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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 4

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Now, not all intentional perturbations within the organism-system share an identity with consciousness. Some (most) intentional perturbations remain subconscious. Why that is remains an exciting mystery.
Here's a very interesting theory/model that presents an answer to this question. (I've shared this article/model in the past, but it--and the entire article--make much more sense to me at this point in my "studies.")

First, a brief overview of my approach:

Organisms are intentional systems. Stimuli in the environment create local perturbations within the organism; the global--or whole--organism recognizes (remembers) these perturbations and in this manner they inform the organism about the environment. (This process also holds true for "stimuli" within the organism.)

The organism is enmeshed within a sea of stimuli, and thus the organism can be said to be in a constant state of dynamic perturbation. However, it appears that 1) organisms are not always conscious, and 2) when they are conscious, they are conscious of only some of the local, intentional perturbations.

Thus my question: Why do only some perturbations "rise" to the "level" of consciousness? Neuroscientist Michael Graziano offers a very intriguing theory. (Link) He casts his model within the computational paradigm, but I don't think it need be. In any case, his suggestion is as follows:

Consciousness is a (phenomenal) model of the organism's attention. In this case, attention is meant in the physiological sense; that is, when the global system (organism) is paying attention to a particular local perturbation, there is a physiological indicator, e.x., the neurons will fire faster.

So, for example, within the organism there will be, say, dozens of local perturbations. The perturbation(s) the whole organism is attending to at any given moment will evidence a physiological change, i.e., faster firing neurons.

What Graziano is suggesting (in my language/understanding) is that--in addition to this process of physiological attention--the organism will manifest an additional perturbation about the perturbation(s) currently being attended to by the organism. This additional perturbation serves as a simplified model of the organism's attention.

Many thinkers have identified a connection between attention and consciousness, but they are not identical. Graziano's model presents an interesting theory about why this is so. It also speaks to the interaction of the subconscious and the conscious. Many of us intuitively sense that there is much for subconscious knowledge/intentional information than there is conscious knowledge/intentional information. The idea that consciousness is a simplified model of the subconscious makes much sense to me.

This approach also dovetails nicely with HOT theories, which suggest that consciousness arises from mental states that are about other mental states. Again, consciousness acting as a real time, simple model of the brain's much richer attentional state, make sense to me.

I wonder how this model applies to meditative states, especially ones emphasizing intense attention on a single stimulus. Hypothesis: By focusing the brain an a single, very simple stimulus (such as breathing) for a sustained amount of time, the isomorphism between the brain's attentional state and the phenomenal model of that attentional state is highly increased.

What would be the function of such a process? Why should the organism benefit from having a simplified model of its own attentional states? Control. The more accurate an organism's model of its attentional states, the better it can control its attentional states. That is, it can inhibit paying attention to certain powerful stimuli and shift it's attention to less powerful, but perhaps more important stimuli. (Keep your eyes up, boys.) Now we're in the territory of executive functioning which I've mentioned before.

Finally, this does not ultimately provide an answer to the Hard Problem, but for my own "investigations" this seems to narrow the search. Brain states that are about brain states that are about external and internal stimuli are identical to phenomenal states.
 
Here's a very interesting theory/model that presents an answer to this question. (I've shared this article/model in the past, but it--and the entire article--make much more sense to me at this point in my "studies.")

First, a brief overview of my approach:

Organisms are intentional systems. Stimuli in the environment create local perturbations within the organism; the global--or whole--organism recognizes (remembers) these perturbations and in this manner they inform the organism about the environment. (This process also holds true for "stimuli" within the organism.)

The organism is enmeshed within a sea of stimuli, and thus the organism can be said to be in a constant state of dynamic perturbation. However, it appears that 1) organisms are not always conscious, and 2) when they are conscious, they are conscious of only some of the local, intentional perturbations.

Thus my question: Why do only some perturbations "rise" to the "level" of consciousness? Neuroscientist Michael Graziano offers a very intriguing theory. (Link) He casts his model within the computational paradigm, but I don't think it need be. In any case, his suggestion is as follows:

Consciousness is a (phenomenal) model of the organism's attention. In this case, attention is meant in the physiological sense; that is, when the global system (organism) is paying attention to a particular local perturbation, there is a physiological indicator, e.x., the neurons will fire faster.

So, for example, within the organism there will be, say, dozens of local perturbations. The perturbation(s) the whole organism is attending to at any given moment will evidence a physiological change, i.e., faster firing neurons.

What Graziano is suggesting (in my language/understanding) is that--in addition to this process of physiological attention--the organism will manifest an additional perturbation about the perturbation(s) currently being attended to by the organism. This additional perturbation serves as a simplified model of the organism's attention.

Many thinkers have identified a connection between attention and consciousness, but they are not identical. Graziano's model presents an interesting theory about why this is so. It also speaks to the interaction of the subconscious and the conscious. Many of us intuitively sense that there is much for subconscious knowledge/intentional information than there is conscious knowledge/intentional information. The idea that consciousness is a simplified model of the subconscious makes much sense to me.

This approach also dovetails nicely with HOT theories, which suggest that consciousness arises from mental states that are about other mental states. Again, consciousness acting as a real time, simple model of the brain's much richer attentional state, make sense to me.

I wonder how this model applies to meditative states, especially ones emphasizing intense attention on a single stimulus. Hypothesis: By focusing the brain an a single, very simple stimulus (such as breathing) for a sustained amount of time, the isomorphism between the brain's attentional state and the phenomenal model of that attentional state is highly increased.

What would be the function of such a process? Why should the organism benefit from having a simplified model of its own attentional states? Control. The more accurate an organism's model of its attentional states, the better it can control its attentional states. That is, it can inhibit paying attention to certain powerful stimuli and shift it's attention to less powerful, but perhaps more important stimuli. (Keep your eyes up, boys.) Now we're in the territory of executive functioning which I've mentioned before.

Finally, this does not ultimately provide an answer to the Hard Problem, but for my own "investigations" this seems to narrow the search. Brain states that are about brain states that are about external and internal stimuli are identical to phenomenal states.
That all makes perfect sense to me, and IMO the HPC isn't relevant because it's based on incoherent logic made seemingly legitimate by relationships between words and their meanings that are too complex for most people to follow in the first place, let alone grasp where the problem is. However setting the HPC aside, the processes by which we come to focus our attention are still different than the issue of consciousness itself. Consciousness is that part of us that is experiencing what it is our attention is focused on ( regardless of how that happens ).

So attention doesn't really explain anything about consciousness other than once again we have a powerful direct neural correlation between our brains and what we're conscious of, which again suggests that the BBS ( Brain-Body-System ) is probably responsible for generating consciousness. I'm not sure what relationship this has to the paranormal. It's probably more fitting for the What Is Consciousness? thread. Maybe someone else ( no names mentioned ) can fit some woo in here someplace for us ;).
 
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