Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 11

[Soupie]

Yes, that is the big point of contention, but I think a lot of that has to do with not being clear on the contextual nuances between the physical makeup of a structure and and the properties of the structure as a whole. For example, personality could in theory be nothing more than specific behavioral patterns run by sheer mechanical processes, and yet one would never be able to look at the mechanical processes under a microscope and see personality any more than we can see someone's consciousness by looking at brain cells.

1) I can observe someone's behavior.

2) You are not claiming that consciousness is brain cells. You are claiming that it is a field that literally emanates from our brains. We should, therefore, be able to observe this field.

So with consciousness it may be the case that the physical component is the various measurable EM fields associated with brain function, but that unless those particular fields belong to us, we cannot experience them as consciousness because they require an intimate coupling with a host brain. EM fields are very strange things when one tries to get a definitive grasp of what exactly they're made of. In the past I've posted a couple of videos that get into theories such as "virtual particles".

To me this idea seems to hold promise because of the work of Michael Persinger who has used EM fields to elicit various experiential phenomena in human test subjects.

I don't see what EM fields and consciousness (subjective experience) have in common at all.

If you are claiming that consciousness is in fact EM fields, that is one thing. It is quite another to suggest (as I understood you to be doing) that consciousness is a field emanating from the brain--like, but not identical to--EM fields emanating from a magnet.

If you are claiming that EM fields just are consciousness, why are you making that claim? How do you support it? To say that EM fields affect our subjective experience is certainly not evidence. We know that physically poking parts of the cortex radically effect our subjective experience as well.

Please clarify whether you are suggesting that EM fields are consciousness.

This is less mysterious than it seems. Just consider for a moment our various experiences resulting from sensory stimuli. Survival requires the our environment to be in a specific temperature range or else we'll either burn or freeze. Our experience of heat and cold guides us very efficiently to find a comfortably warm environment. Our experience of touch and taste help us to identify what is edible. Our experience of pleasure and beauty attracts us to our mates. The experience of consciousness makes very short work of identifying patterns that are useful for survival. These are all like shortcuts that would otherwise seem to require a whole other set of material processors to deal with as effectively. Consciousness is sort of like our brain's "virtual machine".

You need to read the relevant literature on overdetermination. To use your own example, if consciousness just is EM fields, then when subjective experience was doing work, it would look, to us observers, as if EM fields were doing work. Does that make sense?

But what you are suggesting is that consciousness itself is a field, like EM fields.

(Although now it seems like you are saying consciousness is EM fields. Please clarify.)

Not sure how I managed to impart to you that I think consciousness is a purely objective phenomena because I've consistently said that there are objective and subjective realities, and that the subjective ones represent our conscious experience. Perhaps you weren't seeing the contextual nuances I'd mentioned above. There is ( IMO ) a dualistic nature to consciousness, 1.) the physical nature and 2.) the experiential nature.
That seems self-evident. We might however someday be able to experience it subjectively .

Why can't brain activity be the physical nature of consciousness and subjective experience the experiential nature? Why include the added step (the double transduction) of a consciousness field emanating from the brain?

What does a Consciousness Field bring to the table that brain activity does not? That's my question for you.

You seem to be using "physiological" in the same sense as I'm using "physical", in which case there logically must be that aspect of consciousness. @marduk made that point quite some time ago and expressed it in a way that makes perfect sense ( to me anyway ). At the same time, there is an experiential context, which is the "what it's like" part of the phenomenon.

Of course. But then that begs the above question: why can't brain activity be the physical (objective) aspect and subjective experience be the "what it's like" aspect?

Why add the extra step of the strong emergence of a consciousness field?

As described in the way I look at fields earlier, consciousness as a field would encompass a region of influence and be subject to the physical conditions which facilitate its emergence. I wouldn't be surprised to find that it has some mathematically describable properties, like its strength being inversely proportional to the square of the distance from it's source, and that proximity to it's source is required for effective functioning.

So a consciousness field emanating from the brain which instantiated a tiny image of a tree would somehow influence the atoms/cells/neurons in the body? That's a very interesting idea but a mechanical nightmare.

Mental causation

It's one thing to say that this consciousness field would influence the body in the way that an EM field influences particles, but to try to flesh that out in any way is extremely messy. Care to try?

So I'm walking in the streets of NYC at night smoking a cigar. All my subjective experiences of this event are literally emanating from my brain in a consciousness field that follows me around, located roughly around my brain. How does this field influence my body? Can you give a mechanical example?

I guess that depends on how you're defining "brain activity". It seems to me that consciousness is as much a part of the system as a whole as it is a phenomenon unto itself. I don't have a problem accepting that. Lot's of systems are made up of interdependent parts and phenomena. Again I defer to the simple light bulb and electromagnet. Tired as you may be of those metaphors, they remain salient to the discussion because no counterpoint has yet been provided that nullifies their relevance to the question at hand ( only to certain individuals who are tired of hearing them . )

They're relevant only in the sense that you ask us to believe that consciousness is literally a field that emanates from the brain like an EM field emanates from a magnet. You haven't--in mechanical, objective, scientific terms--explained how subjective experience could be a field emanating from the brain nor how it could influence the body in very complex ways, much more complex than how an EM field influences a particle.

 

[marduk]

You seem to be using "physiological" in the same sense as I'm using "physical", in which case there logically must be that aspect of consciousness. @marduk made that point quite some time ago and expressed it in a way that makes perfect sense ( to me anyway ). At the same time, there is an experiential context, which is the "what it's like" part of the phenomenon.

I think at the end of the day you have to call the ball and ask yourself whether you're going to rely on inventing a whole new universe to answer the consciousness problem (dualism) or look at things like self-referential systems (a la "I Am A Strange Loop") as a potential explanation, which unfortunately relies on number theory, especially Godel, to begin to grok.

Me, I go for exploring the physical universe first as an explanation with a heavy dose of "The universe is under no obligation to make sense to you." (NDT).

The fact that consciousness doesn't make sense from a reductionist human perspective is entirely our problem, and not the physical universe's.

 

[smcder]

I think at the end of the day you have to call the ball and ask yourself whether you're going to rely on inventing a whole new universe to answer the consciousness problem (dualism) or look at things like self-referential systems (a la "I Am A Strange Loop") as a potential explanation, which unfortunately relies on number theory, especially Godel, to begin to grok.

Me, I go for exploring the physical universe first as an explanation with a heavy dose of "The universe is under no obligation to make sense to you." (NDT).

The fact that consciousness doesn't make sense from a reductionist human perspective is entirely our problem, and not the physical universe's.

That's Colin McGinn's take under the labels "cognitive closure" or "New Mysterianism" - and not just consciousness ... posted in several places on the threads, I'll see if I can link.

http://www.chadpearce.com/Home/BOOKS/112327702-Am-a-Strange-Loop-Douglas-R-Hofstadter.pdf

 

[Soupie]

Searle on perception. Starts off with a bang. Addresses the direct/naive realism issue we were discussing a few months ago.

He makes the same point that i did, interestingly, that one of the confusions lies in saying that we "see" the mental image in our brain/mind. Rather, we see the object 'out there' and the mental image in the brain/mind is the seeing.

I haven't finished the lecture but I certainly hope there's something more to the difference between indirect and direct realism than semantics. So far I haven't found anything. That seems to be the only difference.

 

[Randall]

1) Please clarify whether you are suggesting that EM fields are consciousness.

I'm suggesting that the physical makeup of consciousness could be an EM field associated with a functioning brain, and that lab experiments with EM fields and the brain appear to lend weight to the theory.

You need to read the relevant literature on overdetermination. To use your own example, if consciousness just is EM fields, then when subjective experience was doing work, it would look, to us observers, as if EM fields were doing work. Does that make sense?

I don't think overdetermination as described in the link you posted is relevant as its premise cannot be determined to be valid. Specifically, all the observed effects of brain function ( including consciousness ) appear to require all the known causes in order to manifest. I don't know of any that can be removed without either impairing or completely losing function.

But what you are suggesting is that consciousness itself is a field, like EM fields. (Although now it seems like you are saying consciousness is EM fields. Please clarify.)

I'm suggesting that the physical makeup of consciousness could be an EM field associated with a functioning brain, and that lab experiments with EM fields and the brain appear to lend weight to the theory.

Why can't brain activity be the physical nature of consciousness and subjective experience the experiential nature?

I think that's exactly what is happening.

Why include the added step (the double transduction) of a consciousness field emanating from the brain?

Again, the concept of "double transduction" as described previously is faulty because it's an assumption about the way something is deemed should be as opposed to the way things are. The way it actually is, is that sensory stimuli are "transduced" to the cellular level ( "transduction" 1 ) then transduced to electrical signals ( "transduction" 2 ) which become chemical signals ( "transduction" 3 ) that are then received by adjacent neurons and reconverted to electrical signals ( "transduction" 4 ), and then this happen billions of times.

Ideas like "double transduction" and "overdetermination" as the links describe them are interesting, but don't really mirror what's actually going on.

What does a Consciousness Field bring to the table that brain activity does not? That's my question for you.

That question assumes that a "consciousness field" is not part of "brain activity". I'm suggesting that it is a perfectly normal part of a functioning brain, and evidence suggests that when that field is disrupted that it has corresponding effects on consciousness as experienced by participants in controlled lab experiments.

Of course. But then that begs the above question: why can't brain activity be the physical (objective) aspect and subjective experience be the "what it's like" aspect?

Exactly. Context is everything.

Why add the extra step of the strong emergence of a consciousness field?

I don't think it's a matter of "adding an extra step". I think all the steps are already inherent in the existing function, and that the result is a bonus third phenomenon that is very useful.

So a consciousness field emanating from the brain which instantiated a tiny image of a tree would somehow influence the atoms/cells/neurons in the body? That's a very interesting idea but a mechanical nightmare. Mental causation

It's one thing to say that this consciousness field would influence the body in the way that an EM field influences particles, but to try to flesh that out in any way is extremely messy. Care to try?

My thinking is that a consciousness field is actually a much more elegant and efficient solution than a purely mechanical ( cellular ) system, e.g. an electronic digital watch has far fewer moving parts and is more accurate.

So I'm walking in the streets of NYC at night smoking a cigar. All my subjective experiences of this event are literally emanating from my brain in a consciousness field that follows me around, located roughly around my brain. How does this field influence my body? Can you give a mechanical example?

The idea would be that perceptual experiences resonate with the neural correlates of similar past experiences, which evokes those memories, thereby providing cues for appropriate behavior ( when the orange hand appears on the walk light it means don't cross the street ).

They're relevant only in the sense that you ask us to believe that consciousness is literally a field that emanates from the brain like an EM field emanates from a magnet. You haven't--in mechanical, objective, scientific terms--explained how subjective experience could be a field emanating from the brain nor how it could influence the body in very complex ways, much more complex than how an EM field influences a particle.

I'm neither asking anyone to believe consciousness ( the physical objective part ) is a field akin to, if not a type of EM field, nor am I claiming to have explained it in any detail. I simply offered it for consideration, pointed to the evidence of others who have studied it far more than I have, considered the alternatives I've been exposed to, and think it's the best theory I've run across so far because to me it seems to fit the situation and doesn't appear to violate any logic or invoke magical nonsense. But if something better comes up I'm fine with that. It's just that I've yet to see it.

 

[Soupie]

I'm suggesting that the physical makeup of consciousness could be an EM field associated with a functioning brain, and that lab experiments with EM fields and the brain appear to lend weight to the theory.

1) Okay, this is vastly different than the claim that consciousness represents the emergence of something ontologically new in nature. Claiming that consciousness just is EM fields is a very different claim indeed. However, making this claim brings you square up against the hard problem, which I am certainly not going to rehash here. So, by claiming consciousness just is EM fields, you avoid the problems of overdetermination and mental causation, but you have to resolve the HP. :shrug:

2) I'm aware of experiments which indicate that exogenous EM fields can impact subjective experience and endogenous EM fields, but I've seen nothing to suggest that consciousness is an EM field.

I don't think overdetermination as described in the link you posted is relevant as its premise cannot be determined to be valid. Specifically, all the observed effects of brain function ( including consciousness ) appear to require all the known causes in order to manifest. I don't know of any that can be removed without either impairing or completely losing function.

I was under the impression that you were claiming that consciousness was an ontologically new phenomena known as a 'consciousness field.' In this case, the much tamer claim that consciousness just is EM fields would not evoke overdetermination in the ontological sense. EM fields are physical and their effects can clearly be observed objectively.

Again, the concept of "double transduction" as described previously is faulty because it's an assumption about the way something is deemed should be as opposed to the way things are. The way it actually is, is that sensory stimuli are "transduced" to the cellular level ( "transduction" 1 ) then transduced to electrical signals ( "transduction" 2 ) which become chemical signals ( "transduction" 3 ) that are then received by adjacent neurons and reconverted to electrical signals ( "transduction" 4 ), and then this happen billions of times.

Ideas like "double transduction" and "overdetermination" as the links describe them are interesting, but don't really mirror what's actually going on.

As noted, the double transduction--as Dennett intended it--refers to a transduction from neural spike trains to some special, consciousness substrate. However, I think Dennett would still quibble--at least I would--with your claim that a transduction to an EM field is necessary.

Although you haven't made this claim, I think the best paradigm for conceptualizing the subjective, phenomenal field is as a unified 'representation' of the organism's non-unified environment. According to the Electromagnetic theories of consciousness Wikipedia page, that's what one theorist suggests the EM field does, carries representations:

"McFadden has proposed that the brain's electromagnetic field creates a representation of the information in the neurons."

I would guess, based on reading Dennett's work--and the work of many neuroscientists--that they would argue that neural spike trains are sufficiently robust and flexible enough to be the carrier of said representations.

However, one relevant aspect of fields that I was curious whether you'd mention is their apparent property of being unified or continuous. This apparent 'wholeness' of fields, of course, could be relevant to the combination problem. From the same wikipedia page:

"This field representation is in this theory argued to integrate parts into a whole that has meaning, so a face is not seen as a random collection of features, but as somebody's face. The integration of information in the field is also suggested to resolve the binding/combination problem."

Personally, I think that is the most interesting, compelling aspect of this idea. However, although I recognize that the combination problem does need to be addressed, I personally think it is one problem of consciousness that further scientific discovery could resolve. And although fields--especially quantum fields--do seem to display a mysterious unification (see quantum collapse), everything is made of quantum fields, including neurons.

Thus, if subjective experience is 'representations" of the environment, I think that neural spikes are robust and flexible enough to be their carrier; I think looking to EM fields as the actual carrier of said representations is unnecessary. Of course I wouldn't rule it out.

My thinking is that a consciousness field is actually a much more elegant and efficient solution than a purely mechanical ( cellular ) system, e.g. an electronic digital watch has far fewer moving parts and is more accurate.

Here you may be getting at the notion that subjective experience consists of unified 'representations' of non-unified environment stimuli. If so, I agreed. The question is whether 'unified', synchronous neural spike trains can be the carrier of these representations or whether an additional medium (EM fields) is necessary.

The idea would be that perceptual experiences resonate with the neural correlates of similar past experiences, which evokes those memories, thereby providing cues for appropriate behavior ( when the orange hand appears on the walk light it means don't cross the street ).

Resonate? Cue? I'm not sure how the EM field resonates and cues neurons. From wiki:

"Neurons generate patterns in the EM field, which in turn modulate the firing of particular neurons."

Sounds kind of hand-wavy to me. Is there any research or evidence that this happens in any meaningful way? You mentioned evidence that exogenous EM fields effect that brain and subjective experience. But is there any evidence that endogenous EM fields are an integral part of human behavior? I know I shared (maybe a few years ago) that the EM field of a neuron can influence neighboring neurons. But that's a far cry from evidence that EM fields influence neurons in the way you are suggesting.

But the mechanics of the brain are certainly not fully understood. It very well could be that EM fields generated by neurons play a greater role than is currently understood.

 

[smcder]

[email protected]

 

[Randall]

1) ... Resonate? Cue? I'm not sure how the EM field resonates and cues neurons. From wiki:

"Neurons generate patterns in the EM field, which in turn modulate the firing of particular neurons."

Sounds kind of hand-wavy to me. Is there any research or evidence that this happens in any meaningful way? You mentioned evidence that exogenous EM fields effect that brain and subjective experience. But is there any evidence that endogenous EM fields are an integral part of human behavior? I know I shared (maybe a few years ago) that the EM field of a neuron can influence neighboring neurons. But that's a far cry from evidence that EM fields influence neurons in the way you are suggesting.

We know there are endogenous EM fields. That's how we know there are "spike trains". However as mentioned previously, they aren't the whole picture. The communication between synapses doesn't work like a spark plug. There are chemical neurotransmitters involved. Together the various parts form a network of neural sets of different shapes and consequently of different shaped EM fields, and the location of these neural sets directly corresponds to specific brain functions including experiences. And then there's Persinger's experiments with externally applied EM fields, so I'm not sure what more evidence is needed to suggest that we're on the right track there. I'll grant that it could all be a misinterpretation, but it seems to be the best we've got so far. The upshot is that consciousness may require very specific materials and conditions such that only a living biological brain meets the criteria. Microprocessors therefore might be computationally powerful, but incapable of giving rise to consciousness.

But the mechanics of the brain are certainly not fully understood. It very well could be that EM fields generated by neurons play a greater role than is currently understood.

Fair enough. Now I also see how the way I've been referring to the idea has led to confusion. To clarify, light and magnetism are both EM fields, and consequently of the same fundamental physical nature, yet very different in the way that makes them unique as phenomena. The evidence suggests ( to me ) that consciousness is yet another manifestation of such fields. That is why I say it's "like light" or "like magnetism" but it's not a "light field" or a "magnetic field" . You nailed it when you said a "consciousness field". So an EM phenomena with the property of subjective experience rather than simply magnetic attraction or photonic radiation.

Or maybe consciousness is something else altogether, but if so, all that seems to do is kick the same can further down the road.

 

[Soupie]

I'll grant that it could all be a misinterpretation, but it seems to be the best we've got so far.

In May of this year, Christof Koch published an article on nature.com which arguably presented the state of the art knowledge of neuroscience and consciousness:

What Is Consciousness?

"More illuminating are two clinical sources of causal evidence: electrical stimulation of cortical tissue and the study of patients following the loss of specific regions caused by injury or disease. Before removing a brain tumor or the locus of a patient’s epileptic seizures, for example, neurosurgeons map the functions of nearby cortical tissue by directly stimulating it with electrodes. Stimulating the posterior hot zone can trigger a diversity of distinct sensations and feelings. These could be flashes of light, geometric shapes, distortions of faces, auditory or visual hallucinations, a feeling of familiarity or unreality, the urge to move a specific limb, and so on. Stimulating the front of the cortex is a different matter: by and large, it elicits no direct experience.

A second source of insights are neurological patients from the first half of the 20th century. Surgeons sometimes had to excise a large belt of prefrontal cortex to remove tumors or to ameliorate epileptic seizures. What is remarkable is how unremarkable these patients appeared. The loss of a portion of the frontal lobe did have certain deleterious effects: the patients developed a lack of inhibition of inappropriate emotions or actions, motor deficits, or uncontrollable repetition of specific action or words. Following the operation, however, their personality and IQ improved, and they went on to live for many more years, with no evidence that the drastic removal of frontal tissue significantly affected their conscious experience. Conversely, removal of even small regions of the posterior cortex, where the hot zone resides, can lead to a loss of entire classes of conscious content: patients are unable to recognize faces or to see motion, color or space.

So it appears that the sights, sounds and other sensations of life as we experience it are generated by regions within the posterior cortex. As far as we can tell, almost all conscious experiences have their origin there. What is the crucial difference between these posterior regions and much of the prefrontal cortex, which does not directly contribute to subjective content? The truth is that we do not know. Even so—and excitingly—a recent finding indicates that neuroscientists may be getting closer."

It seems that your humble declaration that the electromagnetic theory of consciousness is the best we've got is lost on mainstream researchers. The idea that the EM fields generated by this cortical tissue might actually be consciousness seems lost on the mainstream.

So an EM phenomena with the property of subjective experience rather than simply magnetic attraction or photonic radiation.

ok, but for the last time (I promise (to myself)), subjective experience is categorically different than magnetic attraction and photonic radiation. Hence, the hard problem.

 

[smcder]

In May of this year, Christof Koch published an article on nature.com which arguably presented the state of the art knowledge of neuroscience and consciousness:

What Is Consciousness?

"More illuminating are two clinical sources of causal evidence: electrical stimulation of cortical tissue and the study of patients following the loss of specific regions caused by injury or disease. Before removing a brain tumor or the locus of a patient’s epileptic seizures, for example, neurosurgeons map the functions of nearby cortical tissue by directly stimulating it with electrodes. Stimulating the posterior hot zone can trigger a diversity of distinct sensations and feelings. These could be flashes of light, geometric shapes, distortions of faces, auditory or visual hallucinations, a feeling of familiarity or unreality, the urge to move a specific limb, and so on. Stimulating the front of the cortex is a different matter: by and large, it elicits no direct experience.

A second source of insights are neurological patients from the first half of the 20th century. Surgeons sometimes had to excise a large belt of prefrontal cortex to remove tumors or to ameliorate epileptic seizures. What is remarkable is how unremarkable these patients appeared. The loss of a portion of the frontal lobe did have certain deleterious effects: the patients developed a lack of inhibition of inappropriate emotions or actions, motor deficits, or uncontrollable repetition of specific action or words. Following the operation, however, their personality and IQ improved, and they went on to live for many more years, with no evidence that the drastic removal of frontal tissue significantly affected their conscious experience. Conversely, removal of even small regions of the posterior cortex, where the hot zone resides, can lead to a loss of entire classes of conscious content: patients are unable to recognize faces or to see motion, color or space.

So it appears that the sights, sounds and other sensations of life as we experience it are generated by regions within the posterior cortex. As far as we can tell, almost all conscious experiences have their origin there. What is the crucial difference between these posterior regions and much of the prefrontal cortex, which does not directly contribute to subjective content? The truth is that we do not know. Even so—and excitingly—a recent finding indicates that neuroscientists may be getting closer."

It seems that your humble declaration that the electromagnetic theory of consciousness is the best we've got is lost on mainstream researchers. The idea that the EM fields generated by this cortical tissue might actually be consciousness seems lost on the mainstream.

ok, but for the last time (I promise (to myself)), subjective experience is categorically different than magnetic attraction and photonic radiation. Hence, the hard problem.

"subjective experience is categorically different than magnetic attraction and photonic radiation. Hence, the hard problem."

Yep yep.

"David Chalmers[22] argues that quantum theories of consciousness suffer from the same weakness as more conventional theories. Just as he argues that there is no particular reason why particular macroscopic physical features in the brain should give rise to consciousness, he also thinks that there is no particular reason why a particular quantum feature, such as the EM field in the brain, should give rise to consciousness either."

 

[Soupie]

"subjective experience is categorically different than magnetic attraction and photonic radiation. Hence, the hard problem."

Yep yep.

"David Chalmers[22] argues that quantum theories of consciousness suffer from the same weakness as more conventional theories. Just as he argues that there is no particular reason why particular macroscopic physical features in the brain should give rise to consciousness, he also thinks that there is no particular reason why a particular quantum feature, such as the EM field in the brain, should give rise to consciousness either."

Yes, not to pile on—because we need to pursue all avenues and all avenues are not without their problems—but 1) as Chalmers points out, the HP applies just as well to EM theories, and 2) positing that neuron-generated EM fields happen to have the property of subjective experience is not explanatory. So, is it really a theory of consciousness? Or mere can kicking?

That's why I've been asking @USI Calgary why he thinks EM fields are consciousness. I suggested their seeming property of wholeness which seems to be a property of subjective experience.

Is the fact that EM fields are generated by neurons and the (not uncontested) notion that subjective experience is 'generated' by neurons the catalyst for this idea?

 

[smcder]

Yes, not to pile on—because we need to pursue all avenues and all avenues are not without their problems—but 1) as Chalmers points out, the HP applies just as well to EM theories, and 2) positing that neuron-generated EM fields happen to have the property of subjective experience is not explanatory. So, is it really a theory of consciousness? Or mere can kicking?

That's why I've been asking @USI Calgary why he thinks EM fields are consciousness. I suggested their seeming property of wholeness which seems to be a property of subjective experience.

Is the fact that EM fields are generated by neurons and the (not uncontested) notion that subjective experience is 'generated' by neurons the catalyst for this idea?

What do we know about neurons and EM fields?

 

[smcder]

https://www.cell.com/neuron/abstract/S0896-6273(10)00520-9?code=cell-site

July, 2010

 

[smcder]

https://www.quora.com/Does-the-brain-use-electricity-to-operate-and-form-thoughts

 

[Randall]

In May of this year, Christof Koch published an article on nature.com which arguably presented the state of the art knowledge of neuroscience and consciousness: What Is Consciousness?

Good article. Thanks for posting it.

It seems that your humble declaration that the electromagnetic theory of consciousness is the best we've got is lost on mainstream researchers. The idea that the EM fields generated by this cortical tissue might actually be consciousness seems lost on the mainstream.

Then again they do say in the article,

"If, at the same time, you are lying inside a magnetic scanner that registers brain activity, experimenters will find that a broad set of cortical regions, collectively known as the posterior hot zone, is active. These are the parietal, occipital and temporal regions in the posterior part of cortex [see box on opposite page] that play the most significant role in tracking what we see." ​

Therefore if what they are measuring are EM fields directly associated with a perceptual experience, it seems that it's not entirely "lost on them" but just not being discussed specifically in the same context in that article, which may or may not be "mainstream" depending on how one interprets that qualifier. Here's only one paper of many search results that talk about theories involving EMF:

• http://www.theplasmaverse.com/pdfs/...mation-cemi-field-theory-johnjoe-mcfadden.pdf

So the idea isn't "mine" or even revolutionary. I just happened to come up with the same sort of ideas about it as some other real researchers out there who also take the role EMF may play in consciousness seriously. A couple more links to consider:

• Electromagnetic fields as structure-function zeitgebers in biological systems: environmental orchestrations of morphogenesis and consciousness
• Michael Persinger and the Extended Mind
• This Is Your Brain on God

ok, but for the last time (I promise (to myself)), subjective experience is categorically different than magnetic attraction and photonic radiation. Hence, the hard problem.

No need to repeat yourself as that has been taken for granted from the start. What you call "categorically different" I usually call "contextually different", which amounts to almost the same thing in that the "categories" are 1.) the objective, and 2.) the subjective. The EM field is the objective context, while the experience ( what it's like ) is the subjective component, which I've referred to as a "property".

 

[smcder]

The peculiar philosophical assumptions of Daniel Dennett

"Dennett likes to present his views as forced on us by science. If only we would free ourselves from outmoded myths, and open ourselves to the latest discoveries, he repeatedly assures us, we would be able to see things as he and his scientific allies do. Readers should be wary of this rhetoric. In truth Dennett’s distinctive views are by no means common currency among the scientific experts. Most cognitive scientists have no doubt that consciousness is real, and most social scientists accept that advanced human culture rests crucially on means-end understanding. This is not to say that Dennett’s theses are pulled out of thin air. They have the backing of a developed theoretical framework. But this framework owes far more to Dennett’s long-standing philosophical commitments than to his familiarity with the latest science."

 

[Soupie]

The peculiar philosophical assumptions of Daniel Dennett

"Dennett likes to present his views as forced on us by science. If only we would free ourselves from outmoded myths, and open ourselves to the latest discoveries, he repeatedly assures us, we would be able to see things as he and his scientific allies do. Readers should be wary of this rhetoric. In truth Dennett’s distinctive views are by no means common currency among the scientific experts. Most cognitive scientists have no doubt that consciousness is real, and most social scientists accept that advanced human culture rests crucially on means-end understanding. This is not to say that Dennett’s theses are pulled out of thin air. They have the backing of a developed theoretical framework. But this framework owes far more to Dennett’s long-standing philosophical commitments than to his familiarity with the latest science."

Its never been clear to me exactly what is meant by Dennett denying that consciousness is real. Everytime ive tried to suss it out, I come away with the idea that he is 'merely' saying its not real in the sense that its not some ontologically new, non-physical substance that emerges from the brain.

Would most other cogsci agree or disagree with that, I honestly dont know. When Koch above for example says subjective experiences is 'generated' by the brain, is he implying that subjective experience oozes from the brain like, er, well, you know.

For some reason, i do have this notion that the majority of cogsci people think consciousness is emergent but epiphenomenal. Having said that, ive interacted with a few on twitter and blogs, and they seem to either dismiss the HP or be unaware of it. So it would be a weak emergence they favor. Which on my reading of dennett is not really different.

 

[smcder]

Its never been clear to me exactly what is meant by Dennett denying that consciousness is real. Everytime ive tried to suss it out, I come away with the idea that he is 'merely' saying its not real in the sense that its not some ontologically new, non-physical substance that emerges from the brain.

Would most other cogsci agree or disagree with that, I honestly dont know. When Koch above for example says subjective experiences is 'generated' by the brain, is he implying that subjective experience oozes from the brain like, er, well, you know.

For some reason, i do have this notion that the majority of cogsci people think consciousness is emergent but epiphenomenal. Having said that, ive interacted with a few on twitter and blogs, and they seem to either dismiss the HP or be unaware of it. So it would be a weak emergence they favor. Which on my reading of dennett is not really different.

https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/

https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/04/03/magic-illusions-and-zombies-an-exchange/

 

[Soupie]

@Pharoah

http://www.jp.philo.at/texte/LimbeckC1.pdf

 

[Soupie]

https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/

https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/04/03/magic-illusions-and-zombies-an-exchange/

"I don’t deny the existence of consciousness; of course, consciousness exists; it just isn’t what most people think it is, as I have said many times."

"No, we Deniers do not say this. We say that there isn’t any conscious experience in the sense that Strawson insists upon. We say consciousness seems (to many who reflect upon the point) to involve being “directly acquainted,” as Strawson puts it, with some fundamental properties (“qualia”), but this is an illusion, a philosopher’s illusion."

"The idea that there is something like a ‘phenomenal field’ of ‘phenomenal properties’ in addition to the informational/functional properties accommodated by my theory” of consciousness “is shown to be a multi-faceted illusion, an artifact of bad theorizing,” he wrote in a 1993 essay..."

Again, what Dennett seems to be saying —whether right or wrong—is that the phenomena of consciousness exists, but not as something ontologically new or distinct from physical goings-on in nature. Thus, the fact that subjective experience seems to consist of some 'phenomenal' substrate such as qualia is an 'illusion." Even the sense that subjective experience is constitiuted by a 'phenomenal field' is a 'sense,' not a reality i.e. there isnt really a field emenating from the brain.

This is why Ive said Dennett is a naive Real Materialst/Panpsychist or is just doesnt grok the HP. If he thinks that neural spike trains can carry 'phenomenal' representations such as green, then he either 1) thinks neurons/matter have fundamental, 'phenomenal' properties allowing phenomenal green to weakly emerge with neural function and doesnt know it, or 2) he simply doesnt grok the HP—i.e. why it is problematic to say phenomenal green emerges with neural activity.

He obviously doesnt subscribe to (1). He seems to believe that non-phenomenal processes (neural spike trains) can indeed give rise to the subjective experience of (phenomenal) green. He doesn't seem to think this is problematic. Thus, one has to wonder if he groks the HP.

On the one hand, i can kind of follow his logic. For ex:

We can represent 3D on a 2D piece of paper. Look at any normal photograph and it looks three dimensional...but its not, really. The 2D photo exists of course (consciousness) but its not really 3D (phenomenal/qualia).

The problem with the HP is that phenomenal properties seem* to be categorically different than all other properties. Its hard to see how phenomenal properties could be represented by a non-phenomenal substrate (matter).

*And I suppose Dennett is challenging this very seeming.**

**As has been pointed out, its hard to see how even the seeming of phenomenal properties could be carried by non-phenomenal substrate.