Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 11

[Pharoah]

Are you certain of that? It seems to me that a physicalist POV holds that properties supervene on the physical, not unlike the collapse of a wave function, and therefore in any given moment that a particular thing exists, it must be unique, even if there are other things elsewhere that are constructed identically.

Yes, it explains that particular things must be unique, (though I question whether their 'identical constuction' is mere appearance and a conclusion that conforms with our physicalist assumptions). So we can say (or conceive) that physics qualifies uniqueness, and that physics might say that there are and will be a trillion unique minds, explaining further that each mind will have a particular subjective view of an objective world. And this physical explanation might sit well with either monism or dualism. But....! it will not address WIIMANSE, that is, you will be none the wiser as to why your subjective world either exists at all, or exists with the content laden world that constitutes 'Usual Suspect'-in-particular.

 

[Pharoah]

So you've said multiple times without more than claiming that q fields are 'sentient'. Where is the evidence to persuade me, or us, that this is true?
My impression in your earlier arguments/claims for a monistic ontology was that you proposed that matter originates in mind//mind produces matter [or the illusion of matter?]. The question remains, now that it is 'sentience' you claim to be the sole ontological primitive, what is the evidence that 'sentience' is experienced in q fields and/or particles?

@Constance. it is not a view that has any evidence. It is an ideological position.
Everything is conscious. quarks have itches on their backs just like us humans... they just choose not to scratch them

 

[Randall]

Yes, it explains that particular things must be unique, (though I question whether their 'identical constuction' is mere appearance and a conclusion that conforms with our physicalist assumptions). So we can say (or conceive) that physics qualifies uniqueness, and that physics might say that there are and will be a trillion unique minds, explaining further that each mind will have a particular subjective view of an objective world. And this physical explanation might sit well with either monism or dualism. But....! it will not address WIIMANSE, that is, you will be none the wiser as to why your subjective world either exists at all, or exists with the content laden world that constitutes 'Usual Suspect'-in-particular.

I would need to review what you mean by WIIMANSE in order to respond specifically to that, and I don't see a recent link to it. In the meantime a point to consider is that "why type questions" are often as simple as cause and effect. The building blocks of the universe have assembled through the fundamental forces of nature and natural evolution in such a way that the result is a system that works and makes copies of itself. It seems fairly obvious that subjective experience plays an important role in that situation ( for us humans ). If we didn't have the subjective experience of beauty or pleasure, it would be doubtful that we'd nearly as interested in making any copies.

So we could say that why we have subjective experience is because it is the mechanism we evolved that moderates our agency in the world in way that contributes to our ongoing success at survival. Yes survival functions might be designed without any particular sense of subjective experience, but that's not what happened with us. We just do it this way because this is how we're made. It works pretty good too.

 

[Pharoah]

WIIMANSE why I am me and not someone else.
WIAMIP why I am me in particular
or
MM my mind... in exception to mind(s)

I would need to review what you mean by WIIMANSE in order to respond specifically to that, and I don't see a recent link to it. In the meantime a point to consider is that "why type questions" are often as simple as cause and effect. The building blocks of the universe have assembled through the fundamental forces of nature and natural evolution in such a way that the result is a system that works and makes copies of itself. It seems fairly obvious that subjective experience plays an important role in that situation ( for us humans ). If we didn't have the subjective experience of beauty or pleasure, it would be doubtful that we'd nearly as interested in making any copies.

So we could say that why we have subjective experience is because it is the mechanism we evolved that moderates our agency in the world in way that contributes to our ongoing success at survival. Yes survival functions might be designed without any particular sense of subjective experience, but that's not what happened with us. We just do it this way because this is how we're made. It works pretty good too.

I have no issue with what you say here... again you are talking about generalities. Subjective experience is a mechanism that, in general, makes for a positive survival contribution...

 

[smcder]

Footnote from Klaasen's paper:

4 Thus Nagel’s problem is not the same problem that I am adressing here (the problem of why I am me rather than someone else). Nagel is concerned with the problem that third-person descriptions of the world, that purport to be complete, in fact seem to leave something out, i.e. the fact of occupying a certain point of view. Nagel’s problem, I think, is essentially epistemological while the problem with which I am concerned is of a more metaphysical nature. The solution that Nagel proposes to his own problem is quite interesting. He says that in order to make our picture of the world complete, one must somehow succesfully integrate both the objective and subjective realms into a coherent whole. The solution he proposes is that an objective world conception can only be conceived by an Objective Self, i.e. a subject that is not tied to any point of view. Although I think Nagel’s solution has problems, I will not go into it. However, for a criticism of Nagel and an alternative solution see ‘The Sense of Identity’ by John Perry, [29]. See also Velleman’s essay ‘Self to Self’, [37]

Perry's paper is here:

http://john.jperry.net/cv/2002dSenseIdentity.pdf

 

[Soupie]

quarks have itches on their backs just like us humans...

No. Representational content emerges with life.

 

[smcder]

"Well... it's the only explanation I am really interested in. It is the deepest question of all and is what fuels all the others."

smcder: But when I ask what an answer to this question would look like:

QUOTE="Pharoah, post: 267824, member: 7275"]well... Lol there's a question. What is the point of the question? I mean... where are you going with it?[/QUOTE]

smcder: The point of the question is to try and sort if "explanation" is the right sort of thing to be after when faced with

"Why am I me and not someone else?"

If we don't know what such an explanation would look like, then can we ask any other questions, for example:

What would I know if I had an explanation?

Pharoah:
"But....! it will not address WIIMANSE, that is, you will be none the wiser as to why your subjective world either exists at all, or exists with thecontent laden world that constitutes 'Usual Suspect'-in-pparticular"

So we would be wiser as to why your subjective world either exists at all, or or exists with the particular content laden world that constitutes Pharoah-in-particular.

So then I ask what that wisdom would look like? What would you do with that knowing why? What would happen to all the other questions?

 

[smcder]

Pharoah
"I don't remember any philosoher saying they were trying to come up with an answer specifically to 'my' mind and 'my' body."

smcder Is that the work you are taking on and comparing to "Being and Time?"

@Soupie scoffed at trialism... mind-body-self: no mention of that daft suggestion by philsophers of yor.
Me... I think monism, dualism, trialism wrong. It makes sense to be an infinitist.

What is an infinitist? Is it that each thing, every thing is ontologically distinct?

 

[smcder]

I don't understand why not, given that most of what concerns us here are the innumerable variations in our time -- and in our species' philosophical, historical, and cultural histories -- of ideas concerning the nature of experience {what we experience} and the consequent multitude of interpretations of the nature of reality expressed in our species' history..

I'm not sure that "explanation" applies to particular selves, not in the same sense that we might look for an explanation of consciousness and an explanation of "self" generally. Pharoah says explaining these won't explain why he is the particular self he is- but what would such an explanation look like? What would it mean to explain why Pharaoh is the particular self he is and not someone else? What sort of why are we looking for?

What comes to mind is giving an account of one's particular self, for example in an existential sense. To me that's something different from the way "explanation" is used when we might hope for an explanation of consciousness and even self.

@Pharoah concludes:

Noumenal Consciousness | Phenomenal Experience | Personal Identity

"The phenomenon of our experience is the property we identify as consciousness, which is why a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience would seem to explain consciousness. However, the specificity of our conscious experience tells us, that following a reductive explanation of phenomenal experience, questions as to the exact nature of consciousness remain unanswered. We are still left with the question as to why each of us happens to be the individual we are, rather than anyone else. Nevertheless, the lack of observational reference does not prevent explorating quantum principles to explain the noumenon of consciousness."

In that sense, I would not expect there to be an (objective) explanation of why I am the particular self I am and not someone else.

 

[smcder]

In John Perry's:

The Sense of Identity

http://john.jperry.net/cv/2002dSenseIdentity.pdf

"Contemporary semantics ought to help us to understand what I think when I think "I am JP." It would thus provide the sense of identity, and illuminate the philosophical self. But it is not clear how it does so. The standard semantics for indexicals and names identifies the propositions expressed by "I am JP" with the necessarily true proposition expressed by "JP is JP"---a thought anyone can think truly (Kaplan, 1983). It identifies the proposition I express with "I am Napoleon," with the necessarily false proposition that JP is Napoleon. But that is not the proposition I am thinking when I imagine being Napoleon. Something seems to have been left out, after all. But from what has it been left out? Is there a side of the world left out, by thinking that all facts are objective? Or is a part of ourselves left out, when we take ourselves to be just flesh and blood persons with a perspective on the world? Or could it be something more boring ---- something left out of the semantics we have for understanding and describing our thought and language?"

 

[smcder]

I think Nagel articulates it as well as I could in 'a view from nowhere': paraphrasing him, he says (chapter 4) Physics can explain objectivity, it might in 400 years explain subjectivity... But that explanation will not explain the individual's subjectivity. Is that trialism?
I agree with Nagel. When I read Klaussen, I thought he did not understand Nagel in the way I do... and not many people have commented on Nagel's text. I think it's brilliant.
@Soupie, your idea of what consciousness is is so different to mine that the notion that I might interpret your mind-body-self comment in the instructive or meaningful way you intend seems doubtful to me. I would love you to write a comprehensive essay on your position so that I might understand more fully you view... because I get bits of it at a time.

Not many have commented on Nagel's text - do you mean The View from Nowhere?

Philpapers lists 558 citations of The View from Nowhere . A version of John Perry's essay appears in The View from Nowhere 1986.

 

[Soupie]

@smcder

Way off the current topic again, so bracket/ignore if needed.

I'm currently reading a book called "altered carbon" which includes the concept of changing bodies like an outfit. Bodies in such cases are referred to as sleeves. Obviously the story and concept are not without metaphysical problems but it is sci-fi and the book is solid so far. I recommend if interested in such things.

Anyhow in one excellent scene the protagonist experiences a kind of dissociation in which he feels like an observer in his body/sleeve. One might argue that this would be the default psychological position in such cases but in this fictional world it's something that happens to sleeve wearers from time to time.

Anyhow, my thoughts wandered to demon possession and the following passages:

Luke 11:24-26

24 “When an impure spirit comes out of a person, it goes through arid places seeking rest and does not find it. Then it says, ‘I will return to the house I left.’ 25 When it arrives, it finds the house swept clean and put in order.26 Then it goes and takes seven other spirits more wicked than itself, and they go in and live there. And the final condition of that person is worse than the first.”

Matthew 8:28-34

When he arrived at the other side in the region of the Gadarenes, two demon-possessed men coming from the tombs met him. They were so violent that no one could pass that way. 29 “What do you want with us, "Son of God?” they shouted. “Have you come here to torture us before the appointed time?”

30 Some distance from them a large herd of pigs was feeding. 31 The demons begged Jesus, “If you drive us out, send us into the herd of pigs.”

32 He said to them, “Go!” So they came out and went into the pigs, and the whole herd rushed down the steep bank into the lake and died in the water. 33 Those tending the pigs ran off, went into the town and reported all this, including what had happened to the demon-possessed men. 34 Then the whole town went out to meet Jesus. And when they saw him, they pleaded with him to leave their region.

---

I guess what interests me is the notions that demons are disembodied spirits and they appear to seek embodiment, be it in humans or swine.

If a human mind were uploaded to a computer/virtual world what would that mean if the CNS didn't receive the typical bombardment of environmental stimuli?

Humans obviously survive sensory deprivation float tanks but only for short periods of time and not without experiencing powerful hallucinations.

Anyhow, from the perspective of a story consumer/creator it's a fun idea to play with.

 

[Soupie]

@smcder

Sci-fi premise in which there are more disembodied minds than bodies and supply/demand fight over who gets them. Minds travel the universe looking for bodies.

Some minds are so large and powerful they posses/enjoy multiple bodies at once. Possessing entire species or planets. Etc etc

 

[smcder]

@smcder

Way off the current topic again, so bracket/ignore if needed.

I'm currently reading a book called "altered carbon" which includes the concept of changing bodies like an outfit. Bodies in such cases are referred to as sleeves. Obviously the story and concept are not without metaphysical problems but it is sci-fi and the book is solid so far. I recommend if interested in such things.

Anyhow in one excellent scene the protagonist experiences a kind of dissociation in which he feels like an observer in his body/sleeve. One might argue that this would be the default psychological position in such cases but in this fictional world it's something that happens to sleeve wearers from time to time.

Anyhow, my thoughts wandered to demon possession and the following passages:

Luke 11:24-26

24 “When an impure spirit comes out of a person, it goes through arid places seeking rest and does not find it. Then it says, ‘I will return to the house I left.’ 25 When it arrives, it finds the house swept clean and put in order.26 Then it goes and takes seven other spirits more wicked than itself, and they go in and live there. And the final condition of that person is worse than the first.”

Matthew 8:28-34

When he arrived at the other side in the region of the Gadarenes, two demon-possessed men coming from the tombs met him. They were so violent that no one could pass that way. 29 “What do you want with us, "Son of God?” they shouted. “Have you come here to torture us before the appointed time?”

30 Some distance from them a large herd of pigs was feeding. 31 The demons begged Jesus, “If you drive us out, send us into the herd of pigs.”

32 He said to them, “Go!” So they came out and went into the pigs, and the whole herd rushed down the steep bank into the lake and died in the water. 33 Those tending the pigs ran off, went into the town and reported all this, including what had happened to the demon-possessed men. 34 Then the whole town went out to meet Jesus. And when they saw him, they pleaded with him to leave their region.

---

I guess what interests me is the notions that demons are disembodied spirits and they appear to seek embodiment, be it in humans or swine.

If a human mind were uploaded to a computer/virtual world what would that mean if the CNS didn't receive the typical bombardment of environmental stimuli?

Humans obviously service sensory deprivation float tanks but only for short periods of time and not with experiencing powerful hallucinations.

Anyhow, from the perspective of a story consumer/creator it's a fun idea to play with.

I may comment more later, but I keep coming back to a scene in which a transfer is occurring and the transferer says "I am still here!" and the transferee says "I am over here!" at the same time - or they both say "shut it off!" - one claiming he is fading away and the other claiming he is becoming someone else suddenly - or someone is saying "I am here and over there!" -

fun for a fiction writer!

 

[Pharoah]

No. Representational content emerges with life.

Ok. In a world where representation is absent you are saying there is sentience. So what is sentience above and beyond content that is represented? I am guessing that sentience is a non-representational relation(ship) to (with) the world. Can you give a positive articulation of the nature of that relation(ship) in a way that makes me think 'sentience' is intuitively the 'right' kind of term?

 

[Pharoah]

"Well... it's the only explanation I am really interested in. It is the deepest question of all and is what fuels all the others."

smcder: But when I ask what an answer to this question would look like:

QUOTE="Pharoah, post: 267824, member: 7275"]well... Lol there's a question. What is the point of the question? I mean... where are you going with it?

smcder: The point of the question is to try and sort if "explanation" is the right sort of thing to be after when faced with

"Why am I me and not someone else?"

If we don't know what such an explanation would look like, then can we ask any other questions, for example:

What would I know if I had an explanation?

Pharoah:
"But....! it will not address WIIMANSE, that is, you will be none the wiser as to why your subjective world either exists at all, or exists with thecontent laden world that constitutes 'Usual Suspect'-in-pparticular"

So we would be wiser as to why your subjective world either exists at all, or or exists with the particular content laden world that constitutes Pharoah-in-particular.

So then I ask what that wisdom would look like? What would you do with that knowing why? What would happen to all the other questions?[/QUOTE]
My current view is that there is no attainable explanation, but imo it is the elephant in the room. It's consideration has bearing on how we should examine the MB problem.

smcder Is that the work you are taking on and comparing to "Being and Time?
What is an infinitist? Is it that each thing, every thing is ontologically distinct?

"Is thst the work you are taking on" Not really... just exploring with you and seeing where we end up:
Ie. infinitism. As with mathematics and the idea thst you can have numbers of kind and my view that this assumption might be wrong, so too might it be wrong that you can have numbers of minds. ie... concluding, there is no such thing as 'minds' and their kind. Altrnatvely, we can speculate that every physical state and every mind is unique, (for convenience only, we say there are such things as physical bodies and minds in general). But in truth the corrct model might be infinitism... maybe everything is ontologically distinct. Of course infinitism does not address WIAMANSE either! But thinking about the MB problem from the problem of WIAMANSE leads to this infinitist ideological stance and questions the mathematics (and therefore physics) paradigm... and I'm all for seeing where this might lead.

@smcder Will read the perry...
yes 'A view from nowhere'

 

[Pharoah]

ould be wiser as to why your subjective world either exists at all, or or exists with the particular content laden world that constitutes Pharoah-in-particular.

So then I ask what that wisdom would look like? What would you do with that knowing why? What would happen to all the other questions?

The wisdom would be to know God, or equivalent. Seeing the question, therefore, is to acknowledge that there might be God, or equivalent. Looking for an answer is to look for one's purpose within the context of all existence. I don't know what would happen to all other questions... they would go pooff in a puff of smoke I suspect and you would find yourself sitting in a white room with an old person in seated in a wheelchair watching CNN for developments

 

[Randall]

WIIMANSE why I am me and not someone else. WIAMIP why I am me in particular or MM my mind... in exception to mind(s)

Okay. Thanks. I don't see how the answer I gave doesn't work for you. WIIMANSE, WIAMIP, and MM are all about the uniqueness of your existence as a person ( or some aspect thereof ). Any particular thing that exists is by it's very nature not something else, and therefore must be unique unto itself. It's fairly simply really. Maybe you're reading too much into the question. Or maybe I'm still missing what you are trying to get at and need more help. Can you elaborate using some sort of example that is necessarily true, but also an exception to my answer, or alternately, illustrates how my answer doesn't apply contextually?

Example: Given Person A and Person B, is there a way that Person A = Person B? Demonstrate.

 

[smcder]

The wisdom would be to know God, or equivalent. Seeing the question, therefore, is to acknowledge that there might be God, or equivalent. Looking for an answer is to look for one's purpose within the context of all existence. I don't know what would happen to all other questions... they would go pooff in a puff of smoke I suspect and you would find yourself sitting in a white room with an old person in seated in a wheelchair watching CNN for developments

Dont you keep up??

God.... she watches Fox News.

 

[Soupie]

Ok. In a world where representation is absent you are saying there is sentience.

Yes, that is what i am saying.

So what is sentience above and beyond content that is represented?

Valid question.

Can you ... make me think 'sentience' is intuitively the 'right' kind of term?

No. It probably isnt the right kind of term. Ill try this one last time.

Lets start here: Tyler Burge, Perception: Where Mind Begins - PhilPapers

"What are the earliest beings that have minds in evolutionary order? Two marks of mind are consciousness and representation. I focus on representation. I distinguish a psychologically distinctive notion of representation from a family of notions, often called ‘representation’, that invoke information, causation, and/or function. The psychologically distinctive notion implies that a representational state has veridicality conditions as an aspect of its nature. Perception is the most primitive type of representational state. It is a natural psychological kind, recognized in a mature science: perceptual psychology. This kind involves a type of objectification, and is marked by perceptual constancies. The simplest animals known to exhibit perceptual constancies, perception, and representation in a distinctively psychological sense, are certain arthropods. Representational mind, or representational psychology, begins in the arthropods. We lack scientific knowledge about the beginnings of consciousness. Consciousness is neither necessary nor sufficient for perception. I conclude by reflecting on the kinds mind and psychology."

Okay? Representational content and p-consciousness are distinct. We have a science that can explain representation/perception, but cannot begin to explain p-consciousness, the hard problem.

So representation and p-consciousness are distinct. Lets circle back to your first question above. Yes, i am saying that in a world without rep content, there is p-consciousness (above referred to as sentience, as noted, not a good term).

What would p-consciousness be like if it werent in the form of a representation?

Fodor via @smcder:

Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 10

"The second is to ask whether consciousness is necessarily experiential. Consciousness obviously is a prerequisite for experience, but without the brain and nervous system, we have to ask what’s left of consciousness: either a destigmatized notion of “experience,” or no experience at all."

Two marks of mind are p-consciousness and perception via representation. We know nothing about p-consciousness. We know that p-consciousness is not necessary nor sufficient for perception.

Though the two are related in human minds, they are distinct.

So what is p-consciousness devoid of representational content? Its non-experiental or perhaps non-representational. It may have no "what it's like" in the sense we know that phrase.

Is the concept of non-experiential p-consciousness intuitve? Of course not. Can I prove that p-consciousness is the intrinsic nature of the physical, of quantum fields? No. But if materialist physicalism is true, then we are faced with the HP and we should be p-zombies.