Philosophy, Science, & The Unexplained - Main Thread

[Constance]

I think you might have your 'skeptometer' set too high, ufology. Being reactive to 'religion' (a rather baggy umbrella category including widely diverging phenomena) doesn't or shouldn't, imo, require rejecting all of the contributions of Eastern philosophy and thought to human epistemology and ontology. What scientists and philosophers mean by 'Physicalism' likewise constitutes a spectrum of ideas in our time, many of them diverging on significant points, so that we need to identify what each of us means when we use that term.

 

[smcder]

oh my, I leave you people alone for one day . . . ;-)

I have just skimmed the content but looks like the discussion has blossomed, I'm not going to have time to look at this in-depth until tomorrow but I look forward to catching up and re-joining the conversation - have a good evening, all!

 

[Constance]

Also, re this:

"The Mind Life Institute right? It looks like there's really good stuff there, but its affiliation with the Dali Lama pings my skeptometer."

Since the contributions of Maturana and Varela (and the continuing elaborations of them by exponents and developers of their insights) are found significant by a range of scientists and thinkers in the West, it should not undermine their value that the Dalai Lama and other eastern thinkers also find those contributions to be significant.

 

[Constance]

Look forward to your return, Steve.

 

[Tyger]

For future reference when I use the word "physical" I mean something empirical, at least to the extent that can be observed or measured or detected by objective means and described "physically", and not simply something material ( a solid, liquid, gas, plasma, state of matter ). For example the substance that a permanent magnet is made of is material and physical, but it's magnetic field is non-material and physical. With respect to consciousness, I propose that what we're dealing with is something like a magnetic field ( non-material but physical ), and therefore not in the land of woo and the supernatural or in logical contradiction with how consciousness appears to work.

I am definitely not in this conversation (in the discursive sense) but here is the crux: the assumption is that the physical universe is the only reality. This is an assumption - not an empirical fact. Layers of existence that are not physical - and unable to be measured by physical instrumentation - become 'woo'. (Because the 'instrument' of perception and measure of the non-physical is the human being itself). There will always be traces of the non-physical realms in the physical universe - 'ghosties in the machine'. In point of fact the physical universe is the furthest, densest manifestation of the spiritual universe (just a convenient phrase at this point). An onion is a handy picture of this - the center of the onion being the physical universe. Another way to understand this is to consider that light becomes condensed matter. The onion layers are stages of densification of light.

[Those in the spiritual realms cannot actually see the physical - the physical universe shows up as impenetrable darkness or density - surrounded by what they can see spiritually. As always these words are misleading - especially the word 'see'. Such are always interpreted in physical terms and that is a mistake, but it is the way of it. In point of fact, it is only through physical incarnation that the physical realm can be experienced - and it is only in physical incarnation that we can learn that which we need for our lives in spiritual realms. That is why rebirth is earnestly sought - our after-death journey depends on what we do and feel during our physical existence (less what we think with our discursive mind - in fact such thoughts cannot 'come with us' - any brain-bound thinking, that is). We may have varying attitudes of dismissal regarding physical existence while alive but once 'passed over' the significance of earthly life becomes manifestly clear and we seek to return with resolve and intent.]

In any event - it's a complete non-starter if the playing field is constrained. It's a bit like a religious debate - God is Osiris and no other ideas about God will be entertained. We must forever converse in Osiris-speak.

 

[Randall]

Also, re this: "The Mind Life Institute right? It looks like there's really good stuff there, but its affiliation with the Dali Lama pings my skeptometer."

Since the contributions of Maturana and Varela (and the continuing elaborations of them by exponents and developers of their insights) are found significant by a range of scientists and thinkers in the West, it should not undermine their value that the Dalai Lama and other eastern thinkers also find those contributions to be significant.

To clarify: Simply pinging my skeptometer is a fairly mild criticism overall. The approach in general looks good, but there's some issues with the DL ...

Penn & Teller BS Pwn The Dalai Lama

There's also more where that came from, like some of the quantum
mystical woo he's sprinkled around, but do we really
want to get into Lama bashing?​

 

[Randall]

I am definitely not in this conversation (in the discursive sense) but here is the crux: the assumption is that the physical universe is the only reality.

It's important here to discern the difference between what is meant by "physical". It's not the same as "material". There are both material and non-material realities, and both still fall within the realm of the "physical".

This is an assumption - not an empirical fact. Layers of existence that are not physical - and unable to be measured by physical instrumentation - become 'woo'. (Because the 'instrument' of perception and measure of the non-physical is the human being itself).

Woo are ideas and beliefs that are incoherent and nonsensical rather than theories that are unproven. So layers of existence may not be woo. That idea depends on what one means by "layers" and "existence". For example multiple universes are a reasonable possibility. On the other hand, what I mean by purveyors of quantum mystical nonsense and woo are like this:

What The Bleep Debunked

There will always be traces of the non-physical realms in the physical universe - 'ghosties in the machine'. In point of fact the physical universe is the furthest, densest manifestation of the spiritual universe (just a convenient phrase at this point). An onion is a handy picture of this - the center of the onion being the physical universe. Another way to understand this is to consider that light becomes condensed matter. The onion layers are stages of densification of light.

Light and matter are both physical so that explanation doesn't work. This is an example why we need to be clear about what "physical" means. It's doesn't simply mean "material".

Those in the spiritual realms cannot actually see the physical - the physical universe shows up as impenetrable darkness or density - surrounded by what they can see spiritually. As always these words are misleading - especially the word 'see'. Such are always interpreted in physical terms and that is a mistake, but it is the way of it. In point of fact, it is only through physical incarnation that the physical realm can be experienced - and it is only in physical incarnation that we can learn that which we need for our lives in spiritual realms.

Now you've wandered off the ledge into the land of "spiritual realms" and "physical incarnations", which implies a belief in the supernatural. Why do you need to go there?

That is why rebirth is earnestly sought - our after-death journey depends on what we do and feel during our physical existence (less what we think with our discursive mind - in fact such thoughts cannot 'come with us' - any brain-bound thinking, that is). We may have varying attitudes of dismissal regarding physical existence while alive but once 'passed over' the significance of earthly life becomes manifestly clear and we seek to return with resolve and intent.

Still in the land of spiritual realms and afterlives. Why bother generating a worldview around faith based assumptions?

In any event - it's a complete non-starter if the playing field is constrained. It's a bit like a religious debate - God is Osiris and no other ideas about God will be entertained. We must forever converse in Osiris-speak.

Theology is part of philosophy, so if you can make your points relevant to science and the unexplained in a coherent manner, and are prepared to address the follow-up questions and comments, then you're as welcome as anyone else on the playing field.

 

[smcder]

I re-read Nagel's What Is It Like to Be a Bat and all the footnotes. I have a better grasp of some of the issues of terminology and grammar that may have caused confusion but before we look at this again - we need to make sure we're all on the same page. I read the problem Nagel raises to specifically be a problem for any physical reduction of consciousness, any reduction of consciousness to purely physical components - (Nagel says the physicalist claim is that all phenomena can be reduced to their physical components - so he doesn't set up the "hard problem" it's a result of the physicalist's claim) - he says there is a problem in objectively accounting for subjective experience which requires a single point of view to fully understand.

Now, if no one is making the claim that subjective experience can be reduced to physical components then we can move on - I don't understand Ufology's field theory - but perhaps it is not a physicalist claim and this is why he feels the "hard problem" as Nagel presents it is incoherent.

But if there is a claim on the table that consciousness can be reduced to its physical components we can discuss the problems Nagel's paper may raise for such claims.

From what I can gather, Nagel feels his position is still valid as he is currently looking at a position in which both mind and matter are irreducible properties of our world.

 

[Randall]

I re-read Nagel's What Is It Like to Be a Bat and all the footnotes. I have a better grasp of some of the issues of terminology and grammar that may have caused confusion but before we look at this again - we need to make sure we're all on the same page. I read the problem Nagel raises to specifically be a problem for any physical reduction of consciousness, any reduction of consciousness to purely physical components - (Nagel says the physicalist claim is that all phenomena can be reduced to their physical components - so he doesn't set up the "hard problem" it's a result of the physicalist's claim) -

OK let's do baby steps. Here's some key wording below:

he says there is a problem in objectively accounting for subjective experience which requires a single point of view to fully understand.

The above describes the problem very well and matches exactly the point(s) I've been trying to get across. Now before we assume anything else, how do we define the phrase "objectively accounting for"?

1. objectively accounting for = A scientific description of the physical processes that are believed to be involved in the production of consciousness | OR
2. objectively account ting for = ( insert your interpretation here )

Now, if no one is making the claim that subjective experience can be reduced to physical components then we can move on - I don't understand Ufology's field theory - but perhaps it is not a physicalist claim and this is why he feels the "hard problem" as Nagel presents it is incoherent.

The field theory I'm proposing falls within the scope of physical ( not to be confused with "material" ) theory, similar in context to the way a magnetic field does.

But if there is a claim on the table that consciousness can be reduced to its physical components we can discuss the problems Nagel's paper may raise for such claims.
From what I can gather, Nagel feels his position is still valid as he is currently looking at a position in which both mind and matter are irreducible properties of our world.

1. What does Nagel mean by "mind"? Does he mean "consciousness" or "cognition" or "self awareness" or "subjective perception"
2. What does Nagel mean by "matter"? Does he mean "material" or "physical" ( both are different ).
3. What does Nagel mean by, "our world"? Does he mean "worldview" or "spacetime" or "universe in general" or "the multiverse" or "existence"?

Perhaps rather than treating Nagel and the hard problem as a main juncture, where we must take the exit ramp, we should file it as a particular aspect of the problem that people sometimes ponder, continue straight through, and see where it takes us? I guess we can't do that right this second because we've still got part one of this post to address, but I think that it's an idea worth throwing on the table.

 

[Constance]

I am definitely not in this conversation (in the discursive sense) but here is the crux: the assumption is that the physical universe is the only reality. This is an assumption - not an empirical fact. Layers of existence that are not physical - and unable to be measured by physical instrumentation - become 'woo'. (Because the 'instrument' of perception and measure of the non-physical is the human being itself).

Well said, Tyger. It's a demonstration of the significance of consciousness/mind that it enables us at times to receive veridical information from mind to mind, and even more obscurely in remote viewing and trance states (not to say that all information reported to be obtained in these ways has veridical support). 'Information' is what we need to understand more fully. Is information itself physical, or is it carried, conveyed, by physical waves and particles? Does it reside in the entanglement of mind and nature as quantum consciousness researchers propose?

 

[Constance]

Setting Nagel aside, then (though we might need to come back to him), it looks like "continu[ing] straight through" would be to take up ufology's case for his physical field theory of consciousness, as introduced in his point 1 above:

. . .before we assume anything else, how do we define the phrase "objectively accounting for"?

1. objectively accounting for = A scientific description of the physical processes that are believed to be involved in the production of consciousness . . . .

 

[smcder]

Ok let me get a few more "high level" thoughts in before coming down to specifics (although the quote below actually addresses some of your specifics Ufology - I want to get out there sort of where I'm at right now - having taken some time to assimilate this ("down time" ;-) and I think I like the idea of irreducible mind - there is still parsimony there (does "parsimony" sound like a vegetable to anyone else?) - if you can't have one irreducible thing (matter) then add just one more - and as Chalmers says: (emphasis mine)

"This position qualifies as a variety of dualism, as it postulates basic properties over and above the properties invoked by physics. But it is an innocent version of dualism, entirely compatible with the scientific view of the world. Nothing in this approach contradicts anything in physical theory; we simply need to add further bridging principles to explain how experience arises from physical processes. There is nothing particularly spiritual or mystical about this theory - its overall shape is like that of a physical theory, with a few fundamental entities connected by fundamental laws. It expands the ontology slightly, to be sure, but Maxwell did the same thing. Indeed, the overall structure of this position is entirely naturalistic, allowing that ultimately the universe comes down to a network of basic entities obeying simple laws, and allowing that there may ultimately be a theory of consciousness cast in terms of such laws. If the position is to have a name, a good choice might be naturalistic dualism."

and your virtual photons might account for this without a basic unit of consciousness . . . I don't know, I don't know your theory -

I'd also like to note that:

There is nothing particularly spiritual or mystical about this theory

doesn't mean there isn't anything particularly spiritual or mystical about me ;-) but that is a side-line to tide over some others on this thread and maybe open other avenues of discussion and maybe not . . .

I do think epiphenomenalism and emergence sort of amount to the same thing in that if consciousness "emerges" from a particular arrangement of matter, it's inherent in matter to begin with . . . kind of sort of - that needs some rigor (your specialty, Ufology!)


and finally, why do find ourselves with a commitment to physicalism anyway? is this a by-product of the agreement with the church during the Enlightenment that science gets matter and the church gets everything else ("what matters" if I may make a pun . . . )?

 

[smcder]

OK let's do baby steps. Here's some key wording below:

The above describes the problem very well and matches exactly the point(s) I've been trying to get across. Now before we assume anything else, how do we define the phrase "objectively accounting for"?

1. objectively accounting for = A scientific description of the physical processes that are believed to be involved in the production of consciousness | OR
2. objectively account ting for = ( insert your interpretation here )

The field theory I'm proposing falls within the scope of physical ( not to be confused with "material" ) theory, similar in context to the way a magnetic field does.

1. What does Nagel mean by "mind"? Does he mean "consciousness" or "cognition" or "self awareness" or "subjective perception"
2. What does Nagel mean by "matter"? Does he mean "material" or "physical" ( both are different ).
3. What does Nagel mean by, "our world"? Does he mean "worldview" or "spacetime" or "universe in general" or "the multiverse" or "existence"?

Perhaps rather than treating Nagel and the hard problem as a main juncture, where we must take the exit ramp, we should file it as a particular aspect of the problem that people sometimes ponder, continue straight through, and see where it takes us? I guess we can't do that right this second because we've still got part one of this post to address, but I think that it's an idea worth throwing on the table.

just this bit first:

Now before we assume anything else, how do we define the phrase "objectively accounting for"?

1. objectively accounting for = A scientific description of the physical processes that are believed to be involved in the production of consciousness | OR
2. objectively account ting for = ( insert your interpretation here )"

Ok, to me, here is the issue, back in 1974 Nagel argued:

physicalists claim there is nothing but matter (little teeny tiny bits of "stuff") and the forces that make it whirl round round (energy, fields . . . strong and weak forces. . .and anything else that motivates the matter - sets it in motion - the bottom line is it all comes to matter and how it behaves)

and so this assume that consciousness can only come out of some way that matter behaves

BUT a full, physical accounting (all of the King's particles and all of the King's forces) does not account for the fact that there is something that it is like to be the King . . . in other words, write all of the relevant equations down and run through them and there would be no reason to suspect that the King has subjective awareness . . .

at that time he didn't rule physicalism out but he said it wasn't adequate.

Nowadays he seems to feel that it's necessary to see mind as a second, irreducible property of the universe - that it's not only matter and the forces and rules that govern it that is out there - but there has to be a second irreducible property of "mind" inherent in the universe, in all things - he doesn't allow that this is in any way mystical or implies the presence of a God (although he admits it doesn't rule the later possibility out) - and Chalmers adds that it is a kind of "innocent dualism" that doesn't alter physics as we know it . . .

that is how I understand Nagel's point - and his original argument turns more on the distinction of subjective/objective than I at first appreciated . . .

 

[smcder]

To clarify: Simply pinging my skeptometer is a fairly mild criticism overall. The approach in general looks good, but there's some issues with the DL ...

Penn & Teller BS Pwn The Dalai Lama



There's also more where that came from, like some of the quantum
mystical woo he's sprinkled around, but do we really
want to get into Lama bashing?​

the above video didn't play for me but I'm pretty skeptical of Penn and Teller - if only for the sensationalism of their techniques, when you start down that road . . . maybe that's not fair, but they are entertainers first and I suspect, like any entertainer, willing to make some sacrifice of absolute truth for entertainment's sake - I think the skeptical route has probably been good to them - (and see George Hansen's excellent The Trickster and the Paranormal The Trickster and the Paranormal -- Home Page for more on magicians and their "liminal" relation to "the truth") - picking on high profile targets like the Dalai Lama and Mother Teresa is good business because you get a free outrage factor and the truth about these figures may be more prosaic than people want to believe - I have no doubt Mother Teresa believed and acted sincerely - those beliefs are subject to fair criticism but that criticism goes for anyone who holds them, it's just a lot less interesting if that person isn't "world famous" - I don't think she made any claims to being special, those were made for her - I also have absolutely no doubt that she is human and I'm sure there is plenty of personal criticism that would apply - who among us could stand up to sustained scrutiny? I don't know a whole lot about the Dalai Lama but I did read an introduction to a book on neuroscience and the mind/eastern and western perspectives (mid 90s publication) and it seemed very down to earth, not at all "woo" . . . . my understanding at the time was that he was very open and interested in Western science and I believe had made a statement that he would like to have been a scientist . . . I guess I'd trust Wikipedia even before Penn and Teller . . . ;-)

 

[Constance]

Steve, what is the source of that Chalmer's quote in your first post of today?

 

[Constance]

Re your third post, I don't get the frequent reaction these days to persons who are held up as spiritual or intellectual models. It's incomprehensible to me. Why shouldn't we recognize peoples' gifts and accomplishments? There seems to be widespread resentment instead, an impulse to tear such people down to rubble.

 

[smcder]

Steve, what is the source of that Chalmer's quote in your first post of today?

oops, sorry it's Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, here:

Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness

 

[Randall]

Ok, to me, here is the issue, back in 1974 Nagel argued:

physicalists claim there is nothing but matter (little teeny tiny bits of "stuff") and the forces that make it whirl round round (energy, fields . . . strong and weak forces. . .and anything else that motivates the matter - sets it in motion - the bottom line is it all comes to matter and how it behaves)

and so this assume that consciousness can only come out of some way that matter behaves

BUT a full, physical accounting (all of the King's particles and all of the King's forces) does not account for the fact that there is something that it is like to be the King . . . in other words, write all of the relevant equations down and run through them and there would be no reason to suspect that the King has subjective awareness . . .

at that time he didn't rule physicalism out but he said it wasn't adequate.

Nowadays he seems to feel that it's necessary to see mind as a second, irreducible property of the universe - that it's not only matter and the forces and rules that govern it that is out there - but there has to be a second irreducible property of "mind" inherent in the universe, in all things - he doesn't allow that this is in any way mystical or implies the presence of a God (although he admits it doesn't rule the later possibility out) - and Chalmers adds that it is a kind of "innocent dualism" that doesn't alter physics as we know it . . . that is how I understand Nagel's point - and his original argument turns more on the distinction of subjective/objective than I at first appreciated . . .

OK. We're still on track. Perhaps the problems I've been describing will become self evident as we run through this next part. At this point we have the meaning of "a full, physical accounting", which is akin to an inventory of all materials and their associated properties involved in the construction of something ( in this case a conscious being ).

So the next task is to define what we mean by "account for something that it is like to be" something? This latter type of accounting doesn't appear to be of the same nature as the former. We're no longer dealing with a technical manual. So what are we dealing with? Does the question even make sense in the first place? I don't think so.

My perspective on this problem is that producing the "what it's like" part ( the second part ) is the result of applying the knowledge gained in the first part ( the technical manual ). All we need to do is use the technical manual to build another working conscious something and it will be sufficiently "like" the first one to justify the assumption that both "somethings" possess a "like" consciousness. So it's not logical to assume that because the technical manual doesn't account for in a material sense, the presence of the actual completed "something" that the technical manual doesn't account for ( in a conceptual sense ) that actual something it represents ( that it's "like" ).

Regarding the concept of duality, I'm not making a reference to any specific philosophical model. I use it only to differentiate between our subjective personal perceptual experiences and external material reality. So specific issues like substance dualism as a combination of physical/non-physical and all the baggage that goes along with that aren't relevant.

 

[Constance]

oops, sorry it's Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness, here:

Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness

Thanks. I read that before, a few years ago, and want to read it again. I just noticed that there are twenty-some responses to it and then a response by Chalmers to the points raised by these various commentators. It might be a very good resource for us to explore in identifying the critical junctures in this inquiry into the origin of consciousness. Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness

 

[smcder]

Re your third post, I don't get the frequent reaction these days to persons who are held up as spiritual or intellectual models. It's incomprehensible to me. Why shouldn't we recognize peoples' gifts and accomplishments? There seems to be widespread resentment instead, an impulse to tear such people down to rubble.

I don't know - people are afraid of being duped maybe, it seems so many biographies of famous people or heroes like Jefferson have revealed their human side - fathering children with slaves or other things that might not be as outrageous as you would first think but that firmly confirm those people as human, all too human (to borrow a phrase from Nietzsche) and my age group grew up with pretty heroic and unrealistic views of these men in early school day encounters (really this was the mythology of early America, I think) so maybe people are kind of disenchanted with the old "great man idea"? or afraid to hope for people to be better than they can be? . . . but I think it's also an appeal to people's baser senses - provocation and outrage are strong sensations and I guess people will consume that . . . but we seem to be such passive consumers, not objecting to so many things (and funny what we do object to) that a kind of cynicism does seem to be fed to us through the media . . . again, with this example - Penn and Teller are entertainers first and so if any of this is right, it would fit in for them to target someone like the Dalai Lama for the payoff (and that could still be true regardless of the truth of their claims - after all, they could focus on positive themes, but probably wouldn't make the money they do (or did) and that says a lot about people in general)