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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 13

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USI Calgary said:
The film doesn't advertise philosophy books, but it did "point" me to the books below, and interestingly, the Ultimate Matrix Collection includes interviews with a number of philosophers, including one of our favorites, David Chalmers.

1593922277739.png 1593922292613.png 1593922307034.png 1593922328429.png

https://www.amazon.com/dp/B00007FYQX/?tag=rockoids-20
https://www.amazon.com/dp/0195181077/?tag=rockoids-20
https://www.amazon.com/dp/0812695720/?tag=rockoids-20
https://www.amazon.com/dp/1405125241/?tag=rockoids-20

Jean Baudrillard's Simulacra and Simulation was also in the actual movie, and required reading for the cast. However Baudrillard may have been ticked off because in the film, his book was hollowed out to store Neo's stash of white hat software. Or maybe it's just because Baudrillard is French ?. Whatever the reason, he trashed the film, and even declined a consulting position for the sequels.
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"The film doesn't advertise philosophy books,"...glad you caught and corrected that ... ;-)
 
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USI Calgary said:
The film doesn't advertise philosophy books, but it did "point" me to the books below, and interestingly, the Ultimate Matrix Collection includes interviews with a number of philosophers, including one of our favorites, David Chalmers.

1593922277739.png 1593922292613.png 1593922307034.png 1593922328429.png

https://www.amazon.com/dp/B00007FYQX/?tag=rockoids-20
https://www.amazon.com/dp/0195181077/?tag=rockoids-20
https://www.amazon.com/dp/0812695720/?tag=rockoids-20
https://www.amazon.com/dp/1405125241/?tag=rockoids-20

Jean Baudrillard's Simulacra and Simulation was also in the actual movie, and required reading for the cast. However Baudrillard may have been ticked off because in the film, his book was hollowed out to store Neo's stash of white hat software. Or maybe it's just because Baudrillard is French ?. Whatever the reason, he trashed the film, and even declined a consulting position for the sequels.
Click to expand...

sketch-1593922798042_compress75.jpg
 
I always thought that consciousness was a bit like cloud storage always accessible but not within us.
I have always thought that is also the explanation for the UFO phenomenon in that it exists on another level outside of our physical realm part of our world but not necessarily within it.
 
USI Calgary said:
The film doesn't advertise philosophy books, but it did "point" me to the books below, and interestingly, the Ultimate Matrix Collection includes interviews with a number of philosophers, including one of our favorites....
Click to expand...

So I spent a few hours looking into the books you linked, including reading a third or more of Like a Splinter in the Mind: Philosophy in the Matrix, and while it's true that they point to philosophical and also sociological issues in 'The Matrix' series they do not provide new or compelling insights into resolutions of those issues in the films. Nor does the last one of the four (Splinter in the Mind} suggest that the films themselves do more than raise questions and, it seems, show perpetuation in Zion of social problems that are present in our current world. So I won't be spending more time with the books, though I appreciate your having made them available. I'm also not inclined to watch these films based on the extracts I've seen. Maybe the 'Ultimate Matrix Collection' of interviews with some philosophers you mention above (if it is a collection of video interviews) would be more persuasive for me. I think it's clear that the production values of these films and their expression, however chaotically, of issues in how we interpret the world we live in, what global technologization of life might lead to, and how we would or could survive as a species capable of value-directed future world- building in the wilderness space left available all have had great appeal to many people. The overall schematic of these films reminds me of Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, which as I recall also provided no solution for those escaping a dominant controlling megastructure that distorted the possibilities for life lived freely and fully.

Jean Baudrillard's Simulacra and Simulation was also in the actual movie, and required reading for the cast. However Baudrillard may have been ticked off because in the film, his book was hollowed out to store Neo's stash of white hat software. Or maybe it's just because Baudrillard is French ?. Whatever the reason, he trashed the film, and even declined a consulting position for the sequels.
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We looked at Baudrillard for a while here a year or more ago. Probably any discussions from that time can be reached by searching. I recall reading somewhere that he considered the Matrix to misrepresent his ideas and work and objected to being associated with the first film.
 
smcder said:
Now, if that is offered as an answer, my response would be to ask you to phrase the mind body problem without that "answer" as a fundamental part. I think what you have done is rephrase it or describe rather than solve the problem.
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I’m not sure what you’re asking here.

“The real distinction of mind and body based on their completely diverse natures is the root of the famous mind-body problem: how can these two substances with completely different natures causally interact so as to give rise to a human being capable of having voluntary bodily motions and sensations?” (Wikipedia)

I don’t think mind and body are “two substances with completely different natures.” I think they only seem to be two substances with different natures due to the subjective nature of knowing/perceiving.

I believe that once we fully account for the subjective nature of knowing/perceiving, the mind-body problem(s) will be resolved.

I think the degree of subjectivity of knowing/perceiving has been traditionally underestimated ( bold claim) and particularly its role in the mbp has been missed ( another bold claim ).

Russel ( and others ) have discussed the subjective nature of knowing/perceiving and used it to make the intrinsic nature argument. But individuals like Dennett, Bach and Clark make arguments suggesting that reality need not be intrinsically phenomenal in order for phenomenal, qualitative experience to exist.

Dennett might say the phenomenal aspect of consciousness is an illusion, Bach would say its virtual, and Clark might say its representational.

I’m agnostic about the nature of reality beyond our subjective knowing/perceiving of it. However I believe any seeming distinction in natures between mind and body are the result of the subjective nature of knowing/perceiving and are not actual distinctions.
 
Soupie said:
Well, it took me about three to four years to reach that conclusion. ?‍♂️
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Well, from the time you came on the threads, you seemed to "get" the hard problem quickly. That and various formulations "the mind IS green!" and something about how the brain is what the mind looks like to the mind ... makes me think you are saying something else/more. Or it may be how it's worded for me. I'll post the paper from part 12 - it's by a primatologist and lays out how/why consciousness could have evolved and is similar to the paper you posted, but it just doesn't say why that has to include subjectivity - access consciousness, yes. But why do we need the experience of pain? The nerve action of pain, yes. Or any other experience? If that experience also has a biological cost - and so is both causally impotent and has a biological cost, why would it be retained? Wouldn't a zombie do better because it's free of the cost of experience? So, maybe experience comes for free ... or has causality. But if it has causality, by what mechanism does one go from experience itself to action?

The same questions but the reason I think we can't say that's just the way it is and move on is because what, exactly, is it that is the way it is?
 
Soupie said:
I’m not sure what you’re asking here.

“The real distinction of mind and body based on their completely diverse natures is the root of the famous mind-body problem: how can these two substances with completely different natures causally interact so as to give rise to a human being capable of having voluntary bodily motions and sensations?” (Wikipedia)

I don’t think mind and body are “two substances with completely different natures.” I think they only seem to be two substances with different natures due to the subjective nature of knowing/perceiving.

I believe that once we fully account for the subjective nature of knowing/perceiving, the mind-body problem(s) will be resolved.

I think the degree of subjectivity of knowing/perceiving has been traditionally underestimated ( bold claim) and particularly its role in the mbp has been missed ( another bold claim ).

Russel ( and others ) have discussed the subjective nature of knowing/perceiving and used it to make the intrinsic nature argument. But individuals like Dennett, Bach and Clark make arguments suggesting that reality need not be intrinsically phenomenal in order for phenomenal, qualitative experience to exist.

Dennett might say the phenomenal aspect of consciousness is an illusion, Bach would say its virtual, and Clark might say its representational.

I’m agnostic about the nature of reality beyond our subjective knowing/perceiving of it. However I believe any seeming distinction in natures between mind and body are the result of the subjective nature of knowing/perceiving and are not actual distinctions.
Click to expand...

"I don’t think mind and body are “two substances with completely different natures.” I think they only seem to be two substances with different natures due to the subjective nature of knowing/perceiving." - right, there are very few substance dualists out there

"I believe that once we fully account for the subjective nature of knowing/perceiving, the mind-body problem(s) will be resolved." Pretty much by definition, how could we fully account for the subjective nature of knowing/perceiving without resolving the mind-body problem? (unless we are dualists, but you ruled that out above)

"I think the degree of subjectivity of knowing/perceiving has been traditionally underestimated ( bold claim) and particularly its role in the mbp has been missed ( another bold claim )."

This is exactly where I think you are trying to say something more/different but you are going to have to say more and differently to make it apparent. So ...

"Russel ( and others ) have discussed the subjective nature of knowing/perceiving and used it to make the intrinsic nature argument. But individuals like Dennett, Bach and Clark make arguments suggesting that reality need not be intrinsically phenomenal in order for phenomenal, qualitative experience to exist.

Dennett might say the phenomenal aspect of consciousness is an illusion, Bach would say its virtual, and Clark might say its representational."

Sure and all that's missing is the how. Dennett side steps that, but all you have to do is look at your own experience of that illusion...the other two just don't say at all how experience has to be attached to the simulation or the representation, you can say (proclaim) experience is the representation but does that get rid of the gap? Why is a zombie inconceivable? For the same people that say that, is an intelligent computer without consciousness conceivable?

"I’m agnostic about the nature of reality beyond our subjective knowing/perceiving of it. However I believe any seeming distinction in natures between mind and body are the result of the subjective nature of knowing/perceiving and are not actual distinctions."

So either

1. you're not agnostic about the nature of reality beyond our subjective knowing/perceiving of it
2. or we can know (from our subjective knowing/perceiving) that any seeming distinction in natures between mind and body are the result of subjective knowing/perceiving

?
 
The paper is by Nicholas Humphries in response to David Chalmers' "meta-problem" but the link seems to have expired, trying to find a good link now.
 
I found this summary:

Editorial Introduction - Debates on the Meta-Problem of Consciousness - Imprint Academic

François Kammerer The meta-problem of consciousness, according to David Chalmers, is (roughly) the problem of explaining why we think there is a problem of consciousness. In his paper, titled ‘The Meta-Problem of Consciousness’, published last year in this journal, David Chalmers did a great...
www.imprint.co.uk www.imprint.co.uk

"Nicholas Humphrey presents his view of consciousness: according to him, consciousness should be understood as an intentional object: consciousness is how privatized ‘sentition’ (reflex motor responses to stimulation) is represented. Making consciousness an intentional object allows us to understand how it can have all kinds of properties that nothing physical could have, which is why we face the hard problem when we try (hopelessly) to locate consciousness in the physical world. Consciousness does not exist at the level of physical reality. However, says Humphrey, this does not mean that it is an illusion. Moreover, the representation of consciousness corresponds to our normal cognitive functioning, which has been fostered by natural selection."

He is a neuropsychologist, not a primatologist. He does, however, associate frequently with primates.
 
smcder said:
I found this summary:

Editorial Introduction - Debates on the Meta-Problem of Consciousness - Imprint Academic

François Kammerer The meta-problem of consciousness, according to David Chalmers, is (roughly) the problem of explaining why we think there is a problem of consciousness. In his paper, titled ‘The Meta-Problem of Consciousness’, published last year in this journal, David Chalmers did a great...
www.imprint.co.uk www.imprint.co.uk

"Nicholas Humphrey presents his view of consciousness: according to him, consciousness should be understood as an intentional object: consciousness is how privatized ‘sentition’ (reflex motor responses to stimulation) is represented. Making consciousness an intentional object allows us to understand how it can have all kinds of properties that nothing physical could have, which is why we face the hard problem when we try (hopelessly) to locate consciousness in the physical world. Consciousness does not exist at the level of physical reality. However, says Humphrey, this does not mean that it is an illusion. Moreover, the representation of consciousness corresponds to our normal cognitive functioning, which has been fostered by natural selection."

He is a neuropsychologist, not a primatologist. He does, however, associate frequently with primates.
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I'd really like to read this paper by Nicholas Humphrey and will help search for an online copy of it. It seems to me that we've discussed Humphreys before so I'll do a search to find out if and where we have.
 
Constance said:
I'd really like to read this paper by Nicholas Humphrey and will help search for an online copy of it. It seems to me that we've discussed Humphreys before so I'll do a search to find out if and where we have.
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Indeed 'twas only months ago that you mentioned Humphrey in relation to Chalmers' 'The Meta-Problem' in this post:

Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 12

I'm going to read that thread to see whether it includes a link to the Humphrey paper you refer to, and also to see how far we got with The Meta-Problem.
 
I'm still seeing a lot of "how", "why" and fully "account" or "explain" type questions when by now it should be evident that none of those types of questions or lines of inquiry can be answered more than superficially for any subject, including consciousness. We may not be able to provide verifiably accurate descriptions of consciousness either, but at least developing a descriptive model that fits the apparent situation is more practical than dwelling on unanswerable or only superficially answerable "why" or "how" type questions.

Then again, who needs to be practical all the time. We can remain as children who ask, "Why is the sky blue" and continue asking why for every answer given, ad infinitum. If the meta-problem of consciousness is valid, so is the meta-meta-problem, and the meta-meta-meta-problem, and the meta-meta-meta-meta ... etc. If that's the sort of thing that brings us some sense of joy or satisfaction, does it really matter whether or not it's also pointless? The HPC is equally as pointless ( as I've said from the start ), at least with the respect to the question it poses, but it has also been motivational.
 
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This comment at the blog above is appealing to me. Steve, having read this blog for a long time, do you know anything about the poster (his identity and publications)?

Jochen on February 19, 2018 at 4:06 pm said:

Looks like Chalmers is trying to go for a ride on the dead horse I’ve been beating… ?

Less facetiously, I think that focusing on the ‘meta-problem’ is a fruitful strategy. To me, the apparent mystery of consciousness comes about simply because the models we use in explanation are essentially computational, however, the way they’re hooked up to the world isn’t (and can’t be). Hence, we can’t explain this hooking up; but we can derive some of its properties: first of all, it must bring us into contact with the properties of things in the world (else, it wouldn’t be hooking up); second, it would seem mysterious, and ineffable (as we can’t talk about things we can’t describe). So there: the sort of stuff that composes our experience of the world is mysterious, intrinsic, and ineffable.

I’ve got no idea if any of that’s right, but it seems at least a simple and not obviously false explanation.
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ETA -- Hence the increasing interest of consciousness researchers from different disciplines in panpsychism. I think we might consider taking up discussion of the variety of forms of panpsychism being pursued in our time.
 
smcder said:
I'll post the paper from part 12 - it's by a primatologist and lays out how/why consciousness could have evolved and is similar to the paper you posted, but it just doesn't say why that has to include subjectivity - access consciousness, yes. But why do we need the experience of pain? The nerve action of pain, yes. Or any other experience? If that experience also has a biological cost - and so is both causally impotent and has a biological cost, why would it be retained? Wouldn't a zombie do better because it's free of the cost of experience?
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I had not seen the paper by Humphries ( or bookmarked it for reading later ). Looks really good.

Re why do we need the experience of pain.

This is where Bach’s little saying comes into play.

Consciousness is an interface. It’s how an organism comprised of billions of cells and dozens of organs and multiple systems and layers of organization acts as a unified whole. Because it’s not a unified whole, but it needs to act like one.

So there is no phenomenal experience inside the organism. We look inside it body Anne brain and we will see no phenomenal consciousness. Is it a zombie?

As the organism has evolved in all its complexity, an organ has evolved that enables the multifaceted organism to perceive the world and itself from the perspective of a single, unified entity, or self/subject.

the organ is the brain and it embodies an interface/model/map/Umwelt of the world and itself.

objectively, we see/know ions, cells, cortices. However, subjectively—to the self/subject being instantiated by the brain—the self is the conscious experience of the world from a unified perspective.

You can’t have a unified self-experience of the world without experience. Phenomenal consciousness is the intrinsic nature of conscious experience. And conscious experience is an interface that evolved bc it allows the organism to navigate the world, it’s adaptive.
 
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