Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 5

[Soupie]

In the brain ... in the world

• Koch was answering how consciousness is generated in the brain
• Frith answered when or in what circumstances consciousness is generated in the world

To clarify, Gallagher compares this to a question discussed earlier in the book:

How are subpersonal causal mechanisms and personal level intentionality integrated in action?

I've noted this distinction in this discussion myself. In different language of course.

I'm more interested in the former while several participants are more interested in the latter.

I'm also very keen on the discussion between Gallagher and Marcel you quote later. I would like to read this book someday.

The brain, as an intentional system, is a meaning making system. Some participants in this thread seem dubious that meaning-making could "emerge" from physical processes whether organic or silicon. I see no metaphysical reasons to doubt meaning can emerge from physical processes.

Re The hard problem and meaning making

In the paper I wrote about consciousness and posted @Pharoah Google page, I hypothesized that phenomenal consciousness is meaning. That is, feeling, ie, what-it's-like, is identical to the intentional-brain-system recognizing—or assigning meaning—to a stimulus.

That is, when a brain-system determines a stimulus is about something, it is at that moment that the stimulus "feels" like something.

The non-blue perceiving tribe comes to mind.

 

[smcder]

I've noted this distinction in this discussion myself. In different language of course.

I'm more interested in the former while several participants are more interested in the latter.

I'm also very keen on the discussion between Gallagher and Marcel you quote later. I would like to read this book someday.

The brain, as an intentional system, is a meaning making system. Some participants in this thread seem dubious that meaning-making could "emerge" from physical processes whether organic or silicon. I see no metaphysical reasons to doubt meaning can emerge from physical processes.

Re The hard problem and meaning making

In the paper I wrote about consciousness and posted @Pharoah Google page, I hypothesized that phenomenal consciousness is meaning. That is, feeling, ie, what-it's-like, is identical to the intentional-brain-system recognizing—or assigning meaning—to a stimulus.

That is, when a brain-system determines a stimulus is about something, it is at that moment that the stimulus "feels" like something.

The non-blue perceiving tribe comes to mind.

Theres a link to the book on PDF for free download above - the Marcel interview is there in full.

 

[smcder]

I've noted this distinction in this discussion myself. In different language of course.

I'm more interested in the former while several participants are more interested in the latter.

I'm also very keen on the discussion between Gallagher and Marcel you quote later. I would like to read this book someday.

The brain, as an intentional system, is a meaning making system. Some participants in this thread seem dubious that meaning-making could "emerge" from physical processes whether organic or silicon. I see no metaphysical reasons to doubt meaning can emerge from physical processes.

Re The hard problem and meaning making

In the paper I wrote about consciousness and posted @Pharoah Google page, I hypothesized that phenomenal consciousness is meaning. That is, feeling, ie, what-it's-like, is identical to the intentional-brain-system recognizing—or assigning meaning—to a stimulus.

That is, when a brain-system determines a stimulus is about something, it is at that moment that the stimulus "feels" like something.

The non-blue perceiving tribe comes to mind.

In the paper I wrote about consciousness and posted @Pharoah Google page, I hypothesized that phenomenal consciousness is meaning. That is, feeling, ie, what-it's-like, is identical to the intentional-brain-system recognizing—or assigning meaning—to a stimulus.

1. The problematic part for me here is "identical". If A=B and B=A, get rid of B! If it's the same thing seen from two different perspectives, then the existence of both perspectives seems to bring you back around to the same problem. (circular reasoning) And the existence of the illusion of two different perspectives is self-refuting.

2. That is, when a brain-system determines a stimulus is about something, it is at that moment that the stimulus "feels" like something.

1 & 2 are making different statements, right? in 2 the events occur at the same time, in 1 they are the same thing?

So on my current understanding I do have non-metaphysical problems with the statements above. It seems there are logical problems to clear up before we even get to metaphysics?

In general I want to be more careful in future re: statements about other participant's positions.

If its necessary to make such statements I will try to word them carefully and in the form of questions intended to make those positions more clear.

So is the statement about metaphysical phatic are are you asking others if they do have doubts?

In other words, can I fairly rephrase this statement:

The brain, as an intentional system, is a meaning making system. Some participants in this thread seem dubious that meaning-making could "emerge" from physical processes whether organic or silicon. I see no metaphysical reasons to doubt meaning can emerge from physical processes.

as

I currently believe that the brain is a meaning making system. If other participants currently have doubts that meaning-making could emerge (why is "emerge" in quotes?) from physical processes could you state those doubts?

I leave out organic/sillicone because that's a separate issue and I leave out metaphysical for obvious reasons. By saying currently we move away from any concerns about identifying a person with a position.

It's not my intention to frustrate you, I am trying to find ways to communicate more clearly and stay focused on the topic.

 

[Constance]

phenomenal consciousness is meaning

Would you define what you mean by 'phenomenal consciousness'? {I know you've used this term in earlier discussions, and I think those discussions were related to a particular theorist's claims (perhaps someone from philosophy of mind). Can you identify that source?

Having defined the term would you explain [flesh out] what you mean by the claim that "consciousness is meaning"?

Thanks.

 

[smcder]

Would you define what you mean by 'phenomenal consciousness'? {I know you've used this term in earlier discussions, and I think those discussions were related to a particular theorist's claims (perhaps someone from philosophy of mind). Can you identify that source?

Having defined the term would you explain [flesh out] what you mean by the claim that "consciousness is meaning"?

Thanks.

I think that's me quoting @Soupie

Let me see

 

[Constance]

I'd add to the above that I think we need to be clear that meaning also exists in subconscious ideation, so we would need to refer also to subconscious mentality and the extent to which it also relies on phenomenal experience in the world.

I'd also add that consciousness consists of more than 'meaning' in the sense of intentionalitly and interpretation. Consciousness also includes feelings of at-homeness or not-at-homeness in the world, as well as aesthetic experiences of the physical and sensable environment in which the conscious being dwells.

Also, there seems to be a category confusion, thus a logical problem, in the claim that "consciousness is meaning." I think Steve has suggested this already.

 

[Constance]

I think that's me quoting @Soupie

Let me see

Yes, but it seems to be a term/concept that Soupie assumes to have a specific denotation, and as I recall Soupie has used it (and made claims based in it) in past discussions, which I'd like to be able to go back and read.

 

[Constance]

This current discussion is, I think, getting down to some primary issues. I'm due at a Thai restaurant in less than an hour so will have to wait until later tonight to absorb all that's been added today. . . . One of those times when I 'd rather stay home and eat whatever's available here so I could continue reading and thinking about the thread.

 

[smcder]

Yes, but it seems to be a term/concept that Soupie assumes to have a specific denotation, and as I recall Soupie has used it (and made claims based in it) in past discussions, which I'd like to be able to go back and read.

Ok i thought you were asking me.

 

[smcder]

This current discussion is, I think, getting down to some primary issues. I'm due at a Thai restaurant in less than an hour so will have to wait until later tonight to absorb all that's been added today. . . . One of those times when I 'd rather stay home and eat whatever's available here so I could continue reading and thinking about the thread.

Ill

This current discussion is, I think, getting down to some primary issues. I'm due at a Thai restaurant in less than an hour so will have to wait until later tonight to absorb all that's been added today. . . . One of those times when I 'd rather stay home and eat whatever's available here so I could continue reading and thinking about the thread.

Trade ya!

Thai sounds great!

 

[Constance]

Ok i thought you were asking me.

I think I quoted the statement from your quotation of Soupie in one of your posts. I think I half-realized that that would be confusing but I was in a rush. Sorry for the confusion.

 

[Constance]

Ill

Trade ya!

Thai sounds great!

It would have been but the restaurant was closed for refurbishments to the kitchen, so we went to our favorite Mexican restaurant instead.

 

[Constance]

Ramachandran isn't trying to learn anything about introspection from behaviorism.

It would be amazing if he thought he could. Behaviorism had nothing to offer concerning consciousness, much less the pathways of introspection.

He is calling for the same kind and extent of knowledge about introspection that he says we have about behaviorism.

What does he propose are the achievements of behaviorism in understanding the mind? It's hard for me to take seriously a neuroscientist who is impressed by behaviorism. I've looked for a source where Ramachandran writes about the relevance of behaviorism for consciousness and brain studies but haven't found one. Have you?

 

[Randall]

It would be amazing if he thought he could. Behaviorism had nothing to offer concerning consciousness, much less the pathways of introspection.
What does he propose are the achievements of behaviorism in understanding the mind? It's hard for me to take seriously a neuroscientist who is impressed by behaviorism. I've looked for a source where Ramachandran writes about the relevance of behaviorism for consciousness and brain studies but haven't found one. Have you?

Maybe this is relevant:

"Indeed, until the last quarter of the twentieth century, rigorous theories of perception, emotion, cognition, and intelligence were nowhere to be found (one notable exception being color vision). For most of the twentieth century, all we had to offer in the way of explaining human behavior was two theoretical edifices—Freudianism and behaviorism — both of which would be dramatically eclipsed in the 1980s and 1990s, when neuroscience finally managed to advance beyond the Bronze Age." | SOURCE |

- Excerpt From: 'The Tell-Tale Brain'​

It would seem from the excerpt that he views behaviorism as outmoded.

 

[Constance]

As short interview with Shaun Gallagher, my paraphrase of interesting points below:

http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=5&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CEAQFjAEahUKEwjRlK2W07XHAhWIDZIKHdElBFo&url=http://avant.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/S-Gallagher-interview-I.pdf&ei=-rnUVdGvEYibyATRy5DQBQ&usg=AFQjCNF3fJEsfqJ_gkNqqa9N4FRWfS10GQ&bvm=bv.99804247,d.aWw

front-loading phenomenology

I'm reading that interview now and note that Gallagher says that the paper he and Varela wrote together did not explore Gallagher's research proposal for 'front-loading phenomenology'. Has Gallagher gone on to write about this approach himself? I'll look for the co-written paper first. Let us know if you find further explanation of Gallagher's proposal. I'd like to read that too.

meditation as a method of neurophenomenology - long-term practitioners may be able to isolate or enhance various experiences or cognitive or attentional strategies in order to allow for the scientific study of these experiences or strategies using, e.g., neuroimaging or behavioural experiments.

Would especially like to understand what he means about 'behavioural experiments'.

erasing the boundaries between body and mind -
One of the implications of the shift to embodied theories is that we need to re-conceive the concept of mind.

We need a positive vocabulary to describe this ... analytic philosophers have forgotten Wittgenstein and Ryle and are now stuck with belief-desire psychology and representationalism which are inadequate for concepts such as embodied action, enactive perception, situated and distributed cognition, and intersubjectivity.

I agree that a new vocabulary is necessary in consciousness studies if neuroscientists, analytic philosophers, and phenomenological philosophers are to communicate. Beyond these disciplines interacting in this field, the problem extends to scientific thought and general thought in the form of the naieve presupposition that the objective alone is 'real'. This raises again the problem of the "natural attitude" as Husserl identified it, the attitude long embedded in western culture -- i.e., that the world, indeed that 'reality', consists in objects and physical processes which we merely observe from the 'outside'. At the same time, to the extent that phenomenological thinking has trickled down to popular discourse, it has been drastically misunderstood to signify that 'we each create our own reality', which is equally unsound and even absurd.

The difficulty of the intellectual situation as Gallagher defines it seems quite intractable if overcoming it requires that we significantly alter our terminology, produce new words and language with which to express the entirely different, actually revolutionary, insight into the mind-world relationship that phenomenology produces.

Interdisciplinary consciousness studies provides an opportunity to comprehend much more than consciousness itself as we experience it in the West. Progress is being made by Western neuroscientists and philosophers who are willing to entertain the perspectives and engage the practices developed in Eastern thought. The acceptance of the reality and significance of psychic, parapsychological, and paranormal research by scientists and philosophers is the next necessary development. But all this will take many decades to bring about.

 

[Constance]

Maybe this is relevant:

"Indeed, until the last quarter of the twentieth century, rigorous theories of perception, emotion, cognition, and intelligence were nowhere to be found (one notable exception being color vision). For most of the twentieth century, all we had to offer in the way of explaining human behavior was two theoretical edifices—Freudianism and behaviorism — both of which would be dramatically eclipsed in the 1980s and 1990s, when neuroscience finally managed to advance beyond the Bronze Age." | SOURCE |

- Excerpt From: 'The Tell-Tale Brain'​

It would seem from the excerpt that he views behaviorism as outmoded.

What's relevant in that extract is how shockingly little he knows about post-Freudian psychology.

Here is a good summary of Behaviorism and its history:
Behaviorism | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy

It would seem from the excerpt that he views behaviorism as outmoded.

Some of his friends and colleagues must have whispered that to him, but yet he clings to it as a model. That would be because he's never read (hasn't even heard of) the variety of modern schools of thought in psychology, which were founded in reaction to the reductiveness of Behaviorism. The man is too narrowly educated, a typical outcome of scientific overspecialization.

 

[Constance]

He asks if it's possible to say that there are contexts in the world that "call forth" or elicit consciousness ... in that sense causing consciousness to emerge?

I haven't yet finished chapters 6 and 7. So glad you found the text of the whole book online. Also, 'contexts in the world' in your summary of Gallagher's expressed thought leaps off the page. What a relief after the endless references to 'information' as generator of our experience in/of the world.

 

[Michael Allen]

Being No One
http://www.amazon.com/dp/0465020690/?tag=rockoids-20

What do you all think? And how is it that I am supposed to trust the answers given by a living conception feeding back on itself ("self" here is very very tenuous ...because its the only "object" that exists that can comprehend the "feeling" of its own misunderstandings) that is the "world existingly?" When you arrive at the end of the proof that--step by step--unveils consciousness then you cannot be conscious (consciousness requires a lacuna)...but when you are mystified by it you feel an understanding "exists" which is just out of reach...synthesize these two perspectives (only consciousness can HAVE a perspective, and perspective requires a lack ) and you have a concept that moves like the focal point of your recursive face in two mirrors facing each others...each time you move to see the vanishing point your own head blocks the way.

 

[smcder]

It would be amazing if he thought he could. Behaviorism had nothing to offer concerning consciousness, much less the pathways of introspection.



What does he propose are the achievements of behaviorism in understanding the mind? It's hard for me to take seriously a neuroscientist who is impressed by behaviorism. I've looked for a source where Ramachandran writes about the relevance of behaviorism for consciousness and brain studies but haven't found one. Have you?

I didn't do a good job of conveying this - he is only saying that he wants a knowledge of introspection similar to what we have for behaviorism, he probably could have used anything that we have an extensive knowledge of for that comparison - that's the only thing it has to do with - does that make sense?

He's just saying we should have a map of phenomenal experience.

 

[smcder]

Maybe this is relevant:

"Indeed, until the last quarter of the twentieth century, rigorous theories of perception, emotion, cognition, and intelligence were nowhere to be found (one notable exception being color vision). For most of the twentieth century, all we had to offer in the way of explaining human behavior was two theoretical edifices—Freudianism and behaviorism — both of which would be dramatically eclipsed in the 1980s and 1990s, when neuroscience finally managed to advance beyond the Bronze Age." | SOURCE |

- Excerpt From: 'The Tell-Tale Brain'​

It would seem from the excerpt that he views behaviorism as outmoded.

See the post above I made in response to @Constance -