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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 8
- Thread starter Gene Steinberg
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smcder
Paranormal Adept
@Soupie - I want to know more about QM is a challenge to ("billiards balls") physicalism?
My first thoughts are:
Physicalism everything supervenes on the physical
Materialism for me right now it's best to look at this in terms of its relationship to physicalism. Physicalism might be said to incorporate "more sophisticated" examples of physicality than "matter".
Wikipedia lists these examples:
The article notes that some distinguish "materialism"/"physicalism" but others treat them as synonymous. I will try to use "physicalism/materialism" consistently but I tend to think of them as synonymous without implying everything is made up of "matter".
My first thoughts are:
- "billiards balls" have been off the table for some time in physics and QM is not a challenge to "physicalism/materialism".
- As there are interpretations of QM that do not depend on consciousness per se but only on "observation"? Is that correct?
Physicalism everything supervenes on the physical
Materialism for me right now it's best to look at this in terms of its relationship to physicalism. Physicalism might be said to incorporate "more sophisticated" examples of physicality than "matter".
Wikipedia lists these examples:
- spacetime
- physical energies and forces
- dark matter
The article notes that some distinguish "materialism"/"physicalism" but others treat them as synonymous. I will try to use "physicalism/materialism" consistently but I tend to think of them as synonymous without implying everything is made up of "matter".
smcder
Paranormal Adept
Idealism - could we say that everything supervenes on the mental?
SEP defines it: ontological idealism (the view that epistemological idealism delivers truth because reality itself is a form of thought and human thought participates in it)
Under this defintion can we say:
@Soupie "Conscious Realism could be considered Idealism in the sense that fundamental reality is immaterial, while also holding that aspects of this reality remain objective and mind-independent."?
Not if we mean that there are no mind-independent objects.
SEP defines it: ontological idealism (the view that epistemological idealism delivers truth because reality itself is a form of thought and human thought participates in it)
Under this defintion can we say:
@Soupie "Conscious Realism could be considered Idealism in the sense that fundamental reality is immaterial, while also holding that aspects of this reality remain objective and mind-independent."?
Not if we mean that there are no mind-independent objects.
smcder
Paranormal Adept
The way I think I think about neutral monism right now is simplistic and raises the question
Physicalism asserts the mental is physical. Emergence is one mechanism to get there. Idealism says it's the other way around. I'm less familiar with the means involved here. Berkley invoked God.
But "neutral" monism says ultimate reality is neither mental nor physical. So how do we avoid dualism with a neither/nor foundation?
The SEP addresses this in its article on Neutral Monism in the section on the challenge from experience. (Section 7.3 from which I've cribbed the following)
Neutral Monism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
The challenge from experiences is based on two assertions:
1. experience cannot be reduced to or constructed from the non-experiential
2. strong emergence is unintelligible
arghument
argument there is no path from the qualities we experience to the experience of those qualities
OK, so we can now ask the question: can neutral monism "manufacture" awareness?
The line of reasoning that the SEP then uses is an account of awareness that Russell later abandoned. The SEP picks up this argument and attempts to restructure it in terms of neutral monism.
Russel's account of awareness is that
"So if the quality/awareness gap had no force against Russell’s old account of awareness, then we should not expect it to have force against the neutral monistically reconstructed account of awareness."
Well ... maybe.
The SEP grants that this account can be rejected on the grounds that
we can still reject the neutral monistic reconstruction because there is an assumed analogy which we can reject.
"So what we have here is no more than a tentative proposal how the traditional neutral monist, and the contemporary panqualityist, might begin to think about the difficult problem of accommodating experience in the neutral monist framework. To the extent that his proposal succeeds, it does raise a question suggested by Strawson’s argument above: is experience, thus understood in a neutral monist setting, a feature that is emergent in an objectionable way (see section 8.4 below)?"
- How do we get to experience, to phenomenal consciousness from a neutral fundamental substrate?
Physicalism asserts the mental is physical. Emergence is one mechanism to get there. Idealism says it's the other way around. I'm less familiar with the means involved here. Berkley invoked God.
But "neutral" monism says ultimate reality is neither mental nor physical. So how do we avoid dualism with a neither/nor foundation?
The SEP addresses this in its article on Neutral Monism in the section on the challenge from experience. (Section 7.3 from which I've cribbed the following)
Neutral Monism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
The challenge from experiences is based on two assertions:
1. experience cannot be reduced to or constructed from the non-experiential
2. strong emergence is unintelligible
arghument
- assume the neutral must be non-experiential, this is because the neutral is neither mental nor physical
- then neutral monism doesn't have a room for experience
argument there is no path from the qualities we experience to the experience of those qualities
- having an experience means having phenomenal qualities
- but phenomenal qualities are not experiential themselves
- phenomenal qualities involves awareness of qualities
- BUT no ("instantiations" of qualities) necessitate awareness of qualities
OK, so we can now ask the question: can neutral monism "manufacture" awareness?
The line of reasoning that the SEP then uses is an account of awareness that Russell later abandoned. The SEP picks up this argument and attempts to restructure it in terms of neutral monism.
Russel's account of awareness is that
- to be aware of x (a red sense-datum, say) just is to bear a special (simple and unanalyzable) relation to x—the so-called acquaintance relation
- "The overall shape of the two accounts of awareness is the same: a self bearing a special relation to an object."
"So if the quality/awareness gap had no force against Russell’s old account of awareness, then we should not expect it to have force against the neutral monistically reconstructed account of awareness."
Well ... maybe.
The SEP grants that this account can be rejected on the grounds that
- experience is fundamental and unanalyzable
- they misconstrue the nature of experience
- to be aware of x (a red sense-datum, say) just is to bear a special (simple and unanalyzable) relation to x—the so-called acquaintance relation
we can still reject the neutral monistic reconstruction because there is an assumed analogy which we can reject.
"So what we have here is no more than a tentative proposal how the traditional neutral monist, and the contemporary panqualityist, might begin to think about the difficult problem of accommodating experience in the neutral monist framework. To the extent that his proposal succeeds, it does raise a question suggested by Strawson’s argument above: is experience, thus understood in a neutral monist setting, a feature that is emergent in an objectionable way (see section 8.4 below)?"
smcder
Paranormal Adept
http://www.sjsu.edu/people/anand.va...calism-Entails-Panpsychism-Galen-Strawson.pdf
This is a 2006 paper and it sets off at a brisk pace:
The first two footnotes are equally instructive ... and then I'll leave the rest of the paper as an exercise for the gentle reader.
[2] More strictly, ‘concrete’ means ‘not abstract’ in the standard philosophical sense of ‘abstract’, given which some philosophers hold that abstract objects — e.g. numbers or concepts — exist and are real objects in every sense in which concrete objects are. I take ‘spatio-temporal’ to be the adjective formed from ‘spacetime’, not from the conjunction of space and time.
smcder So does this mean that some philosophers hold that mind could be abstract and also be real in every sense in which concrete objects are?
This is a 2006 paper and it sets off at a brisk pace:
- Strawson is a Physicalist!
- Strawson's mind is concrete!
- Strawson has experiences!
The first two footnotes are equally instructive ... and then I'll leave the rest of the paper as an exercise for the gentle reader.
- matter is associated with mass
[2] More strictly, ‘concrete’ means ‘not abstract’ in the standard philosophical sense of ‘abstract’, given which some philosophers hold that abstract objects — e.g. numbers or concepts — exist and are real objects in every sense in which concrete objects are. I take ‘spatio-temporal’ to be the adjective formed from ‘spacetime’, not from the conjunction of space and time.
smcder So does this mean that some philosophers hold that mind could be abstract and also be real in every sense in which concrete objects are?
Soupie
Paranormal Adept
Actually the Planck Constant fits elegantly into QST. I could copy the section from the book that explains how if you'd like.
Re: physicalism/materialism being past the notion of billiard balls being fundamental. I'm not 100% thats the case, but I think it's ultimately moot. What's important when it comes to the MBP is physicalism/materialism, naive realism, and the Hard Problem.
The HP is based on two suppositions:
(1) That objective reality just is as we perceive it to be. (Naive Realism)
(2) Consciousness/experience is discontinuous.
Therefore, what's important as it relates to the MBP when one says they are a Materialist is whether they suppose that (1) objective reality is devoid of experience (as it appears to be in perception ie consciousness cannot be perceived), and (2) that consciousness/experience emerges from objective processes devoid of consciousness/experience.
If one is a Strawsonian Real Physicalist (panpsychist) or a Conscious Realist (panpsychist) than one grants that reality is split into objective and subjective poles at its ground level.
Whether one views this objective, mind-independent reality as immaterial (Hoffman) or material (Strawson) is inconsequential as it relates to the MBP and the HP. What is of consequence is how they view subjectivity and objectivity.
Both Strawson and Hoffman view subjectivity and objectivity as fundamental, whereas a (faux) Physicalist would view objectivity as fundamental and subjectivity as derivitive (and most likely emerging at the level of neurons).
When faux Physicalists take that position, they encounter the HP.
As per the Hoffman quote above, from the perspective of particular minds, there are mind-independent objects.
Hoffman would not say that objectivity is derivative of subjectivity, but he would say that matter (ie billiard ball materialism) is derivative of subjectivity. Hoffman is rejecting Naive Realism, not the existence of an objective, mind-independent reality.
Of course Hoffman then introduces his Interface Theory of perception which need not concern us.
smcder
Paranormal Adept
Sorry, I have to plod along at this point and stay focused until some clarity emerges. I may be able to respond better when I clear up the terminology/concepts.
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smcder
Paranormal Adept
Strawson
"It follows that real physicalism can have nothing to do with physicSalism, the view—the faith—that the nature or essence of all concrete reality can in principle be fully captured in the terms of physics. Real physicalism cannot have anything to do with physicSalism unless it is supposed—obviously falsely—that the terms of physics can fully capture the nature or essence of experience.*3 It is unfortunate that ‘physicalism’ is today standardly used to mean physicSalism because it obliges me to speak of ‘real physicalism’when really I only mean ‘physicalism’ — realistic physicalism. Real physicalism, then, must accept that experiential phenomena are physical phenomena."
*Strawson sends us to a paper that outlines the standard argument for why this is impossible.
This point and this one:
"Real physicalism, then, must accept that experiential phenomena are physical phenomena. But how can experiential phenomena be physical phenomena?Many take this claimto be profoundly problematic (this is the ‘mind–body problem’). This is usually because they
think they know a lot about the nature of the physical. They take the idea that the experiential is physical to be profoundly problematic given what we know about the nature of the physical. But they have already made a large and fatal mistake. This is because we have no good reason to think that we know anything about the physical that gives us any reason to find any problem in the idea that experiential phenomena are physical phenomena. If we reflect for a moment on the nature of our knowledge of the physical, and of the experiential, we realize, with Eddington, that ‘no problemof irreconcilability arises’"
are pretty basic for me in understanding what a physicalist argument would be. Strawson may give a way to understand the basic problems clearly from which it would then be possible to understand other positions/objections.
This is key: we have no good reason to think that we know anything about the physical that gives us any reason to find any problem in the idea that experieintial phenomena are physical phenomena.
This makes me think of Russell's arguments about consciousness as the direct experience of matter.
"It follows that real physicalism can have nothing to do with physicSalism, the view—the faith—that the nature or essence of all concrete reality can in principle be fully captured in the terms of physics. Real physicalism cannot have anything to do with physicSalism unless it is supposed—obviously falsely—that the terms of physics can fully capture the nature or essence of experience.*3 It is unfortunate that ‘physicalism’ is today standardly used to mean physicSalism because it obliges me to speak of ‘real physicalism’when really I only mean ‘physicalism’ — realistic physicalism. Real physicalism, then, must accept that experiential phenomena are physical phenomena."
*Strawson sends us to a paper that outlines the standard argument for why this is impossible.
This point and this one:
"Real physicalism, then, must accept that experiential phenomena are physical phenomena. But how can experiential phenomena be physical phenomena?Many take this claimto be profoundly problematic (this is the ‘mind–body problem’). This is usually because they
think they know a lot about the nature of the physical. They take the idea that the experiential is physical to be profoundly problematic given what we know about the nature of the physical. But they have already made a large and fatal mistake. This is because we have no good reason to think that we know anything about the physical that gives us any reason to find any problem in the idea that experiential phenomena are physical phenomena. If we reflect for a moment on the nature of our knowledge of the physical, and of the experiential, we realize, with Eddington, that ‘no problemof irreconcilability arises’"
are pretty basic for me in understanding what a physicalist argument would be. Strawson may give a way to understand the basic problems clearly from which it would then be possible to understand other positions/objections.
This is key: we have no good reason to think that we know anything about the physical that gives us any reason to find any problem in the idea that experieintial phenomena are physical phenomena.
This makes me think of Russell's arguments about consciousness as the direct experience of matter.
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Soupie
Paranormal Adept
Understood. In the meantime, I wanted to clarify my assertion that Conscious Realism is a form of Panpsychism.
Hoffman says:
"Conscious realism is not panpsychism nor does it entail panpsychism. Panpsychism claims that all objects, from tables and chairs to the sun and moon, are themselves conscious (Hartshorne 1937/1968, Whitehead 1929/1979), or that many objects, such as trees and atoms, but perhaps not tables and chairs, are conscious (Griffin 1998). Conscious realism, together with MUI theory, claims that tables and chairs are icons in the MUIs of conscious agents, and thus that they are conscious experiences of those agents. It does not claim, nor entail, that tables and chairs are con- scious or conscious agents."
However, Panpsychism does not make that claim per se. Some panpsychists may make that claim, but not all panpsychists need make that claim. It's enough to claim—as per wikipedia:
"In philosophy, panpsychism is the view that consciousness, mind or soul (psyche) is a universal and primordial feature of all things. Panpsychists see themselves as minds in a world of mind."
The "things" is left wide open. Panpsychists hold that things can be particular-mind independent. (Furthermore, some panpsychists might hold that reality is one super mind, but I don't think all panpsychists must hold that reality is one super mind.)
It seems to me that a panpsychist is one who holds that objective reality is suffused with subjectivity, however they conceive of objective reality. (In Hoffman's case he views reality to be composed of conscious agents. Seems like panpsychism to me.)
One other note: "Leibniz' view is that there are an infinite number of absolutely simple mental substances called monads which make up the fundamental structure of the universe."
This seems like a strikingly similar idea to Hoffman's "conscious agents" as fundamental. And Leibniz is considered a panpsychist.
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smcder
Paranormal Adept
How does CR relate to Idealism?
smcder
Paranormal Adept
My original question was about Idealism and CR I think. You responded
@Soupie
Conscious Realism could be considered Idealism in the sense that fundamental reality is immaterial, while also holding that aspects of this reality remain objective and mind-independent.
But my understanding is that Idealism is that objects of knowledge are in some way dependent on the activity of mind. So "objects of knowledge" could not be mind-independent. Then in the post above you discuss CR and panpsychism. So I may have missed something?
@Soupie
Conscious Realism could be considered Idealism in the sense that fundamental reality is immaterial, while also holding that aspects of this reality remain objective and mind-independent.
But my understanding is that Idealism is that objects of knowledge are in some way dependent on the activity of mind. So "objects of knowledge" could not be mind-independent. Then in the post above you discuss CR and panpsychism. So I may have missed something?
smcder
Paranormal Adept
now we get cruxy
As a real physicalist, then, I hold that the mental/experiential is physical, and I am happy to say, along with many other physicalists, that experience is ‘really just neurons firing’, at least in the case of biological organisms like ourselves.
smcder what does this mean "at least in the case of biological organisms like ourselves? Experience, at least for biological organisms, is neurons firing ... what/who else is experience for and and what then is experience for them/those if not neurons firing?
But when I say these words I mean something completely different from what many physicalists have apparently meant by them.
It amounts to radical ‘eliminativism’ with respect to experience, and it is not a form of real physicalism at all.9 My claim is different. It is that experiential phenomena ‘just are’ physical, so that there is a lot more to neurons than physics and neurophysiology record (or can record).
No one who disagrees with this is a real physicalist, in my terms.
As a real physicalist, then, I hold that the mental/experiential is physical, and I am happy to say, along with many other physicalists, that experience is ‘really just neurons firing’, at least in the case of biological organisms like ourselves.
smcder what does this mean "at least in the case of biological organisms like ourselves? Experience, at least for biological organisms, is neurons firing ... what/who else is experience for and and what then is experience for them/those if not neurons firing?
But when I say these words I mean something completely different from what many physicalists have apparently meant by them.
- I certainly don’t mean that all characteristics of what is going on, in the case of experience, can be described by physics and neurophysiology or any non-revolutionary extensions of them.
- That idea is crazy.
It amounts to radical ‘eliminativism’ with respect to experience, and it is not a form of real physicalism at all.9 My claim is different. It is that experiential phenomena ‘just are’ physical, so that there is a lot more to neurons than physics and neurophysiology record (or can record).
No one who disagrees with this is a real physicalist, in my terms.
Soupie
Paranormal Adept
If Idealism holds that mind-independent objects do not exist, then I would say Conscious Realism is not Idealism.
Soupie
Paranormal Adept
If I follow Strawson, he holds that consciousness/experience is continuous. Thus, when he says "experience is ‘really just neurons firing" I don't think he means consciousness/experience comes into existence when neurons fire. What I think he is saying is that firing neurons just are experiences such as green.
Again, from the panpsychist/continuous stance, I believe Strawson is suggesting that for other organisms/systems, their experience might be some other processes equivalent to neurons firing. In other words, if all matter is intrinsically conscious, then substrate independence for consciousness is moot. However, whether minds can be substrate independent is another matter. It seems Strawson is open to that possibility.
Obviously, I may be misunderstanding Strawson. However, if I have it right, I think it would have made more sense for him to say "I am happy to say, along with many other physicalists, that
>> It is that experiential phenomena ‘just are’ physical, so that there is a lot more to neurons than physics and neurophysiology record (or can record).
In other words, Naive Realism is false, i.e., the belief that because objective reality appears devoid of consciousness/experience, it is devoid of consciousness/experience.
Which Strawson text are you citing here? Does he, in this text or any other you've come across, actually proceed to describe the 'lot more to neurons' he refers to in the last sentence you quote?
smcder
Paranormal Adept
Leibi
Galen Strawson, Realistic monism - why physicalism entails panpsychism - PhilPapers
I've not seen it yet and that is one of my big questions too.
Soupie responds to Steve's post #812 in this way:
"If I follow Strawson, he holds that consciousness/experience is continuous. Thus, when he says "experience is ‘really just neurons firing" I don't think he means consciousness/experience comes into existence when neurons fire. What I think he is saying is that firing neurons just are experiences such as green.
Again, from the panpsychist/continuous stance, I believe Strawson is suggesting that for other organisms/systems, their experience might be some other processes equivalent to neurons firing. In other words, if all matter is intrinsically conscious, then substrate independence for consciousness is moot. However, whether minds can be substrate independent is another matter. It seems Strawson is open to that possibility.
Obviously, I may be misunderstanding Strawson. However, if I have it right, I think it would have made more sense for him to say "I am happy to say, along with many other physicalists, thatexperience mind is ‘really just neurons firing’, at least in the case of biological organisms like ourselves."
>> It is that experiential phenomena ‘just are’ physical, so that there is a lot more to neurons than physics and neurophysiology record (or can record).
In other words, Naive Realism is false, i.e., the belief that because objective reality appears devoid of consciousness/experience, it is devoid of consciousness/experience."
Can you flesh out your last sentences, Soupie? It seems to me that you are trying to characterize statements of Strawson's as supporting Hoffman's metaphysics. I don't think that attempt is valid, but if it is you should be able to support your thesis in detail.
I continue to wonder why, as a panpsychist, you feel the need to support panpsychism with Hoffman's ideas. I also continue to wonder why you seem unable to let go of the well-settled issue of the inadequacy of'Naieve Realism' and recognize what Strawson explains in terms of 'Direct Realism'. In much of what you write I sense a desire to get free of, to think entirely beyond, the continuous and inescapable interrelationship of consciousness and that which consciousness is conscious of, which includes embodied contact with the body of the physical world and understanding of the nature of that contact, that interrelationship, that chiasm.
"If I follow Strawson, he holds that consciousness/experience is continuous. Thus, when he says "experience is ‘really just neurons firing" I don't think he means consciousness/experience comes into existence when neurons fire. What I think he is saying is that firing neurons just are experiences such as green.
Again, from the panpsychist/continuous stance, I believe Strawson is suggesting that for other organisms/systems, their experience might be some other processes equivalent to neurons firing. In other words, if all matter is intrinsically conscious, then substrate independence for consciousness is moot. However, whether minds can be substrate independent is another matter. It seems Strawson is open to that possibility.
Obviously, I may be misunderstanding Strawson. However, if I have it right, I think it would have made more sense for him to say "I am happy to say, along with many other physicalists, that
>> It is that experiential phenomena ‘just are’ physical, so that there is a lot more to neurons than physics and neurophysiology record (or can record).
In other words, Naive Realism is false, i.e., the belief that because objective reality appears devoid of consciousness/experience, it is devoid of consciousness/experience."
Can you flesh out your last sentences, Soupie? It seems to me that you are trying to characterize statements of Strawson's as supporting Hoffman's metaphysics. I don't think that attempt is valid, but if it is you should be able to support your thesis in detail.
I continue to wonder why, as a panpsychist, you feel the need to support panpsychism with Hoffman's ideas. I also continue to wonder why you seem unable to let go of the well-settled issue of the inadequacy of'Naieve Realism' and recognize what Strawson explains in terms of 'Direct Realism'. In much of what you write I sense a desire to get free of, to think entirely beyond, the continuous and inescapable interrelationship of consciousness and that which consciousness is conscious of, which includes embodied contact with the body of the physical world and understanding of the nature of that contact, that interrelationship, that chiasm.
Thank you for the link. I've just begun reading it and want to quote two paragraphs which you already quoted in part:
"You’re certainly not a realistic physicalist, you’re not a real physicalist, if you deny the existence of the phenomenon whose existence is more certain than the existence of anything else: experience, ‘consciousness’, conscious experience, ‘phenomenology’, experiential ‘what-it’s-likeness’, feeling, sensation, explicit conscious thought as we have it and know it at almost every waking moment. Many words are used to denote this necessarily occurrent (essentially non-dispositional) phenomenon, and in this paper I will use the terms ‘experience’, ‘experiential phenomena’, and ‘experientiality’ to refer to it.
Full recognition of the reality of experience, then, is the obligatory starting point for any remotely realistic version of physicalism. This is because it is the obligatory starting point for any remotely realistic (indeed any non-self-defeating) theory of what there is. It is the obligatory starting point for any theory that can legitimately claim to be ‘naturalistic’ because experience is itself the fundamental given natural fact; it is a very old point that there is nothing more certain than the existence of experience.
It follows that real physicalism can have nothing to do with physicSalism, the view—the faith—that the nature or essence of all concrete reality can in principle be fully captured in the terms of physics. . . ."
Nor, I would add, can "the nature or essence of all concrete reality ... in principle be fully captured in the terms of" computational information theory and computational neuroscience."
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