Having said that, I still believe however that whatever sets consciousness neural processes apart from non-conscious neural processes won’t be observable/measurable.The mind doesn’t read the map; the mind is the map. A map of the self and world, implemented by the organism to self-regulate
On the representational account, the representations are implemented via physiological processes. There is no problem of mental causation.
When we peer into the physical world, we find no consciousness. Consciousness only exists for us inside our model of the world. Each of us is ( in ) a subjective model of the world, an umwelt.
The mbp arises when we mistake our world, our umwelt, for the larger reality we are modeling.
The “only” question for me is whether someone akin to panpsychism is still required. Bach and others seem convinced that purely material/biological systems/organisms can implement qualitative models ( akin to pharaoh’s approach ). There are certain qualitative feels I can imagine emerging from purely physical processes if I squint my eyes, but then others that I can’t imagine emerging from purely physical processes.
So even though the consciousness-as-self-regulatory-model makes a lot of sense to me, I’m not convinced it can emerge/evolve from purely material systems. Im still intrigued by the intrinsic nature argument.
I think it may be a moot point though. Whether human consciousness derives from matter with a non-phenomenal intrinsic nature or from matter with a phenomenal intrinsic nature, what seems to be important are the physiological processes which we can ultimately observe and measure.
Having said that, I still believe however that whatever sets consciousness neural processes apart from non-conscious neural processes won’t be observable/measurable. It will be something subjective; internal to the system. It will have something to do with the role that particular neural process plays in implementing the organisms world model.
From an objective, public perspective, a non-conscious neural process and a conscious neural process will look the same.
So two observably/measurably identical (this includes identical situations - i.e. where they are located and how they are connected to the rest of the network) "neural processes" could exist and one would be conscious and the other not ... determined strictly by subjective requirements (which are determined by what?)
It will be something subjective; internal to the system. It will have something to do with the role that particular neural process plays in implementing the organisms world model.
So what subjectively determines the role that a particular neural process plays in implementing the organism's world model? and how does this interact with the physical aspects of the process... i.e. what is the mechanism of causality here?