Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 8

[smcder]

Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 7

1. consciousness is fundamental - I do think consciousness, experience, maybe even POV are in some sense fundamental ... I think it is very hard for me not to think about this the way I think of fundamental aspects of what we call the physical/material - in other words, I think we should be careful thinking about little tiny bits of consciousness or proto-consciousness, for Chalmers thinking about it this way leads to the "combination problem" ... so it's very hard not to think about consciousness as a fluid or a field, or a particulate building block from which we build up our experiences - but I think we should try, because I think these metaphors are misleading.

You've shared the idea before that rather than monism or dualism there may be a "polyism." That is, there may be a multitude of fundamental "aspects" within what-is such as mass, gravity, space, time, consciousness, etc.

To me, that is classic dualism or perhaps "polyism."

So maybe you don't have an affinity for this approach, but you've mentioned it several times throughout this discussion.

And of course there are "hard" problems with this approach, namely the problem of interaction, and perhaps the "hard problem" of interaction as consciousness would seem to be an aspect unlike those other aspects.

There are many kinds of dualism - I think labeling leads to bad mental habits, so and so is a "dualist" so they must think this .... that's caused confusion here on the thread - in most cases, I think it's maybe better to focus on particular statements rather than assigning positions or applying labels.

 

[Constance]

I had written in a post reponding to @ufology: "Randall, we're not 'on the same page' and can't be until you invest the time required to read and comprehend phenomenological philosophy.” He replied:

Like I keep trying to get across, it's not that I don't comprehend, it's that, as should be obvious to you as well, there is no one correct way of looking at phenomenology, and that's because there are differing approaches by different philosophers who have their own spin or perspective on it. Add to that, there are multiple interpretations by individual students as to what each of those means.

The phenomenological school of philosophy is coherent from its outset to the present, though, as is the case in any philosophical discipline, individual philosophers have specific perspectives to bring to it – not surprising given the complexity of issues phenomenology addresses. You, nor anyone else, can comprehend phenomenological philosophy in whole or in part without reading it. To say as you do above that you ‘comprehend’ phenomenology without reading it is quite ludicrous. Prove me wrong, if you can, by writing us a lengthy post in which you characterize the philosophical problems and issues phenomenology addresses and what it contributes to philosophy of mind, consciousness studies, neuroscience, biology, ethology, evolutionary theory, and other disciplines involved together in the current vigorous inquiry into what consciousness is.

So the point in my asking, is to know exactly, without ambiguity, what you think you are saying, not what other people are saying. Once I know that, then we can build from there.

The point in your asking is to demand that I present you with a statement or a paragraph which you will attempt to discredit or dismiss with a statement or a paragraph, as is your usual practice in these forums. Ultimately what you want is rhetorical debate rather than cooperative effort to understand all the perspectives being brought to the complex problem consciousness presents to philosophy and science. The only thing we -- not just you and I but all of us together in this thread -- can mutually ‘build’ is mutual comprehension of the complex nature of consciousness, which requires comprehension of all the disciplinary perspectives brought to it in our time.

So please, some specifics. Instead of focusing on what you think my intellectual capacity for comprehension is, or other issues that will get us sidetracked, can you please just answer the question I asked in your own words: By "open-ended, lived, phenomenal interface", what exactly are you referring to there?

Sure, I’ll say again what I have said hundreds of times before in this thread with the wild hope that this time you will understand it. The phrase I wrote that puzzles you, referring to the “open-ended, lived, phenomenal interface” of conscious beings with the environing world in which they find themselves existing, refers to the ways in which we experience the world in which we live phenomenally – through the always situated, always temporally changing, and always partial phenomenal appearances of things and others available to us as we begin to walk around in this world, equipped with the affordances nature has provided us to see things to the extent that we do [never in-themselves], to hear the sounds that penetrate our ears, to feel the significance of touching and being touched by things and others actually present in the natural and cultural mileau in which we live, and gradually becoming capable of reflection on and thinking about our own experiences, our commonly shared experiences with others of our species and of other species, and the resulting funding of meaning, meaningfulness, in 'lived reality'. I hope that satisfies your demand. If not, so be it. (Btw, I have not cast aspersions on your "intellectual capacity for comprehension" but rather observed that you cannot engage effectively in discussions here because they are based on the reading of many lengthy texts, which you refuse to read.)

I also wrote: “Regarding the genesis of consciousness, however, Hoffman dives right in, claiming an ontological truth beyond demonstration that consciousness pre-exists the physical world itself and the evolution of beings capable of consciousness within it,” to which you replied:

If that made any sense I might buy into it, but from my perspective, which is that existence itself is physical in nature, it doesn't.

Then Hoffman’s interface theory should make no sense to you either. But if that’s the case why do you appear to be defending it? It looks as if you will need to spend some time reading what Hoffman has written, and also reading the critical respondents who have found what he has written to make no sense.


I also asked: “What are you talking about with regard to "our inner perceptual world"? And on what basis is all that we perceive and reflect on in the world "a step away from the question of consciousness itself"? And you replied:

“I use the phrase "perceptual world" as a reference, literally, to things perceived (the process of using the senses to acquire information about the surrounding environment or situation - Encarta ), not the thing that is experiencing the perceptions.”

So for you the “perceptual world” is constituted by things perceived through the senses, but somehow does not involve the perceiver’s experiential consciousness of the things that are perceived? Then who or what, in your view, does the perceiving? What is “the thing experiencing the perceptions” you go on to invoke in your next sentence?

Consciousness is from my perspective, the thing experiencing the perceptions, which makes the perceptual world one step away from consciousness itself. So for example, An AI might have a collection of electronic bits gathered from various sensory input devices that constitutes "information about the surrounding environment or situation", and it could even result in tasks being performed that are related to that information, but we don't have sufficient reason based on the task being performed, to assume that there is any consciousness behind it. I hope that helps clarify.

I’m afraid it doesn’t. What is the functional role or purpose of consciousness, in your view, if it does not open us up to sensorial and other bodily experiences of the mileau in which we have our existence?

 

[Constance]

We cannot empirically model consciousness emerging from matter. And we can't conceptualize it doing so either, except as brute fact. (For what it's worth, as I've noted, I think the autopoietic model of how a system might evolve to "sense" its environment is just about as damn close as we can get to conceptualizing how conscious experience could emerge from matter.)

I'm glad to read this. Autopoiesis is squarely in the phenomenological tradition. Maturana and Varela had both read Merleau-Ponty at length and recognized their debt to his insights. Thompson and his colleagues, beginning with Varela, are all informed and influenced by MP's philosophy, particularly concerning the nature of consciousness. There is, after all, a significant distinction to be made between 'matter' and 'living matter' as it takes form and develops in the organic evolution of species increasingly capable of awareness, affectivity, prereflective experience, and reflective consciousness/mind. Thompson's investigations of the structure of living organisms as self-organizing dissipative systems embedded in nature clarifies the nature of embodied consciousness in its evolution.

We might also want to consult this paper:

US National Library of Medicine
National Institutes of Health

Naturwissenschaften. 2003 Feb;90(2):49-59. Epub 2003 Jan 10.
Autopoiesis: a review and a reappraisal.
Luisi PL1.
Author information

Abstract

"The aim of the paper is to review critically the notion of autopoiesis as presented by Maturana and Varela. In particular, recognizing that there are difficulties in obtaining a complete and clear picture from the primary literature, an effort is made to present a coherent view-also based on many years of personal contact with Francisco Varela. The paper begins with a few historical notes to highlight the cultural background from which the notion of autopoiesis arose. The basic principles of autopoiesis as a theory of cellular life are then described, emphasizing also what autopoiesis is not: not an abstract theory, not a concept of artificial life, not a theory about the origin of life-but rather a pragmatic blueprint of life based on cellular life. It shown how this view leads to a conceptually clear definition of minimal life and to a logical link with related notions, such as self-organization, emergence, biological autonomy, auto-referentiality, and interactions with the environment. The perturbations brought about by the environment are seen as changes selected and triggered by the inner organization of the living. These selective coupling interactions impart meaning to the minimal life and are thus defined by Maturana and Varela with the arguable term of "cognition". This particular view on the mutual interactions between living organism and environment leads these authors to the notion of "enaction", and to the surprising view that autopoiesis and cognition are two complementary, and in a way equivalent, aspects of life. It is then shown how cognition, so defined, permits us to build a bridge between biology and cognitive science. Autopoiesis also allows one to conceive chemical models of minimal cellular life that can be implemented experimentally. The corresponding work on "chemical autopoiesis" is then reviewed. The surprising impact of autopoiesis in the social sciences ("social autopoiesis") is also briefly discussed. This review also comments on why the theory of autopoiesis had, and still has, a difficult time being accepted into the mainstream of life-science research. Finally, it is pointed out that the new interest in system biology and complexity theories may lead to a reappraisal of autopoiesis and related notions, as outlined also by other authors, such as Tibor Ganti and Stuart Kauffmann."

Autopoiesis: a review and a reappraisal. - PubMed - NCBI

.

 

[Constance]

The opening pages of McGinn's most recent book, Inborn Knowledge: The Mystery Within,
available in the text sample at amazon, are relevant to issues we are discussing now. I can't set a link to amazon for some reason, but you can find it in a trice.

As @Soupie suggested in a post today, Strawson's paper "Cognitive Phenomenology" is also significant for this current discussion. Here's a link to it:

Cognitive Phenomenology: Real Life

 

[Randall]

... the “open-ended, lived, phenomenal interface” of conscious beings with the environing world in which they find themselves existing, refers to the ways in which we experience the world in which we live phenomenally

OK Thanks. The above implies a model in which there are four main components:

1. The external world
   
2. Sensory perception ( information about the surrounding environment or situation obtained by the senses )
   
3. A perceptual interface between sensory perception and consciousness
   
4. Consciousness ( the experiencer of the perceptual interface )

If you see it differently than in the 4 points above, it might help if you could identify where and how the above differs from what you were trying to get across.

Then Hoffman’s interface theory should make no sense to you either. But if that’s the case why do you appear to be defending it?

The glitch we have there might lie in a faulty assumption. If you think I think Hoffman is trying to explain how consciousness comes into being, I don't. What I think Hoffman is doing is mapping relationships between conscious agents, which could prove very useful in networking them if they are ever created by us.

So for you the “perceptual world” is constituted by things perceived through the senses, but somehow does not involve the perceiver’s experiential consciousness of the things that are perceived?

Right, my analogy to AI should have gotten that across fairly clearly. An AI could conceivably have "information about the surrounding environment or situation" ( perception ), yet not be conscious of it.

Then who or what, in your view, does the perceiving? What is “the thing experiencing the perceptions” you go on to invoke in your next sentence?

The thing experiencing the perceptions ( or anything else for that matter ) is in my view, consciousness. In this context consciousness = experience.

What is the functional role or purpose of consciousness, in your view, if it does not open us up to sensorial and other bodily experiences of the mileau in which we have our existence?

I'm not sure what you mean by "open us up to". That seems like it could be a real can of worms. So maybe the question might be better dealt with if we leave that part out and just ask what the function of consciousness is. I've commented before that it provides motivation for action, and action is essential for survival.

 

[smcder]

The opening pages of McGinn's most recent book, Inborn Knowledge: The Mystery Within,
available in the text sample at amazon, are relevant to issues we are discussing now. I can't set a link to amazon for some reason, but you can find it in a trice.

As @Soupie suggested in a post today, Strawson's paper "Cognitive Phenomenology" is also significant for this current discussion. Here's a link to it:

Cognitive Phenomenology: Real Life

I finished re-reading the Taylor Carman paper and looked at some reviews of the McGinn book. I also started listening again to Dreyfus' lectures on PB.

 

[Constance]

The Kafatos paper is very challenging. I'm wondering how y'all respond to it. A few excerpts :

"Awareness, i.e. it is irreducibly present at every scale and from every perspective. One might ask, of course, whether this is truly fundamental because prior to the initiating symmetry break there is, by definition, no ability to assign qualities to the non-dual awareness, including complementarity. However, what pre-exists the initiating symmetry break is also therefore beyond description and, de facto, to describe it we are already an observer that has arisen from it. Our presence to interrogate its nature necessarily implies that this non-dual pure awareness is in complementarity with the dual, phenomenal universe. Thus complementarity is fundamental in this sense."


"Core principles of the self-organizing universe

The initial emanation of space and time, matter and energy that comprise both the initiating events (Big Bang) of the universe as well as its moment by moment maintenance represent the initiation of duality in contrast to the substratum of non-duality. This represents a complementarity in Bohr’s sense of the term and represents one core principle of Fundamental Awareness, i.e. it is irreducibly present at every scale and from every perspective. One might ask, of course, whether this is truly fundamental because prior to the initiating symmetry break there is, by definition, no ability to assign qualities to the non-dual awareness, including complementarity. However, what pre-exists the initiating symmetry break is also therefore beyond description and, de facto, to describe it we are already an observer that has arisen from it. Our presence to interrogate its nature necessarily implies that this non-dual pure awareness is in complementarity with the dual, phenomenal universe. Thus complementarity is fundamental in this sense."

 

[Soupie]

The Kafatos paper is very challenging. I'm wondering how y'all respond to it. An excerpt :

"Awareness, i.e. it is irreducibly present at every scale and from every perspective. One might ask, of course, whether this is truly fundamental because prior to the initiating symmetry break there is, by definition, no ability to assign qualities to the non-dual awareness, including complementarity. However, what pre-exists the initiating symmetry break is also therefore beyond description and, de facto, to describe it we are already an observer that has arisen from it. Our presence to interrogate its nature necessarily implies that this non-dual pure awareness is in complementarity with the dual, phenomenal universe. Thus complementarity is fundamental in this sense."

What I take from that is along the lines (perhaps) of what the phenomenologists have surmised: that awareness must always be self-awareness. And this implies a duality (awareness + self). And if we start with a duality (a symmetry break) I think a variety of forms/differentiations can follow.

So the notion of pure awareness does not seem to be supported by the phenomenological school.

 

[Constance]

@Soupie, I came back to add another extract to my above post apparently just when you were reading it. Looking forward to hearing your thoughts about Kafatos's ideas tomorrow. It's dawn here and I have to get to bed.

 

[Constance]

What I take from that is along the lines (perhaps) of what the phenomenologists have surmised: that awareness must always be self-awareness. And this implies a duality (awareness + self). And if we start with a duality (a symmetry break) I think a variety of forms/differentiations can follow.

So the notion of pure awareness does not seem to be supported by the phenomenological school.

It might be by Gabriel Marcel, but I haven't read him in any depth. 'Til tomorrow.

 

[smcder]

@Soupie writes

Here is a very crude metaphor in order to "see." (Throwback to our discussion of how we use physical terminology to describe mental processes.)

Imagine (if you can) a background of unbound telesis. Nothing emerges from this background. Something emerges from this background but dissipates. Something emerges from this background that is self-sustaining and ergo able to persist. If it wasn't self-sustaining it wouldn't persist and ergo would fall back into the background of unbound potential. (This is a tautology I believe.)

Imagine if you can)



... can you (can one) ... so imagine? This is a serious question. We are asked to:

Imagine (if you can) a background of unbound telesis. Nothing emerges from this background. Something emerges from this background but dissipates. Something emerges from this background that is self-sustaining and ergo able to persist. If it wasn't self-sustaining it wouldn't persist and ergo would fall back into the background of unbound potential. (This is a tautology I believe.)

If you can imagine this - then I am asking what it is that happens when you imagine it. Do you see pictures? Do you see a field of static - like a television screen off channel? Literally, what image do you get in your head? When you ask the reader to imagine - what is it that you expect him or her to be able to do? As I continue to read I "see" in my head something amorphous coming out of this static and then breaking back down into it .... and then I see something emerging and taking the shape of something maybe more spherical but more definite ...


Imagine that the self-sustaining substrate/process that emerged from the background of UT was consciousness. A crude metaphor might be a uniform clay substrate. (And here you will rightly protest that I am using physical metaphors, but it can't be avoided. We have to use metaphors. I'm not saying consciousness is like physical clay, only using it as a metaphor.) This uniform substrate/process--in order that it exist in the first place must be self interacting, i.e., it must be able to self-sustain itself within the ground state of unbound potential (the potential for nothing and something that is always present, the ground state of what-is).

And here you will rightly protest that I am using physical metaphors, but it can't be avoided. We have to use metaphors.

I don't protest - but I ask why do you think we have to use metaphors? I have heard people say that you have to give up trying to have a picture of things in QM for example and I know that was true for me in mathematics past a certain point. I'm questioning if these metaphors may be misleading or creating a false sense about the way things are - or perhaps there is too much value place on a particular (visual) mode of imagination? You say you are not saying consciousness is like physical clay - but you are, that is what a metaphor is - it has to have some qualities in common with physical clay or you can't use that metaphor. Alternatively, you could simply describe those qualities and drop the metaphor. At this point ... I feel we are moving into "philosophy by proclamation" which just means there may be too much emphasis placed on a way of thinking about something because you are able to form a picture of it.

This clay self-interacts, differentiates, and evolves. Imagine the clay differentiating into various forms. We can assume (better word than conceptualize?) that it does these things but that it does these things in ways unlike those described (and that's an important word here!) in quantum and classical physics.

This seems to be saying that if I assume we start from A, this is what I think or can visualize must happen to get to B - so this is how it must happen. That is why I keep saying we need to be aware of when we are using physical metaphors ... in Calculus, it can be helpful to have a visualization at times, but at others times, you are dealing with abstraction and there isn't really a picture of what's going on ... or the picture you have may lead you astray ... there comes to be formed later a kind of intuition that can guide you but I'm not sure it's exactly metaphorical in nature.

 

[smcder]

We cannot empirically model consciousness emerging from matter. And we can't conceptualize it doing so either, except as brute fact. (For what it's worth, as I've noted, I think the autopoietic model of how a system might evolve to "sense" its environment is just about as damn close as we can get to conceptualizing how conscious experience could emerge from matter.)


I have been mixing my use of model and conceptualize. I apologize for the confusion.

Let me try to make the same point with clearer language:

Consciousness as a fundamental substrate (or at least more fundamental than classical physical reality) may interact with itself and differentiate within itself, but it may do so in ways unlike those described in classical physics.


Here is a very crude metaphor in order to "see." (Throwback to our discussion of how we use physical terminology to describe mental processes.)

Imagine (if you can) a background of unbound telesis. Nothing emerges from this background. Something emerges from this background but dissipates. Something emerges from this background that is self-sustaining and ergo able to persist. If it wasn't self-sustaining it wouldn't persist and ergo would fall back into the background of unbound potential. (This is a tautology I believe.)

Imagine that the self-sustaining substrate/process that emerged from the background of UT was consciousness. A crude metaphor might be a uniform clay substrate. (And here you will rightly protest that I am using physical metaphors, but it can't be avoided. We have to use metaphors. I'm not saying consciousness is like physical clay, only using it as a metaphor.) This uniform substrate/process--in order that it exist in the first place must be self interacting, i.e., it must be able to self-sustain itself within the ground state of unbound potential (the potential for nothing and something that is always present, the ground state of what-is).

This clay self-interacts, differentiates, and evolves. Imagine the clay differentiating into various forms. We can assume (better word than conceptualize?) that it does these things but that it does these things in ways unlike those described (and that's an important word here!) in quantum and classical physics.

Why is described so important? Because at the heart of physics, we don't know why the processes we observe are happening, we are merely describing them. We can importantly make very accurate predictions based off of the patterns we've described, which I don't mean to diminish in any way, but why the described physical laws of the universe are as they are is ultimately a mystery.


I think Velman's book extract was very helpful with this issue.

On the one hand we can think of consciousness as pure, content-less awareness. But wouldn't contentless awareness be nothingness? Even if we say pure awareness is "awareness of awareness" we are inserting a content, a something. An awareness "of" something. A reflexive or self awareness is still an awareness of something. ergo not contentless.

Velmans had said consciousness was a "something its like." If there is a "something" its like, then there can be said to be consciousness.

Awareness of awareness. Awareness of self. Awareness of oneness. Awareness of pure love. Awareness of X.

We can discuss this at length some more if you'd like, but contentless awareness doesn't seem possible to... conceptualize.

So, I submit that the conscious substrate/process that arises from UT must therefore be self-interactive and able to differentiate within itself.

Aware of awareness implies self-interaction and differentiating. Otherwise nothingness.


A metaphor or rough model. As I say, I think the autopoeitic approach is the best I've encountered.


Dealing with the hard problem is nothing to take lightly, haha.

There may be more and more layers of reality! We identify problems with current paradigms and propose paradigms that are more explanatory. The HP, QM, Critical Realism point to a reality not grounded in classical, billiard-ball, macro physics.


Ok. I'll loop back and find the post were you outlined these ideas recently.

@Soupie comments in italics

On the one hand we can think of consciousness as pure, content-less awareness. But wouldn't contentless awareness be nothingness?
Even if we say pure awareness is "awareness of awareness" we are inserting a content, a something. An awareness "of" something. A reflexive or self awareness is still an awareness of something. ergo not contentless.

Velmans had said consciousness was a "something its like." If there is a "something" its like, then there can be said to be consciousness.

Awareness of awareness. Awareness of self. Awareness of oneness. Awareness of pure love. Awareness of X.

We can discuss this at length some more if you'd like, but contentless awareness doesn't seem possible to... conceptualize.

This goes back to the last time we discussed this. The claims of contentless awareness that I know about are from eastern traditions and come from meditative experience. I think those claimants would agree it's not possible to conceptualize nor would they claim they can do so ... but rather that they have experienced it in these states. So the problem I have is rejecting this experience out of hand - without having had it. If you had the experience, then I think you could say something about it or critique it - without that, you could certainly be skeptical or doubtful of the claims but there would be a remedy - which is to pursue that experience for yourself and then you would be in a position to critique it. Is that fair? It seems that is what we would do for any other claim. This division of the experiencer/non-experiencer is a major limitation in the discussion of any kind of mysticism and is why it is generally rejected out of hand by those who haven't experienced it. The majority who do I think find it as convincing as other experiences they've had - it is as real to them - so they are difficult to be argued out of it - and there are in fact in most traditions cautions and rules about sharing these experiences - those who haven't experienced it generally try to approach it from whatever position they come to it with, whatever philosophy they bring to it.

So, I submit that the conscious substrate/process that arises from UT must therefore be self-interactive and able to differentiate within itself.

Aware of awareness implies self-interaction and differentiating. Otherwise nothingness.

Again, this may be where the imagery you are using is getting in the way. We would have to look at specific claims of "contentless awareness" to see but I have a sense that the claimants will not use the same "logic" as you do here, because of their experiences. You would be free to reject those claims or to pursue those experiences in order to critique them from an informed position.

 

[smcder]

Some eastern traditions have a rich "vocabulary" of the imagination - with training in elaborate, sequential visualizations and other sensations - mindfulness of the body and its sensations, for example. The Western tradition is very visual and it took a reconciliation of the Hebrew philosophy (based on the voice and sound) in Neoplatonism to successful marry Christianity into that tradition but this visual tradition is expressed in words and lead the tradition to increasing levels of abstraction (McGilChrist). I can think of a number of exceptions, but I believe they generally lie outside the mainstream, often in the esoteric branches of Western philosophy.

 

[Soupie]

It might be by Gabriel Marcel, but I haven't read him in any depth. 'Til tomorrow.

Hm, Thompson touches on this in his paper above:

Reflexive awareness (self-awareness) and nonduality

"I turn now to Buddhist philosophy. In certain schools of Indian, Chinese, and Tibetan Buddhist philosophy, we also find the view that consciousness or awareness is reflexive (Williams 1998; Yao 2005). The Sanskrit term is svasam ̇ vedana, which has been variously translated as reflexive awareness, self-awareness, and self-cognition. Buddhist philosophical systems that ac- cept this notion explain that it means a cognition’s being aware of itself simultaneously with its awareness of an object, and that this kind of self- awareness or reflexive awareness is nondual, that is, it does not involve any subject/object structure (see Sopa and Hopkins 1976: 78). The analogy or simile often used is that of a light, which in its illumination of objects also illuminates itself (see Williams 1998; Yao 2005)."

 

[Soupie]

At this point ... I feel we are moving into "philosophy by proclamation" which just means there may be too much emphasis placed on a way of thinking about something because you are able to form a picture of it.

Absolutely I am.

There are empirical and logical reasons to doubt that consciousness emerges from physical processes.

There are empirical and logical reasons to believe that consciousness is at an ontological level below physical, classical reality. That physical reality is a subset of conscious reality (conscious experience).

So if consciousness does not emerge/arise from physical processes what is its origin and nature?

I've said that if we cannot use the scientific method (empiricism) to determine the origin and nature of consciousness, then we must rely of phenomenology, philosophy, and mathematics to attempt to get a grip on it.

Obviously there will be major resistance to steering away from empericism. It's dangerous to do so.

But the reality is that consciousness is invisible to empiricism and the scientific method. As powerful as those tools are, it's time to augment them (as many have always done).

So, I'm not suggesting my metaphysical yammerings are going to get anywhere. Those yammering are merely a "hobby" on my part.

But I do think the phenomenologist, theorists/philosophers, and mathematicians have got to jump in and save the empericists.

As I've noted—and I've only come to this conclusion recently as you know—I agree that naive realism is an impediment to progress. We must move beyond the billiard-ball, macro, classical model of the universe given to us phenomenally by the underlying perceptual system, and use phenomenology/meditation, philosophy, and math to identify patterns and relationships that aren't apparent empirically/objectively.

For instance, I think naive realism is an impediment in unifying quantum and classical physics. I don't think physicists have a good grip on which phenomena are "out there" and which phenomena are products of their perceptual apparatus. This is because no objective, scientific models even incorporate consciousness!

Only quantum mechanics has begun to figure consciousness into the equation (and not in the simplistic way that @ufology likes to argue against).

So, yes, I've begun to stumble about for a model I can hold onto that might begin to account for how consciousness could possible be more fundamental than the phenomenal world I experience within consciousness.

 

[smcder]

Absolutely I am.

There are empirical and logical reasons to doubt that consciousness emerges from physical processes.

There are empirical and logical reasons to believe that consciousness is at an ontological level below physical, classical reality. That physical reality is a subset of conscious reality (conscious experience).

So if consciousness does not emerge/arise from physical processes what is its origin and nature?

I've said that if we cannot use the scientific method (empiricism) to determine the origin and nature of consciousness, then we must rely of phenomenology, philosophy, and mathematics to attempt to get a grip on it.

Obviously there will be major resistance to steering away from empericism. It's dangerous to do so.

But the reality is that consciousness is invisible to empiricism and the scientific method. As powerful as those tools are, it's time to augment them (as many have always done).

So, I'm not suggesting my metaphysical yammerings are going to get anywhere. Those yammering are merely a "hobby" on my part.

But I do think the phenomenologist, theorists/philosophers, and mathematicians have got to jump in and save the empericists.

As I've noted—and I've only come to this conclusion recently as you know—I agree that naive realism is an impediment to progress. We must move beyond the billiard-ball, macro, classical model of the universe given to us phenomenally by the underlying perceptual system, and use phenomenology/meditation, philosophy, and math to identify patterns and relationships that aren't apparent empirically/objectively.

For instance, I think naive realism is an impediment in unifying quantum and classical physics. I don't think physicists have a good grip on which phenomena are "out there" and which phenomena are products of their perceptual apparatus. This is because no objective, scientific models even incorporate consciousness!

Only quantum mechanics has begun to figure consciousness into the equation (and not in the simplistic way that @ufology likes to argue against).

So, yes, I've begun to stumble about for a model I can hold onto that might begin to account for how consciousness could possible be more fundamental than the phenomenal world I experience within consciousness.

i think I wasn't trying to make a broad critique of your approach as much as trying to get at what we mean when we say

"imagine this"
"can you imagine ... ?"

"well, i don't know if i can, tell me what you are doing when you imagine that!"

... that sort of thing ... and that we don't have traditions/disciplines of the imagination (which may overlap with what you are saying) ... we don't have a vocabulary of communicating our imaginings - a poetry of science, so to speak ... to others or ourselves, I've said before we fail on imagination, not intelligence ... we don't have a way to evaluate our imaginings - so if we say "I can imagine this" then I want to know what that means exactly for the claimant - what is going on in your head when you say you can do that - if I claim something that someone says is impossible - say "contentless-awareness" - then I should be able to either

1) tell them what that is like
or (more likely)
2) tell them how to pursue the experience and give them indicators to know when they have experienced it

then, if they do, we can compare notes and make fun of others who have not experienced it - which is the hallmark of a true science

 

[Soupie]

for me, it seems about as difficult, well really more difficult to "imagine" a substrate of pure consciousness (its hard to imagine because it has no physical qualities, so I can't "see" it or imagine it as a field or a force or anything else) ... and then to imagine this "differentiating" into various forms ...

It's interesting that you say that because what I'm picking up from the literature is that the deeper physicists dive into "physical matter" the less physical and less material it appears to be.

The Illusion of Matter: Our Physical Material World Isn’t Really Physical At All

"At the turn of the ninetieth century, physicists started to explore the relationship between energy and the structure of matter. In doing so, the belief that a physical, Newtonian material universe that was at the very heart of scientific knowing was dropped, and the realization that matter is nothing but an illusion replaced it. Scientists began to recognize that everything in the Universe is made out of energy.

Quantum physicists discovered that physical atoms are made up of vortices of energy that are constantly spinning and vibrating, each one radiating its own unique energy signature. Therefore, if we really want to observe ourselves and find out what we are, we are really beings of energy and vibration, radiating our own unique energy signature -this is fact and is what quantum physics has shown us time and time again. We are much more than what we perceive ourselves to be, and it’s time we begin to see ourselves in that light. If you observed the composition of an atom with a microscope, you would see a small, invisible tornado like vortex, with a number of infinitely small energy vortices called quarks and photons. These are what make up the structure of the atom. As you focused in closer and closer on the structure of the atom, you would see nothing, you would observe a physical void.(0) The atom has no physical structure, we have no physical structure, physical things really don’t have any physical structure! Atoms are made out of invisible energy, not tangible matter.

It’s quite the conundrum, isn’t it? Our experience tells us that our reality is made up of physical material things, and that our world is an independently existing objective one. Again, what quantum mechanics reveals is that there is no true “physicality” in the universe, that atoms are made of focused vorticies of energy-miniature tornadoes that are constantly popping into and out of existence. The revelation that the universe is not an assembly of physical parts, suggested by Newtonian physics, and instead comes from a holistic entanglement of immaterial energy waves stems from the work of Albert Einstein, Max Planck, and Werner Heisenberg, among others. (0)

Despite the findings of quantum physics many scientists today still cling onto the prevailing matter-oriented worldview, for no good reason at all. As mentioned earlier, these scientists restrict quantum theory’s validity to the subatomic world. If we know that matter isn’t physical, how can we further our scientific discovery by treating it as physical?"

The above is hardly a rigorous source of info, but I've read the same in more rigorous papers. I will look for more formal expressions of this idea.

The point is, you may cringe at my suggestion that a non-physical substrate such as reflexive awareness might differentiate into various forms, but just how a non-physical substrate can differentiate into various forms is just what quantum physicists seem to be grappling with right now.

 

[smcder]

It's interesting that you say that because what I'm picking up from the literature is that the deeper physicists dive into "physical matter" the less physical and less material it appears to be.

The Illusion of Matter: Our Physical Material World Isn’t Really Physical At All

"At the turn of the ninetieth century, physicists started to explore the relationship between energy and the structure of matter. In doing so, the belief that a physical, Newtonian material universe that was at the very heart of scientific knowing was dropped, and the realization that matter is nothing but an illusion replaced it. Scientists began to recognize that everything in the Universe is made out of energy.

Quantum physicists discovered that physical atoms are made up of vortices of energy that are constantly spinning and vibrating, each one radiating its own unique energy signature. Therefore, if we really want to observe ourselves and find out what we are, we are really beings of energy and vibration, radiating our own unique energy signature -this is fact and is what quantum physics has shown us time and time again. We are much more than what we perceive ourselves to be, and it’s time we begin to see ourselves in that light. If you observed the composition of an atom with a microscope, you would see a small, invisible tornado like vortex, with a number of infinitely small energy vortices called quarks and photons. These are what make up the structure of the atom. As you focused in closer and closer on the structure of the atom, you would see nothing, you would observe a physical void.(0) The atom has no physical structure, we have no physical structure, physical things really don’t have any physical structure! Atoms are made out of invisible energy, not tangible matter.

It’s quite the conundrum, isn’t it? Our experience tells us that our reality is made up of physical material things, and that our world is an independently existing objective one. Again, what quantum mechanics reveals is that there is no true “physicality” in the universe, that atoms are made of focused vorticies of energy-miniature tornadoes that are constantly popping into and out of existence. The revelation that the universe is not an assembly of physical parts, suggested by Newtonian physics, and instead comes from a holistic entanglement of immaterial energy waves stems from the work of Albert Einstein, Max Planck, and Werner Heisenberg, among others. (0)

Despite the findings of quantum physics many scientists today still cling onto the prevailing matter-oriented worldview, for no good reason at all. As mentioned earlier, these scientists restrict quantum theory’s validity to the subatomic world. If we know that matter isn’t physical, how can we further our scientific discovery by treating it as physical?"

The above is hardly a rigorous source of info, but I've read the same in more rigorous papers. I will look for more formal expressions of this idea.

The point is, you may cringe at my suggestion that a non-physical substrate such as reflexive awareness might differentiate into various forms, but just how a non-physical substrate can differentiate into various forms is just what quantum physicists seem to be grappling with right now.

No, I just meant it's hard to imagine without using physical metaphors, as you note above:

And here you will rightly protest that I am using physical metaphors, but it can't be avoided. We have to use metaphors.

So ... that's all ... is that why you thought I would "cringe"?

 

[Constance]

It’s quite the conundrum, isn’t it? Our experience tells us that our reality is made up of physical material things, and that our world is an independently existing objective one. Again, what quantum mechanics reveals is that there is no true “physicality” in the universe, that atoms are made of focused vorticies of energy-miniature tornadoes that are constantly popping into and out of existence.

But that is not all that our experience tells us, all that our lived experience makes available to us as 'food for thought'. Otherwise how would whole schools of thought concerning our being and its relationship to Being as an ontological whole have evolved in our species over millenia? How, indeed, would we have been capable of thinking ontologically?

I've long thought that the interactivity and entanglement generated in the quantum substrate begin a habit of interactivity carried forward in the evolution and development of physical forces and the accumulation of interacting physical systems (including the evolution of living species and their increasing capabilities of consciousness and thought). Stars, planets, galaxies are not appearances that we project but parts of the World/Being as a Whole that we are capable of perceiving. The World is not a vapor; major parts of it are materially solid. Nature generates physical being along with our capability of recognizing its physicality and also recognizing that its essence is more than material.

 

[Constance]

“Joseph Kosuth, No Number #6 (On Color, Blue) (1991), neon tubing with argon gas and mercury. In the Chicago Museum of Contemporary Art's permanent collection: "I am only describing language, not explaining anything." (neon on wall, circa 1997, displayed at the Museum of Contemporary Art, Chicago; the original neon is blue) A succint definition of Conceptual art, in "Inquiry into the foundations of the concept 'art', as it has come to mean," given by Joseph Kosuth, requires "a linguistic rather than plastic context."