Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 2

[Soupie]

Remember, Barrett argues for something different going on in humans:

Our solution is that emotion categories live at the level of human perception. Emotions are contents, not systems, in the brain.

I'm not sure how that's different from what I said? "Emotion categories live at the level of human perception." That is, emotions are conditional.

On this view, when a newborn baby is separated from its mother for the first time and begins to cry and show signs of distress, some infants may be experiencing pleasure or joy. The reason that infants will attempt to return to their mothers--despite feeling this pleasure and joy--is pretty much a mystery, right?

 

[smcder]

This is a sub-debate of the global the nature/nurture debate imo. And like the consensus on the nature/nurture debate, the answer is it's a little of both. Panksepp seems to be saying it's both, and Barrett is saying it's all "nurture."

If it's all nurture, why do we even talk about "human" psychology? Shouldn't we just talk about generic psychology? The reason we talk about human psychology versus non-human psychology is because we believe that a human mind is different than a non-human mind.

So why do we believe that a human mind is different than a non-human mind? That's a very honest question! I would love to hear both @smcder's and @Constance's answers to this question. So far Constance has not answered this question. (That's a statement of fact, not meant as a challenge or insult.)

I can think of two leading reasons for the difference between human and non-human minds:

(1) There are disembodied minds possessing phenomenal affect, experiences, cognitions, metacognitions, and memories. These minds are different. Certain of these minds get paired with humans and certain of these minds get paired with non-humans. How and why these minds are different cannot currently be known.

(2) Minds are directly related to organisms. The differences between human minds and non-human minds are directly related to the physical and physiological differences between human organisms and non-human organisms.

Are there other ways to account for the differences between human and non-human psychologies? If so, what are they?

Do the two of you deny that there are differences between human and non-human psychologies?

My view is that: Certain organisms and certain developing, infant organisms have their behavior guided by unconditional, innate affective feelings. However, certain organisms--such as humans--quickly, within mere months, begin to have there affective feelings shaped by secondary and tertiary processes.

If you've spent time with children or even the mental ill, I believe you will see this. Take the example of the mentally ill: If we accept Barrett's position -- that all affect is cognitively constructed -- then we're suggesting that all mental illness is cognitive -- it's all do to faulting thinking. Of course, some mental illness is due to faulty cognition; but to suggest that all mental illness is a result of faulty cognition is wrong imo. In some cases, people have brains that are not neurotypical or are in some ways damaged or impaired.

And what does the constructivist position say about temperament and personality? Are temperament and personality all cognition/computation as well?

Having said all that, I do think the human brain has been shaped via evolution to be the most adaptable, general purpose "processor" in the known universe, allowing humans (and human minds) to be incredible adaptable. We are the most cognitive (tertiary) organisms currently known. However, at our core--I believe--are some innate, biological, primary physical and mental lattice that get us started... but onto this lattice each of us quickly begins actively and passively shaping--via secondary and tertiary processes--our minds.

This is a sub-debate of the global the nature/nurture debate imo. And like the consensus on the nature/nurture debate, the answer is it's a little of both. Panksepp seems to be saying it's both, and Barrett is saying it's all "nurture."

Barrett is saying emotions are constructed cognitively. I don't think we can make the jump to all nurture from that. It's a good question to research, at this point I don't think "all nurture" is accurate.

So why do we believe that a human mind is different than a non-human mind? That's a very honest question! I would love to hear both @smcder's and @Constance's answers to this question. So far Constance has not answered this question. (That's a statement of fact, not meant as a challenge or insult.)

Comparitive anatomy ... Barrett thinks a human mind is different than a non-human mind for these reasons:

Our solution is that emotion categories live at the level of human perception. Emotions are contents, not systems, in the brain.

Furthermore, homologous emotion circuits of the sort presumed by the natural-kind model are unlikely to exist given what is known about the evolution of the human brain.

When compared with other mammals, the human brain has seen a rapid expansion in the isocortical aspects of affective circuitry along with increasingly dense reciprocal projections to subcortical areas (some of which have evolved in concert with the cortical changes).

Do the two of you deny that there are differences between human and non-human psychologies?

Is that a serious question? I live with six dogs ... I have noticed differences. My dogs are more similar to one another than to me. Although, I do have to say the longer we live together, the more alike we become.

If you've spent time with children or even the mental ill, I believe you will see this. Take the example of the mentally ill: If we accept Barrett's position -- that all affect is cognitively constructed -- then we're suggesting that all mental illness is cognitive -- it's all do to faulting thinking. Of course, some mental illness is due to faulty cognition; but to suggest that all mental illness is a result of faulty cognition is wrong imo. In some cases, people have brains that are not neurotypical or are in some ways damaged or impaired.

I helped raise six children and worked for a mental health organization for seven years ... and no, Barrett is not saying that mental illness is faulty thinking. My sense is that cognitive construction is thinking on her view, so faulty thinking is faulty cognition which, as you say, goes back to damaged, impaired or non-typical physiology ... I think she would agree with you on that. I don't think many mainstream psychologists see it otherwise. There is a minority view though in which mental illness is seen primarily as faulty thinking - for some persons diagnosed with mental illness this view is felt to be empowering. Thomas Szaz and mandessradio.net are good sources on these ideas.

And what does the constructivist position say about temperament and personality? Are temperament and personality all cognition/computation as well?

See my answer above.

Having said all that, I do think the human brain has been shaped via evolution to be the most adaptable, general purpose "processor" in the known universe, allowing humans (and human minds) to be incredible adaptable. We are the most cognitive (tertiary) organisms currently known. However, at our core--I believe--are some innate, biological, primary physical and mental lattice that get us started... but onto this lattice each of us quickly begins actively and passively shaping--via secondary and tertiary processes--our minds.

Did you read the alien minds article above? it would challenge some of those assumptions and it has challenged some of my thoughts about brain and consciousness research ... evolutionary theory would suggest the brain was cobbled together and is modular with numerous special purposes ... not a general purpose processor - the computer is a very bad metaphor here. As to the known universe ... I believe we've been as far as the moon ... right? ;-)

The rest of it I generally agree with.

 

[smcder]

I'm not sure how that's different from what I said? "Emotion categories live at the level of human perception." That is, emotions are conditional.

On this view, when a newborn baby is separated from its mother for the first time and begins to cry and show signs of distress, some infants may be experiencing pleasure or joy. The reason that infants will attempt to return to their mothers--despite feeling this pleasure and joy--is pretty much a mystery, right?

I mean that Barrett is say something different is going on with humans compared to even other mammals.

 

[Soupie]

All three would seem to be a contradiction too ... emotion is unconditional and conditioned and (or?) cognitive ... I can't make that work.

Even if you say there are basic circuits that "generate" emotion, once it hits that second level and is conditioned, then you can't really say it's overall unconditioned ... and then if it's constructed, then you can't really say it's conditioned (not for humans) - not the final emotion as we feel it and think about it...

When a child touches a hot stove, he burns (damages) his hand. If he does not remove his hand, it may become permanently damaged. The phenomenal sensation of pain is a motivator. It motivates us to move our hand in the moment. (People who do not feel pain would not move their hand. Although I wonder if there is research on this?) At conception, pain is unconditional. When we touch a stove and it hurst, we don't have to cognitively/conceptual "learn" to move our hand. However, pain is also involved in conditional learning; we learn not too touch any stoves, whether they're on or not.

Panksepp seems to be arguing the same for affective feelings: they motivate organisms and they are unconditional. When we instinctively play, the simultaneously experienced affect is unconditionally pleasant. Kids don't "learn" to play, or "learn" that play is pleasant. When we are separated from primary caregivers, the affect is unpleasant. Kids don't "learn" that being separate from mom is unpleasant. It just is.

Barrett seems to argue that infants come out of the womb as little thinking adults. Hm, I'm separated from mum. That could be bad! I'm going to cry, dammit! Hm, I think this is a bad feeling I'm having right now. I'll call it anxiety! Yay!

Certainly, children quickly--within the first days and weeks of life--begin to learn conditionally and within the first months begin to form concepts. However, to deny that there is a innate, biological framework of human psychology is wrong, imo.

 

[Soupie]

Comparitive anatomy ... Barrett thinks a human mind is different than a non-human mind for these reasons:

Our solution is that emotion categories live at the level of human perception. Emotions are contents, not systems, in the brain.

Furthermore, homologous emotion circuits of the sort presumed by the natural-kind model are unlikely to exist given what is known about the evolution of the human brain.

When compared with other mammals, the human brain has seen a rapid expansion in the isocortical aspects of affective circuitry along with increasingly dense reciprocal projections to subcortical areas (some of which have evolved in concert with the cortical changes).

What I would gather from this, is that humans can (1) more quickly developmentally and (2) more strongly regulate their feelings. That is, humans have a unique ability to cognitively shape and regulate their emotions. However, we know that humans who have genetically or environmentally impaired frontal lobe chronically struggle with self-regulation (and emotional regulation).

The reason Panksepp uses caps is because his basic 7 are not to be confused with our tertiary, conceptual emotions of the same name.

Is my conception of jealous different from other humans? Of course. But the pleasant affect (PLAY) that young children experience during appropriate rough and tumble play is likely unconditional and innate.

 

[Soupie]

Panksepp says FEAR is FEAR but Barrett says it's not fear until it's constructed ... is the boxer afraid or is the boxer angry or ... it makes a big difference in what the boxer will do ... if the two theories can be distinguished they will make different predictions at this point

Remember Jordan Peterson said that when we face our fears we bring a whole other set of processes into play? That's closer to what Barrett is saying.

And I interpret this as: Human infants, via the hereditary information in their DNA, are born with innate, physical brain circuits that seem to utilize unique neurochemicals ( perhaps in a manner proposed by Lövheim ). These brain circuits and chemicals serve to motivate/guide the rapidly developing infant human. Forming an attachment to mum, eating, avoiding damage, and exploring the (social) environment seem to be paramount. In many ways, each of these things is social in nature. Basic emotion theories suggest that basic emotions guide the infant in these pursuits.

However, these innate systems are quickly (immediately?) "co-opted" by secondary and tertiary processes that are developing in the infant brain. Infants need to have conditional learning to survive and flourish in their unique physical and social environments. Therefore, these innate, basic affects are quickly "overridden" by secondary and tertiary processes.

In Western culture, infants are separated from their mothers and placed in a quiet, dark, flat crib to sleep. Many infants exhibit immense distress when this occurs. One would might suppose they are experiencing a negative affect when they are put in this situation. Some parents even let infants cry themselves to sleep. "Cry it out." However, over time, infants will no longer cry when they are separated from mum and placed in a quiet, dark, flat crib. In the best case scenario, they have learned a positive association with the crib or how to self-soothe with a pacifier or blanket; and in the worst case scenario, they have learned that when they are in distress in this situation, no one will help them, so "asking" for help is pointless.

If an infant does not exhibit signs of distress (and presumably unpleasant affect) when seprated from mum or denied food, etc, it is usually indicative of a serious problem.

 

[Soupie]

Soupie: Having said all that, I do think the human brain has been shaped via evolution to be the most adaptable, general purpose "processor" in the known universe, allowing humans (and human minds) to be incredible adaptable. We are the most cognitive (tertiary) organisms currently known. However, at our core--I believe--are some innate, biological, primary physical and mental lattice that get us started... but onto this lattice each of us quickly begins actively and passively shaping--via secondary and tertiary processes--our minds.

Smcder: Did you read the alien minds article above? it would challenge some of those assumptions and it has challenged some of my thoughts about brain and consciousness research ... evolutionary theory would suggest the brain was cobbled together and is modular with numerous special purposes ... not a general purpose processor - the computer is a very bad metaphor here. As to the known universe ... I believe we've been as far as the moon ... right? ;-)

I did read the article. Which of my assumptions does it challenge? That brain/mind are shaped over historic time by evolution and that brain/mind are shaped during an organisms lifetime by both nature and (self-) nurture? I think the article actually supports those assumptions.

I've argued that the subjective mind is information, but I've never argued for the CTM. I think that brains do process information, but they don't do it the same way man-made computers do.

It seems to me that Barrett's cognitive constructivist model of affect is essentially a computational model. That is, there is no innate, historical, biological meaning; meaning is derived cognitively ie computationally.

 

[Pharoah]

I think this is a big difference in Barrett and Panksepp:

"Barrett (2006a) pointed out that whether defined by analogy or homology, empirical evidence from human experience, behavior, facial movements, psychophysiology, and cognitive neuroscience is steadily accumulating to disconfirm the natural-kind model of emotion. Not all instances of an emotion (e.g., what people call fear) look alike, feel alike, or have the same neurophysiological signature (i.e., they are not analogous). As a result, the natural-kind model cannot explain the considerable variability of emotional life that has been observed within individuals over time, across individuals from the same culture, and of course, across cultures. Even rats display behavioral flexibility that is context dependent. In the natural-kind model, such heterogeneity in emotional life is either treated as error or is explained by processes added to the model post hoc (e.g., display rules). To understand what emotions are and how they work, however, scientists must understand and model this variability, not explain it away. Furthermore, homologous emotion circuits of the sort presumed by the natural-kind model are unlikely to exist given what is known about the evolution of the human brain.

When compared with other mammals, the human brain has seen a rapid expansion in the isocortical aspects of affective circuitry along with increasingly dense reciprocal projections to subcortical areas (some of which have evolved in concert with the cortical changes).1

Together with the pronounced interspecies differences that exist in cognition and behavior, these changes suggest that the human brain may function very differently when compared with nonprimate, mammalian species such as rats, calling into question the existence of strong emotion homologies.

As a result, animal models yield necessary and important insights that must be incorporated into any model of emotion, but they have not (and probably cannot) give a sufficient account of the events people call fear, anger, or sadness."

When a child touches a hot stove, he burns (damages) his hand. If he does not remove his hand, it may become permanently damaged. The phenomenal sensation of pain is a motivator. It motivates us to move our hand in the moment. (People who do not feel pain would not move their hand. Although I wonder if there is research on this?) At conception, pain is unconditional. When we touch a stove and it hurst, we don't have to cognitively/conceptual "learn" to move our hand. However, pain is also involved in conditional learning; we learn not too touch any stoves, whether they're on or not.

Panksepp seems to be arguing the same for affective feelings: they motivate organisms and they are unconditional. When we instinctively play, the simultaneously experienced affect is unconditionally pleasant. Kids don't "learn" to play, or "learn" that play is pleasant. When we are separated from primary caregivers, the affect is unpleasant. Kids don't "learn" that being separate from mom is unpleasant. It just is.

Barrett seems to argue that infants come out of the womb as little thinking adults. Hm, I'm separated from mum. That could be bad! I'm going to cry, dammit! Hm, I think this is a bad feeling I'm having right now. I'll call it anxiety! Yay!

Certainly, children quickly--within the first days and weeks of life--begin to learn conditionally and within the first months begin to form concepts. However, to deny that there is a innate, biological framework of human psychology is wrong, imo.

Soupie, you say
"Barrett seems to argue that infants come out of the womb as little thinking adults. Hm, I'm separated from mum. That could be bad! I'm going to cry, dammit! Hm, I think this is a bad feeling I'm having right now. I'll call it anxiety! Yay!"

I don't think Barrett can be saying such things... she can't be that daft. Panksepp and Barrett are both a bit blinkered - fighting their corner like trapped animals.
As you say Soupie, Panksepp has never denied the importance of secondary and tertiary processes in shaping and individuating 'emotion'. He re-iterates this point over and over.
Barrett is right that there is something special about the human conceptualised interpretation of feelings.
HCT states that all sophisticated animals have feeling, but that humans are unique in interpreting and classifying feelings as different "types of emotions". HCT says, for example, that when you catch your dog sitting on the sofa, it will jump off, look up sheepishly at you, put its tail between its legs, curve its back, and stand sideways on to you because of a particular feeling (a feeling that is important for social creatures to possess - for it encourages behaviours that say, 'you are dominant and I did something that is against the rule laid down by the dominant one in the pack - please don't shout at me or bite me' [nb: smcder]). As humans, we interpret and conceptualise those feelings - in terms of our feeling-experiences as they relate to our social commitments - and those interpretative concepts identify (with our peers), the "emotion we call guilt"; the experience of the "feeling we call regret"; the judgements that tell us "we have done wrong". A dog does not have any of those conceptual notions about right and wrong, about social values etc. As HCT defines this, the animal does have the feelings but in the absence of any "emotion interpretation".
But this is a semantic issue as much as anything. A lot of the conflict arises because people do not have the same definition for or understanding of 'emotion'.
Many scientists understand emotion as interpretative. HCT supports this notion, but emphasises that emotion is an interpretation of something - that 'something' is a complex world of feeling phenomena, a world that links in with innately acquired, qualitatively relevant, biochemical and neurological mechanisms.
HCT unites Panksepp with Barrett. (Unless Barrett really is daft.)

 

[smcder]

I did read the article. Which of my assumptions does it challenge? That brain/mind are shaped over historic time by evolution and that brain/mind are shaped during an organisms lifetime by both nature and (self-) nurture? I think the article actually supports those assumptions.

I've argued that the subjective mind is information, but I've never argued for the CTM. I think that brains do process information, but they don't do it the same way man-made computers do.

It seems to me that Barrett's cognitive constructivist model of affect is essentially a computational model. That is, there is no innate, historical, biological meaning; meaning is derived cognitively ie computationally.

"Having said all that, I do think the human brain has been shaped via evolution to be the most adaptable, general purpose "processor" in the known universe."

That's what I was going off of ... and that sounded like a computer metaphor.

Have you read Barrett's article or articles I posted? I'll go back and pull the links and the statements where they share concerns/ objections to one another's work - and then I'd suggest we read the articles carefully and more recent ones if available.

If I remember Barrett says there is evidence contrary to the 7 circuits that Panksepp hasn't taken into consideration and Panksepp says there isn't enough evidence to support Barrett's theory ... so if they are both making empirical claims about how the brain works we should be able to see the differences in their theories.

 

[smcder]

I did read the article. Which of my assumptions does it challenge? That brain/mind are shaped over historic time by evolution and that brain/mind are shaped during an organisms lifetime by both nature and (self-) nurture? I think the article actually supports those assumptions.

I've argued that the subjective mind is information, but I've never argued for the CTM. I think that brains do process information, but they don't do it the same way man-made computers do.

It seems to me that Barrett's cognitive constructivist model of affect is essentially a computational model. That is, there is no innate, historical, biological meaning; meaning is derived cognitively ie computationally.

"Which of my assumptions does it challenge?"

That the brain is a general purpose processor.

I don't see a challenge as a bad thing or as saying "you're wrong" - and for that matter I don't see being wrong as a bad thing.

 

[Constance]

. . . Have you read Barrett's article or articles I posted? I'll go back and pull the links and the statements where they share concerns/ objections to one another's work - and then I'd suggest we read the articles carefully and more recent ones if available.

Great suggestion. I was about to begin catching up with all the links posted yesterday, so if you're going to provide us with those that are most to the point of distinguishing the two hypotheses in contention that will be a great help.

If I remember Barrett says there is evidence contrary to the 7 circuits that Panksepp hasn't taken into consideration and Panksepp says there isn't enough evidence to support Barrett's theory ... so if they are both making empirical claims about how the brain works we should be able to see the differences in their theories.

I've been wondering about the '7 circuits' and '12 emotions' since I first read references to them here late yesterday afternoon. My impression was that these numbers originated in Panksepp's theory? Any clarification of that available? Where do I read about it? I mentioned the theory that we have eight available emotions to my dinner companions last night and all brows were raised. Mine too.

 

[smcder]

Soupie, you say
"Barrett seems to argue that infants come out of the womb as little thinking adults. Hm, I'm separated from mum. That could be bad! I'm going to cry, dammit! Hm, I think this is a bad feeling I'm having right now. I'll call it anxiety! Yay!"

I don't think Barrett can be saying such things... she can't be that daft. Panksepp and Barrett are both a bit blinkered - fighting their corner like trapped animals.
As you say Soupie, Panksepp has never denied the importance of secondary and tertiary processes in shaping and individuating 'emotion'. He re-iterates this point over and over.
Barrett is right that there is something special about the human conceptualised interpretation of feelings.
HCT states that all sophisticated animals have feeling, but that humans are unique in interpreting and classifying feelings as different "types of emotions". HCT says, for example, that when you catch your dog sitting on the sofa, it will jump off, look up sheepishly at you, put its tail between its legs, curve its back, and stand sideways on to you because of a particular feeling (a feeling that is important for social creatures to possess - for it encourages behaviours that say, 'you are dominant and I did something that is against the rule laid down by the dominant one in the pack - please don't shout at me or bite me' [nb: smcder]). As humans, we interpret and conceptualise those feelings - in terms of our feeling-experiences as they relate to our social commitments - and those interpretative concepts identify (with our peers), the "emotion we call guilt"; the experience of the "feeling we call regret"; the judgements that tell us "we have done wrong". A dog does not have any of those conceptual notions about right and wrong, about social values etc. As HCT defines this, the animal does have the feelings but in the absence of any "emotion interpretation".
But this is a semantic issue as much as anything. A lot of the conflict arises because people do not have the same definition for or understanding of 'emotion'.
Many scientists understand emotion as interpretative. HCT supports this notion, but emphasises that emotion is an interpretation of something - that 'something' is a complex world of feeling phenomena, a world that links in with innately acquired, qualitatively relevant, biochemical and neurological mechanisms.
HCT unites Panksepp with Barrett. (Unless Barrett really is daft.)

Dogs are interesting - Daniel Dennett argues in Kinds of Minds that they be unique emotionally among mammals as a result of their close association with humans ... in fact he says they may have a unique capacity for suffering.

 

[smcder]

Here's the Barrett article and Abstract and it references Panksepp and Izard in the same issue.

My suggestion is that we read these papers and discuss them in terms of the three concerns raised by Panksepp and Izard and the following two claims by Barrett:

1. "Barrett (2006a) provided a comprehensive review of the empirical evidence from the study of emotion in humans and concluded that this assumption has outlived its usefulness."

2. "Finally, we end the article with some thoughts on how to move the scientific study of emotion beyond the debate over whether or not emotions are natural kinds."

Of Mice and Men: Natural Kinds of Emotions in the Mammalian Brain? A Response to Panksepp and Izard

"For almost 5 decades, the scientific study of emotion has been guided by the assumption that categories such as anger, sadness, and fear cut nature at its joints. Barrett (2006a) provided a comprehensive review of the empirical evidence from the study of emotion in humans and concluded that this assumption has outlived its usefulness. Panksepp and Izard have written lengthy papers (published in this issue) containing complementary but largely nonoverlapping criticisms of Barrett (2006a). In our response, we address three of their concerns. First, we discuss the value of correlational versus experimental studies for evaluating the natural-kind model of emotion and refute the claim that the evidence offered in Barrett (2006a) was merely correlational. Second, we take up the issue of whether or not there is evidence for “coherently organized neural circuits” for natural kinds of emotions in the mammalian brain and counter the claim that Barrett (2006a) ignored crucial evidence for existence of discrete emotions as natural kinds. Third, we address Panksepp and Izard’s misconceptions of an alternative view, the conceptual act model of emotion, that was briefly discussed in Barrett (2006a). Finally, we end the article with some thoughts on how to move the scientific study of emotion beyond the debate over whether or not emotions are natural kinds."

 

[smcder]

Soupie, you say
"Barrett seems to argue that infants come out of the womb as little thinking adults. Hm, I'm separated from mum. That could be bad! I'm going to cry, dammit! Hm, I think this is a bad feeling I'm having right now. I'll call it anxiety! Yay!"

I don't think Barrett can be saying such things... she can't be that daft. Panksepp and Barrett are both a bit blinkered - fighting their corner like trapped animals.
As you say Soupie, Panksepp has never denied the importance of secondary and tertiary processes in shaping and individuating 'emotion'. He re-iterates this point over and over.
Barrett is right that there is something special about the human conceptualised interpretation of feelings.
HCT states that all sophisticated animals have feeling, but that humans are unique in interpreting and classifying feelings as different "types of emotions". HCT says, for example, that when you catch your dog sitting on the sofa, it will jump off, look up sheepishly at you, put its tail between its legs, curve its back, and stand sideways on to you because of a particular feeling (a feeling that is important for social creatures to possess - for it encourages behaviours that say, 'you are dominant and I did something that is against the rule laid down by the dominant one in the pack - please don't shout at me or bite me' [nb: smcder]). As humans, we interpret and conceptualise those feelings - in terms of our feeling-experiences as they relate to our social commitments - and those interpretative concepts identify (with our peers), the "emotion we call guilt"; the experience of the "feeling we call regret"; the judgements that tell us "we have done wrong". A dog does not have any of those conceptual notions about right and wrong, about social values etc. As HCT defines this, the animal does have the feelings but in the absence of any "emotion interpretation".
But this is a semantic issue as much as anything. A lot of the conflict arises because people do not have the same definition for or understanding of 'emotion'.
Many scientists understand emotion as interpretative. HCT supports this notion, but emphasises that emotion is an interpretation of something - that 'something' is a complex world of feeling phenomena, a world that links in with innately acquired, qualitatively relevant, biochemical and neurological mechanisms.
HCT unites Panksepp with Barrett. (Unless Barrett really is daft.)

Panksepp will win because he is FIGHTING while Barrett is thinking about how she feels.

That is, unless she tickles him.

 

[Soupie]

Okay, the discussion of emotions right now is excellent, and I'm not purposefully trying to get the thread sidetracked. However, I just stumbled upon a paper about Nietzsche that seems to pull all of us together: @Constance, @smcder, @Pharoah, and myself.

Thinkers' thoughts noted in the paper include: Darwin, Heidegger, Dennette, Kant, Merleau-Ponty, Evan Thompson, FranciscoVarela, and, of course, Neitzsche. I was looking for more information about Nagel's idea of Naturalistic Teleology, and found this absolute beauty!:

"Nietzsche's Non-Reductive Naturalism: Evolution, Teleology, Value" (published in Pli: The Warwick Journal of Philosophy) | David Storey - Academia.edu

Nietzsche's Non-Reductive Naturalism: Evolution, Teleology, and Value

Abstract: I argue that Nietzsche intended his philosophy of the will to power, understood as a philosophical biology, as a solution to the problem of nihilism. For Nietzsche, the riseof positivism meant the “decline of cosmological values” and entailed that mere nature--a closed, materialistic, meaningless, mechanistic order--was all there is. Nietzsche's pronouncement that God is dead meant that the super-natural order in which human beings placed their highest hopes and values never existed in the first place, and that the dawning realization of this truth, when placed before the background of a nature without purpose or value, would lead to great confusion and disorientation about the meaning of human life.Yet Nietzsche took humans' natural and unavoidable capacity for valuation as a sign that valuation is intrinsic to life. Nietzsche attempted to “dehumanize nature” while “re-animalizing man,” but without lapsing into what we today would call scientific naturalism.He rejected the mechanistic view of the animal (and the mechanistic view of the in organic world) advanced in modern science and replaced it with what we might call a non-reductive naturalism. I lay out Nietzsche's naturalism by focusing on his view of biology because it is his point of entry for anchoring value in the natural world. My main purpose is to clarify Nietzsche's specific form of naturalism and his positions on Darwinian evolution, teleology, and values. ...

So I suggest that Nietzsche's project falls within the category of “non-reductive naturalisms,” which Ted Benton defines thus:

A non-reductionist naturalism, making use of the ideas of a hierarchy of more or less autonomous levels of organization of matter, each with its own, qualitatively new, 'emergent' powers or properties has been one fruitful way of maintaining the insights of a naturalistic approach, without falling foul of what is valid in the anti-naturalistic critique. Such hierarchical, 'emergent powers' ontologies enable their advocates to recognize in the various subjectmatters of the different natural and social sciences more or less discrete andautonomous object-domains, while at the same time making no concessionsto spiritualistic, vitalist, or supernatural beliefs. 3
​

What Nietzsche is doing, in short, is trying to reconstruct the great chain of being without speculative supports in a way that is consistent with biological science. ...

As Thompson explains,

Our conception of matter as essentially equivalent to energy and as having the potential for self-organization at numerous spatiotemporal scales is far from the classical Newtonian worldview. In particular, the physics of thermodynamically open systems combined with the chemistry and biology of self-organizing systems provides another option that is not available toKant: life is an emergent order of nature that results from certain morphodynamical principles, specifically those of autopoiesis. 51​

Though he did not have access to the science we do, it seems that Nietzsche's basic intuition that mechanism would be superseded by a “dynamic interpretation of the world”centered on quanta of energy was generally correct. Finally, Thompson explains why the autopoietic view underwrites a naturalized teleology or “immanent purposiveness”:

The first mode of purposiveness is identity: autopoiesis entails the production and maintenance of a dynamic entity in the face of material change. The second mode of purposiveness is sense-making: an autopoietic system always has to make sense of the world so as to remain viable. Sense-making changes the physiochemical world into an environment of significance and valence, creating an Umwelt for the system. Sense-making, Varela maintains, is none other than intentionality in its minimal and original biological form.​

I'll admit, I don't quite grok all the ideas presented in the paper, but I'm fairly certain I see all of our various viewpoints apparently unified here... Is that possible!?

 

[Constance]

. . . this is a semantic issue as much as anything. A lot of the conflict arises because people do not have the same definition for or understanding of 'emotion'. Many scientists understand emotion as interpretative. HCT supports this notion, but emphasises that emotion is an interpretation of something - that 'something' is a complex world of feeling phenomena, a world that links in with innately acquired, qualitatively relevant, biochemical and neurological mechanisms. [/quote]


I like the sound of this. Just to clarify, do you see the "interpretation of something" that accompanies/is involved in emotion as the result of phenomenal feelings in nonhuman animals [beyond a certain point in the evolution of species]as well as in humans?

 

[smcder]

Constance asked me to post this:

USER=6548]@Soupie[/USER], the Nietzsche paper you link sounds fascinating and I will read it. I'll continue participating in the rest of the current discussion over on the google forum. The reason I'm leaving the discussion here is that I frequently have (and now again have) instrumental/technical difficulties in getting my posts posted and in editing them even a minute or two after I've posted them. Later and elsewhere.

 

[smcder]

And this:

url="Depressed? Your "SEEKING" System Might Not Be Working: A Conversation with Neuroscientist Jaak Panksepp | Karin Badt"]Depressed? Your "SEEKING" System Might Not Be Working: A Conversation with Neuroscientist Jaak Panksepp | Karin Badt[/url][/QUOTE]

 

[Pharoah]

I like the sound of this. Just to clarify, do you see the "interpretation of something" that accompanies/is involved in emotion as the result of phenomenal feelings in nonhuman animals [beyond a certain point in the evolution of species]as well as in humans?

Not sure what you are asking, but I will answer anyway.
Non-human and human animals have phenomenal feeling - determined by innate qualitatively relevant mechanisms as they are related by identified associations through such facilities as an animal's perceptions. Thus animals understand qualitative relevancy by association through sensory perceptions.
Humans additionaly and uniquely have concepts about their phenomenal feelings. Our concepts of feeling phenomena, as they relate to us and to the world, are categorised by the conceptual family of "emotions".

 

[Polterwurst]

moved from another thread

You see one of these

"nuts-and-bolts" or "consciousness phenomena" ?

One of these

"nuts-and-bolts" or "consciousness phenomena" ?

One of these

"nuts-and-bolts" or "consciousness phenomena" ?

One of these

"nuts-and-bolts" or "consciousness phenomena" ?

What exactly is it about a possible craft from another planet, that cant be nuts and bolts and makes you lean towards consciousness phenomena as the default answer ?

If you were to see something like this come zipping across the sky and land in front of you, to all appearances a solid structured craft, whats the cue that makes you leap from nuts and bolts to consciousness phenomena ?

Nice pictures, but one is a fake. Can you spot it?


To be serious, though, I never said I believe all UFOs are figments of the imagination, psychic intrusions, discarnate consciousness flying around or messing with our heads (which is what I mean by "consciousness phenomena"). I know about the landing marks cases, I've seen the Australian witnesses talking about the water-sucking UFO, the Westall case, etc etc. These people are obviously not describing phantasies but physical craft with physical effects.

But there are some reports which might be totally unrelated, and which remind me of "lightshows" reported in poltergeist and haunting cases. That's what I was talking about. As you have had your experience, I have had mine, and it seems to indicate that there's something more than a purely material reality. And I think, many of the ball of lights cases might be evidence. But even that is nothing but speculation, to quote myself:

When thinking about future or alien technology, anything goes. They could be some kind of energy-based probe sent out from the "motherships" or even a life-form of their own. ... And there are undoubtedly many sighting reports in which balls of lights seem to emerge from "nuts and bolts" UFOs, which implies a direct connection.

..or just natural phenomena.