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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 13

Soupie

Paranormal Adept
Almost. It's more like this: The MPB is not a valid problem because explaining how the mind an body are related cannot be done. We can only describe the situation involving minds and bodies. But there might be an explanation for how such things are related when we can explain how the rules of nature came into existence. Unfortunately, that is well beyond my intellectual reach.
At this point whether we agree that the mbp should be called a problem or not is a matter of semantics.

we both agree that we currently do not have a theory that begins to explain how the mind and body are related.

at best we can say human consciousness seems to be related to the body, especially the brain, and especially neurons.

but we are nowhere near having a scientific explanation of why, say, the taste of chocolate is correlated with certain neural states and not, say, the taste of vanilla.

you seem content to say “let’s stop calling it a problem and just accept that certain feelings/sensations are correlated with certain neural states even though we have no idea how or why.”

I say it is a problem, you say it’s not. Let’s move on.

I also quibble with your suggestion that consciousness, somehow being caused by physical processes in the brain, is fundamental. If that’s the case, it would be a case of strong emergence on my understanding.

if something were to be fundamental, it would have no priors that we know of. Human organism and brains would be required for consciousness, which in your account mysteriously (strongly) emerges from them.

save me your bricks and house analogy. Again, let’s move on.

my position is as follows: there are multiple lines of evidence converging on the idea that the classical reality we perceive is not base reality. There are conversations in physics atm about the reality of space, time, causality, etc. The science of perception is converging on the idea that, to some degree, we don’t see reality in itself but in a limited, subjective way that has been adaptive for our species.

couple the above with the fact that we have no beginnings of a theory ( or idea ) of how consciousness might emerge from neural processes.

I don’t dispute the fact that states of human consciousness seem to correlate with states of the human brain and body. What i do dispute is the intuition that the human brain and neurons cause consciousness.

I think we are beginning to understand that space, time, and causality are not fundamental. That means things like brains and neurons are not fundamental either.

this, I believe, is why we can’t move beyond mere correlation when it comes to the nature of the relationship between mind and matter.

I think mind and matter share a deeper relationship than can be revealed via classical physics, chemistry, or biology.

I think an understanding of the relationship between what we know as the mind and the body will come, if ever, when we have models of reality at a deeper level then we do currently.
 

USI Calgary

J. Randall Murphy
Staff member
The phenomenological tradition in modern philosophy understands the subject-object relation not in terms of dualism but in terms of dialectical relations between subject and object. This is clarified in the following overview of dialectics in philosophy: dialectic
According to the article you linked to, dialectic with respect to phenomenology is interpreted as the reconciliation of ostensible paradoxes to arrive at absolute truth. This is wholly in keeping with other common definitions, including the one from Wikipedia ( below ).

Dialectic or dialectics (Greek: διαλεκτική, dialektikḗ; related to dialogue), also known as the dialectical method, is at base a discourse between two or more people holding different points of view about a subject but wishing to establish the truth through reasoned methods of argumentation.

Dialectic is far from being a method exclusive to phenomenology. The dialectic approach is my default approach to examining contentious claims, and paradoxically that process is also what seems to get you frustrated with my point-counterpoint method of examining subject matter. So perhaps it would be more advantageous not to jump to the conclusion that opposition to your views is something other than dialectic.
 
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Constance

Paranormal Adept
At this point whether we agree that the mbp should be called a problem or not is a matter of semantics.

we both agree that we currently do not have a theory that begins to explain how the mind and body are related.

at best we can say human consciousness seems to be related to the body, especially the brain, and especially neurons.

but we are nowhere near having a scientific explanation of why, say, the taste of chocolate is correlated with certain neural states and not, say, the taste of vanilla.

you seem content to say “let’s stop calling it a problem and just accept that certain feelings/sensations are correlated with certain neural states even though we have no idea how or why.”

I say it is a problem, you say it’s not. Let’s move on.

I also quibble with your suggestion that consciousness, somehow being caused by physical processes in the brain, is fundamental. If that’s the case, it would be a case of strong emergence on my understanding.

if something were to be fundamental, it would have no priors that we know of. Human organism and brains would be required for consciousness, which in your account mysteriously (strongly) emerges from them.

save me your bricks and house analogy. Again, let’s move on.

my position is as follows: there are multiple lines of evidence converging on the idea that the classical reality we perceive is not base reality. There are conversations in physics atm about the reality of space, time, causality, etc. The science of perception is converging on the idea that, to some degree, we don’t see reality in itself but in a limited, subjective way that has been adaptive for our species.

couple the above with the fact that we have no beginnings of a theory ( or idea ) of how consciousness might emerge from neural processes.

I don’t dispute the fact that states of human consciousness seem to correlate with states of the human brain and body. What i do dispute is the intuition that the human brain and neurons cause consciousness.

I think we are beginning to understand that space, time, and causality are not fundamental. That means things like brains and neurons are not fundamental either.

this, I believe, is why we can’t move beyond mere correlation when it comes to the nature of the relationship between mind and matter.

I think mind and matter share a deeper relationship than can be revealed via classical physics, chemistry, or biology.

I think an understanding of the relationship between what we know as the mind and the body will come, if ever, when we have models of reality at a deeper level then we do currently.
Happily in agreement with you now, @Soupie. And impressed with the clarity of your summary of the current situation regarding the MBP, though I don't agree that the MBP is only a problem of semantics. The issue used to be discussed in terms of whether 'matter' or 'mind' or both could be considered to be "ontological primitives." Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Science have become more sharply focused on this question since the development of Consciousness Studies began about 35 years ago, but we have a long way to go in understanding the role of consciousness, which includes the subconscious mind and the collective unconscious, in our efforts to comprehend the actual lived nature of what we casually refer to as 'reality'.
 
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USI Calgary

J. Randall Murphy
Staff member
At this point whether we agree that the mbp should be called a problem or not is a matter of semantics.
Semantics is not trivial in the quest for understanding.
we both agree that we currently do not have a theory that begins to explain how the mind and body are related.
Sure we have a theory that begins to explain how the mind and body are related. However that explanation can only be superficial, e.g. How we relate minds and bodies to each other is by correlating the phenomena of consciousness with the presence of bodies, in particular, human bodies with functioning brains.
at best we can say human consciousness seems to be related to the body, especially the brain, and especially neurons. but we are nowhere near having a scientific explanation of why, say, the taste of chocolate is correlated with certain neural states and not, say, the taste of vanilla.
Those sorts of questions aren't valid scientific questions. Feynman tried to explain this to people, and I have made a similar attempt here: Superficial Questions Get Us Nowhere. This is not simply semantics.
You seem content to say “let’s stop calling it a problem and just accept that certain feelings/sensations are correlated with certain neural states even though we have no idea how or why.”
That's superficially correct. Understanding the reason is much less superficial.
I say it is a problem, you say it’s not. Let’s move on.
Okay. But that analogy is a really good one ( for something anyway ).
I also quibble with your suggestion that consciousness, somehow being caused by physical processes in the brain, is fundamental. If that’s the case, it would be a case of strong emergence on my understanding.
I'm not saying that the brain is necessarily the cause of consciousness. I am saying that there is no reason not to conclude that consciousness will always correlate to certain brains. Whether the brain itself is causal depends on how we interpret that term. For example, as an analogy, and please try to remember that no analogy is perfect, a water condenser doesn't cause or create water out of nothing, and it doesn't in and of itself even change much while working, but the result is that water comes out of it.

Now suppose we had never encountered water before. Water emerging from a water condenser might seem to be like some mysterious ectoplasm that is strongly emergent. But when we know the actual situation, we can tell that the idea of emergentism in this analogy doesn't really fit. I'm not saying consciousness exists in some ethereal state that brains are able to condense into awareness, but it might be something analogous to that, instead of something emergent.
if something were to be fundamental, it would have no priors that we know of.
Sort of. Maybe a little more complex than that, but good enough.
Human organism and brains would be required for consciousness, which in your account mysteriously (strongly) emerges from them.
My account would be as much a maybe as a maybe not. I like the idea of strong emergence, but I've been drifting in the direction that it's similar to panpsychism, in that it doesn't really explain anything.
save me your bricks and house analogy. Again, let’s move on.
Okay.
my position is as follows: there are multiple lines of evidence converging on the idea that the classical reality we perceive is not base reality. There are conversations in physics atm about the reality of space, time, causality, etc. The science of perception is converging on the idea that, to some degree, we don’t see reality in itself but in a limited, subjective way that has been adaptive for our species.

couple the above with the fact that we have no beginnings of a theory ( or idea ) of how consciousness might emerge from neural processes.

I don’t dispute the fact that states of human consciousness seem to correlate with states of the human brain and body. What i do dispute is the intuition that the human brain and neurons cause consciousness.
That seems to fit the picture to the extent that in the end we don't know what the fundamental causes are of anything. We can always reduce superficial explanations to the point where we have no complete explanation for the forces or phenomena involved, and simply have to accept them as a given.
I think we are beginning to understand that space, time, and causality are not fundamental.
I'm not so sure about that claim. I think it depends on context. Space and time can both be broken down into smaller conceptual elements, but as they exist in the world, there is no way to explain how or why they should exist any more than anything else. Causality requires preexisting conditions such as space, time, and matter, so there's a strong case for it being something emergent.
That means things like brains and neurons are not fundamental either.
I don't think I know of anyone who claims brains and neurons are fundamental in the same way as space, time, electromagnetism, or gravitation.
this, I believe, is why we can’t move beyond mere correlation when it comes to the nature of the relationship between mind and matter. I think mind and matter share a deeper relationship than can be revealed via classical physics, chemistry, or biology.
I have a feeling you are probably right. The sciences all accept that certain forces and phenomena are a given and then try to find ways to describe the relationships between them. The "deeper relationship" ( how these forces and phenomena are imparted on the world ) is something that is presently beyond the ability of science to answer. I'm not sure it can ever be answered.
I think an understanding of the relationship between what we know as the mind and the body will come, if ever, when we have models of reality at a deeper level then we do currently.
I empathize with your thirst for the big answers. Maybe I'm just getting old and resigning myself to what it seems we can learn rather than what seems impossible ( at least to me ). I strongly suspect that we may never understand the relationship between consciousness and other phenomena, but we will gain an increasingly higher resolution description of it, and from that we will invent practical applications.
 
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Soupie

Paranormal Adept
Can you say more about that?

“What is reality?

Sean Carroll: The best answer we can give is that reality is a vector in Hilbert space. This is the technical way of saying that reality is described by a single quantum mechanical wave function.

OK, that’s abstract. Please conceptualize this?

We see tables and chairs and people and planets moving through spacetime. Quantum mechanics says that there are no such things as tables and chairs—there’s just something we call a wave function.

Our classical description of the world is a higher level, approximate way of talking about the wave function. The job of physicists and philosophers is to show how, if we live in a world that is just a wave function, then why does it look like there are people and planets and tables and chairs? We don’t have a definite consensus.”
 

Constance

Paranormal Adept
According to the article you linked to, dialectic with respect to phenomenology is interpreted as the reconciliation of ostensible paradoxes to arrive at absolute truth. This is wholly in keeping with other common definitions, including the one from Wikipedia ( below ).
I don't think the underscored is an accurate reading of the text I linked. In phenomenology (beginning with Hegel) dialectical thinking evolves to a "dialectical model of subjectivity as the interpenetration between subject and object." That is expressed in the first sentence of a key paragraph in the cited text, which I reproduce below. What happens in the development of phenomenological philosophy is that its leading thinkers overcome the premises of Cartesian dualism in recognizing the inescapable interrelationship, inter-reliance, of consciousness and mind {i.e., what we sense and think} with that which we encounter in the phenomenal presentations of the 'thingly' furniture of the world. What we otherwise think of superficially [in what Husserl called 'the natural attitude'] as a wholly objective 'reality' existing outside of and beyond our lived experience of being, is understood to involve consciousness and mind in what we think of as 'reality'. We are always 'on the way', as Heidegger expressed it, to understanding the relationship of our being to the Being of all that is.

"Dialectic permeated Hegel's philosophy, but his dialectical model of subjectivity as the interpenetration between subject and object probably holds the most relevance for us today. In The Phenomenology of Spirit , Hegel described subjectivity as "a being-for-self which is for itself only through another" (115). In other words, I can never define myself purely in relation to myself; it is through my interaction with the external world that I become aware of my self-consciousness. The subject only exists through its relationship with others: "Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged" (111). The following passage addresses this dialectical relationship: Among the countless differences cropping up here we find in every case that the crucial one is that, in sense-certainty, pure being at once splits up into what we have called the two 'Thises,' one 'This' as 'I,' and the other 'This' as object. When we reflect on this difference, we find that neither one nor the other is immediately present in sense-certainty, but each is at the same time mediated : I have this certainty through something else, viz. the thing; and it, similarly, is in sense-certainty through something else, viz. through the 'I'. It is not just we who make this distinction between essence and instance, between immediacy and mediation; on the contrary, we find it within sense-certainty itself...(59, Hegel's emphasis). Significantly, subjectivity is not merely a one-sided relationship through which the outside world, or [reality, (2)] , is defined (mediated) according to sensory input (see senses). Hegel's subject is not an autonomous entity that interprets the world; additionally, the world interprets the subject. The subject is constantly adjusting its self-conception based on its interaction with external reality."
To understand the above, it is necessary to pursue the 'existentialia' foregrounded by Heidegger and also his description of the hermeneutic circle of interpretation, and as well to pursue Merleau-Ponty's later philosophy of nature as 'Chiasm'. It's also helpful to read Gadamer on the subject of the hermeneutic circle of interpretation in which we are involved as radically temporal, existential, beings. SEP has a helpful article on Hermeneutics.

Randall continued:
[quote]Dialectic is far from being a method exclusive to phenomenology. The dialectic approach is my default approach to examining contentious claims, and paradoxically that process is also what seems to get you frustrated with my point-counterpoint method of examining subject matter. So perhaps, rather than jumping to the conclusion that opposition to your views are something other than dialectic, some benefit of the doubt would be in order.[/quote]

I didn't say that 'dialectics' is a method exclusive to phenomenology, but rather hoped to point out its exponential development in phenomenology.

{note: do not know why the last use of the quote function above isn't working.}
 
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marduk

quelling chaos since 2352BC

“What is reality?

Sean Carroll: The best answer we can give is that reality is a vector in Hilbert space. This is the technical way of saying that reality is described by a single quantum mechanical wave function.

OK, that’s abstract. Please conceptualize this?

We see tables and chairs and people and planets moving through spacetime. Quantum mechanics says that there are no such things as tables and chairs—there’s just something we call a wave function.

Our classical description of the world is a higher level, approximate way of talking about the wave function. The job of physicists and philosophers is to show how, if we live in a world that is just a wave function, then why does it look like there are people and planets and tables and chairs? We don’t have a definite consensus.”
ah, one of my favorite books.

So if the underlying thing that gives rise to our perception of reality is an underlying wave function in hilbert space (which is a fancy way of saying an abstract vector space), then the thing that triggers neuronal shifts is also the underlying wave function - which is also (Carroll posits) the thing that gives rise to all physical phenomena.

Which is all a way of saying that QM is a more accurate way of describing the universe, and that the classical behaviours we see in macro views of the universe really have underling roots in QM, and in fact, QM gives rise to them, including (most interestingly at the moment) gravity, but also entanglement.

Which itself a way of saying that if you extend the physical universe we see into QM, and describe that interaction using an abstract vector (problem) space, then you can reconcile the two.

Now, I'd buy that consciousness has a QM component, or that it is itself arising out of QM behaviours, but that would also mean that consciousness itself needs to abide by the same natural laws of physics inclusive of QM. And all the problems describing how it relates to the basic structure of neurons goes away in concept (because it's the same interaction QM has for the rest of the universe) but now we're describing consciousness itself in a probabilistic way - because that's how the rest of QM itself works.

The upshot of all this is that we can describe the mind with math, because we can describe QM and the rest of the universe with math.

The downside is of course is that it either makes us fundamentally random (which is a drag), or deterministic (which is also a drag), or all possible choices are explored (which is what Carroll kinda says). Either way, free will is DOA because either we make random choices, or we make no choices, or we make all choices - in other words, 'we' aren't actually making any choices at all.
 

USI Calgary

J. Randall Murphy
Staff member
I don't think the underscored is an accurate reading of the text I linked.
The interpretation you refer to above is from the same article at the section which talks about Hegelian phenomenology. So better that you take up any differences you have about that quote with the author of that article. Here is the exact quote:

"Roughly speaking, Hegel's dialectic involves the reconciliation of ostensible paradoxes to arrive at absolute truth. The general formulation of Hegel's dialectic is a three-step process comprising the movement from thesis to antithesis to synthesis. One begins with a static, clearly delineated concept (or thesis), then moves to its opposite (or antithesis), which represents any contradictions derived from a consideration of the rigidly defined thesis. The thesis and antithesis are yoked and resolved to form the embracing resolution, or synthesis."​
In phenomenology (beginning with Hegel) dialectical thinking evolves to a "dialectical model of subjectivity as the interpenetration between subject and object." That is expressed in the first sentence of a key paragraph in the cited text, which I reproduce below. What happens in the development of phenomenological philosophy is that its leading thinkers overcome the premises of Cartesian dualism in recognizing the inescapable interrelationship, inter-reliance, of consciousness and mind {i.e., what we sense and think} with that which we encounter in the phenomenal presentations of the 'thingly' furniture of the world. What we otherwise think of superficially [in what Husserl called 'the natural attitude'] as a wholly objective 'reality' existing outside of and beyond our lived experience of being, is understood to involve consciousness and mind in what we think of as 'reality'. We are always 'on the way', as Heidegger expressed it, to understanding the relationship of our being to the Being of all that is.
The above is not dissimilar to what I've been trying to get across when I say that the MBP and the HPC are not "problems" in that they don't pose more than superficial questions, which in the end resolve to the same sort of acceptance about the existence of "our being" ( both minds & bodies ) as part of the "Being of all that is" ( nature ). This inclusiveness of all things within the larger framework is the "synthesis".
To understand the above, it is necessary to pursue the 'existentialia' foregrounded by Heidegger and also his description of the hermeneutic circle of interpretation, and as well to pursue Merleau-Ponty's later philosophy of nature as 'Chiasm'. It's also helpful to read Gadamer on the subject of the hermeneutic circle of interpretation in which we are involved as radically temporal, existential, beings. SEP has a helpful article on Hermeneutics.
I think I've got a fairly good grasp of the fundamentals here, but the other content you suggest might be interesting to checkout because of the parallels between it and my own views that I described above. Maybe something further can be gleaned. Again, it seems we may not be so polarized as you might have imagined. Or maybe you think I've got it all wrong ( again ). Either way, thank you.
 
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Constance

Paranormal Adept
The interpretation you refer to above is from the same article at the section which talks about Hegelian phenomenology. So better that you take up any differences you have about that quote with the author of that article. Here is the exact quote:

"Roughly speaking, Hegel's dialectic involves the reconciliation of ostensible paradoxes to arrive at absolute truth. The general formulation of Hegel's dialectic is a three-step process comprising the movement from thesis to antithesis to synthesis. One begins with a static, clearly delineated concept (or thesis), then moves to its opposite (or antithesis), which represents any contradictions derived from a consideration of the rigidly defined thesis. The thesis and antithesis are yoked and resolved to form the embracing resolution, or synthesis."​

The above is not dissimilar to what I've been trying to get across when I say that the MBP and the HPC are not "problems" in that they don't pose more than superficial questions, which in the end resolve to the same sort of acceptance about the existence of "our being" ( both minds & bodies ) as part of the "Being of all that is" ( nature ). This inclusiveness of all things within the larger framework is the "synthesis".

I think I've got a fairly good grasp of the fundamentals here, but the other content you suggest might be interesting to checkout because of the parallels between it and my own views that I described above. Maybe something further can be gleaned. Again, it seems we may not be so polarized as you might have imagined. Or maybe you think I've got it all wrong ( again ). Either way, thank you.
If you don't read "the other content I suggested" in my post you'll continue to miss and misunderstand the development of phenomenological philosophy. Indeed, in your above response it's apparent that you have not read and thus not responded to the paragraph I quoted to you from the 'dialectics essay'. What's the point?
 
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USI Calgary

J. Randall Murphy
Staff member
If you don't read "the other content I suggested" in my post you'll continue to miss and misunderstand the development of phenomenological philosophy. Indeed, in your above response it's apparent that you have not read and thus not responded to the paragraph I quoted to you from the 'dialectics essay'. What's the point?
I haven't read all the gory details about the development of phenomenological philosophy, and haven't made any claim to understanding its development. Therefore it is impossible for me to be misunderstanding its development. More accurately I am simply uninformed about its development. That however doesn't mean I misunderstand the concept of the dialectic process as outlined in the article you linked us to, or that from that understanding, it cannot be determined that there is no Earth shattering revelation to be had from recounting all the ways it can be applied. However it may be an exercise that you enjoy, so by all means carry on.
 
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Constance

Paranormal Adept
I haven't read all the gory details about the development of phenomenological philosophy, and haven't made any claim to understanding its development. Therefore it is impossible for me to be misunderstanding its development. More accurately I am simply uninformed about its development. That however doesn't mean I misunderstand the concept of the dialectic process as outlined in the article you linked us to, or that from that understanding, it cannot be determined that there is no Earth shattering revelation to be had from recounting all the ways it can be applied. However it may be an exercise that you enjoy, so by all means carry on.

Seriously? You want me to 'enjoy' posting in this thread? Gee, thanks. It's so hard to tell.
 

USI Calgary

J. Randall Murphy
Staff member
The downside is of course is that it either makes us fundamentally random (which is a drag), or deterministic (which is also a drag), or all possible choices are explored (which is what Carroll kinda says). Either way, free will is DOA because either we make random choices, or we make no choices, or we make all choices - in other words, 'we' aren't actually making any choices at all.
Well said. But the illusion is so convincing that most people will go to great lengths to protect it.
 
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Constance

Paranormal Adept
This very taking sentence -- "...the intentional and world-directed character of life is a feature of life itself, and not something that is added from without" (Heidegger 1993, 261) -- occurs in note 7 of a very challenging paper by Dan Zahavi entitled "Husserl's noema and the internalist-objectivist debate." I've read this paper once tonight and will need to read it again. Here is note 7:

"7 On one reading of what Husserl’s transcendental idealism amounts to, this might exactly be what Husserl was up to. Husserl is known for arguing that the world is conditioned by transcendental subjectivity (Husserl 1976, 104-6, 159). However, it is crucial not to miss the way in which the transcendental discourse transforms the concepts “subjectivity” and “world”.​
Husserl’s concept of subjectivity is eventually expanded in such a way that it surpasses or undermines the traditional opposition between subject and object (cf. Husserl 1962, 265). For instance, Husserl’s concept of the ‘monad’ – which is his term for the subject in its full concretion – encompasses not merely the intentional life, but also all the objects which are constituted through it (Husserl 1973a, 26, 102, 135,1973b, 46). On this background, we are consequently faced with the following choice:​
On one reading, Husserl’s theory of intentionality shares important features with one form of externalism. On another reading, Husserl’s transcendental idealism might be said to embody a form of internalism, but an internalism so radical that it undermines the gap between mind and world, thereby approaching a form of externalism.​
It might be of interest to notice that the same ambiguity can also be found in Heidegger. Heidegger of course is primarily known as an externalist. But in some of his early lectures, Heidegger makes claims that sound remarkably like internalism. In Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (1925), for instance, Heidegger denies that a perception only becomes intentional if its object somehow enters into a relation with it, as if it would lose its intentionality if the object didn’t exist.​
Rather the perception, be it correct or deceptive, is in itself intentional. As a perception, it is, as Heidegger writes, intrinsically intentional, regardless of whether the perceived is in reality on hand or not (Heidegger 1979, 40). In Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (1927) Heidegger basically repeats this characterization, and adds that it is a decisive error to interpret intentionality as a relation between a psychical subject and a physical object, as if the subject, in itself, in isolation, would lack intentionality.​
The truth of the matter is that the subject is intentionally structured within itself. Intentionality does not first arise through the actual presence of objects but lies in the perceiving itself, whether veridical or illusory (Heidegger 1989, 83-85). These statements do sound rather internalistic, and they match well with another recurrent idea of the young Heidegger, the idea namely that life is characterized by a self-sufficiency (Selbstgenügsamkeit), in the sense that the intentional and world-directed character of life is a feature of life itself, and not something that is added from without (Heidegger 1993, 261).​

Link to the paper: https://www.academia.edu/4374059/Husserls_noema_and_the_internalism-externalism_debate?email_work_card=view-paper
 
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USI Calgary

J. Randall Murphy
Staff member
This very taking sentence -- "...the intentional and world-directed character of life is a feature of life itself, and not something that is added from without" (Heidegger 1993, 261) -- occurs in note 7 of a very challenging paper by Dan Zahavi entitled "Husserl's noema and the internalist-objectivist debate." I've read this paper once tonight and will need to read it again.

Link to the paper: https://www.academia.edu/4374059/Husserls_noema_and_the_internalism-externalism_debate?email_work_card=view-paper
I also found this link which doesn't require a membership to download.

https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Dan_Zahavi/publication/249001466_Husserl's_Noema_and_the_Internalism-Externalism_Debate/links/569c9e5708ae748dfb1107d1/Husserls-Noema-and-the-Internalism-Externalism-Debate.pdf

The following would seem to be of relevance as well: The Phenomenological Reduction

"Husserl discovered the need for such a regimen once it became clear to him that the foundation upon which scientific inquiry rested was compromised by the very framework of science itself and the psychological assumptions of the scientist; the phenomenological reduction is the technique whereby the phenomenologist puts him or herself in a position to provide adequately rigorous grounds for scientific or any other kind of inquiry."
⚠ This part launches a red flag right away:

"The phenomenological reduction is the meditative practice described by Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, whereby one, as a phenomenologist, is able to liberate oneself from the captivation in which one is held by all that one accepts as being the case."

The problem with the above is that "the case" is a term that equates to "the truth". I am not someone who will "liberate" myself from what I accept as the truth without more reasons than doing a bunch of philosophical meditation for the purpose of "liberating" myself from it. This stinks of the same sort of programming that cults use to gain converts, and indeed, this sort of conversion is the aim of this process:

"the phenomenological reduction is properly understood as a regimen designed to transform a philosopher into a phenomenologist by virtue of the attainment of a certain perspective on the world phenomenon."​
The above requirement puts any analyst of this "regimen" in the position of abandoning all previous views and replacing them with those of the regimen, and if that process fails, then the analyst has failed to understand it and therefore cannot claim to have any proper criticism of it. This is obviously not a road you'll get me on. Nor would I give credence to claims by adherents of this regimen that it bears any value other than to reinforce their own personal adherence to Husserl's Phenomenology, no matter how out of touch with "the case" they happen to be.

The upshot here is that apparently, I will never be a devotee of Husserl's Phenomenology, nor will those phenomenologists who are, ever accept that any critical analysis of it is valid, instead, simply writing them off as misinformed or lacking in comprehension. Because this has been a recurring theme in the criticism of my participation here, I cannot help but think that your advocacy for phenomenology is connected to such criticism rather than accepting what would otherwise seem to be "the case".

I will continue to stick with the approach that knowing what the "the case" is, is preferable to joining a belief system that purposefully chooses to dismiss what "the case" is and proclaim any opposition to that dismissal as a misinterpretation or lack of comprehension that can only be reconciled by abandoning whatever reasons the opposition may have for why they hold the position they do.

This means that no adherent to Husserl's Phenomenology can effectively argue in favor of it with me because it would require them to have an appreciation for what "the case" is, thereby dissolving their own connection with whatever they think Husserl's Phenomenology is. Therefore assuming the IEP article is accurate, there can be no bridge between Husserlian phenomenology and the philosophical approach I and others not wedded to Husserl's phenomenology take.
 
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Constance

Paranormal Adept
Posting links to four additional sources for understanding of Husserl's phenomenology by Zahavi (storms again now thundering above my townhouse, so no time to add more details now)

Published in E. Thompson (ed.),
The Problem of Consciousness: New Essays in Phenomenological Philosophy of Mind
.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy,

Supplementary Volume 29, 2003, 63-92.

Dan Zahavi, Danish National Research Foundation:
Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen

"Intentionality and phenomenality A phenomenological take on the hard problem"

https://www.academia.edu/9561065/In...n_the_hard_problem?email_work_card=view-paper

ALSO SEE ZAHAVI'S PAPER "Phenomenology and Metaphysics" . . . .

AND THIS BOOK OF HIS ENTITLED Husserl's Phenomenology at this amazon link: Husserl's Phenomenology (Cultural Memory in the Present): Zahavi, Dan: 9780804745468: Amazon.com: Books

AND THIS MOST RECENT ONE: Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity
 

USI Calgary

J. Randall Murphy
Staff member
Posting links to four additional sources for understanding of Husserl's phenomenology ...
Are you a devotee of Husserl's phenomenology, or are you simply interested in it from an academic perspective? If it is the former, then you might understand it from your own perspective, but if so, cannot explain it to anyone else, because the phenomenological reduction required isn't something that can be imparted by explaining to someone else.

If it is the latter ( from an academic perspective ), then for the same reason as above, the academic perspective cannot impart any meaning for the student. The only alternative is to deny that phenomenological reduction is required to understand Husserl's phenomenology, in which case you'd be compromising the core principle of Husserl's phenomenology, thus making it no longer applicable to the question.

Husserl's phenomenology appears les and less to be philosophy and more and more to be theology. In fact you might find this quite interesting:
 
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