Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 11

[smcder]

>> direct awareness

I would say my view is 'direct' in the sense that there is no intermediary between the object perceived and the perceiver/perception. For instance, I wouldn't say we perceive internal representations or sense data.

>> realist

I would say my view is 'realist' in the sense that the 'objects' we perceive are real, concrete, and perception-independent.

As far as the claim that we perceive reality "pretty much as it is" which is often found with definitions of direct/naive realism—this is where my view would depart from direct realism. I don't see how anyone could support this view.

I think "things as they are" (in themselves) is a confusion. Can you further the concept for us?

"As they are for us" is marginally better and can be expanded as @Constance says by situating our perceptions evolutionarily and phenomenologically. For our purposes and from our perspective - our perceptions are accurate. When was the last time an apple bit you instead of a snake? ;-)

We can expand and confirm our perceptions to a degree with our science and scientific and cognitive instruments.

An apple may not look like an apple under a microscope or via infrared light...but again, it's not going to bite us.

Tomatoes...on the other hand:

 

[smcder]

A sampling of criticism:

Thing-in-itself - Wikipedia

 

[Soupie]

First you said "materialist" this time you say "direct awareness" ... do you mean "direct realism"?

I did mean materialist in the first instance. The "direct awareness" was a quote from the definition you posted in the second instance.

I think "things as they are" (in themselves) is a confusion. Can you further the concept for us?

The phrase was "pretty much as it is." I did not mean in-itself or intrinsically in this case, but of course that is relevant too. Meaning, I don't think we see reality pretty much as it is extrinsically nor do we see it pretty much as it is intrinsically!

On my view we perceive reality in a way that is adaptive for us. That's it.

"As they are for us" is marginally better and can be expanded as @Constance says by situating our perceptions evolutionarily and phenomenologically. For our purposes and from our perspective - our perceptions are accurate. When was the last time an apple bit you instead of a snake? ;-)

We can expand and confirm our perceptions to a degree with our science and scientific and cognitive instruments.

An apple may not look like an apple under a microscope or via infrared light...but again, it's not going to bite us.

Tomatoes...on the other hand:

 

[smcder]

"Meaning, I don't think we see reality pretty much as it is extrinsically nor do we see it pretty much as it is intrinsically!"

Remember Plantinga's defeater of Naturalism?

 

[smcder]

In a way that is adaptive for us...yes...
but "us" is... ("we is") of that Reality, not alien to it ... we are in this world and OF this world ... we are inter-adaptive. We are adapter and adaptee. Things as they are is who we are where we come from, so "adaptive for us" is something vast.

Now that doesn't mean we "perceive" things as they are...but then our conceptions must be flawed as they are built on perceptions that are merely (as you think of it, merely) "adaptive". And
our conceptions themselves are merely adaptive...and this applies to your line of reasoning above, too! It's merely adaptive to think that we only see reality in a way that's adaptive for us!
---
'That's (roughly) the defeater.

But if we perceive reality (more or less) as it is...and that's also adaptive, then we can trust our perceptions and conceptions and we can proceed and not be surprised when one confirms the other as I think it does.

 

[smcder]

Now "pretty much as it is" covers a range...we've seen Newton give way to Einstein give way to Bohr and yet we haven't. Newtonian physics is "pretty much" the way reality works and the same on for Einstein, QM...

But I think the position you claim is something far from what even this generous interpretation of "pretty much as it is" allows.

 

[Pharoah]

>> How can we say there is such a thing as color in-itself

When we have a waking experience of perceiving color, the assumption is that there is something in our environment that we are perceiving.

The problem with saying that we are directly perceiving color when we have a waking experience of perceiving color, is that there will always be a difference between the perception/perceiver and the thing being perceived. In my way of thinking, therefore, I consider perception to be indirect by default.

However as I think we've covered in the past a la Strawson, because perception can't be any more direct than the above account (X and X1) some people refer to that as direct realism/perception.

>>Without perception and awareness in living beings, there would be neither experience of nor concepts of 'color'.

I agree with this 100%. So the question is, sans living things and their properties of perception and awareness, what is color?

It is a physical property with no phenomenal character that any existing thing is conscious of. Ie the conscious phenomenon of ‘color’ experience does not exist

 

[Pharoah]

"If Putnam has any writing on direct realism, I'd be happy to read."

LMGTFY

Wow. That’s amazing. @smcder. Howdyou do that?!

 

[Pharoah]

http://www.naturalthinker.net/trl/t...ll, Bertrand - The Problems of Philosophy.pdf
chapter 1

 

[Soupie]

Wow. That’s amazing. @smcder. Howdyou do that?!

LMGTFY

 

[Soupie]

http://www.naturalthinker.net/trl/texts/Russell,Bertrand/Philosophy/(ebook - pdf - Philosophy) Russell, Bertrand - The Problems of Philosophy.pdf
chapter 1

Beautiful.

 

[Soupie]

It is a physical property with no phenomenal character that any existing thing is conscious of. Ie the conscious phenomenon of ‘color’ experience does not exist

This is a response to the question posed below, I believe.

>> So the question is, sans living things and their properties of perception and awareness, what is color?

 

[Soupie]

Now "pretty much as it is" covers a range...we've seen Newton give way to Einstein give way to Bohr and yet we haven't. Newtonian physics is "pretty much" the way reality works and the same on for Einstein, QM...

But I think the position you claim is something far from what even this generous interpretation of "pretty much as it is" allows.

When it comes to PMAII, I'm referring strictly to perception. Not scientific models. Although drawing a firm line between perception and conception will be impossible of course.

So when it comes to perception pmaii does cover a range. For instance:



Normal vision and thermal vision are both ways of perceiving reality. if you're like me, youall find yourself thinking "sure but reality really is like the image on the left."

Is it really?

The way I think of perceiving reality pmaii, is that there is quite a bit to reality that we simply don't perceive, and that which we do perceive may be in a modality and potentially have a phenomenal/qualitative character that differs from other perceiving organisms.

Re modality: whereas some organisms may taste certain chemicals, we may smell them. Whereas some organisms may feel an object, we may see it. Wheras some organisms may see temperature, we may feel it. Etc.

Some individuals are apparently blind, deaf, etc. there is an entire class of qualitative experience that they do not have. Are there other classes of qualitative experience that non-human organisms have that we don't have and vice versa?

This when I express skepticism that we perceive reality pmaii, I'm not suggesting that perception of reality and reality are completely different. (For one, as we've said, we are reality.) I'm saying that we perceive the aspects of reality that have been evolutionarily adaptive for us to perceive (and it's a dialectic relationship, a two-way relationship) and we perceive them in a qualitative way that is likewise adaptive (also a dialectic).

And yes, this relationship continues itself to evolve and change.

 

[smcder]

When it comes to PMAII, I'm referring strictly to perception. Not scientific models. Although drawing a firm line between perception and conception will be impossible of course.

So when it comes to perception pmaii does cover a range. For instance:



Normal vision and thermal vision are both ways of perceiving reality. if you're like me, youall find yourself thinking "sure but reality really is like the image on the left."

Is it really?

The way I think of perceiving reality pmaii, is that there is quite a bit to reality that we simply don't perceive, and that which we do perceive may be in a modality and potentially have a phenomenal/qualitative character that differs from other perceiving organisms.

Re modality: whereas some organisms may taste certain chemicals, we may smell them. Whereas some organisms may feel an object, we may see it. Wheras some organisms may see temperature, we may feel it. Etc.

Some individuals are apparently blind, deaf, etc. there is an entire class of qualitative experience that they do not have. Are there other classes of qualitative experience that non-human organisms have that we don't have and vice versa?

This when I express skepticism that we perceive reality pmaii, I'm not suggesting that perception of reality and reality are completely different. (For one, as we've said, we are reality.) I'm saying that we perceive the aspects of reality that have been evolutionarily adaptive for us to perceive (and it's a dialectic relationship, a two-way relationship) and we perceive them in a qualitative way that is likewise adaptive (also a dialectic).

And yes, this relationship continues itself to evolve and change.

"I'm not suggesting that perception of reality and reality are completely different."

That helps ... Do you fall into representative realism vs DR?

 

[smcder]

This is a response to the question posed below, I believe.

>> So the question is, sans living things and their properties of perception and awareness, what is color?

The Kane b video discusses this in terms of DR.

 

[Soupie]

"I'm not suggesting that perception of reality and reality are completely different."

That helps ... Do you fall into representative realism vs DR?

Representationalism - By Branch / Doctrine - The Basics of Philosophy

"Representationalism (also known as Representative Realismor Indirect Realism or Epistemological Dualism or the Representative Theory of Perception) is the philosophical position that the world we see in conscious experience is not the real world itself, but merely a miniature virtual-reality replica of that world in an internal representation. Thus, we know only our ideas or interpretations of objects in the world, because a barrier (or veil of perception) between the mind and the existing world prevents first-hand knowledge of anything beyond it."

On the above account of representative realism, i would say my approach to perception is different. I will try to explain and it might be clarifying. (But if history is a guide, it probably wont be. )

>> but merely a miniature virtual-reality replica of [reality]

Perception is not a minature, virtual-reality replica of reality. Perception is, in large part, a process in which one thing (for example, the environment) co-varys with another thing (for example, the nervous system of an organism).

A basic example would be:

The surface water of the pond increases (changes) in temperature (ie molecules start vibrating faster), the nervous system of the frog also changes in response to the increase in temperature. The frog has perceived reality. It swims to cooler water.

The changes in the frog's nervous system are not a "replica" of the changes in the water molecules.

I think this co-varying process holds true for all modalities of perception, sight, smell, hearing, etc.

>> the world we see in conscious experience is not the real world itself

I think the above is semantically confused. But the confusion is impossible to avoid, based on the nature of perception itself (as i have been trying to point out!).

We have to do this work!

Going back to my example of the frog; for the sake of this (toy) example, lets say that subjectively, the change to the frog's nervous system just is the qualitative feel of hotness.

Objective — frog nervous system changes

Subjective — qualitative feel of heat

So what is the frog feeling (or "seeing" in the statement above)? Is the frog feeling the change in the pond or is the frog feeling the change in its nervous system?

On my view, the frog is feeling the change in the pond (the real world) because the change in its nervous system just is the qualitative feeling of heat.

In this way, there is no duality between mind and matter. The qualitative feel of hotness does not ooze or strongly emerge from the nervous system. It just is the nervous system. (However, when we perceive hotness (different than *experiencing* hotness), we see a changing nervous system. This apparent duality is not an actual, ontological duality.)

>> an internal representation

The only sense in which, on my view, we would say perception is internal would be in the sense that perception is a process in which a change within the organism co-varys with a change in the environment. But again, the organism is not percieving the change in its nervous system; rather, the change in its nervous system just is the perception.

 

[smcder]

Representationalism - By Branch / Doctrine - The Basics of Philosophy

"Representationalism (also known as Representative Realismor Indirect Realism or Epistemological Dualism or the Representative Theory of Perception) is the philosophical position that the world we see in conscious experience is not the real world itself, but merely a miniature virtual-reality replica of that world in an internal representation. Thus, we know only our ideas or interpretations of objects in the world, because a barrier (or veil of perception) between the mind and the existing world prevents first-hand knowledge of anything beyond it."

On the above account of representative realism, i would say my approach to perception is different. I will try to explain and it might be clarifying. (But if history is a guide, it probably wont be. )

>> but merely a miniature virtual-reality replica of [reality]

Perception is not a minature, virtual-reality replica of reality. Perception is, in large part, a process in which one thing (for example, the environment) co-varys with another thing (for example, the nervous system of an organism).

A basic example would be:

The surface water of the pond increases (changes) in temperature (ie molecules start vibrating faster), the nervous system of the frog also changes in response to the increase in temperature. The frog has perceived reality. It swims to cooler water.

The changes in the frog's nervous system are not a "replica" of the changes in the water molecules.

I think this co-varying process holds true for all modalities of perception, sight, smell, hearing, etc.

>> the world we see in conscious experience is not the real world itself

I think the above is semantically confused. But the confusion is impossible to avoid, based on the nature of perception itself (as i have been trying to point out!).

We have to do this work!

Going back to my example of the frog; for the sake of this (toy) example, lets say that subjectively, the change to the frog's nervous system just is the qualitative feel of hotness.

Objective — frog nervous system changes

Subjective — qualitative feel of heat

So what is the frog feeling (or "seeing" in the statement above)? Is the frog feeling the change in the pond or is the frog feeling the change in its nervous system?

On my view, the frog is feeling the change in the pond because the change in its nervous system just is the qualitative feeling of heat.

In this way, there is no dualism between mind and matter. The qualitative feel of hotness does not ooze or strongly emerge from the nervous system. It just is the nervous system. (However, when we perceive hotness (different than *experiencing* hotness), we see a changing nervous system. This apparent duality is not an actual, ontological duality.)

>> an internal representation

The only sense in which, on my view, we would say perception is internal would be in the sense that perception is a process in which a change within the organism co-varys with a change in the environment. But again, the organism is not percieving the change in its nervous system; rather,

At a glance this still sounds like DR not Representationalism. The Kane B is video is very helpful.

 

[Soupie]

At a glance this still sounds like DR not Representationalism. The Kane B is video is very helpful.

"This" meaning my description or the definition of RR that i posted?

 

[smcder]

Naïve realism - Wikipedia


We've discussed this before too:

is not uncommon to think of naïve realism as distinct from scientific realism, which states that the universe contains just those properties that feature in a scientificdescription of it, not properties like colour per se but merely objects that reflect certain wavelengths owing to their microscopic surface texture. This lack of supervenience of experience on the physical world has influenced many thinkers to reject naïve realism as a physical theory.[13]

One should add, however, that naïve realism does not claim that reality is only what we see, hear etc.. Likewise, scientific realism does not claim that reality is only what can be described by fundamental physics. It follows that the relevant distinction to make is not between naïve and scientific realism but between direct and indirect realism.

The direct realist claims that the experience of a sunset, for instance, is the real sunset that we directly experience. The indirect realist claims that our relation to reality is indirect, so the experience of a sunset is a subjective copy of what really is radiation as described by physics. But the direct realist does not deny that the sunset is radiation; the experience has a hierarchical structure,[14] and the radiation is part of what amounts to the direct experience.

An example of a scientific realist is John Locke, who held the world only contains the primary qualities that feature in a corpuscularian scientific account of the world (see corpuscular theory), and that other properties were entirely subjective, depending for their existence upon some perceiver who can observe the objects."[1]

The modern philosopher of science Howard Sankey argues for a form of scientific realism which has commonsense realism as one of its foundations.[15]

 

[smcder]

Howard Sankey, Scientific Realism and Basic Common Sense - PhilPapers