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Consciousness and the Paranormal — Part 6

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"Wiggle room"? Just to clarify. Hierarchical construct theory identifies distinct hierarchical levels that have emerged and evolve. Each level emerging from the previous, and each level evolving complexities of form. The theory predicts that there must be another hierarchical level that is yet to emerge from the human 'awareness of reality' perspective, and that this level is ... transformative.
Right. What I'm saying; to attempt to use your terms, is that in order to engineer a consciousness equivalent to that of humans, the engineering might need to duplicate the, "distinct hierarchical levels that have emerged and evolved." all the way down to the molecular level in order for it to work, in which case we end up with something that isn't "artificially human" but is human, the only difference being that one might be "engineered" in a lab, while the rest of us are constructed in utero.
 
@Pharoah, I've read your information paper with pleasure and profit. I'm now reading the current version of the HCT paper. Want to discuss both tomorrow or the next day. In the meantime I want to provide you with this link to a paper by Varela that is highly relevant to both of your papers in draft. I've just scanned some of the V paper, but I'm finding great similarities in your ideas and his. The title of the paper is "On Being Autonomous: The Lessons of Natural History for Systems Theory."

http://www.autopoiesis.com/documents/varela 1978.pdf
 
Right. What I'm saying; to attempt to use your terms, is that in order to engineer a consciousness equivalent to that of humans, the engineering might need to duplicate the, "distinct hierarchical levels that have emerged and evolved." all the way down to the molecular level in order for it to work, in which case we end up with something that isn't "artificially human" but is human, the only difference being that one might be "engineered" in a lab, while the rest of us are constructed in utero.
Three points,
1. Indeed, the engineering would need, not to duplicate but to generate processes equivalent to each hierarchical level. Btw, the zombie argument has this idea that you can have the higher level without the lower phenomenal level. Though imaginable, it is not possible. Each level depends on the existence of the lower levels.
2. Though a theoretic possibility, it will not be possible in practice to engineer each hierarchical level. I can't even see how the biochemistry can me mimicked so, at the equivalent of the biochemical level, artificial pre-requisite statuses would have to be instituted artificially to provide the foundation for the next level up. In this way, the higher level would be being conned into an artificial state consciousness... and, importantly, I have no idea if that state would possess a subjective identity or not. It would act as though it did, but it would not be impossible to know for certain whether it did because of the underlying fake biochemistry status.
3. It is not possible to create the artificial level equivalent to the human in the near future (>500 years). The level of phenomenal consciousness (like a fly maybe) is the best we could hope for—so perhaps the implications of not knowing if our artificial fly has a subjective existence does not really matter a great deal (unless it starts fighting back of course).
 
@ufology Yes this (Searle 27'25") is how the reviewer is understanding the observer-dependence/independence distinction. That is probably the way these terms are conceptually understood in philosophy and it is my fault for not clearly debunking their stance and slotting in my own. I thought I made clear in my paper... clearly not:

I argue that any agency (A) that is a unified physical construct (be it living or non-living), reacts to the world (B) in a way that is 'observer-dependent' i.e. its own dynamic construction determines what any given external influence's informational affect and content is going to be following interaction. . . . .


Pharoah, I think I've finally groked the full implications and ramifications of what you are seeking to accomplish with your hierarchical construct theory, and for me the grasp of it {if in fact I've grasped it} has been similar to the world-shifting experience I had when I first understood Heidegger's essays in Poetry, Language, Thought. My understanding of your HCT at present is that you are going to the evolutionary roots of consciousness to demonstrate the stages of the emergence of consciousness and mind from the autopoetic state of primordial life understood phenomenologically. Modern philosophy, both phenomenological and analytical, by attempting to account for consciousness as we experience and know it, have for the most part failed to search out the organic roots of consciousness in primordial life and to mark the evolutionary stages by which living species have developed their self-organization to the point where self-referential awareness becomes increasingly conscious, increasingly differentiating itself from nature, but as MP shows, never detaching itself from nature {though in our time that detachment is the mistaken goal of those who wish to replace our species with an artificial, mechanically engineered, species of 'being'}. Our being is the offspring of nature's being and, in metaphysical terms, of Being itself. We are tied to nature in the nature of our being despite the often alienating achievement of conceptual thinking by our species. We become further alienated in representational thinking, taking our representations for reality. Some of us want to forget the natural Ursprung from which we have originated and evolved, which is to live, as Heidegger said, in "the forgetfulness of being." So we need to reread Hegel (The Phenomenology of Spirit [Geist, Mind] and the subsequent phenomenologists, esp MP, to regain the knowledge of our embeddedness in the natural world despite our standing by degrees outside of it. And to realize, as W. Stevens wrote, that "the spirit comes from the body of the world."


Let me know if I've gone off the rails of your thinking and your goal in HCT, Pharoah. I do think that Varela, Panksepp, and Akins are your colleagues in the project I’m seeing in your paper.
 
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I've rewritten section 3 of my paper to account for the reviewer's comments calling on the following papers for support:
Perception and Reality: Why a Wholly Empirical Paradigm is Needed to Understand Vision
NB: Von Foerster: On Constructing a Reality | MUD
http://www.univie.ac.at/constructivism/EvG/papers/070.1.pdf
all of which I found very engaging.
They might have been linked elsewhere... not sure

Is your new third section incorporated at the link you provided a few days ago?
 
Is your new third section incorporated at the link you provided a few days ago?
@Constance re section 3: No it is not. I need to reread it a few times. I'll put it up on the same link when I am happy with it.
re: #425, I think, in a way, that we have been meeting halfway and that my ideas have become richer for reading some of the links posted on this site and this has been reflected in my attempts at explaining things.
What you say in #425 resonates with my way of thinking and it is nice to hear it voiced from your perspective.

I did first start with Hegel TPoS and dumped it for Heidegger BaT. But what has engaged me most is MP; TSoB is up there on my reading list.
 
re: #425, I think, in a way, that we have been meeting halfway and that my ideas have become richer for reading some of the links posted on this site and this has been reflected in my attempts at explaining things.
What you say in #425 resonates with my way of thinking and it is nice to hear it voiced from your perspective.

Yes, meeting halfway between the perspectives of analytical POM and phenomenology concerning consciousness and mind. I think my response above is clearly moving in a direction you're not yet ready to commit to. Your ship might be temporarily stalled in the cross currents of those approaches, and that might be why the last reviewer felt that you added 'nothing new about consciousness'. I do think the seeds of what is new in this version of HCT still lie semi-dormant in, for example, your use of the term 'proto-concept' and in note 19 in which you write re Searle's approach that "Notably, Searle admits, ‘Perhaps there might be more biologically primitive Intentional states which do not require a Network, or perhaps not even a Background.’" Panksepp clarifies the required direction to be taken -- through the thick of the evolution of consciousness -- in this paper: "A Synopsis of Affective Neuroscience — Naturalizing the Mammalian Mind" introducing three additional papers under the heading of "The Philosophical Implications of Affective Neuroscience," presented at a Cognitive Science Society conference in 2010.

https://www.psychologytoday.com/sites/default/files/attachments/109303/jcs-articlefinal.pdf

Here are the concluding paragraphs of the Panksepp paper in which the subjects of the following three papers are described:

". . . In sum, many of the scientific dilemmas of the twentieth century, including the Computational Theory of Mind advocated by many cognitive scientists, were created by situating all of consciousness (i.e. the capacity of have ‘awareness’ of experiences) just at the very top of the brain, especially the sensory-perceptual and executive regions of the brain. The instinctual-emotional action apparatus, the source of raw emotional experiences, that helps weave together a foundational form of organismic coherence (perhaps a core-SELF: Panksepp, 1998b) was provided no role in consciousness. That view prevailed, and was well-tolerated, in preference to the ever increasing empirical evidence during the second half of the twentieth century that affective consciousness (Panksepp, 2007) — perhaps the primal form of ‘coreconsciousness’ (Panksepp, 2010) — had evolutionarily ripened into experiential states within the ancient subcortical brain networks. These foundational basic emotional and motivational urges of all mammals, which monitor vital life qualities, are the foundation of mind. If destroyed, the rest collapses (Bailey and Davis, 1942; 1943).

The tragedy of twentieth-century behaviourism — penetrating deeply into the psychological, cognitive, and social sciences — lies in a disciplinary failure to confront the deeper evolutionary psychological nature of organisms. Without an empirically justifiable vision of their affective lives, we cannot have a coherent understanding of the higher reaches of our own minds. It is now clear that modern brain imaging has seen the glimmers of basic emotions in PET and fMRI images (Damasio et al., 2000; Vytal and Hamann, 2010), even though those tools, especially fMRI, are typically not well suited to visualizing the more ancient primal emotional networks coursing through upper brainstem (mesencephalic and diencephalic) regions. We should also recall that tools like fMRI detect small percentage changes of overall brain activity, with most of it remaining unseen, almost as if it were ‘dark energy’ (Raichle, 2010a,b; Zhang and Raichle, 2010). We will need better Hubble-type mind scopes before we can metabolically envision the more ancient recesses of brain functions that evolved much longer ago. The marginalization of affective states in the shared origins of human mental life in other organisms, when reversed by better evolutionary epistemologies (Panksepp and Panksepp, 2000; Panksepp, 2009; 2011a,b), will give us more accurate visions of our own nature.

The consequences of such a vision were explored in the following symposium: Rami Gabriel focusing on the consequences of such knowledge for cognitive science, Glennon Curran and Rami Gabriel focusing on the legal implications of the use of neuroscience data in courtroom testimony, and Stephen Asma and Thomas Greif discussing the philosophical implications for our emerging understanding of the ‘core self’ structures deep within the brain. They share visions of how an understanding of ancient regions of our minds may profoundly influence higher cognitive processes in humans. An appreciation of the relevance of affective neuroscience could steer the course of cognitive science toward more naturalistic visions of the foundations of human mind."


I did first start with Hegel TPoS and dumped it for Heidegger BaT. But what has engaged me most is MP; TSoB is up there on my reading list.

I am glad to hear that you're finding MP to be engaging. I do think replacing reference to Heidegger with reference to Hegel's phenomenology of mind (Geist/Spirit) would be a better and more accessible fit, along with presentations of Varela's thinking and of course MP's, which inspired Varela.

I still have problems with your strict categorical separation of levels 2 and 3. The passage from preconceptual, prereflective, consciousness to reflective consciousness enabling linguistic 'conceptualization' is not a sudden leap but a gradual evolution, in our species and in the history of consciousness in our species' forebears. MP, Varela and Thompson, Panksepp, Akins, and others are the thinkers who can be your guides in developing this point (. . . if you do decide to develop it; it's presently implicit but not explicit in what you are writing.)
 
This paper might also be useful:

What affective neuroscience means for science of consciousness
Leonardo Ferreira Almada1, Alfredo Pereira2, Claudia Carrara-Augustenborg3

What affective neuroscience means for science of consciousness Almada LF, Pereira A, Carrara-Augustenborg C - Mens Sana Monogr

Abstract

The field of affective neuroscience has emerged from the efforts of Jaak Panksepp in the 1990s and reinforced by the work of, among others, Joseph LeDoux in the 2000s. It is based on the ideas that affective processes are supported by brain structures that appeared earlier in the phylogenetic scale (as the periaqueductal gray area), they run in parallel with cognitive processes, and can influence behaviour independently of cognitive judgements. This kind of approach contrasts with the hegemonic concept of conscious processing in cognitive neurosciences, which is based on the identification of brain circuits responsible for the processing of (cognitive) representations. Within cognitive neurosciences, the frontal lobes are assigned the role of coordinators in maintaining affective states and their emotional expressions under cognitive control. An intermediary view is the Damasio-Bechara Somatic Marker model, which puts cognition under partial somatic-affective control. We present here our efforts to make a synthesis of these views, by proposing the existence of two interacting brain circuits; the first one in charge of cognitive processes and the second mediating feelings about cognitive contents. The coupling of the two circuits promotes an endogenous feedback that supports conscious processes. Within this framework, we present the defence that detailed study of both affective and cognitive processes, their interactions, as well of their respective brain networks, is necessary for a science of consciousness.
 
"8. Is Phenomenality Essential to Intentionality?

Suppose one rejects both the view that consciousness is explanatorily derived from a more fundamental intentionality, as well as the view that phenomenal character is insufficient for intentionality because it is a matter of raw inward feel. It seems one might then press farther, and argue for what Flanagan (1992) calls ‘consciousness essentialism’ — the view that the phenomenal character of experience is not only sufficient for various forms of intentionality, but necessary also.

This type of thesis needs careful formulation. It does not necessarily commit one to a Cartesian (or Brentanian or Sartrean) claim that all states of mind are conscious — a total denial of the reality of the unconscious. A more qualified thesis does seem desirable. Though Freud's waning prestige has weakened tendencies to assume that he had somehow demonstrated the reality of unconscious intentionality, the rise of cognitive science has created a new climate of educated opinion that also takes elaborate non-conscious mental machinations for granted—the ‘cognitive unconscious.’ Even if we do not acquiesce in this view, we do (and long have) appealed to explanations of human behavior that recognize some sort of intentional states other than phenomenally conscious experiences and thoughts. . . . ."


9. Four Views of the Consciousness-Intentionality Relationship

The preceding discussion has conveyed some of the complexities and potential ambiguities in talk of ‘consciousness’ (Section 1) and ‘intentionality’ (Section 2) that must be appreciated if one is to resolve questions about the relationship between consciousness and intentionality with any clarity. Brief surveys of relevant aspects of phenomenological (Section 3) and analytic (Section 4) traditions have brought out some shared areas of interest, namely: the relationship of consciousness to reflexivity and ‘self-directed’ intentionality; efforts to distinguish between conceptual and non-conceptual (or sensory) forms of intentionality; and a concern with the extent to which the character of either conscious experience or intentional states of mind is essentially ‘world-involving.’ These concerns were seen to bear on attempts to account for consciousness in terms of intentionality in Sections 5 and 6, and also on questions that arise even if those attempts are rejected — questions regarding the separability of phenomenal consciousness and intentionality (Section 7). In Section 8 attention was given to views that, in some sense, reverse the order of explanation proposed by intentionalizing views of consciousness, and take the facts of consciousness to explain the facts of intentionality. Now it is possible to step back and distinguish four general views of the consciousness-intentionality relationship discernable in the philosophical positions canvassed above, as follows.

  1. Consciousness is explanatorily derived from intentionality.
  2. Consciousness is underived and separable from intentionality.
  3. Consciousness is underived but also inseparable from intentionality.
  4. Consciousness is underived from, inseparable from, and essential to intentionality. . . . . ."
Consciousness and Intentionality (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
 
Three points,
1. Indeed, the engineering would need, not to duplicate but to generate processes equivalent to each hierarchical level. Btw, the zombie argument has this idea that you can have the higher level without the lower phenomenal level. Though imaginable, it is not possible. Each level depends on the existence of the lower levels.
2. Though a theoretic possibility, it will not be possible in practice to engineer each hierarchical level. I can't even see how the biochemistry can me mimicked so, at the equivalent of the biochemical level, artificial pre-requisite statuses would have to be instituted artificially to provide the foundation for the next level up. In this way, the higher level would be being conned into an artificial state consciousness... and, importantly, I have no idea if that state would possess a subjective identity or not. It would act as though it did, but it would not be impossible to know for certain whether it did because of the underlying fake biochemistry status.
3. It is not possible to create the artificial level equivalent to the human in the near future (>500 years). The level of phenomenal consciousness (like a fly maybe) is the best we could hope for—so perhaps the implications of not knowing if our artificial fly has a subjective existence does not really matter a great deal (unless it starts fighting back of course).
The problem I see there is with the phrase, "artificial state of consciousness". There either is or isn't consciousness. There is no "artificial"; other than perhaps, in the sense that it might have been intended to replicate human consciousness, in which case, semantically, it might be "artificially human". However that view is rather weak because consciousness cannot be a consciousness of something else.

So basically, the switch is either on or off, and if it's on, as you have pointed out, it is autologous, and therefore it has it's own unique existence, and consequently it's own claim to continued existence, justice, ethics, and all the rest. This is a huge issue. It's why we shouldn't really be messing around with it. But eventually I suppose someone is going to invent their version of Frankenstein, or the robots will revolt, or something along those lines, and it will all have come about in the name of science and good intentions I'm sure. Nobody wants to admit that they're just playing God.


Hey what happened to smcder?
 
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The problem I see there is with the phrase, "artificial state of consciousness". There either is or isn't consciousness. There is no "artificial"; other than perhaps, in the sense that it might have been intended to replicate human consciousness, in which case, semantically, it might be "artificially human". However that view is rather weak because consciousness cannot be a consciousness of something else.

So basically, the switch is either on or off, and if it's on, as you have pointed out, it is autologous, and therefore it has it's own unique existence, and consequently it's own claim to continued existence, justice, ethics, and all the rest. This is a huge issue. It's why we shouldn't really be messing around with it. But eventually I suppose someone is going to invent their version of Frankenstein, or the robots will revolt, or something along those lines, and it will all have come about in the name of science and good intentions I'm sure. Nobody wants to admit that they're just playing God.


Hey what happened to smcder?
I am 90% with you on this... but it supposes that the theory and the application are are there is to existence and that assumption should never be taken at face value. Personally, I will always leave more to existence than meets the theoretical eye. I always think of dark energy and dark matter in this respect which remind us that we have only a bit of an idea about a fraction of what there is.
Some will argue one way and others the other about an artificially constructed entity that has the hierarchy in place that would suggest it possesses phenomenal qualitative experiences and therefore a subjective identity. I would not commit to either position... I don't see the point to doing so either.
 
I am 90% with you on this... but it supposes that the theory and the application are are there is to existence and that assumption should never be taken at face value. Personally, I will always leave more to existence than meets the theoretical eye.
I might need some clarification on your view. Mine seems to be different. Basically, If there is something, it cannot, not exist; consciousness included. There can only be different contexts of existence in which whatever we happen to be speaking of reside. In the case of consciousness, although it is experientially subjective, it is ontologically objective. In other words, it exists in people entirely separate from each other, and provides each with their own unique experience. Therefore there can be no artificiality. It either is or it isn't.
I always think of dark energy and dark matter in this respect which remind us that we have only a bit of an idea about a fraction of what there is.
At this point Dark Energy and Dark Matter are mathematical variables used to balance out theoretical cosmological models. Existence as a theoretical construct, and existence as an objective reality are two entirely different concepts. There is no question that consciousness exists as an objective reality, therefore it cannot be artificial in any sense other than as a semantic convenience ( as previously described ).
Some will argue one way and others the other about an artificially constructed entity that has the hierarchy in place that would suggest it possesses phenomenal qualitative experiences and therefore a subjective identity. I would not commit to either position... I don't see the point to doing so either.
That position implies that you don't see an important distinction between a conscious entity and a box of gears that can both perform the same actions. If true, that's a little disturbing. On the other hand, if you're saying that if we can't tell the difference, then we should err on the side of caution and grant both equal status, then we're wasting an opportunity to exploit a powerful material asset. So either way, there is definitely a point to taking a stand on one side of the fence or the other. The problem of course remains, how do we tell the difference?

I suggest that your sort of ground-up approach combined with my sort of top-down approach might be a way to advance that endeavor. The problem of course being, that if it turns out that we can engineer consciousness, then we've got way bigger problems to address. I just don't know that it's a great idea. It's a huge risk. Perhaps with great rewards. But also with serious responsibility.
 
Here is a review by Evan Thompson of a recent book relevant to our discussions:

Havi Carel and Darian Meacham (eds.), Phenomenology and Naturalism: Examining the Relationship between Human Experience and Nature, Cambridge University Press, 2013, 341pp. $39.00 (pbk), ISBN 9781107699052

Phenomenology and Naturalism: Examining the Relationship between Human Experience and Nature // Reviews // Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews // University of Notre Dame

A clarifying extract from Thompson's review:

". . .This somewhat disparate collection concerns the difficult relationship between phenomenology and naturalism. Although the editors state in their introduction that "phenomenology," as understood in the volume, refers to the style and method of doing philosophy that originated with Edmund Husserl and was carried forward in different ways by Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, three of the fourteen essays (by James Lenman, Alison Assiter, and Iain Hamilton Grant, respectively) make little or no mention of phenomenology defined in this way, though they do concern various ontological and ethical issues about the relationship between human experience and the natural world. "Naturalism," too, is understood in a variety of ways. Given the heterogeneity of the essays, it will not be possible to discuss them all here. Instead, my focus will be on those essays that examine the relationship between naturalism and phenomenology in its broadly Husserlian and Heideggerian senses.

It will be useful to have in hand a forceful form of naturalism. "Scientific naturalism" can be defined as the view that science provides the best account of reality. The view has an ontological component and a methodological component (Papineau 2009). The ontological component is physicalism, the thesis that everything that exists, including the mind, is completely physical. The methodological component is the thesis that the methods of empirical science give science a general and final authority about the world, and therefore science should be epistemically privileged over all other forms of investigation. Scientific naturalism is a philosophical thesis, not a thesis belonging to any of the empirical sciences themselves. Although some scientists may espouse scientific naturalism, it is not built into the actual practice of empirical science. Moreover, when a scientist gives voice to scientific naturalism, she or he no longer speaks just as a scientist. Dan Zahavi quotes Husserl to make this point:

'When it is actually natural science that speaks, we listen gladly and as disciples. But it is not always natural science that speaks when natural scientists are speaking; and it assuredly is not when they are talking about 'philosophy of Nature' and 'epistemology as a natural science.' (Husserl 1982, p. 39, quoted by Zahavi, p. 31).

Phenomenology, understood as transcendental philosophy (Husserl, Merleau-Ponty), fundamental ontology (Heidegger), or existential analysis (Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty), stands opposed to scientific naturalism, especially its methodological component. Phenomenologists generally argue that naturalism overlooks and cannot account for the necessary conditions of its own possibility. For example, as Zahavi and Dermot Moran explain, Husserl argues that naturalistic treatments of consciousness as a biological or psychological property of certain organisms overlook and cannot account for the transcendental standing of consciousness as a necessary condition of possibility for any entity to appear in whatever way it does and with whatever meaning it has. Husserl (1970) also argues that scientific naturalism presupposes and overlooks the "life-world" as a transcendental structure of intersubjective understanding, without which science would not be possible. Moran explains the phenomenological concept of the life-world as Husserl presented it. The concept also plays a significant role in Matthew Ratcliffe's contribution, which argues in an original way that the intelligibility of science presupposes the life-world, yet scientific naturalism remains oblivious to the life-world's existential and epistemological primacy.

Another way to sharpen the issue between phenomenology and naturalism is to draw on Heidegger's concept of "world" (Heidegger 1962). By "world" Heidegger means neither the totality of things or states of affairs nor the being of that totality as nature, but the everyday world as the place in which we find ourselves and as an existential structure of our being (Being in Time, Part One: II-III). We exist as "being-in-the-world," which means, among other things, that we always find ourselves inhabiting a "space of meaning" (Crowell 2001) that we ourselves create. When we think scientifically of the universe or nature as containing our world, we are not thinking of the world in the proper philosophical sense as the space of meaning in which anything is intelligible. When we think of the world in this philosophical way, however, then we have to reverse the formulation and say that the universe or nature is within the world (Heidegger 1982, p. 165), for it is always within the world that the universe or nature is disclosed to us. In this way, the world as the space of meaning has priority in the order of philosophical inquiry and understanding over the universe as represented by empirical science. As Havi Carel and Darian Meacham state in their "Editors' Introduction," "whereas naturalism takes objectivity as its point of departure, phenomenology asks how objectivity is constituted in the first place" (p. 3).

We can now state the objection that phenomenology makes to the methodological component of scientific naturalism. Phenomenology charges that scientific naturalism is oblivious to the priority of the world as the space of meaning and does not recognize the need for specifically philosophical methods, especially transcendental and existential phenomenological ones, for investigating and understanding it."
 
I might need some clarification on your view. Mine seems to be different. Basically, If there is something, it cannot, not exist; consciousness included. There can only be different contexts of existence in which whatever we happen to be speaking of reside. In the case of consciousness, although it is experientially subjective, it is ontologically objective. In other words, it exists in people entirely separate from each other, and provides each with their own unique experience. Therefore there can be no artificiality. It either is or it isn't.

At this point Dark Energy and Dark Matter are mathematical variables used to balance out theoretical cosmological models. Existence as a theoretical construct, and existence as an objective reality are two entirely different concepts. There is no question that consciousness exists as an objective reality, therefore it cannot be artificial in any sense other than as a semantic convenience ( as previously described ).

That position implies that you don't see an important distinction between a conscious entity and a box of gears that can both perform the same actions. If true, that's a little disturbing. On the other hand, if you're saying that if we can't tell the difference, then we should err on the side of caution and grant both equal status, then we're wasting an opportunity to exploit a powerful material asset. So either way, there is definitely a point to taking a stand on one side of the fence or the other. The problem of course remains, how do we tell the difference?

I suggest that your sort of ground-up approach combined with my sort of top-down approach might be a way to advance that endeavor. The problem of course being, that if it turns out that we can engineer consciousness, then we've got way bigger problems to address. I just don't know that it's a great idea. It's a huge risk. Perhaps with great rewards. But also with serious responsibility.
@ufology On dark matter: I thought that observationally, the stars on the outer parts of a spiral galaxy are travelling way to fast it one calculates the gravitational effects of the observables. It is a straightforward observation that there is a heck of a lot of mass unaccounted for which shapes spiral galaxies.
Similarly, one might think of the observable and experienced conscious entity as being the phenomenal... but I am of the view that there must additionally be an unobservable noumenal consciousness. So it is not so much whether consciousness exists but what it exists from and to given that all we can conceive of is the phenomenal. A lot of what we see and assume is not what there is.
Another way of looking at this is to acknowledge that Newtonian physics demonstrates application and accuracy. However, it is not so much that it is wrong, but that the picture is incomplete.
I think that an explanation of phenomenal consciousness is not as complete a picture as I would want it to be. So if an artificial mechanism modelled on HCT created artificial phenomenal consciousness, I think there is some wriggle room to say that its subjective identity might be of a type that is not instituted by universals and therefore might not possess noumenal content and all that could go with that. It's just wriggle room... Look, @ufology... I am just playing here with possibilities. I am very unsatisfied by an objective explanation of the subjective.
Another way of looking at it is that philosophers are like blind people with white sticks submersed at the bottom of the deepest ocean trying to fathom out what the world above the surface might be like.
The thing is, a naturally acquired physiology is qualitatively relevant according to HCT. An artificial construct of this would falsify the qualitative relevance of the mechanisms. Of the back of that you could then have it 'organically' modifying its behaviours to satisfy its artificially constructed affective states and, in doing so, possessing an artificially derived phenomenal consciousness. But I am not sure that that state counts as identical in type with a naturally acquired phenomenal consciousness. Therefore, it is questionable whether it would truly possess a subjective identity. Even if it were to then possess the next hierarchical level equivalent to human awareness of phenomenal consciousness, I don't know... It would say and speak as a human might, although its phenomenal experiences about which it could speak would be most likely impoverished. It would be a grotesque monster of the mind.

@Constance you said "I still have problems with your strict categorical separation of levels 2 and 3."
I think there is a lot to be said on this. As a starter,
I maintain that the levels are separate. However:
If there are a bunch of level 2 apes, I am not saying that one of them became a level 3 ape and so too all its offspring and... cazam!! the level 3 category arrived and the hominid lineage was born. No...there is a gradual transition.
Think of the emerging level 3 as impoverished. But the potential survival benefits are great and they require physiological changes to implement. What happens then, is that the physiological makeup of emerging level 3 creatures fills the void created by the potential benefits: it is the potential of an impoverished level 3—the realisation of the existence of phenomenal consciousness—that drives cerebral expansion and other physiological adaptations... the physiological adaptations fill in the void created by the potential. And this takes time. As the physiologies catch up (quickly in evolutionary terms over thousands of years) so too the level 3 becomes less impoverished and this then further fuels the physiological, cultural, social explosion etc.
Take for example language. An individual's dawning realisation of its phenomenal existence cannot be vocalised until the creature possesses the necessary musculature in the tongue and lips. It gives it a go and tries various grunts and gestures. But the potential benefits of improved musculature are very great. So there is a survival precedent to fill the potentiality void and evolve musculatures and specialised cognitive functions that facilitate the desire to communication about the realisation of phenomenal existence.
Of course, the same applies to every level and to the next level that is yet to emerge. There is a delaying catch up before the explosive potential consequences can reach maturity.
 
@ufology On dark matter: I thought that observationally, the stars on the outer parts of a spiral galaxy are travelling way to fast it one calculates the gravitational effects of the observables. It is a straightforward observation that there is a heck of a lot of mass unaccounted for which shapes spiral galaxies.
The existence of Dark Matter is inferred based on current astronomical and cosmological models and current mathematical constructs related to them. Observation plays a part in constructing the current model of what appears to be going on out there, but dark matter has never been observed, and assuming it's there may be wrong. It may be the case that the current assumptions are in error instead.

Perhaps the math isn't uniformly applicable throughout the universe as is currently believed. Maybe there are other reasons. Those who clung to the geocentric model used observation as well, and constructed elaborated models demonstrating how it all worked, but there was always some niggling little inconsistency, until finally they had to accept that things were different and had to abandon their models. In contrast, we don't have to make assumptions about consciousness. We already know it's real.

Similarly, one might think of the observable and experienced conscious entity as being the phenomenal... but I am of the view that there must additionally be an unobservable noumenal consciousness. So it is not so much whether consciousness exists but what it exists from and to given that all we can conceive of is the phenomenal. A lot of what we see and assume is not what there is.
Then the issue of the existence of consciousness is no longer a factor. If there is consciousness then it must exist, just as if there is dark matter it must also exist. We have sufficient proof for the former and insufficient proof for the latter.
Another way of looking at this is to acknowledge that Newtonian physics demonstrates application and accuracy. However, it is not so much that it is wrong, but that the picture is incomplete.
I think that an explanation of phenomenal consciousness is not as complete a picture as I would want it to be. So if an artificial mechanism modelled on HCT created artificial phenomenal consciousness, I think there is some wriggle room to say that its subjective identity might be of a type that is not instituted by universals and therefore might not possess noumenal content and all that could go with that. It's just wriggle room... Look, @ufology... I am just playing here with possibilities. I am very unsatisfied by an objective explanation of the subjective.
Perhaps, depending on how you look at it, "universals and noumenal content" aren't required. But even if we assume they are because in your view they constitute something requisite in our own consciousness, either the generated construct will have it or it won't and therefore it either will or will not have consciousness. Again, there's no in-between.
Another way of looking at it is that philosophers are like blind people with white sticks submersed at the bottom of the deepest ocean trying to fathom out what the world above the surface might be like.
The thing is, a naturally acquired physiology is qualitatively relevant according to HCT. An artificial construct of this would falsify the qualitative relevance of the mechanisms. Of the back of that you could then have it 'organically' modifying its behaviours to satisfy its artificially constructed affective states and, in doing so, possessing an artificially derived phenomenal consciousness. But I am not sure that that state counts as identical in type with a naturally acquired phenomenal consciousness. Therefore, it is questionable whether it would truly possess a subjective identity. Even if it were to then possess the next hierarchical level equivalent to human awareness of phenomenal consciousness, I don't know... It would say and speak as a human might, although its phenomenal experiences about which it could speak would be most likely impoverished. It would be a grotesque monster of the mind.
You're sort of saying the same thing I was a few posts back where I said that the materials and engineering may have to be replicated all the way down to the molecular level in order for an engineered consciousness to work. Again, if it's modeled on humans, such a construct wouldn't be "artificially human", it would be human, only built in a lab rather than in utero, and that would seem to be a rather pointless exercise given our natural ability to replicate. Any potential benefit on that level would not be to create new human consciousness, but to repair the circuitry in damaged humans that gives rise to our consciousness.

Engineered consciousness for a non-human entity would require that we first identify the carrier. So far this search has proven futile. However it may not remain that way indefinitely. I believe that those who are exploring the idea that the carrier of consciousness is a physical field generated by the brain-body system will eventually be able to detect and map it. There are already brain scan maps indicating where it is located within the brain, but those scans aren't detecting consciousness directly. It's sort of like your dark matter analogy. It's inferred that it must be there, but it's not directly observable.

I return once more to the magnetic field analogy. It took a long time for humans to discover magnetic fields, but we now can detect and reproduce them in a variety of extremely complex ways. Assuming that we can find the equivalent of iron filings around a magnet for a consciousness field, then the carrier will have been nailed down, and a new frontier in consciousness studies and technology will bloom. This is where your HCT could come in very handy, because logically it should be pointing us in the right direction, and it may even lead to the emergence of the carrier. We might even call that carrier ( field or whatever it is ) the bridge between the objective and the subjective worlds.
 
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