Yes, and what I'm suggesting is that if the mind is a simulation/presentation/representation of nature for nature, than we should actually anticipate this seeming difference between nature and it's self-presentation.
I recently heard a little "thought experiment" that is helpful.
"Point to your brain. (We raise a pointing finger to our head.)
Now, point to your mind."
We can't point to our mind. We are our mind. The experience we have of pointing to our brain just is our mind.
Conceptually, we might say that our mind is "in" our brain. But we know that the thing we are pointing to—our brain—is actually in our mind.
The <BRAIN> is not the same as the brain experienced in our mind. The map is not the territory indeed but the map and the territory are constituted of the same substrate.
PS I think the self-reference paradox, Gödel's incompleteness theorem, etc. is relevant to the MBP for sure. The <BRAIN> perceiving itself certainly results in the same kind of blind spots. However, my thought is that blind spot has more to do with the binding problem than the issue of feeling from non-feeling.
Nicht so schnell, Kleinchen!
What is the German word for “mind”?
Zo...wenn du asking der German wo die "mind" ist...he ist nicht an der kopf pointing...he ist on your kopf pounding! Doch!
As to self reference maybe...i haven't read all your links above...I'm sure you've checked out Hofstadter, D.
Will try and catch up soon.