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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 12


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@smcder

re emergence

I agree that it’s problematic. Just as the term fundamental is problematic. The point is the terms don’t refer to the same thing.

yeah, me grokkie ...and all that wasn't aimed at you, but for a more general audience ... I can't recall it now, but I had a good example of something similar, maybe it was fundamental vs emergent, but the acid test was whether you can reliably make a distinction - and also if the one followed necessarily on from the other, which I think still best applies to the case of consciousness, it certainly seems like you could have it all without consciousness, pain, experiencing pain isn't necessary for reflex action to pull a finger from a stove, or even to learn a lesson about fingers and stoves, it seems to me you could just wire it up that way - I think zombie is an unfortunate term, because consciousness could also be arbitrarily related to experience...stub your toe and you think of blancmange.
 
I think you are wrong in at least two ways. And I don’t think it’s a matter of interpretation.
1) If something is fundamental (say water molecules) then the thing that emerges from them (say waves) is emergent.
The water molecules are fundamental and the waves emergent. We don’t say the waves are fundamental.
2) Something is emergent if it has new properties that it’s constituents don’t have. Individual water molecules don’t have waves. Waves are something new that emerge from interacting water molecules. Anyhow this stuff is pretty well defined. We’ve already hashed this all out many posts ago. It’s not a matter of interpretation or argument as you seem to believe.
Your explanation in the context you deliver it is fine. The problem is that it isn't in the context I was under the impression we were working in. So the situation here with respect to our discussion has nothing to do with either of us not grasping concepts, definitions, and frameworks. It's more a case of talking past each other.

In this case I was under the impression that we were both looking at the idea that something is fundamental if it cannot be reduced to something other than itself, and whether or not that situation can coexist with something emergent. When we do that with waves made of some fundamental stuff composed of quanta, we find that every wave can be reduced to its fundamental stuff ( quanta ). Therefore in this specific type of situation, waves ( the emergent ) and the fundamental stuff ( quanta ) must exist simultaneously.

There is no escaping this logic, though you are welcome to try. In order to prove it wrong all you would need to do is identify a situation of this exact same type, where waves of some fundamental stuff ( quanta ) do not require the simultaneous existence of both both fundamental stuff ( quanta ) and waves. Good luck with that. Even if we try to make the task easier by not requiring that the stuff ( quanta ) be fundamental, we still have the same problem. Try to make waves of water without water and waves existing simultaneously. It's not possible.

This provides a reason to think that perhaps we need to rethink the bottled and canned definitions of fundamentalness and emergence. Other participants like @Michael Allen and @smcder seem to be doing this as well. The alternative is to cite chapter and verse of someone else's thoughts, which can get really boring really fast ( for me ).

NOTE: When I say "this exact same type of situation", I mean situations where quanta constitute the makeup of something emergent without changing the intrinsic nature of such quanta in the process, not situations like particle-wave duality in phenomena such as light. That's a whole other context and subject.
Your logic for monism is good. However a resolution to the mbp does not follow from this.
I don't claim that I've solved the MBP. I claim that the MBP is not a valid "problem" in the first place, and therefore doesn't require "solving". For me, minds and bodies are simply part of a larger state of affairs in nature where different things coexist. I have no idea what the underlying substrate of nature is, or if there even is such a thing. Perhaps like a computer program it's all ultimately all ones and zeroes, but until we get to that level, we just have to accept that the program has different modules that from our perspective aren't reducible. They simply are what they are.
Nor does it follow that the mbp is no longer a problem for you.
Actually, it does follow that the MBP is not a problem ( for me ) because that paradigm ( problem ) isn't my paradigm ( problem ).
The mind might be identical with the body. Or the mind might be a fundamental physical field that exists in parallel to the body. The mind might information processing at the neural level. Or the mind might be a field emitted by neurons. Etc.

What new models have you proposed and defended in this thread? You were keen on Searle’s notion of consciousness oozing from biological neurons at one point. Then the idea of consciousness being fundamental quanta/field at one point. Am I missing something?
I was never "keen on Searle", but I respect him as a thinker. I'm more aligned with Chalmers ( who is working on a new book as we speak ), not to mention that he also makes an appearance in the Ultimate Matrix collection ( which alone makes him super cool ). On the subject of what models I've proposed and defended, I don't work like that.

I use a process called critical thinking, where I evaluate ideas and arrive at what seems to be the most reasonable perspective given the evidence at hand and the reasoning applied to it. That perspective changes over time as new or better information and analysis presents itself. So I'm not wedded to any particular paradigm. I also don't pretend to have all the answers. I just follow the path where it leads.

With that being said, I need a break from this discussion. It's too draining and I need to focus my energy elsewhere for a while.
 
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When we do that with waves made of some fundamental stuff composed of quanta, we find that every wave can be reduced to its fundamental stuff ( quanta ). Therefore in this specific type of situation, waves ( the emergent ) and the fundamental stuff ( quanta ) must exist simultaneously.
It was never a question of something fundamental and something emergent existing simultaneously. It was a question of something (consciousness) being both fundamental and emergent. You seem clear on the difference now, so let’s move on.
I don't claim that I've solved the MBP. I claim that the MBP is not a valid "problem" in the first place, and therefore doesn't require "solving".
It absolutely is still a valid problem. @smcder just illustrated why in his last post. It’s one thing to say that the mind and body consist of the same substrate. But you need to take the next step and explain how this can be. Only then can you say the mbp is not a problem for you. Moreover you seem to be claiming that the mind and body are both physical. You seem to believe that there is wiggle room in how one defines the concept of “physical.” But again, in order to say that the mbp is not a problem, you must explain the mind in physical terms. There is good reason to believe that this is not possible.
In short, other than by simple, empty proclamation, you have not demonstrated that the mbp is not a problem for you.
With that being said, I need a break from this discussion. It's too draining and I need to focus my energy elsewhere for a while.
It’s draining because you’re focused too much on your appearance. I’ll let you in on a secret: know one thinks you’re an expert on POM, metaphysics, physics, information, biology, or anything really. But then again, no one expects you to be. In short, you’re not fooling anybody in this thread. Except maybe yourself?
Relax. Have fun. Explore these ideas with some open mindedness and humility. It will be much less draining.
 
I’m not finding a tidy way to post twitter discussions which are nonlinear. He seems to tweet quite a bit. Best bet is to just browse through his tweets. He engages in discussion with everyone (which is nice) but some heavy weights too.

 
“A physical thing cannot experience anything. Only a simulation can. Physical things can implement simulations, however.“ Joscha Bach
I continue to find this statement fascinating. I think this is very close to Dennett’s way of thinking.

I think of experience as the way in which the content presents itself to the observer, while the observer is constituting itself over the act of observation.

Think of the observer as constructed from the ground up, as the minimal system that can model that it is modeling itself and its relationship to its environment.
The seem to believe that p consciousness can be a property of the simulation—not as a property of the brain per se.

This is where the illusion talk comes from.
The counter argument of course is that even an illusion of p consciousness is hard to explain via physical mechanisms. They seem to believe that computation and simulation gets around this.

And this is why I say their view is akin to panpsychism or pan proto psychism, though they wouldn’t see it that way.
 
I continue to find this statement fascinating. I think this is very close to Dennett’s way of thinking.

The seem to believe that p consciousness can be a property of the simulation—not as a property of the brain per se.

This is where the illusion talk comes from.
The counter argument of course is that even an illusion of p consciousness is hard to explain via physical mechanisms. They seem to believe that computation and simulation gets around this.

And this is why I say their view is akin to panpsychism or pan proto psychism, though they wouldn’t see it that way.

I took down my post above because I don't think I had the links rights, but this:


is a place to get commentary on the podcast where Bach makes the statement above. In the commentary on that part of the podcast, the author of this blog responds:

"CW – To say “The self is a model of what it would be like to be a person” seems to be circular reasoning. The self is already what it is like to be a person. If it were a model, then it would be a model of what it’s like to be a computer program with recursively binding (binding) states. Then the question becomes, why would such a model have any “what it’s like to be” properties at all? Until we can explain exactly how and why a phenomenal property is an improvement over the absence of a phenomenal property for a machine, there’s a big problem with assuming the role of consciousness or self as ‘model’ for unconscious mechanisms and conditions. Biological machines don’t need to model, they just need to behave in the ways that tend toward survival and reproduction."

And further down he comments on this phrase again:

"CW – I agree this is an improvement over the idea that physical systems are conscious. What would it mean for a ‘simulation’ to exist in the absence of consciousness though? A simulation implies some conscious audience which participates in believing or suspending disbelief in the reality of what is being presented. How would it be possible for a program to simulate part of itself as something other than another (invisible, unconscious) program?"
 
“A physical thing cannot experience anything. Only a simulation can. Physical things can implement simulations, however.“ Joscha Bach

1. only a simulation can experience anything (can have experiences)
2. a physical thing cannot, so simulations are not physical things
3. physical things can implement simulations
-can anything else implement simulations? this seems like a valid question since we have established things other than physical things (i.e. simulations, it seems possible there could be yet other things, so there could be other things that aren't physical (they cannot experience anything) but can implement simulations - or is it the case that there are only physical things and non-physical things that can be implemented by physical things, or are there other kinds of non-physical things (that cannot be implemented by the physical)?
4. how do physical things implement non-physical things?
5. no, that's all
 
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I took down my post above because I don't think I had the links rights, but this:


is a place to get commentary on the podcast where Bach makes the statement above. In the commentary on that part of the podcast, the author of this blog responds:

"CW – To say “The self is a model of what it would be like to be a person” seems to be circular reasoning. The self is already what it is like to be a person. If it were a model, then it would be a model of what it’s like to be a computer program with recursively binding (binding) states. Then the question becomes, why would such a model have any “what it’s like to be” properties at all? Until we can explain exactly how and why a phenomenal property is an improvement over the absence of a phenomenal property for a machine, there’s a big problem with assuming the role of consciousness or self as ‘model’ for unconscious mechanisms and conditions. Biological machines don’t need to model, they just need to behave in the ways that tend toward survival and reproduction."

And further down he comments on this phrase again:

"CW – I agree this is an improvement over the idea that physical systems are conscious. What would it mean for a ‘simulation’ to exist in the absence of consciousness though? A simulation implies some conscious audience which participates in believing or suspending disbelief in the reality of what is being presented. How would it be possible for a program to simulate part of itself as something other than another (invisible, unconscious) program?"

Steve, thanks for locating these blogs to help us understand [to the extent possible] what Joshua Bach and CW are on about. I'll read this second linked blog and follow the link embedded there to the first blog and will wait to see if I am persuaded that these hypotheses amount to more than a glass bead game.
 
Steve, thanks for locating these blogs to help us understand [to the extent possible] what Joshua Bach and CW are on about. I'll read this second linked blog and follow the link embedded there to the first blog and will wait to see if I am persuaded that these hypotheses amount to more than a glass bead game.

I haven't heard that term in a while! :)
 
I've read the first blog and wonder what @Soupie sees in Joshua Bach (except perhaps that he denies the nature/natural reality of consciousness and the MBP?). I find CW a much more interesting and prolific thinker. I suspect JB of being afflicted with a death wish.
 
I took down my post above because I don't think I had the links rights, but this:


is a place to get commentary on the podcast where Bach makes the statement above. In the commentary on that part of the podcast, the author of this blog responds:

"CW – To say “The self is a model of what it would be like to be a person” seems to be circular reasoning. The self is already what it is like to be a person. If it were a model, then it would be a model of what it’s like to be a computer program with recursively binding (binding) states. Then the question becomes, why would such a model have any “what it’s like to be” properties at all? Until we can explain exactly how and why a phenomenal property is an improvement over the absence of a phenomenal property for a machine, there’s a big problem with assuming the role of consciousness or self as ‘model’ for unconscious mechanisms and conditions. Biological machines don’t need to model, they just need to behave in the ways that tend toward survival and reproduction."

And further down he comments on this phrase again:

"CW – I agree this is an improvement over the idea that physical systems are conscious. What would it mean for a ‘simulation’ to exist in the absence of consciousness though? A simulation implies some conscious audience which participates in believing or suspending disbelief in the reality of what is being presented. How would it be possible for a program to simulate part of itself as something other than another (invisible, unconscious) program?"
I think we have to understand that “simulation” is a metaphor. It seems like CW is arguing about details of the metaphor.

But I do think that CW is exactly correct to ask why p consciousness should be a property of these simulations if non phenomenal simulations would work just as well.

Again, panpsychism.

The relationship between matter/mechanism is correlational, not causal.

People will continue banging their heads against the wall trying to discover a causal relation between matter and p consciousness.

Even though the the perspectival nature of the mbp is right under Bach’s nose, I don’t think he sees this. I will eventually attempt to ask him about it. Maybe he does see it but feels he has an answer for it.
 
The relationship between matter/mechanism is correlational, not causal.
That should be:

“the relationship between matter/mechanism and p consciousness is correlational, not causal.”

Ontologically they are identical. I’m not sure how best to articulate this so as not to confuse.
 
I've read the first blog and wonder what @Soupie sees in Joshua Bach (except perhaps that he denies the nature/natural reality of consciousness and the MBP?). I find CW a much more interesting and prolific thinker. I suspect JB of being afflicted with a death wish.
Constance, don’t get lost in the metaphors. Computation is a natural and even biological process. There are purely biological ways to frame this same idea, see Anil Seth.
there is nothing unnatural about the notion that consciousness is a simulation/model. It’s not too far off from the notion that all consciousness is intentional.
 
To say “The self is a model of what it would be like to be a person” seems to be circular reasoning. The self is already what it is like to be a person.
No one is saying that. They are saying that a self is a unified model of a person. And then yes, what it feels like to be a person is a self.
 
One could say that environmental stimuli X (em waves) correlates with conscious experience X1 (experience of green).

Or we could use a shortcut metaphor and say green experiences are how humans model em waves.
 
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