Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 12

[Soupie]

Are you satisfied that you have sufficiently unpacked and analyzed those concepts? If not, what is missing for you? Or are you simply content with collecting different viewpoints on them, without necessarily running any analysis on them?

@Constance

No, I haven’t sufficiently explored the topic of consciousness.

I’m still exploring the mbp. I’m particularly interested in the self-referential nature of the mbp. The seeming duality between the perceived and the perceiver, the known and the knower, subject and object, Etc.

 

[Randall]

(1) How can we be sure other humans are conscious?

I don't claim we can be sure other humans are conscious. I only claim that it's reasonable to assume that all normal humans have the same capacity for consciousness.

(2) Can we be sure some humans aren’t zombies?

I don't claim we be sure some humans aren’t zombies. I only claim that it's reasonable to assume that all normal humans aren't zombies.

(3) Do you think neuroscientific knowledge is so course grained that the brains of humans and other organisms are radically different but this radical difference escapes biologists? Or do you think the biological mechanics that creates consciousness is just that subtle?

I think it's reasonable to assume for the sake of investigation that biology in general ( not specifically biological mechanics ) makes consciousness apparent, ( not that it creates it ). By that I mean that biology creates a situation whereby consciousness as we experience it happens.

(4) Just to be clear, panpsychists don’t explore the deep fringe for biomechanical reasons. They do so due to the hard problem of consciousness and the hard problem of matter.

Whatever their reasons are, apparently they're probably wrong ...

Why Panpsychism Is Probably Wrong

It’s enchanting to think that everything—from atoms to rocks to trees—is conscious, but it doesn’t explain much about the world.

www.theatlantic.com

 

[Randall]

What work do you or MA want that observation to do? That is, what conclusions do you think you can draw from it?

I can't speak for Michael, but one thing that comes to mind is that all we need to determine with reasonable certainty is what situations result in consciousness in order to create practical applications. That is different from understanding all the nuances of what exactly consciousness is composed of or what imparts it on the world. For example, if we are able to repair brain damage that results in a patient regaining consciousness, we don't need to know how it works. We just need to know it works with the same certainty as other things we aren't entirely sure of, like that pain killers work.

 

[Soupie]

Whatever their reasons are, apparently it's probably wrong ...

It probably is wrong, but not for any reason so far identified. And despite this fact, it is regarded by many as our most potentially fruitful approach to the problem. Certainly more fruitful than any current theories of emergence.

From your article:

“Panpsychists hold that consciousness emerges from the combination of billions of subatomic consciousnesses, just as the brain emerges from the organization of billions of subatomic particles. But how do these tiny consciousnesses combine?”

Many attacks on panspychism use straw man arguments. A la Pharoah lamenting the idea that electrons can have headaches about being late for tea.

Panpsychists argue that p-consciousness is the intrinsic nature of what physics identifies as quantum fields. No panpsychists are arguing that elementary particles have rich, complex minds with streams of consciousness like humans.

The following might be helpful.

Is Matter Conscious? - Issue 47: Consciousness - Nautilus

The nature of consciousness seems to be unique among scientific puzzles. Not only do neuroscientists have no fundamental explanation…

m.nautil.us

Note that I’m not trying to evangelize. Carry on with your search for emergent theories of p-consciousness.

 

[Randall]

No, I haven’t sufficiently explored the topic of consciousness.

What I was asking is more specific to the problems you mentioned, e.g. those below:

I’m still exploring the mbp. I’m particularly interested in the self-referential nature of the mbp. The seeming duality between the perceived and the perceiver, the known and the knower, subject and object, Etc.

Every time I think we've moved past these, they pop-up again. When it comes to minds and bodies I don't see explaining their existence as more of a "problem" than explaining the existence of anything else. What makes it more special to you? Or is it?

 

[Soupie]

I only claim that it's reasonable to assume that all normal humans have the same capacity for consciousness.

Many would therefore argue that it’s likewise reasonable to assume the other organisms with similar brain architectures and behaviors as normal humans also have the capacity for consciousness.

The point is that we never and can never know from the objective point of view whether another entity is p-conscious. The subject becomes object.

 

[Soupie]

What makes it more special to you? Or is it?

Special to me? Am I the only one who thinks the mbp is special? Is it? Indeed.

If you don’t see that the mbp is a special scientific problem, or perhaps feel comfortable suggesting that it’s not, I’m certainly not going to try to convince you it is haha.

 

[Soupie]

No panpsychists are arguing that elementary particles have rich, complex minds with streams of consciousness like humans.

That’s actually not true as I recently posted about a fellow who does think exactly that.

 

[Randall]

Many would therefore argue that it’s likewise reasonable to assume the other organisms with similar brain architectures and behaviors as normal humans also have the capacity for consciousness. The point is that we never can know from the objective point of view whether another entity is p-conscious. The subject becomes object.

That seems to be the case, unless that is, as was posted on the Philosophy, Science, and the Unexplained thread, that the quantum eraser delayed choice experiment is true.

 

[Randall]

Special to me? Am I the only one who thinks the mbp is special? Is it? Indeed. If you don’t see that the mbp is a special scientific problem, or perhaps feel comfortable suggesting that it’s not, I’m certainly not going to try to convince you it is haha.

We need to be careful here not to misinterpret intention, so it might take a few tries to get across what I'm saying with the same intent it's being delivered. What I'm getting at, is that at some point in our exploration of things, we get to the place where there are no more answers as to why or how or what. There is simply an acceptance of the fact that it is.

This to me seems to be the case with minds and bodies. Both exist, and we may never know all the answers as to how exactly everything about them comes into being, just like we don't know everything about how a magnetic field comes into being. All we know are the situations that make it happen. Isn't learning that good enough?

 

[Constance]

It [panpsychism] probably is wrong, but not for any reason so far identified. And despite this fact, it is regarded by many as our most potentially fruitful approach to the problem. Certainly more fruitful than any current theories of emergence.

I take it that by 'the problem' you mean the 'mind-body problem'. I have not yet seen any persuasive evidence supporting panpsychism (quantum or otherwise) over the evidence supporting emergence. So I wonder why you believe that panpsychism is "our most potentially fruitful approach to the problem."

What I was asking is more specific to the problems you mentioned...

@Soupie replied: "I’m still exploring the mbp. I’m particularly interested in the self-referential nature of the mbp. The seeming duality between the perceived and the perceiver, the known and the knower, subject and object, Etc.

Every time I think we've moved past these, they pop-up again. When it comes to minds and bodies I don't see explaining their existence as more of a "problem" than explaining the existence of anything else. What makes it more special to you? Or is it?

@Soupie replied:
"Special to me? Am I the only one who thinks the mbp is special? Is it? Indeed.

If you don’t see that the mbp is a special scientific problem, or perhaps feel comfortable suggesting that it’s not, I’m certainly not going to try to convince you it is haha."

The mind-body problem was recognized and taken up in philosophy long before science began to grapple with it. Even Aristotle grappled with it. It is still with us and will be for a long time yet. In grappling with it, modern physicists, neuroscientists, and even some biologists seem to want to stamp out the MBP by locating consciousness and mind not in humans and other species of organic life but in a remote process operating in the quantum substrate. Why? Because human science is still dominated by materialist/physicalist presuppositions and a long-embedded desire to see the universe/cosmos/etc of being/Being as a closed system which they hope to define at some point in the future.

 

[Constance]

@Constance

No, I haven’t sufficiently explored the topic of consciousness.

I’m still exploring the mbp. I’m particularly interested in the self-referential nature of the mbp. The seeming duality between the perceived and the perceiver, the known and the knower, subject and object, Etc.

Not seeing why I'm tagged in this response, @Soupie.

 

[Soupie]

Which of those concepts and problems are you interested in discussing at this point?

I’m still exploring the mbp. I’m particularly interested in the self-referential nature of the mbp. The seeming duality between the perceived and the perceiver, the known and the knower, subject and object, Etc.

 

[Soupie]

The mind-body problem was recognized and taken up in philosophy long before science began to grapple with it. Even Aristotle grappled with it. It is still with us and will be for a long time yet. In grappling with it, modern physicists, neuroscientists, and even some biologists seem to want to stamp out the MBP by locating consciousness and mind not in humans and other species of organic life but in a remote process operating in the quantum substrate.

Why? Because human science is still dominated by materialist/physicalist presuppositions and a long-embedded desire to see the universe/cosmos/etc of being/Being as a closed system which they hope to define at some point in the future.

Why? Maybe human life is a manifestation of matter/energy/consciousness which is able to contemplate its being and articulate the same in the form of questions.

 

[Constance]

Why? Maybe human life is a manifestation of matter/energy/consciousness which is able to contemplate its being and articulate the same in the form of questions.

Could be.

 

[Constance]

 

[Randall]

The mind-body problem was recognized and taken up in philosophy long before science began to grapple with it. Even Aristotle grappled with it. It is still with us and will be for a long time yet ...

The point I'm making is that we've gotten to the point where the MBP ( duality ) is no more resolvable than the problem of existence itself, which is also an age old problem that will probably never be fully understood. Therefore the solution to the MBP is that there is no solution. We can only accept that there are minds and bodies and deal with that situation as a given. By accepting what is, the two become one & neither, and in doing so, the "problem" vanishes, and we can make practical advancements.

 

[Soupie]

Could be.

Indeed.

 

[smcder]

Quick replies to your second paragraph:

Yes.
Perhaps.

But those same "folks" may have fallen prey to GOFAI ..."Good old-fashioned ...."

Symbolic artificial intelligence - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

As the late Dreyfus points out, such a point of view is a dead end. The dead end is true with respect to a single static computational unit...but such units (with the help of our own designs and plans) can make such units into vast huge interconnected networks for which human are more reliant on their existence than the other way around...take a microcontroller foundry creating millions of chips for governing processes of all human "for somethings" with lessened human intervention than what was required 70 years ago. Not one single human can recreate any one of those billion transistor logic gate microcontrollers without the aid of another computer...

"logic gate microcontroller"?

The question then is what do we know about those networks and the computers used in designing them compared to what we know about the mechanics of consciousness?

 

[Randall]

"logic gate microcontroller"? The question then is what do we know about those networks and the computers used in designing them compared to what we know about the mechanics of consciousness?

I think that question is at the very heart of the quest for an engineered consciousness.