), and those who recognize that we cannot view the whole of what-is from outside of it. You express what situatedness is very well in a preceding paragraph of your post:

"In talking about being we almost have to put quotations around every object and then try to formulate a meta-language that further "explains" these needed relations...the final question "why does anything exist at all...and what is IT" is left unanswered. Perhaps the question itself is as invalid as asking for a universally valid "time" which is meaningful for all frames of reference (Special and General Relativity analogy)."

 

[Constance]

One further note: any 'meta-language' we attempt to construct is inescapably generated from within the concepts and structures possible within our own situated perspectives and understanding.

 

[smcder]

I can't imagine living without the Internet. Sometimes that requires begging 'em to keep it on, of course.

$70 month for DSL, dial up speeds. Occasionally, on a clear night - we could stream. We still sit around the fire and talk about it.

It's already changed me ... I sleep better, seem to have fewer memory problems during the day ... first day or two was a little tough to shift gears, then it went very smoothly.

 

[smcder]

Numbers are an interesting case.

Mathematical platonism is any metaphysical account of mathematics that implies mathematical entities exist, that they are abstract, and that they are independent of all our rational activities.

David Berlinski's One Two Three is an excellent read. It's about absolutely elementary mathematics. He points out that each number is simply an increment of the previous one, but that the properties of adjacent numbers vary wildly.

You can Google each number and get a "biography" ...

5 (number) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

... don't get me started on three...

 

[smcder]

11630 is the First Uninteresting Number

There’s an old math paradox that says that all natural numbers are interesting, since otherwise there would have to be a smallest uninteresting number, and that in itself is pretty interesting. Of course, this is meant to show that ideas in the English language do not always translate to well-defined mathematical concepts, but let’s ignore our better mathematical sense and tinker with the idea of how interesting different numbers are a little bit. In particular, I claim that 11630 is utterly bland and uninteresting.

 

[Soupie]

@Michael Allen I appreciate the further clarification. I have some questions based on what I think youre asking/saying. Its possible some of my questions wont make sense if ive misunderstood what youre asking/saying of course.

in order to understand being, we must understand the necessary mechanisms ... that underlie our own encounter of being-ness...or at least make explicit what is usually passed over in silence.

What is it that usually gets passed over in silence by those pondering consciousness? Being?

Do you mean to say that when pondering consciousness, most people begin with self-awareness and take (a-conceptual) awareness for granted?

This is the real mystery...we must use the language developed by relations between our own isolated forms to others for which we interact with...that language cannot reach inside the very mechanism that creates and sustains such records.

In other words, the answer to the mystery actually dissolves itself in the explication of the very question formulated by the ONE individual...the ONE viewpoint vs object for which both are part of the same "system" of "existence."

In talking about being we almost have to put quotations around every object and then try to formulate a meta-language that further "explains" these needed relations...

If I follow you, I would say that its not just language that "cannot reach inside the mechanism that creates" language; it seems to me that being cannot get behind being. That is, we (being) cannot be (?) the underlying "mechanism" or "cause" of being. Or, experience cannot be of the mechanism that generates experience.

(And of course there may not be an underlying mechanism or cause of being as those terms are commonly understood.)

Even if we say being is fundamental we still dont know why it (we) exists.

(But as you say, all these questions are grounded in our everyday, macro, monkey experiences and may be category errors applied to the origin and nature of being.)

We understand nothing more than relations between our bodies and the external "objects"...and our language is fully equipped to help us survive most encounters, but it is not necessarily equipped to reconstruct that primordial foundations of its own "existence." Every question must be viewed with caution...because there are no such things as questions without unanswerable assumptions.

So what is the way forward? How do we proceed with the formation of the meta-language? The objective, intersubjective language of science cannot do it. (But I think we can make educated inferences about being based on the scientific method.) Is the language of math, information, and physics sufficient? Is it a beginning? Not even close?

Constance has recently said we cannot talk about experience in non-experiential terms, but I wonder if trying to explain experience in experiential terms can bear fruit?

One wonders if we human beings need to interact with equally self-aware non-terrestial intelligences with radically different (?) experiences of being in order to gain some glimmer of insight into its underlying mechanisms. If ever advanced aliens had reason to interact with, study, or observe us, that might be it; to gain insight into their own being, or being in general.

 

[Michael Allen]

Again, I don't necessarily follow you, but it's obvious that our language is too course-grained to capture reality; but it's also evident that our experience of the world is too course-grained to capture he world.

This approach comes to mind:

Donald Hoffman: Do we see reality as it is? | TED Talk | TED.com

If anything the words can only grasp analogies in an attempt to explicate the structure (if any) of our own relations in the world (existence) These analogies can point in a particular direction (to denote an ontological stance) only by virtue of the nature of pointing itself...the act of pointing is itself rich in unspeakable assumptions and notions. Actions and relations precede language...and our constructive framework to understand these relations and actions are based on a prior development of unspeakable or even incomprehensible habits. A habit is a noun we break off from the tree of habituation, which is further grown from the "tree of life" we call an "environment." But all of these terms point to entities that we ourselves have modeled into "separations" from the continuous "realities" of the "not-us"...the unfortunate result of our own comprehension bestows and indomitable barrier of the ultimate understanding we seek of all reality which has engendered our own relationship to the same. The words fall into circles and twist around the very source of all being. The less we contemplate the "reason" or "purpose" of a thing when we use it (like a door...or window) the more we are embedded in reality...but at the same instance our embedding in our reality removes the artificial symbol correspondences we seek to map that same reality...our consciousness involves a lack which is built of things that are easily addressed only because of the blanks between their appearances..the markers of being in our awareness require an undefined which cannot exist in the same world, just as a comma itself like the one in this sentence cannot denote to the reader an understanding of the being of this sentence without being ignored. The figure must be defined by a background which is unspeakable. This explains why so many people are intimidated by marks such as ',' and ';'...they remind us of the blanks which we should forget in order to remember a structure. Structures are the meta-formative background of understanding objective being...without which we are left with no relations for which to denote a foundation of workable understanding.

 

[Pharoah]

Mathematical platonism is any metaphysical account of mathematics that implies mathematical entities exist, that they are abstract, and that they are independent of all our rational activities.

David Berlinski's One Two Three is an excellent read. It's about absolutely elementary mathematics. He points out that each number is simply an increment of the previous one, but that the properties of adjacent numbers vary wildly.

You can Google each number and get a "biography" ...

5 (number) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

... don't get me started on three...

"abstract"... difficult to define.
do they exist independently IYO?

 

[Constance]

Constance has recently said we cannot talk about experience in non-experiential terms, but I wonder if trying to explain experience in experiential terms can bear fruit?

Actually, what I said is that we cannot understand what experience is without attending to it, becoming aware of it, and describing it phenomenologically as experience.

We can also attempt to account physically for how we become capable (biologically, physiologically, evolutionarily) of both experiencing and thinking about the actual world in which we find ourselves existing.

But those are two very different types of analysis, and the latter must include the former {the first-person experiential perspective} as the foundation of its inquiry. Otherwise its hypotheses and 'models' float above experience itself without touching it and illuminating it.

 

[Constance]

addendum: so the challenge before all researchers and thinkers involved in consciousness studies is deeply, unavoidably, interdisciplinary, as we've recognized all along given the variety of disciplines required to assess the nature and complexity of consciousness and its relation to the palpable world.